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War, reform and state -building in Brazil and in the United States: Slavery, emancipation and decision -making processes in the Paraguayan and civil wars (1861--1870)

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WAR, REFORM AND STATE-BUILDING IN BRAZIL AND IN THE UNITED STATES
Slavery, Emancipation and Decision-Making Processes in the Paraguayan and Civil Wars (1861-1870)

BY

Vitor Izecksohn

Submitted to the University of New Hampshire
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For Arminda and Júlia

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Dissertations as wars are easy to begin and hard to end. In this case even the beginning was rather difficult.

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I hope destiny will reward each of the persons who helped me develop this dissertation on the most varied ways. They know who they are and how important they are.

I hope destiny will reward each of the persons who helped me develop this dissertation on the most varied ways. They know who they are and how important they are.

Gracias a la vida; que me ha dado tanto.

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Abstract

WAR REFORM AND STATE-BUILDING IN BRAZIL AND IN THE UNITED STATES
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by

Vitor Izecksohn

University of New Hampshire, May, 2001

The present dissertation undertakes a comparative-historical analysis of the impact of the American Civil War and the Paraguayan War on the American and the Brazilian populations. It investigates how both war's dynamics interfered with the social orders existent in both countries. It underlines the impact of recruitment to show how the pronounced growth of each national state during wartime interfered with the lives and customs of the populations subjected to the draft.

War mobilization is always a dramatic event in any society. Increasing government intervention during wartime normally leads to a temporary invasion of local prerogatives through recruitment and mobilization. The remarkable political centralization established during these processes frequently resulted in a reduction of local autonomy. Many of these problems were similar in both countries although they found very different solutions in the postwar period. The long-term results were very dissimilar, both for the patterns of state organization

and for the place of racial and socially oppressed groups. These solutions affected the distribution of power, the place of the races and the historical memory of war events in the decades following the ends of the two wars.

Introduction

This dissertation has its origins in my earlier MA thesis on the professionalization of the Brazilian Army. That work investigated the impact of the Paraguayan War on the Brazilian officer corps. I analyzed the reconstruction of the Brazilian military bureaucracy in the light of the war efforts. Warfare in Brazil provided army professional cadres with a corporate identity and a consistent discourse about the nation. That development widened previously existent fissures between civilian and military authorities. These differences were increased by the complaints and recriminations raised after the war by veterans who felt abandoned by the government.[1]

An important question raised but not answered by that earlier work concerned the failure of the war mobilization to provide for an improved life for those Brazilians, freed slaves and poor whites, who constituted the bulk of the Imperial army. Although slavery was seriously damaged by the conditions that the war created, social segregation survived the enormous national effort.

In the long run, the war's results were detrimental to the stability of political institutions and to social reform.

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[1] Vitor Izecksohn, "O Cerne da Discórdia. A Guerra do Paraguai e o Núcleo Profissional do Exército," MA thesis, IUPERJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1992.

Military protests did not bring broad transformations in the structure of Brazilian society. That society remained very hierarchical, even after the abolition of slavery and the proclamation of a republic at the end of 1880s.

I decided that it would be necessary to reconsider the issues of state formation and the military experience during the war in the light of slavery and social stratification. Thus, slavery and collective action should be central elements in any discussion about war mobilization, mainly because military service in Brazil, during the 19th century, was viewed as a menial task, confined to the poor, the black, and the social undesirables. The problem of citizenship was not central in the military organization, although today's military discourse in Brazil presents the institution as widely integrative.

I felt, consequently, the need to compare conditions in Brazil to those present in another country, where the solutions for similar problems had been supposedly different from those found in the Empire. My expectation was that many of the problems concerning the operation of state structures and political systems could be better observed in a comparative context, making the historical specificity of social structures more apparent for both countries. I decided to measure the Brazilian war experience against that of the United States, thus examining the junctures where the slave and free sections of each country intersected with the state bureaucracy, as well as connecting individual experiences with large social processes. I believed such a strategy could provide

fertile ground for more encompassing conclusions by breaking the parochial limits of national boundaries.

The present dissertation undertakes a comparative-historical analysis of the impact of the American Civil War and the Paraguayan War on the American and the Brazilian populations. It investigates how both wars' dynamics interfered with the social orders existent in both countries. It underlines the impact of recruitment to show how the pronounced growth of each national state during wartime interfered with the lives and customs of the populations subjected to the draft. War mobilization is always a dramatic event in any society. Increasing government intervention during wartime normally leads to a temporary invasion of local prerogatives through recruitment and mobilization. The remarkable political centralization established during these processes frequently resulted in a reduction of local autonomy, a process Max Weber defined as the "monopolization of the means of coercion."[2]

Military service can be seen as a civic duty, but it is also an obligation that restricts individual liberties. It means the acceptance of the nation, as a primary subject of loyalty, above the family and other groups. This acceptance contributes to the internalization of public values, but it also raises questions

[2] Max Weber defined the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory." Weber was writing before Leon Trotsky, who declared at the Brest-Litovsky conference that "Every State is founded on force." The use of the term "claims," by Weber, suggests that modern states did not completely achieve this monopoly. See "Politics as a Vocation" in H. H. Gert and C Wright Mills (eds.) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 78.

connected to the ideological and social divisions present in societies subjected to war. In the advent of a total war, whose individual liberties should be sacrificed first? Whose class should contribute more to the war effort? How was such interference perceived?

This study advances many themes that were central to earlier research: the expansion of citizenship, the different national projects, the place of slavery in face of the patriotic feelings raised by war. However, it focuses on the impact of war and of state expansion on those who served or who were otherwise more affected by the large mobilization of troops. It also discusses how national authorities responded to social protests emerging from wartime tension.[3]

The comparative analysis of military enlistment may provide a means to overcome some of the problems that afflict the study of collective action and bureaucratic organization in the case of a single nation. By confronting evidence from one case with that from another, it allows us to evaluate these national trajectories from different perspectives. It can provide fertile ground for deeper insights to come. Can the army provide an avenue of social mobility for disadvantaged people? If yes, then, on what grounds can social demands for freedom and equality enter the military discourse?

Many of these problems were similar in both countries, although they found different solutions in the postwar period. The long-term results were very

[3] In this approach the role of military officers is to some extent. They are focused on only when their decisions affected the sectors of the population targeted by recruitment.

dissimilar, both for the patterns of state organization and for the place of racial and socially oppressed groups. These solutions affected the distribution of power, the place of the races, and the historical memory of war events in the decades following the ends of the two wars.

The Role of Comparisons

Brazil and the United States have been compared in several studies. There is however no consensus on the best approach to comparative research. The historian's concern for specificity, particularity, and ambiguity, focusing on the developments of singular groups instead of on large processes, has limited the growth of this field in the last thirty years. As George M. Fredrickson underlined some years ago, "there is no firm agreement on what comparative history is or how it should be done."[4]

Existing comparisons between Brazil and the United States are centered on various subjects, embracing both historical processes and political institutions. A first methodological problem of these comparisons is that Brazil has most often been included as part of a larger group, the Latin American countries. This classification diluted continental cultural diversity by subsuming all countries into a single pattern of national organization. Richard Morse, one of the critics of this classification, pointed out that the concept of Latin America - diffused by Napoleon III's foreign policies – covers over the profound diversity

[4] George M. Fredrickson, "Comparative History," in Michael Kammen, The Past Before Us. Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). This limitation

among states and societies, ignoring the distinctions between Dutch, French, Hispanic, Portuguese, and British Cultures.[5]

Historical comparisons have usually been framed to give account of particular institutions. One of the pivotal themes in the comparative literature about Brazil and the United States has been slavery. Post-Second-World-War studies emphasized the influence of each country's political culture on the creation of different patterns of slavery. These studies have provided one of the richest multidisciplinary branches of historical analysis involving historians from many countries. Emphasis here will be given to the American branch of this group.[6]

In American historiography, Frank Tannenbaum opened the debate in 1947, arguing for the importance of political culture in the creation of distinct patterns of slavery. Tannenbaum was the first to observe systematically the comparative impact of cultural and institutional traditions in the shaping of master-slave relations. According to Tannenbaum, Latin American slavery was milder than British American because the slave was recognized as a Christian. Slavery in Latin America was marked by the previous experience of slavery in

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is not particular to the Brazilian-American comparisons. It encompasses the current state of comparative analysis in the discipline.

[5] Richard Morse, El Espejo de Prospero (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1982), especially p. 8.

[6] There were, of course, studies produced before the Second World War, the most important of which are, Manoel de Oliveira Lima, The Evolution of Brazil Compared with that of Spanish and Anglo-Saxon America (Stanford: 1914), H. B. Alexander, "Brazilian and United States Slavery Compared," in Journal of Negro History, VII, 1922, pp. 349-464, and Mary M. Williams, "The Treatment of Slaves in the Brazilian Empire: a Comparison with the United States," Journal of the

the Iberian Peninsula and the contact with the Moors, by the Catholic tradition of these countries, and by the existence of a juridical tradition regulating slavery. He asserted that Catholicism mediated the master-slave relation, creating a pattern of social life that was more tolerant and that allowed the slave to develop a "moral personality," a concept central to his thesis. The moral personality provided for a less traumatic transition from slave to free man in Latin America. This transition was not tensionless but permitted some slave groups to achieve real social mobility in spite of color.

Tannenbaum's comparisons encompassed institutions like the Church and the state, and argued that both the Law and the Church defended the slave in Latin America. In contrast to this "mild" environment, the combined effects of Protestantism, individualism, capitalism, and localism in British America accentuated the separation of races. This circumstance degraded the position of blacks after abolition because slaves were considered as chattel, not as persons. They were subjected to strong prejudice even after gaining freedom. Anglo-American institutions and culture, based on decentralized political government and lacking both the corporate constraints of Catholicism and a judicial tradition regulating the relations with slaves, resulted in a harsher variant of slavery.

After comparing the two variants of slavery, Tannenbaum explained the peaceful path to abolition and easy incorporation of the freedmen into the

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Negro History, XV, 1930, pp. 313-336. But these studies did not inaugurate a systematic debate on the issue.

national community in Latin America. In the United States, on the contrary, emancipation required a civil war, and the freedmen continued to suffer severe disabilities.

Tannenbaum relied heavily on the pioneer work of Gilberto Freire and abandoned the ethnocentric conceptions of progress prevalent in most American historiography. His Slave and Citizen broke new ground in historical research because it presented alternative parameters to evaluate concepts such as "national development" and "social order." Tannenbaum emphasized the consequences of slavery for the establishment of divergent patterns of social order in both countries, advocating the Latin American "open" pattern of race relations as superior to American segregation.

However, Tannenbaum's influential comparisons overestimated the impact of cultural and institutional factors in the definition of the slave's status and moral personality, and his excessive concern with ideological and institutional traditions in the shaping of slave societies and race relations also led to a neglect of the differences in the social structure of the free communities which coexisted after the end of slavery. In Stanley Elkins's Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life, this vision received a more sophisticated conceptual framework through the use of social theory, psychology, and anthropology. Elkins maintained that slavery was much more oppressive in British America than in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies and stressed the psychological impact of the capitalist nature of the North American

slave plantation on slaves. The development of the plantation within a context of unopposed capitalism meant that economic considerations were not restrained by prior arrangements and institutions, because, "With the full development of the plantation there was nothing, so far as [the planter's] interests were concerned, to prevent unmitigated capitalism from becoming unmitigated slavery."[7]

A second wave of comparative studies on "racial relations" showed that the development of citizenship in societies marked by the existence of slavery grew over an ocean of ambivalence. The works of David Brion Davis and Carl Degler demonstrated that Latin American slavery did not differ markedly from slavery in British America. Davis demonstrated that the dual status of the slave as both man and thing created problems for enslavers of both cultures, who were rarely able to deny the slave a moral personality.[8] The evidence presented by Davis, A.A. Sio, and Degler showed convincingly that neither were there such systematic differences in law and custom between American and Latin America slavery, nor did the officials of Church and Crown represent for Latin American

[7] Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery, A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 49.

[8] David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Western Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). This thesis was very influential on Genovese's development of the concept of negotiation and the roles of hegemony and consensus on southern plantations. Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll. The World Slaves Made (New York: Vintage Books, 1972).

slaves a widening in the range of other significant lines of communication with the wider society.[9]

The work of Carl Degler, Neither Black nor White, explored the ambiguities of the definitions of the legal status of the slaves in Brazil. Degler also pointed out the limitations of the Catholic Church, especially the small direct influence of priests and bishops on plantations. He emphasized demography and differential rhythms of economic development as possible variables to explain differences. According to Degler, there were no major differences between Brazilian and North-American slavery based on legislation or on the position of the national state. Degler also contested Tannenbaum's assumptions concerning the benevolence of Brazilian slavery and the average number of slaves held by masters. Degler even states that the persistence of the international slave traffic made Brazilian slavery harsher in some ways than American, but he does not analyze in depth the impact of the central state in the struggles for abolition and reform. In Brazil, the continuation of the international slave trade until 1850 and the sharp imbalance in the sex ratio of the slave population created unfavorable conditions for the slave family's stability. The negative rate of natural increase of the slave population throughout the whole slavery period provides indirect evidence of this.

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[9] Arnold A. Sio, The Legal Structures of Slavery in the United States (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958). Carl N. Degler, Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States (New York: Macmillam, 1971).

Summarizing, Tannembaum explained different attitudes about race as resulting from the long evolution of attitudes. He stressed the role of political culture as the main explanatory factor behind these differences. This "idealistic" vision was very influential in the works of many Brazilianists, among other students of Latin American history. Degler and Davis based their analyses on the unequal development of material and demographic capacities, concluding that, except for the incidence of manumissions, Brazil and the U.S. did not remarkably differ. This provided for a materialistic model of comparative explanation. The "idealistic" and the "materialistic" paths were present in most of the comparisons made since the end of the 1960s.[10]

The wave of comparative studies that so successfully opened the debate about the status of black slaves and the degree of severity of slavery did not endure. In the last thirty years, comparisons by historians in both countries have focused on specific issues. Broad comparative analyses have been infrequent, coming piecemeal in the work of one or another student. Most recent historiography on slavery remains very insular, relying on particular individuals and groups.[11]

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[10] The idealistic-materialist pattern of comparative analysis was first suggested by Eugene Genovese. See "Materialism and Idealism in the History of Negro Slavery in the Americas," in Genovese and Foner (eds.) Slavery in the New World (Englewoood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 238-255.

[11] A mark of the importance of comparative studies in the American historiography was the publication of a collection of essays, just some months after Tannenbaum's death. This collection was edited by Laura Foner and Eugene Genovese in 1969. It included resumes of the main books from several comparative historians and historical sociologists such as Sydney Mintz, Marvin Harris, Arnold A. Sio and Magnus Morner, among others. See Slavery in the New World. A Reader in Comparative History.

We can say that the few recent comparative studies made by Brazilian and American scholars have revolved around the themes raised during the sixties, especially political culture and material development. Consequently more recent works, more concerned with the themes of citizenship and cultural identity, still return to the questions raised by the pioneering comparisons.[12]

In 1981 Richard Graham reinvigorated the debate with his article comparing the patterns of economic development in Brazil and in the South of the United States. According to Graham, "Brazil's development sluggishness in comparison with the South cannot be attributed to the presence of slavery, since even with slavery the South experienced a much higher degree of development than did Brazil."[13] In order to understand differences, Graham points to the "contrasting structures" in Brazil, originating in the seigniorial values and the hierarchically structured society. These values were more firmly present in Portugal than in England. Thus, Graham rejects materialist-centered explanations, returning to a path of a broad analysis of political culture.

Other historians of slavery followed Graham, underlining the differing political cultures as the main explanatory variable to account for differences between the two countries. Celia M. Azevedo analyzed antislavery movements in both countries. She remarked that, while political and religious ideals could be

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[12] Marco A. Pamplona. Riots, Republicanism and Citizenship. New York City and Rio de Janeiro City During the Consolidation of the Republican Order (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996).

[13] Graham, Richard. "Slavery and Economic Development: Brazil and the United States South in the Nineteenth Century," in Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 23. No. 4, 1981, pp. 620-655.

very important in the American tradition, Brazilian antislavery kept more in tune with the ideals of enlightenment. According to Azevedo, the central theme in Brazilian abolitionism was the idea of progress, not human rights or individual freedom or Christian sin. The Brazilian case was characterized by the absence of a "community of feeling," because Brazilian elites were concerned, not with fulfilling God's commandments, but with an abstract ideal of "public interest," that is, the defense of a social order commanded by men of wealth and power.[14]

In spite of the great contribution of these comparative works to the debates on slavery and racial relations, little has been said about the influence of slavery over the organization of the states' bureaucracies or the ideas about the nation in societies where it flourished. Nothing has been said about the ways state-building helped to shape the patterns of racial relations in both nations, or vice versa. The scholarly debate on slavery has been centered, instead, on themes including the capitalist or pre-capitalist character of slave systems, the economic efficiency of slave labor, and the degree of severity of treatment slaves received in different societies.[15]

The basic assumption underlining this study is that only through the wars against Paraguay and the Confederacy did Brazil and the United States consolidate definitively their national unity, establishing national armies that were

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[14] Celia A. Marinho, Abolitionism in the United States and Brazil. A Comparative Perspective (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1995).

[15] But see the recent contributions of Anthony Marx, "Contested Citizenship: The Dynamics of Racial Identity and Social Movements," in International Review of History, Vol. 40, Supplement 3, 1995 and

independent of both regional influence and external political patronage. My primary intention here is to test the validity of the idealistic and materialist models in terms of the consequence of each war for social organization. I will examine whether differences in the core values of each country's culture provide an explanation for patterns of war mobilization. I will also examine whether those differences were relevant to the ways each elite group faced and responded to their main war challenges. Did differences at the level of political cultures account for the distinct levels of state management in the conduct of each war?

My hypothesis is, that if slavery and freedom in Latin America were not very far from each other, this was not because the status of the Brazilian slave was much different from that of the North American slave, but because the status of the majority of free men in Brazil was not far from the condition of slavery. Consequently we can say that, in America's 19th century liberal society, the military tradition was very racist, denying African Americans access to the state militias and the army, while the Brazilian army admitted blacks and mulattos with fewer restrictions, simply as two among the voiceless lower class groups belonging to a highly unequal society and a highly authoritarian polity.

Comparison of the Paraguayan and the Civil Wars has been previously suggested by American historians such as James McPherson, Richard Berlinger, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still. A point common to these

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Desmon King, Separate and Unequal: Black Americans and the US Federal Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

analyses was that the capacity of the Confederate nation to resist should be compared and contrasted to the Paraguayan example, to demonstrate that the South could have kept fighting for years longer. A possible reason for the differences between the "lesser" Confederate and the "greater" Paraguayan resistance could be found in the fact that slavery was an issue that split the gentry and the plain folk in the Confederacy. Because slavery was much more central to the Confederacy than to Paraguay, these disputes contributed to the disintegration of the Confederate fighting capacity during the last months of the war, while homogeneous poverty kept the Paraguayans fighting even when chances of victory had vanished completely.[16]

Unlike those historians, I intend to compare the Brazilian and the Union situations. My focus will be directed both to the efforts of each nation state and to the divisive social and racial tensions in each country. I will take into consideration the idealistic and materialistic approaches. In order to test the validity of the concept of political culture, Chapter One offers a digression on the dissimilar routes of historical formation followed by each society. The insertion of chronological information aims at explaining the national trajectories of each society. I will analyze the roles of slavery, centralization, and the army in both countries before 1860 in order to underline their differences, both from one another, and from the European patterns of state building.

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[16] James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Richard E. Berlinger, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William Still, Jr. Why the South Lost the Civil War (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), pp. 440-442.

This dissertation has, as its point of departure, an interest in a better understanding of Brazilian. Consequently, most comparisons begin with chapters centered on the Brazilian experience and comparisons are developed in order to underline the Brazilian case. I expect also to furnish new light on American issues, although my command of American sources is less complete than my command of Brazilian ones.

Following this strategy, Chapters 2 and 3 analyze the origins of the Civil and the Paraguayan wars in the context of the state-building process in each nation. These chapters focus on the connections between internal and external politics and the expectations of the main elite groups in both cases. Chapters 4 and 5 analyze the crises in the recruitment systems in each country during the war, stressing the similarities of both cases, especially the increase of recruitment demands and popular resistance to them, including the draft riots that occurred in both Brazil and the U.S. These chapters show how military traditions in both countries prevented the army from exerting a pivotal role in national politics. They will also show how both countries were unprepared for war and how both faced enormous structural limitations as they tried to mobilize their free populations. Chapters 6 and 7 show the pivotal role of freed slaves in solving the recruitment problems in each society. They emphasize the contradictions presented by the enrollment of people of African descent in each country. They analyze how each government dealt with these contradictions and

the results of the conflicts. They also underline the ways slaves were freed and the slaves' impressions concerning the enormous impact of the war in their lives.

The conclusion analyzes the postwar panorama and the consequences of the processes that were touched off during the wars. It also discusses the consequences for citizenship and bureaucratization, emphasizing the situation of blacks in both countries.

While those cultures were dissimilar, the circumstances of war created similar recruitment problems for the Imperial and for the Union governments. The nature of the total wars fought by Brazil and the Unites States reinforced centralization and conscription as measures necessary for victory. It forced elites to break old compromises and invade the rights of local communities. Consequently, the materialistic model provides the best framework to analyze the wartime period. It was during the post-war period that political cultures became dissimilar. Especially in the former Confederate states, Reconstruction provided a substantial difference in the ways racial issues could be addressed. Consequently, differences during the post-war period can be better understood when framed through the idealist model.

Chapter 1

Two Projects of Nation-building
Brazil and the United States from the Late Colonial Period to Independence

> The fact that Brazil and the United States lie in the same continent is a geographic accident, about which it would be foolish to give an exaggerated importance.
>
> Eduardo Prado, 1893.[1]

Introduction

This chapter will examine the nature and evolution of social structures and the institutions in American and Brazilian societies. This chronological analysis treats the years from the late colonial period up to the triumph of national integration in both countries. It will emphasize questions related to the maintenance of territorial unity and slavery. These questions would be at the center of elite concerns leading to both the Civil and the Paraguayan wars.

Brazil and the United States evolved from colonial possessions to independent nations in different ways. From their positions as colonization nuclei in the New World, their local leaders formulated distinct projects of nationhood. Such projects embraced agendas that included redefining the political participation and membership in the civil community. Each nation-building project represented an unique compromise between the ruling group and the general

[1] Eduardo Prado, A Ilusão Americana (1893, reprint, São Paulo: Ibrasa, 1980), p. 17.

populations, as colonial backgrounds and economic opportunities helped to shape specific sets of social relations.

Although there were many traits common to both countries, slavery being one of them, independence enabled the development of peculiar divergent patterns of political and social organization in each nation. As a consequence, the independence movements of the two countries took on sharply divergent social meanings. The differences were in part cultural, but the nation-building projects helped to accentuate those differences still more. The way each emergent political culture faced fundamental challenges - especially slavery and the maintenance of national unity - varied accordingly. In order to compare how each country confronted these challenges I will briefly analyze the process of acquiring independence as it occurred in Brazil and the United States, focusing on both the goals and limitations of these national movements.[2]

Independence and Its Limits

Independence did not solve the problem of slavery in either the newly independent Brazil or the United States. Both countries inherited compulsory forms of labor introduced during the colonial period. Slaves worked in the cities and in fields, in skilled crafts and at menial labor. It was in agriculture, however, that slavery established its firmest roots. After the 16th century, the development of an international market-based economy created a worldwide demand for

[2] On the differences between Latin American and North American political traditions, see Richard Morse, O Espelho de Próspero (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1988). For an account of the ways each culture stereotyped the other, see Fredrick B. Pike, The United States and Latin America: Myths and Stereotypes of Civilization and Nature (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992).

tropical products. Plantation slavery arose in the Americas as part of this world movement. It helped to shape specific patterns of society, the ramifications of which have been crucial in the development of multiethnic cultures in Brazil and the United States.[3] Plantation slavery also enabled the emergence of paternalist master classes, whose political behavior was based on a sense of social supremacy. It supported the notion that blacks were incompetent and child-like, whose nature required supervision by white owners as a civilizing influence.[4]

At the time of independence in both countries, slave labor had established firm roots, becoming essential for labor-intensive, high-volume agricultural produce like cotton, rice, tobacco, sugar cane, and coffee. On the eve of the 19th century, Brazil and the southern United States were the two largest slaveholding societies in the Americas. According to Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman, between 1500 and 1870 Brazil and the U.S. accounted for 44% of the slave traffic between Africa and the New World. By 1825 these two countries contained 67% of the total slave population in the Americas.[5]

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[3] For the relations between slavery and the wealth of European nations, see Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System. Vol I: Capitalist Agriculture in the Sixteenth Century (1974, reprint, New York: Academic Press, 1990).

[4] On the relation between the world market and the spread of slavery, see Elizabeth Fox Genovese and Eugene D. Genovese "Slavery: The World's Burden" in Fruits of Merchant Capital: Slavery and Bourgeois Propriety in the Rise and Expansion of Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 391-414. See also, David Brion Davis, Slavery and Human Progress (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, Vol. III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World Economy, 1730-1840s (New York: Academic Press, 1988). Wallerstein defined the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as the second era of great expansion of the capitalist world economy.

[5] Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, Time on the Cross. The Economics of American Negro Slavery. (1974, reprint, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989), pp. 14, 28.

More relevant than the sizes of their slave populations were the tenacious and initially successful efforts of elites in Brazil and the American South to keep slavery as a legal system of productive labor, contrary to the experience of the French, Spanish, and other English former colonies[6]. Wealthy slaveholders were able to resist the first international wave of anti-slavery reform and revolution by taking advantage of their strong internal political positions.[7]

Slaveowners struggled to keep their privileges. During constitutional debates in the United States and Brazil, they strenuously opposed the few abolitionist reforms which were proposed. After independence, the initial threat to slaveholders came from central and federal restrictions. For Brazil, this took the form of limitations on the volume of the international traffic in slaves. For the American South, it took the form of northern reformist opposition to territorial expansion. Slaveholders in both countries recognized these as opening shots in a protracted battle which would place their enterprise at risk.[8]

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[6] With the exception of Cuba.

[7] According to Eugene D. Genovese the success of slaveholders in Brazil and the southern United States was due to the fact that in these regions they constituted a ruling class while in the French and the British sugar colonies they were a stratum of the metropolitan ruling class. I believe this hypothesis is difficult to test for Brazil, as I hope to show later on. For a comparative approach to the experience of abolition in different slave societies, see Eric Foner, Nothing But Freedom. Emancipation and its Legacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983), especially chapter I, "The Anatomy of Emancipation," pp. 8-39.

[8] For the political action of slaveholders in America, see Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson (New York: Sharpe, 1999). According to Finkelman slavery was a central issue in the founding of the US. The slaveholders dominated the government from 1787 to 1819. For Brazil, see Luiz C. Barbosa and Thomas D. Hall, "Brazilian Slavery and the World-Economy: An Examination of Linkages within the World-System." in Western Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1986, pp. 99-118.

Through a series of political compromises, pressure, and manipulation, these emerging political elites prevented more progressive reforms or restrictions of slavery in their respective countries, and for long avoided direct state intervention against their class interests. Slaveholders confidently relied on national authority to enforce the politics of slavery as property; when these policies seemed about to collapse, they accused the central bureaucracy of threatening their local prerogatives.[9] By the second quarter of the 19th century, Brazil and the American South openly challenged the transatlantic diffusion of the abolitionist movement. Both societies faced strong criticism for maintaining the coercive plantation system and enforcing its expansion to new geographic areas.[10]

The self-interested agenda of slaveowners undermined the project of nation-building in both the United States and Brazil. It was socially and politically divisive. Progressive sectors of each society criticized slavery as an aberration, a sin, and an impediment to the spread of civilization and true religion. Slavery symbolized backwardness in a world dominated by the idea of progress. [11]

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[9] The U.S. Fugitive Slave Law is a clear example of this. It was perceived and denounced as proof of "Slave Power" by American abolitionists during the 1850s. I will discuss this in depth in chapter III.

[10] Close to the outbreak of the Civil War the American South had approximately 4,0000,000 slaves. In 1872, at the first demographic census made in Brazil, slaves numbered around 1,500,000 in a population of 10,000,000 inhabitants.

[11] On religious criticism of slavery, see Ronald G. Walters American Reformers, 1815-1860 (1978, reprint: New York, Hill and Wang, 1997), pp. 77-102 and The Antislavery Appeal: American Abolitionism After 1830 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976); for Brazil, see Heloisa Toller Gomes, As Marcas da Escravidão. O Negro e o Discurso Oitocentista no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos (Rio de Janeiro: Editora da UFRJ, 1994). For comparison of Abolitionist behavior in the two countries see Celia M. Azevedo, "Abolitionism in the Two Countries: an Overview" in

In spite of such opposition, few practical measures were introduced to combat slavery effectively. Abolitionism remained limited to a minority of religious leaders and progressive politicians in the U.S. and enlightened bureaucrats in Brazil.[12] For their part, moderate political leaders avoided making substantial changes which would threaten early constitutional compromises that allowed for political unity. By the middle of the nineteenth century, social peace and territorial integration were still considered more important than social justice. Only very slowly would these priorities be modified.

According to David Brion Davis, the rise of abolitionist ideology was predicated on the victory of bourgeois individualism inside the expansion of international capitalism. This development put slaveholders on the defensive throughout the world.[13] The degree of abolitionist success regionally depended on the political power, social authority, strength, and fragility of each group of slaveholders within their territorial dominion: where they achieved enough legitimization, slaveholders were able to resist abolitionist condemnation and successfully counterattack. In countries like Brazil and the United States, territorial control became the key to sustaining the enterprise of slavery.

Abolitionism in the United States and Brazil. A Comparative Perspective (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1995), pp. 3-21. Azevedo centers her analysis on the American development of anti-slavery feeling since the 18th century. This feeling was absent in Brazil until the 1880s.

[12] According to Celia M. Azevedo, except for a few isolated writers, there was no community of abolitionist sentiment in Brazil, at least until the mid-1860s. See Azevedo, Abolitionism in the United States and Brazil, p. 4.

[13] David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 398-99.

From Colony to Nation: The Creation of the Brazilian Empire

According to Stuart B. Schwartz "Brazil was created to reproduce Portugal, not to transform or transcend it."[14] The Brazilian economy was directed toward the fulfillment of Portuguese interests. Its center lay in Lisbon, outside the colonial territory. The goal of settlement and settlers was the quick achievement of opulence, not social transformation.[15]

From the earliest colonial times, Lisbon strove to isolate its territories in South America from each other.[16] The Portuguese imperial structure, of which Brazil was to become the most important part by 1640, was based on colonial fragmentation and imperial centralization. Portuguese colonial administration in South America created therefore, only a weak cohesion among the different regions of the entire colony.[17] Speaking about the lack of integration of Brazilian provinces at the end of the colonial period, French naturalist August De Saint-Hilaire observed that:

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[14] Stuart B. Schwartz, "The Formation of a Colonial Identity in Brazil," in Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden (eds.), Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 19.

[15] This strategy was reinforced during the late colonial period. For a broader analysis concerning Portuguese intentions and reforms see Kenneth Maxwell, Pombal, paradox of the enlightenment (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For a comparative point of view, see Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World. Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Portugal, Britain and France C. 1500- C.1800 (New York: Yale University Press, 1998). Dom Luis da Cunha, an18th century Portuguese reformer, compared the king to a father dealing with a great family. Testamento Político de Dom Luis da Cunha (1749, reprint, Rio de Janeiro: Alfa-Omega, 1976).

[16] In these efforts the Portuguese colonial administration also relied on the natural forces. Contrary sea currents and prevailing winds made communication from the Amazon easier with Lisbon than with Recife or Salvador. From 1616 to 1772 the Amazon region was administered as a separate colony outside the jurisdiction of Brazil's governor general.

[17] A. J. R. Russell-Wood, "Local Government in Portuguese America: A Study in Cultural Divergence," in Comparative Studies in Society and History, (16), 1974, pp. 187-231.

> The colonial system did not only impoverish Brazil; it had a still more despised function: to divide it. Spreading germs of dissension among the provinces, the metropolis aimed to keep the balance of power that was necessary to maintain its tyranny. Each [province] had its own satrap, each of them with its small army; each with its small treasury. [They] hardly communicated with each other; frequently they even ignored each other's existence. There was no common center in Brazil: it was a huge circle the radii of which converged far from the circumference.[18]

Saint-Hilaire, who lived in Brazil during the late colonial period (from 1816 until 1822), traveled extensively through its main provinces. As a result he became deeply convinced of the detrimental influence plantation slavery had on Brazilian life. Constant observations in his writings were the lack of modern technology and the precariousness of colonial roads. In fact, this situation was not new. Since the initial settlement tropical agriculture, together with the extension of the plantation system and of slavery, comprised the formative patterns of Brazilian society, a society that gravitated around an export economy directed to gratify European needs.[19]

Black slavery was the main source of labor on the great properties that produced most Brazilian export goods. The importation of African slaves began simultaneously with the Portuguese decision to "colonize" the land, in the 1530s.[20] As a result Brazil became the largest slave-importing region of the

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[18] Auguste De Saint-Hilaire, Viagem Pelo Distrito dos Diamantes e Litoral do Brasil (São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 1974), p. 213.

[19] Forty-four years later some Confederate farmers who immigrated to Brazil reached similar conclusions. According to Reverend Ballard S. Dunn, "Brazilian slaves cultivate cotton exactly as American Indians cultivate corn." Rev. Ballard S. Dunn, Brazil, the Home for the Southerners (New York: George B. Richardson, 1866), p. 139.

[20] On the colonial administration in Brazil, see Dauril Alden, Royal Government in Colonial Brazil

Americas.[21] Social inequality became an important characteristic of the territory's political culture. Inequality existed not only between the free men and the slaves; it divided society into distinctive status groups, limiting political participation to a thin minority of landlords, priests and bureaucrats. Chances for social mobility were very small, as poor whites lived segregated from society's mainstream as a pariah group.[22]

Nothing could differ more from the southern yeoman's situation than the living conditions of poor Brazilian whites. Without land ownership rights, and far from the elective franchise brought by American republicanism, they were kept in a permanent state of dependency in relation to the plantation slaveholders. Unlike their American counterparts, Brazilian poor whites did not benefit from the race-based egalitarianism provided by the southern social order. Under these circumstances, poor whites in Brazil endured a miserable existence, with no

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with Special Reference to the Administration of the Marquis of Lavradio, Viceroy, 1769-1779 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), especially chapter 16, "Relations with Governors and Captains-Generals," pp. 447-51.

[21] According to Luiz Felipe de Alencastro, Brazilian dependence on slavery was part of a Portuguese strategy to keep the labor market dependent on foreign supplies. See "O Aprendizado da Colonização," in Economia e Sociedade, 1, 1992, pp. 135-62.

[22] On the social position of poor whites in Brazil, see Maria Sylvia de Carvalho Franco, Homens Livres na Ordem Escravocrata (São Paulo: Ática, 1972); Alzira Lobo de Campos, "A configuração dos agregados como grupo social: marginalidade e peneiramento (o exemplo da cidade de São Paulo no século XVIII)," in Revista de História, Vol. 117, 1984, pp. 27-69; Hebe Maria Mattos de Castro, Ao Sul da História: Lavradores na Crise do Trabalho Escravo (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1987). For a summary of the argument, see Hebe Maria Mattos de Castro "Beyond Masters and Slaves: Subsistence Agriculture as a Survival Strategy in Brazil During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century, Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 461-89. Of course chances for social mobility varied according to place, time, and the position of the slaves of the labor structure.

reason to consider slavery "the poor man's best Government."[23] Commenting on the condition of the Brazilian peasants, abolitionist leader Joaquim Nabuco painted a somber portrait:

> We are dealing here with a population without resources, without assistance, a population taught to think of labor as an activity suitable only for slaves. We are referring to a population without markets for its products - if such an El Dorado even exists in our country - and therefore without any alternative but to live and raise its children in the conditions of dependence and misery in which they are allowed to vegetate.[24]

Another important feature of early Brazilian society was the size and importance of the central state. It is normally accepted that in Brazil the state invented the nation. The formation of the central state preceded the independence movement. It had been implanted by the Portuguese Crown as part of a general strategy to enhance its control over an extensive territory with a scattered population. Early in the 20th century, historian Capistrano de Abreu perceived the consequences of this evolution for the social order, remarking that after three centuries of colonization, "There was no such a thing as social life - there was no society. Public affairs were also not of interest and went unheralded."[25]

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[23] Joseph E. Brown, Governor of Georgia (at secession time), quoted by Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 86-7.

[24] Joaquim Nabuco, The Abolitionism. The Brazilian Antislavery Struggle. (1883, reprint, Illinois: University of Chicago Press 1977), p. 123.

[25] João Capistrano de Abreu, Chapters of Brazil's Colonial History, 1500-1800 (1907, reprint, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 202.

With scarce resources and a strong dependence on British commerce, Portugal could not afford a large degree of autonomy for its most important colony. After independence, the part of the elite that opted for Brazilian nationality supported administrative continuity in order to avoid territorial fragmentation. In the words of historian Ron Seckinger, "The [Portuguese] bureaucracy survived virtually intact in configuration and personnel."[26]

According to sociologist Raymundo Faoro, Brazil can be best defined as a compromise solution between the incipient liberalism that flourished in the Iberian Peninsula during the late 18th century and the political tradition centered on the supremacy of the Iberian idea of state.[27] General freedom and local autonomy were surrendered to more pragmatic concerns, as order and peace became the supreme goals of the political system. After Brazilian independence in 1822, in strong contrast to the decentralization of the colonial period, the ruling elite opted for an aggressive centralization.[28] Under these circumstances, the kind of state organization that flourished in Brazil aimed to control, discipline, and organize the population, instead of reflecting the wills and demands of its people. The Brazilian national state was a "constituency state," not a constitutional one.

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[26] Ron Seckinger, The Brazilian Monarchy and South American Republics, 1822-1831 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984), p. 8.

[27] According to Perry Anderson the origin of the term liberalism is in the Iberian Peninsula, not in the core of the international system. The term was created by the Spanish resistance during the Napoleonic occupation. Later it became a popular term in the French and British salons. See Perry Anderson's introduction to As Origens da Pós-Modernidade (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1999).

[28] Raymundo Faoro, Os Donos do Poder. Formação do Patronato Político Brasileiro (1958, reprint; Porto Alegre: Editora Globo, 1984), vol. I, pp. 73-96.

According to Euclides da Cunha, "it was the singular case of a nation produced by a political theory." [29]

Colonial Sources of American Republicanism

The British settlement in North America presents sharp contrasts when compared to Portuguese settlement in colonial Brazil. Perhaps the most important difference was the broader differentiation among the colonization nuclei of British America. No single pattern followed, as migration was undertaken by families or individuals; skilled laborers or adventurers; Anglican ministers or members of dissenting congregations; free people, or involuntary laborers. Heterogeneity was great, not only between Britain's North-American provinces, but also within them (with the possible exception of New England). Some colonies, like South Carolina, were able to develop regions favoring slave and free labor simultaneously. Others, like Massachusetts, preserved their original identity as much as possible. Heterogeneity varied according to the set of options adopted by each major migration group, although in most cases, it had far more to do with the force of circumstance than with a struggle over principles.[30]

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[29] Euclides da Cunha, "À Margem da República," in Obra Completa Vol I (Rio de Janeiro: Aguillar, 1995), p. 374.

[30] On peopling diversity in South Carolina, see "The Land and the People" in William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War. The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina 1816-1836 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 7-24. On Massachusetts see Patricia Bonomi, "The New Heavens and the New Heart," in Under the Cope of Heaven. Religion, Society and Politics in Colonial America (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995). For the enormous cultural differentiation between the British colonies see David Hackett Fisher, Albion's Seed. Four British Folkways in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

Such diversity makes it difficult to define a single American pattern because the white immigrants represented nearly all the cleavages in northern European societies with the exception of great lords or nobility. The colonists showed various motivations for immigrating to the new world. The interaction between individual motivation and the environment of settlement contributed to the formation of a peculiar political culture, contributing to a large degree of differentiation among the initial thirteen colonies.[31]

A second difference between Brazil and British North America concerned variations in the timing and direction of colonial integration into the Atlantic commercial system. In the British colonies there was not a single main pattern of economic activity, nor a unified strategy for commercial integration. Commercial companies worked over scattered areas without a unified monopoly over the land and its inhabitants. Under these circumstances, England's North American colonies presented a diversified set of economic activities and partners. Some served mainly as sources of raw materials for Europe, while others slowly diversified their economies, assuming a more complex pattern of economic development. In New England and some of the Middle Colonies, this complex pattern characterized a social attitude in which curiosity, investigation, and experiment became paramount.[32] Some areas (like Pennsylvania) formed part of

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[31] Even the large numbers of indentured servants coming to the North aimed at a new life. It was probably due to this circumstance that the English Revolutionary, Tom Paine, considered revolutionary America "an asylum for mankind," for only there did freedom survive after having been expelled from other parts of the world. See Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America, p. 78.

[32] For an elaboration, see David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (New York: W. W.

a three-way pattern of commercial interaction with the Caribbean and Southern Mediterranean, while other regions maintained strong ties with Africa and the slave trade. In the long run, economic variation would lead to strong sectional competition.[33]

A third difference was the larger degree of autonomy exercised by the ordinary British America colonists when compared with the narrower liberties achieved in the Portuguese-American colony. During the 17th and 18th centuries, streams of individuals and families crossed the Atlantic Ocean in pursuit of a larger degree of autonomy. Immigrants came from a myriad of regions and cultures in order to settle in North America. Some were attracted by the possibility of making a fortune. Others emphasized the purity of their religious faith, contrasted with the corruption of the Church of England. Other groups of dissenters sought the right to religious freedom and a society free from political and religious tyranny. In spite of the initial orthodox attitudes shown by the dominant religious groups of each American region, by the time of independence, religious freedom prevailed.[34]

Norton, 1998). According to Landes, by 1640 in places like New England and the middle colonies of Pennsylvania and New Jersey the colonists developed metallurgy and other activities associated with iron. See p. 298.

[33] Although the Middle Colonies allowed for the selling of larger land tracts even then the tendency was for dividing large tracts into small parts to be cultivated by families. See John Allen Krout and Dixon Ryan Fox, "The Completion of Independence, 1790-1830 " A History of American Life," vol. V (New York: Macmillam, 1944), pp. 53-7.

[34] Richard Hofstadter suggested that an extraordinary number of the colonists were just content to live either without organized religion or with only a weak relation to it. America at 1750. A Social Portrait (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), pp. 180-216. The idea of religious freedom is currently subjected to strong revaluation. During the early colonial period, Massachusetts religious leaders wanted freedom to practice their own Calvinist version of Protestantism. They persecuted and

Migrating Puritans, Quakers, Lutherans, Mennonites, Presbyterians and other religious groups struggled to escape what they perceived as a corrupt Old World system characterized by religious intolerance, absolutism, and corruption. Having felt the sting of centralized power in church and state, these colonists emphasized local exercise of authority as an antidote. The avowed intention of the most politically ambitious religious sect, the Puritans, was to establish "a city on the hill," that is, a "New England" more perfect than the Old. This unattained ideal of social and religious perfection survived the Puritan epoch and influenced New Englanders to the 19th century.[35]

Religious diversity helped colonists to develop new ideas concerning the exercise of political activity and the legitimacy of established authorities through a set of dramatic experiences peculiar to the New World. Implementation of these new ideas directly increased levels of literacy and political participation for white males and gave consistency to the formation of a civic culture based on religious freedom and individual liberty. The seeds of modern civic republicanism were planted during the early colonial period and developed well in the American environment. By the same token, the concept of a strong central state was undermined because, to suspicious colonists, it represented the worst side of European despotism. These experiences also helped to crystallize colonial

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even executed religious dissenters. Only during the late Colonial period did religious freedom spread to most colonies, except those such as Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, where religious freedom had been established earlier.

[35] On the historical trajectory of the idea of "The City on the Hill," see Maurice Gandillac Gêneses da Modernidade (Rio de Janeiro: Editora 34, 1995), especially chapter 1, "Cidade dos Homens e Cidade de Deus," pp. 11-22.

perceptions of the injustice of their subordination to Parliament and their lack of imperial representation, thereby reinforcing the importance of economic autonomy. Benjamin Rush, a physician and civic leader in colonial Pennsylvania, expressed such an understanding in 1777: "a people who depends on strangers to be fed and dressed will be always subject to them."[36]

The Northern Meaning of Freedom

There was more disparity between Brazil and the northern British American colonies than existed with the southern ones.[37] The character of colonization in the New England and the Middle Atlantic differed from that in other settlements in religious as well as in social terms. Speaking about Philadelphia, Eric Foner emphasized the fact that, during the 18th century, in the northern colonies "a large majority of the citizens were yeoman farmers who owned their own land with titles free from the complex restrictions of feudal land law which still persisted in Europe."[38]

In the North, free colonists coming to the new lands could not be satisfied with fewer political liberties than those they enjoyed at home. When limits were too narrow, the possibility of fewer restrictions in another colony was always an

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[36] Quoted in John W. Oliver, History of American Technology (New York: Ronald Press, 1956), p. 89.

[37] However, as shown by Stuart Schwartz, the American South experienced a much greater degree of development than Brazil. See his "Slavery and Economic Development: Brazil and the United States South in the Nineteenth Century," Comparative Studies in Society and History (148), 1981, pp. 620-55. I will return to this point latter.

[38] Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionaire America, p. 24.

incentive against accommodation.[39] This situation encouraged a permanent exchange of people and ideas across the northern colonies, a constant mobility fostered by optimistic expectations of finding a better place to live.[40] Behaviors were no more uniform than the personal intentions or the social origins of those who abandoned their homelands in England and continental Europe. In spite of their differences, the inhabitants of the northern colonies slowly developed common attitudes and objectives in the new lands.[41]

Except for the Narragansett valley in Rhode Island, where tobacco was cultivated, slavery never became the foundation of the northern colonial work force, for labor-intensive crops such as sugar and rice would not grow in colder climates. In spite of that, involuntary labor provided by black slaves, indentured servants, and apprentices supplied a significant portion of the workforce. During the late colonial period slaves were visible and important elements in the larger northern cities. Slaves were employed as artisans, worked on the waterfront, and filled the crews of vessels. Under the circumstances, living and working

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[39] Bernard Bailyn, "The Rings of Saturn" in The Peopling of British North America (Reprint 1986, New York: Vintage Books, 1988), p. 45.

[40] In his first proposition, Bernard Bailyn showed that the peopling of British America was an extension and an expansion of domestic mobility but he also revealed the enormous transformation this transatlantic migration introduced in the traditional configuration, Peopling of British North America, p. 20. However, most movement from Pennsylvania was to the South (along the mountain valleys).

[41] According to Fred Anderson during the 1760s most northern colonists still saw themselves as members of the British Empire. For many young men to serve in the Imperial Army was still considered an honor. See his A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Year's War (Chappel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984). See specially Part I chapter 2 "Sons of Some of the Best Yeomen in New England": Army and Society in Provincial Massachusetts, pp. 26-62.

conditions were not so hard as on southern plantations. In spite of that, freed slaves were considered inferior to all white poor and recent European immigrants.[42]

The Special case of New England

In British America, New England exhibited a peculiar pattern of colonization, especially when compared to the Caribbean and the South. Especially in Massachusetts, but also in its neighbors, religious motivations set the tone of occupation of the new lands, creating an atmosphere of political redemption and religious reform. According to Bernard Bailyn in those provinces: "[R]eligion shaped the leadership, organization and ethos of the Puritan migration during the colonial period..."[43] The first settlers coming to New England saw themselves as a colonial vanguard creating the social structures with which they could finally make visible their faith. These settlers wished, in first place, liberty of faith in order to build the culture to which they aspired. Democracy was one consequence, because the New World was a place to rescue humankind from the ruins of the Old World.

As an important consequence of their independent behavior, New England's colonists developed a pattern of economic activity that was oriented toward the countinghouses of London much less than was true in other colonies. By doing so they escaped to some degree the more usual relationship of a

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[42] According to Eric Foner as late as 1772 ten per cent of Philadelphia craftsmen owned slaves and over 80 percent of the young men apprenticed in the city in the early 1770 were bound to craftsmen. See, Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America, p. 43.

[43] Bernard Bailyn, The Peopling of British North America, p. 25.

colony as hinterland serving as an economic prop to its parent metropolis, which was common in other parts of the continent, including the southern colonies. In spite of the strong importance of Atlantic commerce, New England colonists developed economic activities based on the free labor of independent farmers, with a diversified production that was also directed to the internal market. This permitted the crystallization of a free labor ideology that was kept alive long after wage labor became paramount during the first half of the 19th century.

The northern economy was not focused only on exports, nor restricted to agricultural activities, timbering and fishing. The development of a shipping industry and the widespread formation of craft shops - some of them even able to produce guns -- diversified the economic landscape in remarkable ways. A strong commercial elite developed that was less dependent on metropolitan sanction. In cities, powerful groups of artisans, such as printers, began to assert their cultural and political influence. If the above pattern did not prevail everywhere under British rule, it was, notwithstanding, common. Americans, of many regions, believed themselves to be a people favored by divine Providence. They tried to establish a society and government suited to a chosen people. In this endeavor, economic autonomy played an important part.

In spite of the importance given to individual freedom, there was little room to negotiate demands for racial equality. The colonists' identity (except for the Quakers) was based on a strong valorization of demographic homogeneity as a formative characteristic of their society. During the 17th and 18th century, the Puritans' descendants proudly emphasized their homogeneity, always

associating it with God's designs. In the Federalist Papers, one of the strongest expressions of American constitutionalism, this point of view was ratified by Alexander Hamilton:

> With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people -- a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government very similar in their manners and customs....[44]

Notwithstanding racial prejudice, shared background and experiences provided a unified foundation for white colonial aspirations. Political culture developed partly from English political thought, partly from the philosophical theories of the Enlightenment, and partly from the experience of civilizing the "wild land" of a New World. It flourished around the ideal of ethnic homogeneity based on English ascendancy, the Protestant faith, and a missionary zeal validated by a millennial destiny. During the 18th century, as elected legislatures in the hinterlands of American began to dispute with the colonial administrators appointed by London, political thinkers in the thirteen colonies began to develop a rationale for resistance based on the ideals of political emancipation, independence, and a republican form of government. But the articulation of these ideals only very slowly shifted from a protest to the point of rebellion.

Thus, in North America, a peculiar colonial culture developed, which derived from the spontaneous immigration of close-knit groups, some of which

[44] Publius (Alexander Hamilton), Paper Number II, "Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence," in James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (1788, reprint, London: Penguin, 1988), p. 91.

emigrated to escape political and religious turbulence in Europe. It is this political culture, centered on the ideals of social homogeneity, religious freedom, and local organization, that would provide the distinctive pattern of the American political tradition, in marked contrast with that of Brazilian. Observing American society in the 19th century and analyzing what he termed as "The Anglo-American Civilization" Alexis De Tocqueville observed that:

> It is the product of two perfectly distinct elements which elsewhere have often been at war with one another but which in America it was somehow possible to incorporate into each other, forming a marvelous combination. I mean the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom.[45]

The main legacy of the struggle for religious freedom to the process of nation building was the development and diffusion of the republican and democratic ideals that shaped American civic culture. Another important colonial legacy to national political culture was the primacy of "local power." In America, state making had been preceded by community making on a vast scale, as citizens showed a general enthusiasm for local government. Town councils, local newspapers, and district representatives became characteristic features of a political culture centered on local competition. De Tocqueville, again, has much to say about the importance of local organization in early American political culture. Writing in the middle of the 19th century, he observed how the features of American politics were still notably local, emphasizing that:

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[45] Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Reprint 1848, New York: Anchor Books, 1969), volume I, part I, chap. II, pp. 46-7.

> In New England, local communities had taken complete and definite shape as early as 1650. Interests, passions, duties, and rights took shape around each individual locality and were firmly attached thereto. Inside the locality there was a real, active political life, which was completely democratic and republican. The colonies still recognized the mother country's supremacy; legally the state was a monarchy, but each locality was already a lively republic.[46]

As Tocqueville observed, self government and freedom of speech existed in New England before independence; they were derived from the aspiration to religious freedom and respect for natural rights, the essence of which may be found in the relatively free practice of religious dissent. This process was supported by the expansion of public opinion, the development of a popular press, and by the series of religious revivals that became known as "The First Great Awakening." All these proceedings enabled the establishment of a peculiar regional political culture, where the possibility of contesting established authority was open to citizens of Protestant origins. When independence came, New England had long known a kind of republicanism in town meetings and annual elections. But in other regions as well, colonists enjoyed different degrees of representative government and religious awakening. Together these processes opened possibilities for a more permanent pattern of democratic participation for white males. It was through an amalgamation of deep-rooted local interests with the tumultuous development of the Revolutionary War that a national identity was established.[47]

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[46] Ibid., p. 44.

[47] According to Eric Foner, Tomas Paine description of the virtues of civic republicanism as it was made in his Common Sense confirms the widespread diffusion of such experience through the colonies, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America, p. 80.

After Independence

Independence did not bring citizenship to members of previously excluded racial groups in Brazil or in the United States. Initially, nation-building and slavery were reconciled during the early years of independence in both states. This contradictory reconciliation proved to be more problematical in the United States, as national integration, sectional differentiation, and economic development divided the country into opposing regional interests. In Brazil, the contradictions seemed less extreme in the plantation economy, which dominated most regions, providing one unquestioned pattern of economic development for the whole society. Consequently, in Brazil sectional differentiation did not lead to regional competition until very late in the 19th century. Free labor in areas with less productive soil actually complemented the plantation economy and furnished a reserve of free workmen as well as food for the slaves who wrestled wealth from more fertile ground.[48]

Nation building and Slavery

In Brazil, state building was characterized by conflict between central and local powers. From its independence in 1822 until the 1850s, the Empire faced a turbulent period, socially and politically. There was no initial consensus between the central power and many of the provinces disagreed about the rules and procedures for establishing the national government. Central authorities

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[48] James Lang, Portuguese Brazil: The King's Plantation (New York: Academic Press, 1979), pp. 153-56.

struggled to impose and retain control in spite of local demands, endowing themselves with the responsibility to maintain territorial integrity based on the boundaries they inherited from the Portuguese colonial administration. For their part, many peripheral regions perceived independence as nothing more than a move of the political center from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro. Those provinces were not served by any efficient system of roads or canals.[49] Taxes drained away wealth without providing any perception of public services in return. Feeling oppressed by the new order, prominent members of some provinces strove for decentralization and autonomy.[50] They understood independence to mean a larger allowance of power to their regions, not complete submission to heirs of absolute power.[51]

The initial victory of the pro-center forces established the pattern which was followed during the next 67 years, but it did not settle the question permanently.

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[49] According to traveler's narratives, it took usually three months to go from Rio de Janeiro to the capital of the province of Goiás and five months to go to Cuiabá in Mato Grosso. See Ilmar Roholoff de Mattos, O Tempo Saquarema (São Paulo: Edusp, 1986), p. 34. See also Alcir Lenharo, As Tropas da Moderação (O Abastecimento da Corte no Formação Política do Brasil - 1808-1842) (São Paulo: Símbolo, 1979), especially pp. 57-72.

[50] José Murilo de Carvalho classified 17 different rebellions from 1831 to 1849. These rebellions involved 11 provinces and the Court. See Teatro de Sombras. A Política Imperial (Rio de Janeiro: Vértice, 1987), p. 13.

[51] From the Brazilian northwest, a secular priest, Frei Joaquim do Amor Divino Rabelo Caneca (1774-1825) provided the best account of the threats posed by centralization. See his "Crítica da Constituição Outorgada" in Frei Caneca, Ensaios Políticos (Rio de Janeiro: PUC/Conselho Federal de Educação, 1976), pp. 65-76. The original date of publication is 1824. Frei Caneca was later executed for the crime of "high treason" because of his intellectual leadership in a provincial rebellion known as Confederação do Equador. On the trajectory of centralization in Latin America, see Claudio Véliz, The Centralist Tradition of Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), especially chapter 7, "The Survival of Political Centralism," pp. 141-62.

Map 1 - Brazil in the 19th Century



Source: Roderick Barman, Brazil the Forging of a Nation, p. 37

The central government headed the nation. It was composed of Imperial bureaucrats, Fluminense landlords, and a circle of the Emperor's closest advisors. But its power was very elusive as it lacked the financial or the military means to constrain the landowners' private interests. [52]

The central government could sternly command provincial presidents and collect taxes, but it could not enforce decrees within plantations. As illustrated by the famous observation of the Viscount of Uruguay, the Imperial government was

[52] The term "Fluminense" designated the inhabitants of the old province (current state) of Rio de Janeiro. The term "Carioca" was used to define the inhabitants of the Rio de Janeiro city previously called "the Court" because it was the center of the Brazilian monarchy.

a "macrocephalic structure," because in spite of its size, it could not penetrate deeply into the periphery of its own society. As a result, while the interior had to submit to external strictures, it kept its own rules. The foundation of these rules was the preeminence of the baron.[53] The enormous amount of power exercised by the slaveowners over their slaves and clients impressed the German painter John Rugendas. Commenting on the lack of effectiveness of government regulations limiting the number of lashes a slave could receive, Rugendas observed that:

> These laws have no force and probably may be unknown to the majority of the slaves and masters; on the other hand, the authorities are so removed that actually the punishment of the slave for a true or imaginary infraction or the bad treatment resulting from the caprice and the cruelty of the master, only encounters limits in the fear of losing the slave by death, by flight, or as a consequence of public opinion.[54]

The great number of rebellions, some with secessionist tendencies, that took place in Brazil both before and after independence, shows that the business of keeping the country together was a very difficult task indeed. After the resignation of the first Brazilian Emperor, Portuguese-born Pedro I, in 1831, central authority seemed to collapse, and revolts became endemic, threatening the country's territorial integrity for the next two decades.[55] Instability achieved its peak during the Regency period (1831-1840), while future Emperor Pedro II was

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[53] I am using the terms Baron, Planter and slaveowner interchangeably.

[54] João Maurício Rugendas, Viagem Pitoresca Através do Brasil (Reprinted, São Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1941), p. 185.

[55] For a narrative concerning Dom Pedro I's life and times see Neil Macaulay, Dom Pedro: The Struggle for Liberty in Brazil and Portugal, 1798-1834 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986).

still a child. For nine years, different regents alternated in power, undermining the exercise of central authority.[56] The rebellions which inevitably occurred had to do with the amount of power provincial leaders would be allowed to exert at the local level. In particular, conflicts centered on the right of access to provincial government positions. Some provinces, such as the strategic Rio Grande do Sul, were the scene of constant political turmoil that was generated not by radical social aims but, rather, by strife within the ruling elite. It was a "power struggle" within the regime rather than about the regime. So serious was the situation, and so strong the fears concerning territorial fragmentation, that Father Diogo Feijó, a leading Imperial politician, recommended that, "in case of separation of the northern provinces, it would be necessary to hold those of the South."[57]

In other cases, provincial disputes escaped elite control, spreading social protest. According to historian Hendrik Kraay, revolts such as the Cabanos War in Pernambuco (1832-1835), the Cabanagem in Pará (1835-1840), and the Balaiada in Maranhão (1838-1841) represented '[a] vigorous contestation of the elite project of the new state by excluded groups more than political struggles between regional elites' and Rio de Janeiro."[58]

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[56] Norman Holub, "The Liberal Movement in Brazil, 1824-1848," (Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1968).

[57] Quoted in Joaquim Nabuco, Um Estadista do Império. Nabuco de Araújo, sua vida, suas opiniões, sua época. (1899, reprint, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1936), Vol. I, p. 36.

[58] Hendrik Kraay, 'As Terrifying as Unexpected: The Bahian Sabinada, 1837-1838' in Hispanic Historical American Review, Volume 72, Number 4, November 1992, p. 503. For recent scholarship on the Balaiada see Luiz Felipe de Alencastro, 'Memórias da Balaiada. Introdução ao Relato de Gonçalves de Magalhães' in Novos Estudos CEBRAP, 23, 1989, pp. 7-13. For the Cabanagem see Décio Freitas, Cabanos: Os Guerrilheiros do Imperador (Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1978). For Cabanagem's racial causes see David Cleary, " 'Lost Altogether to the Civilized World':

In political as well as in social terms, these revolts expressed not only parochial dissatisfaction but also social discontent. They also made clear the temporary incapacity of the central government to articulate a military reaction. Finally, they expressed the importance of race and class discontent. Such was the case during the Malês' Revolt, in 1835.[59] The social panorama was also affected by poor whites and freed slaves who attacked Portuguese immigrants in Rio streets, and by radical liberals who were angry about the direction taken by the monarchical regime. It was clear that Brazilians of many classes and regions, some of whom had fought for independence, now demanded for themselves the liberty Brazil had won from Portugal and full citizenship in the new political order.[60]

Political instability prevailed until the mid-century, when more sophisticated instruments of political consensus finally achieved some degree of legitimization among different elite groups. By 1850 the regional movements were over and a conciliatory cabinet, composed by members of both the Liberal

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Race and the Cabanagem in northern Brazil, 1750 to 1850" in Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 40, no. 1, January 1998, pp. 109-35. For the Cabanos War see Marcus Joaquim Maciel de Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion in Pernambuco (Brazil), 1821-1835," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1989), pp. 251-83.

[59] The Malês' Revolt was the largest Brazilian urban slaves' uprising. In July 1835 a group of African Muslim slaves took control of parts of the city of Salvador, Bahia's provincial capital for some hours. On the Malês' Revolt best work is João José Reis, Slave Rebellion in Brazil: The Muslim Uprising of 1835 in Bahia (John Hopkins Studies in Atlantic History and Culture) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

[60] For the role of military discontent and its articulation within social uprisings see John Schulz, O Exército na Política. Orígens da Intervenção Militar, 1850-1894 (São Paulo: EDUSP, 1994). especially chapter 2, "Reformadores e Revoltados," pp. 35-51; and José Murilo de Carvalho, Teatro de Sombras: A Política Imperial, pp. 11-22.

and Conservative parties, sealed a political agreement that would make possible decades of institutional stability for the Empire.[61] This "golden age" of imperial political stability at the mid-century is defined by Brazilian historiography as the period of "Conciliation."[62] This term expresses the victory of the conservative forces that favored central power in the long struggle for hegemony against centripetal impulses. If political stability became a reality, the social situation remained a strong source of concern for the political elites. Slavery was at the core of the persistent social crisis as it reinforced the precariousness of the country's social cohesion and debilitated its military capacities.[63]

The Slave Supply Crisis

A second order of problems related to the labor question. Since the beginning of colonization, black slavery had been the basis of the Brazilian economy, directed toward the production of tropical agricultural commodities. It provided the main labor force on the great plantations. Toward the second quarter of the 19th century, the emergence of coffee plantations in the Center-South reinforced both the centralization process and the importance of slavery, increasing the need for slaves to keep agricultural production at its full rate.[64]

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[61] For a good description of the chronology of these events see Roderick J. Barman, Brazil: The Forging of a Nation, 1798-1853 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). See especially pp. 160-242.

[62] For a contemporary conservative account of "Conciliation" see Justiniano José da Rocha, "Ação, Reação e Transação" in R. Magalhães Júnior, Três Panfletários do Segundo Reinado (São Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1956), pp. 161-218.

[63] In many provinces slaves and freed blacks outnumbered whites creating deep concerns on the Imperial bureaucrats.

[64] According to Robert W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, Brazil alone accounted for 38 per cent

During the 1840s, the main coffee plantations moved away from the exhausted, overworked soil around the city of Rio de Janeiro to a new location near the center of the province. In the Paraíba do Sul Valley, 95 miles from Rio, the coffee Arabic found fertile ground on which to establish dominion.[65] From there, coffee production spread to the adjacent provinces, devastating the native forests. Coffee estates in the southwest established the last cycle of plantation slavery in Brazil. The coffee barons were the heirs of a seigniorial culture whose influences would endure long after slavery's termination. Observing slavery's diverse influences over the American and the Brazilian societies, abolitionist leader Joaquim Nabuco noticed they differed most markedly in that, "[S]lavery in the United States did not affect the entire social order [while] in Brazil the complete body was infected by the influences of that institution."[66]

Robert Conrad, Leslie Bethell and others have already shown that the extinction of the international slave traffic was due to international, mainly British, pressures.[67] Opposition to slavery appeared in Europe during the last decades of the 18th century, a philanthropic movement which pressed the English and

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of the world traffic in slaves. See Time on the Cross. The Economics of America Negro Slavery (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1974), p. 14.

[65] On the Paraíba Valley see Warren Dean, "The Planter as Entrepreneur: The case of São Paulo," Hispanic American Historical Review 46 (May 1966), pp. 143-145 and Stanley J. Stein, Vassouras, a Brazilian Coffee County, 1850-1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

[66] Joaquim Nabuco, The Abolitionism, pp. 120-21.

[67] Leslie Bethel, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1970), Robert Conrad, The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972); Seymour Drescher, From Slavery to Freedom. Comparative Studies in the Rise and Fall of Atlantic Slavery (New York: New York University Press, 1999).

French metropolitan governments to free the slaves toiling in their colonial dependencies.[68] The British solution of gradual emancipation constrained Portuguese policies because of Portugal's strong dependence on British trade.[69] For pragmatic reasons Lisbon attempted to minimize restrictions on the slave trade as much as international conditions permitted, while at the same time honoring the old commercial and military alliances between the two countries. [70]

Brazilian independence in 1822 brought important changes to the dialogue over slavery. The main social question emerging was the role of slaves and freedmen in the nation-building process. The process itself was peculiar in Brazil because national organization developed from the top, based exclusively on a political alliance between the state bureaucracy and the landowners. Naturally, the discussion of the future of slavery was undertaken by members of the political elite. José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, a Brazilian founding father, took a position which was typically ambivalent: he attacked slavery for the evils it brought to Brazil, but was against its immediate suppression.[71] Bonifácio feared

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[68] Protest against slavery began in the second half of the 18th century. After visiting Barbados, William Edmunson opened the attack in 1776, imputing that slavery was responsible for the sins of that island. David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Western Culture, especially chapter X, "Religious Sources of Antislavery Taught: Quakers and the Sectarian Tradition," pp. 291-332. Seymour Drescher and William Law Mathieson (eds.), British Slavery and Its Abolition, 1823-1828 (New York: Octagon Books, 1967).

[69] For a discussion on the British abolitionist struggles see Howard Temperley British Antislavery, 1833-1870 (London: Longman Group Limited, 1972), especially chapters I, "The Antislavery Tradition," and II, "Emancipation and After."

[70] For a more complete vision of the impact of the slaves' traffic on the Brazilian economy with special attention on the Court and Rio de Janeiro settings see Manolo Florentino. Em Costas Negras: um estudo sobre o tráfico atlântico de escravos para o porto do Rio de Janeiro, 1790-1830 (São Paulo: Cia. das Letras, 1997).

[71] See Emilia Viotti da Costa "José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva. A Brazilian Founding Father" in

that emancipation would devastate the Brazilian economy. In a speech on the subject written in 1825, Bonifácio defended a gradual emancipation policy:

> I do not wish to see slavery abolished at once; such a fact would bring great evils. In order to emancipate slaves without social damages we should first make them deserving of liberty: we should be forced, by reason and by law, to convert them gradually from mean slaves to free and active men.[72]

An independent Brazil found it even more difficult to balance the need for an active slave trade to counteract plantation mortality with British abolitionist demands. The imperial government found itself in the uncomfortable, ultimately impossible position of trying to satisfy simultaneously both its most powerful international ally and its most powerful political elite. Brazilian slaveowners remained deeply dissatisfied with what they saw as improper government interference in their business interests.[73]

After Pedro I declared independence, England demanded an end to the Brazilian slave trade before it would recognize the new South American nation. In 1826, the Brazilian government was forced to sign a treaty that declared the slave trade to be "piracy," abolishing all legal traffic by 1829. In the popular sense, it was "a law to be seen by the English."[74] During the 1830s and 1840s

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The Brazilian Empire. Myths and Histories (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1985), pp. 24-52.

[72] José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, Representação à Assembléia Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil (Paris: Typographia Firmin Didot, 1825), p. 142.

[73] "In the British and French West Indies, in Dutch Guyana, and in Brazil, the death rate of slaves was so high, and the birthrate so low, that these territories could not sustain their population levels without large and continuous importation of Africans." Fogel and Engerman, Time on the Cross, p. 25.

[74] "Uma lei para inglês ver," as it was said in Portuguese. This expression is still very popular in Brazil, referring to laws impossible to be fulfilled.

Brazilian naval officers practiced selective blindness, abetting slavers and ignoring the treaty as much as they could. By that time, the Brazilian economy had swelled with the coffee boom. Coffee planters in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo supplied half of the growing and apparently inexhaustible world demand. Under such circumstances, the Brazilian landlords had good reason to resist the initial attacks against slavery with all means at their disposal, and they did so from a position of power.[75]

The Empire issued a set of timid pronouncements against the traffic in Africans to fulfill two agendas: First, the government would have a seemingly civilizing influence, and second, implementing even weak rules required strengthening the national administration The slaveowners struggled to keep traditional privileges and power, and, pragmatically, to maintain an active traffic in slaves. In part because of the imminent threat of closure of the slave trade, the years between 1830 and 1850 were marked by the importation of thousands of African slaves. David Eltis shows how astonishingly large numbers were absorbed into the important northern province of Bahia.

Finally, after more than twenty years of reluctant and indifferent enforcement, under a virtual blockade designed to intercept slavers imposed by the British navy, the Brazilian government effectively abolished the international slave traffic in 1850. We can say without hesitation that until the decree of the Eusébio de Queirós law (1850) put an end to the slave traffic, the main foreign

[75] Eugene W. Ridings Jr., "Class Sector Unity in an Export Economy: the Case of Nineteenth Century Brazil," in The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 58, 1978.

question faced by the Brazilian government was how to maintain slavery, not how to abolish it.[76]

Chart I
Slaves Imported Into Bahia in the Nineteenth Century



Source: David Eltis, Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 243-244. Also quoted in Thurston Graden Dale, "From Slavery to Freedom in Bahia, Brazil, 1791-1900." (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1991), pp. 148-149.

The end of the importation of slaves into Brazil in 1850 compelled profound changes in the nature of slavery as an institution, bringing about great changes for slaves as well as for administrators and overseers charged with the control of enslaved workers. In spite of the opposition to the embargo by coffee-

[76] Leslie Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade Question, 1807-1869. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

growing interests, the demise of the African slave trade reassured a considerable number of Imperial politicians who feared the imbalances between slave and free sections in some provinces. From the beginning of the 19th century, many regions were becoming overpopulated with slaves. Stanley S. Stein and Barbara H. Stein estimate the Brazilian slave population around 1820 to be two million, that is, two thirds of the country's total population. In certain parts of the country, slaves were always more numerous than the free population. According to Kenneth Maxwell, in the province of Minas Gerais in 1786 slaves were 47% of a total population of 362,847 inhabitants.[77] According to Robert Conrad, in 1821 a military map of the province of Rio de Janeiro showed a slave population of 173,775 and a free population of 159,271. It is estimated that in the rural areas the slave portion of the population was still larger.[78] Even in more peripheral provinces such as Rio Grande do Sul, the proportion of slaves to free was very high. Herbert Klein estimates that at the end of the 18th century this province had 21,000 slaves and 5,000 free men of color out of a total population of 71,000.[79]

If slaves could comprise a large proportion of some provincial populations, the proportion of African-born slaves was also impressive. According to Joaquim

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[77] Kenneth Maxwell, Conflict and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal, 1750-1808 (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 266.

[78]Stanley J. Stein and Barbara J. Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin America (New York: 1970), p. 148. "Mappa dos fogos, pessoas livres e escravos compreendidos nas freguezias da cidade e província do Rio de Janeiro, AN, I G 1-428 and Relatório do presidente da província do Rio de Janeiro....para os annos de 1840 a 1841 quoted in Conrad, The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, p. 6.

[79] According to Herbert Klein, these slaves were linked to the export sector of Gaucho economy. See Herbert S. Klein, A Escravidão Africana. América Latina e Caribe (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1987), p. 89.

Norberto de Souza e Silva, in the late 1830's forty-five percent of the total slave population of São Paulo was African born. Pernambuco also listed 45% of its slaves as foreign-born. An extraordinarily large African-born slave population inhabited the city of Rio de Janeiro itself--the capital of the Empire--representing 60% of its slave labor force in 1849.[80] This potentially explosive situation inspired fear because it reproduced some of the most dangerous conditions found in Santo Domingo Island prior to the Haitian revolution. Nevertheless, during the first half of the century opponents of slavery were linked to the public administration, not to popular demands. No free labor ideology was developed.[81]

Inter-provincial Traffic

When coffee growing was introduced to Brazil, sugar cultivation had long been in a decline brought on by international competition, an excessive supply, and the development of new technological refining processes in Europe. Cycles

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[80] Joaquim Norberto de Souza e Silva, Investigações Sôbre os Recenseamentos da População Geral do Império (Rio de Janeiro: Conselho Nacional de Estatística, Serviço Nacional de Recenseamento, Documentos Censitários, Série B, Número 1, Rio de Janeiro, 19,510 [original edition 1870], pp. 48, 95, and 99.

[81] Even in regions were slaves were not the main labor force, an antislavery policy did not develop until very late in the century. See J.H. Galloway, "The Last Years of Slavery on the Sugar Plantations of Northeastern Brazil," in The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 57, 1871; Peter Eisenberg, "A Mentalidade dos Fazendeiros no Congresso Agrícola de 1878" in José Roberto do Amaral Lapa (ed.), Modos de Produção e Realidade Brasileira (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1980), pp. 167-94. From the same author, see the more encompassing, The Sugar Industry in Pernambuco, 1840-1910 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974). For a divergent position on the issue see Robert B. Toplin, The Abolition of Slavery in Brazil (New York: Atheneum, 1972) and Thomas H. Holloway, "Immigration and Abolition: The Transition from Slave to Fee Labor in the São Paulo Coffee Zone," in Dauril Alden and Warren Dean (eds.), Essays Concerning the Socioeconomic History of Brazil and Portuguese India (Gainesville: The University Presses of Florida, 1977), pp. 150-177. For an accurate description of the controversies involving the subject see Stuart B. Schwartz, "Recent Trends in the Study of Brazilian Slavery" in Slaves, Peasants, and Rebels. Reconsidering Brazilian Slavery (Urbana: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp.1-38. It should be noted that Toplin and Holloway's analyses are restricted to the last

of economic growth were quickly followed by depressions that damaged the regional economies of sugar producing areas. Thus, sugar lost its prominence in the Brazilian agrarian economy. Under these circumstances, with international export at an end, it was almost impossible for the sugar barons to hold on to their slaves in competition with the stronger demands of southern coffee plantations.[82]

With the final termination of the Atlantic slave traffic, the coffee planters turned for labor to the under-utilized slave populations of the more decadent areas in the sugar-dependent northeast and in the southern provinces, particularly the jerked beef areas of the Rio Grande do Sul. Slaves from Bahia, Pernambuco, and Rio Grande do Sul began to be moved to the center-south coffee regions of the Paraíba Valley. This shift also marked the increasing importance of coffee plantations in the country's economy and heralded the power of coffee to change the demographics of slavery.[83]

Stanley Stein has provided evidence for the demography of decay in Brazilian slavery. In the northeast section as whole, the slave population fell from 500,000 in 1823 to 350,000 in 1872, a reduction of approximately 30% in 49

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phase of the process, from 1880 until the complete abolition of Brazilian slavery.

[82] On the situation of the Northeast elites, the best account is Evaldo Cabral de Mello, O Norte Agrário e o Império, 1871-1889 (1984, reprint, Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1999).

[83] Rio Grande do Sul was the largest slave province of the southern region of Brazil. During the mid-century, as a consequence of the jerked beef crisis, it became the second largest exporter of slaves to Rio de Janeiro. From 1867 to 1872 the province's slave population dropped from 77,000 to 67,000. It is still impossible to estimate the impact of the recruitment for the war in this demographic decay. On Rio Grande do Sul's role in internal traffic see Herbert Klein, "The Internal Slave Trade in Nineteenth-Century Brazil: A Study of Slave Importation into Rio de Janeiro in 1852," in The Hispanic American Historical Review, Volume 51, 1971, pp. 567-77.

years.[84] According to Eustáquio Reis and Elisa Reis, during the same period, the region's total population grew approximately 60%. Therefore, the share of the slave population in the northeast areas felt from 23% in 1823 to 10% in 1872. In the Northeast province of Pernambuco the internal slave trade accounted for 24% of the total number of individuals removed from the slave population during the period from 1850 to 1888.[85]

Many of those slaves were sold to the southwestern region, especially to the provinces of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, while traditional sugar producers began to shift toward free labor. After 1850 the flood of international traffic became so great that, for a short period, the supply of slaves met the most dynamic demand. Thousands of slaves were sold out of economically stagnant areas and sent toward the booming southern coffee plantations.[86]

Uprooted slaves suffered the sudden loss of family and community. Husbands and wives, mothers and children were easily split apart as coffee

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[84] It should be emphasized that a steady inter-provincial slave trade had gone on before the termination of the Atlantic traffic, although long-distance seaborne trade developed most fully after the Atlantic trade was terminated. See Robert Edgar Conrad, "A New Forced Migration. The Inter-provincial Slave Trade" in World of Sorrow. The African Slave Trade to Brazil (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), pp.171-90.

[85] Stanley J. Stein, Vassouras: A Brazilian Coffee County, 1850-1900 .The Roles of Planter and Slave in a Plantation Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 296. Eustáquio J. Reis and Elisa P. Reis, "As Elites Agrárias e a Abolição da Escravidão no Brasil" in Revista Dados, 31 (3), 1988, p. 316. Peter Eisemberg, "From Slave to Free Labor on Sugar Plantations: The Process in Pernambuco" (paper presented at the 1979 meeting of the American Historical Association).

[86] Herbert Klein minimizes the impact of the internal slave traffic. Klein's estimates the total number amounts to 209,000 for the whole period from 1850 to 1888. These numbers were much smaller than the 482,000 brought in by the Atlantic traffic in the period 1831-1850, "The Internal Slave Trade...," p. 583.

planters demanded more laborers for the new agricultural bonanza.[87] These slaves were transported in boats or on foot with rates of mortality not much less than those of the Middle Passage.[88] Transportation and settlement tended to encourage the concentration of slaves in single properties. These changes affected their rhythms and reinforced the predominance of males over females among Creoles.[89] The Paraíba Valley, the most important coffee-growing region, absorbed most of this flood of slave labor, but some additional groups were sent to places like Minas Gerais or the newest open areas of Western São Paulo.[90]

By this time, coffee was so profitable an activity that planters could cope with taxes and increasing cost of slaves without much difficulty, as long as slaves were available. Slavery in Brazil changed very little from 1850 to 1865, although the total number of slaves declined drastically, due to the end of international

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[87] This situation established remarkable similarities with the American internal slave migration. As shown by recent research, especially Michael Tadman's book, Speculators and Slaves. Masters, Traders, and Slaves in the Old South (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), an extensive slave trade substantially outweighed planter migrations in numerical importance. See especially pp. 3-11.

[88] For one view of conditions in the internal trade, see Robert Conrad. World of Sorrow. For a different interpretation see Klein, "The Internal Slave Trade," p. 578. According to Klein the average cargo size was 4 slaves per vessel. This compares to the figure of over 480 slaves per vessel in the transatlantic-Atlantic slave trade from Africa to Rio de Janeiro at the beginning of the nineteenth century. See Klein, "The Internal Slave Trade...," p. 578.

[89] According to Stanley Stein the county of Vassouras (Paraíba Valley), an area of dense, recently imported slave populations, revealed a high of 63% males for the decade 1850-1859. See his Vassouras...., p. 77.

[90] For the impact of interprovincial traffic in the life of the slaves see Hebe Maria Mattos de Castro, Das Cores do Silêncio. Os Significados da Liberdade no Sudeste Escravista - Brasil Século XIX (Rio de Janeiro, Arquivo Nacional, 1995), especially chapter VI, "Sob o jugo do Cativeiro", pp. 119-36.

importation.[91] No open criticism was directed against the internal traffic in slaves with its high demographic costs, most apparent in the dissolution of families and the concentration of displaced individuals in single properties. Until the Triple Alliance War came, no relevant manifestation of anti-slavery sentiment appeared in Brazil.[92]

Brazilian Sectional Differences and the Planter's Behavior

It remains unclear how sectional differences affected the political behavior of the Northeast sugar planters. Many of the revolts which occurred in the Northeast during the first two decades after independence were exacerbated by declining production, although it is uncertain how export of slave labor to the Southwest affected productive capacity.

In the Sertão, the Northeast backlands, a population of poor whites was available to serve as a seasonal workforce on the great plantations. This poor free class emerged early in the 16th century, when subsistence agriculture flourished in parts of the coastal area. During the 19th century, planter elites, supported by the central state, reduced these farmers to complete dependence on the plantation system. While slavery declined locally, a rigid legal framework

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[91] In 1865, Imperial Councilor Sousa Franco reported to Pedro II his estimates concerning the proportions of freemen over the slaves. According to Sousa Franco, for the whole Empire, there were 4 free men to each slave. In the North that proportion was 7 to 11; in the southern littoral it was 3 to 1 and in the center of the Empire it was 6 to 1. Sexual imbalances among the slaves were huge. Sousa Franco estimated that, from 1,800,00 slaves, 1,100,000 were men. See José Honório Rodrigues (ed.), Atas do Conselho de Estado (Brasília-DF: Senado Federal, 1978), p. 202.

[92] On the absence of a strong abolitionist criticism in Brazil see Heloisa Toller Gomes, As Marcas da Escravidão, especially part III, "A Expressão do Pensamento Racial no Brasil Oitocentista," pp. 140-43.

based on discipline developed in order to provide cheap and tractable wage laborers as substitutes for the diminishing number of slaves.[93] It seems then valid to conclude that the Northeast Brazilian agrarian elites also benefited from the coffee boom in the South. Some authors even state that the internal traffic "brought to the northeast agrarian elites the possibility of obtaining bigger profit rates with slave exportation than those obtained from the exploitation of slaves."[94]

Whether the export of slaves was good business or bad is difficult to determine. Even assuming the worst, agrarian elites tried to turn a profit by selling their slaves to other parts of the country. But internal traffic in slaves was at best a temporary measure that could not maintain the supply for long. Unlike the southeastern United States, Brazilian was unable to sustain population growth among slaves. As a result, the end of the international traffic challenged the structure of Brazil's longterm workforce even as it rerouted the supply of slaves. The government could only offer temporary palliatives to cope with the scarcity of labor. By the time of the Triple Alliance War the capacity of the internal slave trade to redistribute labor was reaching its limit. Under these

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[93] An extensive summary of the history of free workers in the Northeast areas can be found in Guillermo Pallacios, "Uma Proposta de Periodização para a História dos Cultivadores Pobres e Livres no Nordeste Oriental do Brasil, C. 1700-1875." in Revista DADOS Vol. 30, No. 3, 1987, pp. 311-24. For a general account about the relations between landlords and the free-poor see Emilia Viotti da Costa, The Brazilian Empire. Myths and Histories (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1985), especially pages 81-4.

[94] Eustáquio and Elisa Reis. "As Elites Agrárias e a Abolição...," p. 316; Nathaniel H. Leff, "Economic Development and Regional Inequality: Origins of the Brazilian Case," in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 86, 1972. For a broad analysis of the Northeast agrarian elites after the end of the traffic see P. L. Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry in Pernambuco, 1840-1910 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), especially pp. 121-79.

deteriorating conditions the authorization to enlist slaves finally came.

Nationbuilding and Democracy

In contrast to what happened in Brazil, nation-building in the United States was linked to the definition of economic and social patterns of development. These were based on individual entrepreneurship and popular sovereignty. The American experience from the end of the 18th century was marked by the emergence of mass political participation and the expansion of market relations. Together, these two elements helped to create an integrated set of both public and private institutions. Their functional interaction promoted national integration during the next 50 years, despite intermittent sectional divergence.[95]

During the Revolutionary War, Americans revolted against the imposition of European patterns of political order. They also revolted against what they perceived as a threat to impose the system of absolute rule prevalent in most European countries. Finally, Americans revolted against the threat of change in the basis of political power from local consensus to imperial authority, in the freedom they and their ancestors had been building since the 17th century.

If there was consensus among Patriots concerning what they did not want, it was more difficult to agree about what these new United States should be like after independence. As colonial experience differed, so did the rationale behind rebellion against England. The intensity of the war and each colony's disposition

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[95] According to Robert H. Wiebe, "The very essence of the American Revolution was political self-determination, with the right to construct governments, allocate sovereignty, and select officials according to America's own republican lights." The Opening of American Society. From the Adoption of the Constitution to the Eve of Desunion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984).

to endure it differed during these crucial years. According to historian Edward Countryman,

> The revolutionary movement was never a united front facing one enemy. It was a series of coalitions that formed, dissolved, and re-formed, as people considered what they needed, what they believed, and what their situations were.[96]

The American Revolution affected the lives of all social groups. It broke the weak links between church and state; it enlarged popular participation in many crucial aspects of the American life; it led to a larger degree of integration between the colonies; it restricted slavery and precipitated the decline of various forms of unfree labor in the North; it made possible a future end to the international slave traffic.[97] However, its political architects faced many dilemmas on the road towards independence: How would relations between the colonies be regulated? What function would the national government have? What was the best form of government? Which limits should be established for political participation?

In social terms, the Revolution brought the rise of radical political leadership from the "patrician" class. During the war artisans, soldiers, sailors, laborers, servants and other denizens of the urban lower class acknowledged the importance of political participation by shifting from spontaneous mob actions

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[96] Edward Countryman, The American Revolution (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), p. 7.

[97] The Revolution enabled changes in different areas. The Confiscation of loyalist lands and the nationalization of banks being some of the most important. James Franklin Jameson, The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1926), especially chapter I, "The Revolution and the Status of Person," pp. 1-39; James A. Henretta, "Economic Development and Social Structure in Colonial Boston, " in William and Mary Quarterly, XXII, 1965. For more recent sources, see Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1992), especially Part III, "Democracy," pp. 229-370.

to more organized forms of protest. This army of "humble men," the effective footsoldiers of liberty, fell outside the ideological factions that fought for Independence, although they assumed a shortlived control of three state legislatures created during the Revolutionary period. They could be an important force in local assemblies, but they were not part of the national elite that pushed for independence.

Moderate and conservative Revolutionary leaders with a background of privilege feared radical democratic sentiment and preferred to establish a more moderate course for the movement, securing it from popular excesses.[98] They were skeptical about the republican capacity to resist factionalism arising from conflicts of interest and, according to social preferences, they envisioned more balanced forms of government as an ideal solution.[99]

However, radical liberals supported more direct forms of democracy and a larger degree of autonomy for states. During the 1780s, as the economic situation worsened, the radical political agenda became the cause of distrust and alarm for the elite, as growing inter-state rivalry and factionalism appeared to endanger the structure and foundation of the new nation.

For their part, the men who led the American Revolution did not have a model for government that could be directly compared with their experiences. When the Revolution came, the historic legacy of the Greek, Roman, and

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[98] See Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), pp. 497-597.

[99] Saul Cornell, "Aristocracy Assailed" The Ideology of Backcountry Anti-Federalism," in Journal of American History 76, March 1990, pp. 1149-172.

Florentine republican ideals was no more than a myth linked to the failures of classical and modern republican examples.[100] These early comparative historians understood that previous republican experiments failed to maintain their original virtue and were contaminated by corruption and decadence.[101] Even the concept of virtue could have very different meanings depending on the group. It could mean "a willingness to sacrifice individual self-interest to the greater good of society," but the supporters of a more laissez-fairean vision of society believed with Mandeville that "private vices could led to public virtues."[102]

This republic was a fragile experiment in a world ruled by kings, emperors, tyrants, and aristocrats. Even the concept of republican government was not clear once it was subjected to the different viewpoints of the Founding Fathers. In spite of their differences, most of the Framers agreed that the philosophical basis of the new political pact would be the individual interest and the search for personal happiness.[103] Many of them agreed that a minimum size state was

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[100] For a comparative approach concerning different forms of Republicanism at the end of the 18th century, see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), especially pp. 462-562.

[101] The Greeks developed an aristocratic elite whose privileges were harmful to the maintenance of their civic virtue. Roman Imperial and commercial expansion degenerated into an oppressive empire founded on the destruction of its original republican institutions. Italian republics during the Renaissance also perished when fragmentation appeared as a challenging obstacle to national unity. On the Enlightenment interpretation of the decline of Roman civic virtue, see Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1774, Reprint, London: Penguin Books, 1980), for the loss of classical civic virtue, especially chapter XI, pp. 436-67.

[102] A summary concerning the different meanings of the concept of "virtue" is offered by Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America., pp. 158-59.

[103] An interesting account on the Founding Fathers' points of convergence is provided by Richard Hofstadter, "The Founding Fathers: An Age of Realism" in The American Political Tradition. And the Men Who Made it (1948, reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1988), pp. 3-22; Wood, The

necessary for a nation to make war and keep diplomatic relations with other nations. At the same time, the idea of a strong nation state was still deeply associated with tyranny and despotism. It is not surprising that contradictions and conflict grew out of the institutions created by the American Revolution, regardless of the compromises which made a central government barely palatable.[104]

Limited suffrage, based on a board of electors, was one of the issues which received less criticism from the opponents of the Constitution. Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist 68, "The mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States [aimed] to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder."[105]

Early National Agreements

The ratification of the Federal Constitution in 1787 gave consistency to American nationhood. The Constitution was the result of changes in the perception of the priorities necessary to stabilize the Revolutionary process and transform the rebellious colonies into a nation. The Constitutional debates were marked by intense conflicts about the division of powers, the nature of the

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Radicalism of the American Revolution, pp. 95-108. Joyce O. Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), especially chapter 6, "The Social Origins of American Revolutionary Ideology," pp. 161-187.

[104] According to Drew R. McCoy, on this level, "[T]he Revolution became a struggle to establish a society that would escape the decay and corruption that had overtaken so much of the Old World..." The Elusive Republic. Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), p. 48.

[105] See Publius (Alexander Hamilton), The Federalist Papers, Federalist XLVIII from 14 March, 1788. There has been no tumult in the Hamiltonian sense but the recent American electoral events showed that the system could enable a little disorder.

republican government, and the meaning of democracy and participation. American politics during the early national period also encompassed conflicts based on divergent economic interests, as the development of commerce and industry challenged the old patterns of economic life. If the modified political processes were not free of friction, yet they also had the merit of sustaining early revolutionary aspirations. Federalists blocked some democratic advances and restricted political participation. But these limitations operated inside the patterns given by the existing political culture. No "terror" appeared after the Constitutional Convention. Although the Constitution limited popular radicalism, it also provided a new set of rules and practices to organize the freedom Americans had inherited and fought for. The success of the Constitution made the American War for Independence the unique example of a Revolution that did not devour its sons.[106]

Early national integration was based on a series of compromises between the leading factions of the revolutionary movement. They supported independence in order to preserve local control against metropolitan interference. Acquiescence to a national organization was slow and pragmatic. Even the framing of the Constitution (one that unified American procedures), limited, but did not destroy, local prerogatives. By the middle of the 19th century, the main features of American politics were still notably local.

In spite of this decentralized construction, it would be inaccurate to say

[106] On the impression that American Revolution was failing in its libertarian promises during the first years of the Republic, see Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, pp. 393-96.

that no "state" at all developed in the United States. After independence, early Federal organization was based on the idea of a relatively weak but functional central state. Like most revolutions, the American experience began as a repudiation of the state, of power, and of authority in the name of liberty. Like most revolutions it ended with the revival of authority to tame the excesses of liberty. The need to create some articulation between the states was a permanent force in the process whereby the Continental Congress was replaced by a Federal Government. This process was not free of conflicts, but it did not take the dimensions of the Brazilian sanguinary struggles, because the inter-elite's degree of consensus was higher in the U.S. than in Brazil.[107]

Special circumstances pushed the Founding Fathers to promote what philosopher Hanna Arendt called "the constitutio libertatis," that is, the organization of liberty. In concrete terms the American leaders did not need to create an abstract idea of liberty (as the French revolutionaries did), because the tradition of civic republicanism had been very well rooted in the land. But it was necessary to establish norms for the operation of human rights in order to avoid the disastrous effect of factionalism and to assure it would not undermine the republic.[108]

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[107] Drew McCoy emphasized the roles of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, for whom, "the reorganization of American government was the necessary prerequisite of the establishment of a republican political economy." They envisioned America not as a virtuous agrarian economy, but "as a powerful, economically advanced modern state such as Great Britain..." The Elusive Republic, pp. 121, 133. The French Revolution and the revolt in Haiti confirmed the fears of some Founding Fathers, that democracy was a drug too dangerous to distribute at large.

[108] It is probably for that reason that Arendt emphasizes the fact that the American Revolution was the only that did not devour its sons. For Arendt's clarification of the concepts involved in the

According to Arendt, independence was not a move to the future, it was the juridical and constitutional sanction of a situation developed over the course of generations. The new origin, the revolutionary mutation, was not in the mythical idea of an impossible future. It was, rather, in the positive conviction of a past that could provide the guaranties for the future. More recent monographs, especially the works of Gordon Wood, Eric Foner and Edward Countrymen, have underlined the enormous transformations produced by the Revolution in the lives of ordinary individuals, emphasizing change and transformation in relation to the colonial past. But the concrete fact is that, by the middle of the 18th century, Americans had achieved degrees of literacy and political participation much higher than those of any other people in the Western Hemisphere.[109] Their institutions were more solid and stable, and their capacity for continuous improvement largely surpassed that of early 19th century Latin American Republics.

The organization of liberty meant the creation of institutional devices to order the relation between the states. The framing of the Constitution was a fundamental step for the achievement of an initial degree of unity. It provided a national unified government for the country. This government furnished the

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making of the American Revolution see, On Revolution (London: Faber and Faber, 1963), especially chapter 4, "Foundation I: Constitutio Libertatis," pp. 139-78. For a comparison between the French and the American revolutionary process see Georges Gusdorf, "Lés Revolutions de France et d"Amérique (Paris: Librairies Académique de Perrin, 1988).

[109] For the emergency of popular electoral franchise, see Wiebe, The Opening of American Society, 152-56.

essential framework for commercial development through the creation of a national market, public credit, a uniform decimal currency, and the protection of contracts. According to Stephen Skowronek, early America developed and maintained an integrated organization of institutions, procedures, and human talents whose peculiarity was "to control the use of coercion within the national territory." Following this line of thought, Americans built an "invisible kind of state." It was based on the general acceptance of a system of widespread rules and on the existence of some organizations, like the parties and courts, that had a national existence. Skrowoniek also points out that the United States certainly had a state, both in the sense of "an organization of coercive power" and in the sense of "stable, valued, and recurring modes of behavior within and among institutions, but such a system would only be crystallized during the 1830's."[110]

It was this kind of national state that made war against the Indians, arranged territorial disputes between the states which formed its internal constituents, maintained an integrated legal order on a territorial scale, aided economic development, and negotiated treaties with foreign nations. The fact that there was no clear perception of the state did not mean it did not exist. Despite the absence of a sense of the state, this structure was essential to the

[110] J. P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," in World Politics, Vol. XX, No. 4, July 1968, pp. 559-92. Stephen Skrowoniek, Building a New American State. The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (1982, Reprint, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 24-5.

maintenance of the social order and to social development in nineteenth-century America.[111]

Later conflicts between Federalist and Jeffersonian groups did not challenge the early pattern of national organization, nor did growing sectional differences. Territorial expansion, immigration and economic development kept the Union as the preferred solution for all contending interests as long as it did not disrupt sectional sources of power. Conciliatory agreements kept a stable balance of power between northern and southern sections as slavery was regulated by ordinances limiting its expansion in the north and west of the country.

The union of the thirteen British colonies as one nation and the adoption of the republican government were achieved because Revolutionary leaders considered it the best solution at the time. Disputes created by sectional differentiation were settled by compromises. If the Constitution solved some of the initial contradictions of this new republic, many other problems were kept intentionally unsolved. As territorial expansion and material development progressed, these contradictions became more visible and acute. Concern deepened regarding the nation's civic faith and the survival of its republican virtue in a context of territorial expansion and economic diversification. Protestant hegemony was challenged by foreign immigrants, especially Irish

[111] Ibid., pp. 26-37.

Catholics, whose method of worship and social behavior did not comport with colonial ideals.[112]

But the most important problem was slavery in the American South. Slowly this sectional division outgrew the compromises that knit the nation together and threatened its existence as a Union. Slavery and abolition would show how costly it could be to change the nature of political institutions when intransigent issues overwhelm the spirit of compromise and conciliatory demands fail to provide solutions to sectional differences.

Early Differences

By the 1820s Brazil and the United States had established different patterns of social development. The contrasts were most pronounced between Brazil and America's northern states. While the northeastern part of the United States changed rapidly due to industrialization, immigration and the growth of cities, many colonial features survived in Brazil: slave labor, the patronage system, a predominantly rural population, and the conservative character of dominant groups.

Although slavery existed in both countries, it was more firmly rooted in Brazil than in the United States. In Brazil, slavery was a national institution, while in America it was largely limited to the South. Although it created social and political problems for both societies, Brazilian inertia could have been shattered only by external pressures. The prohibition of the Atlantic traffic in slaves and the

[112] For a summary of these conflicts involving the impact of modernization over early notions of civic virtue see Leo Marx, The Machine on the Garden. Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in

war against Paraguay would become landmarks in the slow process of Brazilian emancipation. For Americans, however, slavery sparked an internal pattern of increasing sectional competition, the relevance of which would be felt more clearly after the 1820s.

America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

Chapter 2

The Coming of the Triple Alliance War: History and Historiography

From colonial times, Portugal and Spain disputed between themselves the amount of American territory in their colonial empires. In spite of its smaller resources (in terms of population and military power), Portugal did better in this geographical competition. From the initial Treaty of Tordesilhas (1494), that divided the world between Portugal and Spain, until the Treaties of Utrecht (1713), and Madrid (1750), when territorial disputes were settled on a more permanent basis, the Portuguese enlarged their territorial possessions in the South American sub-continent.[1] Such successes were obtained, partly due to the concentration of efforts on a single colony (after Portuguese restoration in 1640), partly due to the efforts of the "Bandeirantes," pioneers who penetrated the interior under Portuguese support, and partly due to the alliances established with England.[2]

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[1] For the Tordesilhas Treatise see Bailey W. Diffie and George D. Winnus, Foundations of the Portuguese Empire, 1450-1580 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), pp. 282-283. For Utrecht and Madrid Treatises see, J. H. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 266, 269-70.

[2] On the Bandeirantes as a historical phenomenon see Vianna Moog, Bandeirantes e Pioneiros. Paralelo entre Duas Culturas (Porto Alegre: Editora Globo, 1955), especially chapter III, "Conquista e Colonização," pp. 125-90, Richard Morse's "Introduction" in Richard M. Morse The Bandeirantes. The Historical Role of the Brazilian Pathfinders (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965),

The rhythms of such disputes also varied according to a set of metropolitan reforms that redefined the colonial administration during the second half of the 18th century (Bourbons in the Spanish side, Pombalinas in the Portuguese). In addition, competition between colonial groups and the extension of commercial links also played their part in the long disputes. By the end of the 18th century Brazilian limits were reasonably settled.[3]

The Portuguese Expansion and its Heritage

Even with such a successful background, Brazilian access to the rivers of the La Plata estuary was still subjected to territorial disputes with the Spanish speaking republics during the 19th century.[4] The tensions originating in these conflicts constantly challenged Brazilian capacity to keep in regular

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pp. 3-39. For a critical approach to Morse and Moog see David M. Davidson, "How the Brazilian West Was Won: Freelance & State on the Mato Grosso Frontier, 1737-1752 in Dauril Alden (ed.) The Colonial Roots of Modern Brazil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 61-106.

[3] For a general survey of the border disputes and administrative reforms during the 18th century, Kenneth Maxwell, Pombal: Paradox of Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), especially chapter 6, "War and Empire," pp. 95-118; see also Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, História de Portugal, Volume V, "A Restauração e a Monarquia Absoluta (1640-1750)" (Lisbon: Editorial Verbo, 1980), pp. 265-69. Territorial additions included the conquest of French Guyana and the Cisplatin Province (Uruguay), although these were lost later. The current state of Acre was added to Brazil in the first decade of the 20th century as well as parts of the Paraguayan territory between the rivers Apa and Pilcomayo that were conquered as a result of the peace treaty with Paraguay in 1871. On the Brazilian acquisition of Paraguayan territory see Harris G. Warren, "Brazil's Paraguayan Policy, 1869-1876," Americas vol. 28, n. 4 (April) 1972, pp. 3-24.

[4]Only in 1858 was there a treaty between Brazil and Paraguay concerning the free navigation of the Paraguayan river. See John Hoyt Williams, The Rise and Fall of The Paraguayan Republic, 1800-1870 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), p. 160, and "The Undrawn Line: Three Centuries of Strife on the Paraguayan-Mato Grosso Frontier" in Luso Brazilian Review Vol. 17, no. 1, 1980, pp. 17-40. See also Thomas Whigham, The Politics of River Trade (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1991), p. 76.

communication with its western provinces. After independence, such problems threatened the Empire's territorial integrity.[5]

Territorial expansion in colonial Brazil was achieved through a combination of public and private initiatives. Even taking into consideration that the interests of colonial freelancers and metropolitan bureaucrats did not always coincide, they shared responsibility for Portuguese penetration far beyond initial agreements permitted by treaty. If early Brazilian historiography viewed the Bandeirantes' intrepidness as the main factor behind territorial acquisition, more recent contributions have stressed the role of the Portuguese state as the main entrepreneur in territorial disputes with Spain. According to David M. Davidson:

> Portuguese freelancers were necessary to the winning of the West, but the state proved to be the sufficient agent. Freelancers settled isolated nuclei and revealed strategic rivers; the state defined such rivers as boundaries and in so doing gained an area far more extensive than that actually held or traveled by freelancers.[6]

Portugal lacked the resources for establishing strong bureaucratic surveillance and could not control her freelancers. A clear limit on Portuguese capabilities was shown in the lack of control of commerce in frontier areas. The Portuguese crown could neither prevent inter-colonial commerce between its settlements and the Spanish missions, nor restrict the autonomous actions of provincial leaders. The Emboabas War, a conflict involving Paulistas' settlers

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[5] La Plata Estuary or River Plate are terms used to designate a region cut by the Rivers Paraná, Uruguay and Paraguay that form the River Plate.

[6] Davidson, "How the Brazilian West Was Won," p. 106.

and Portuguese agents for the control of the mines, provided a clear signal where tensions could go.

As the mid-18th century Brazilian "gold rush" paid off and possession was confirmed, South American boundaries were altered. The Portuguese secured more than half of the continent's available lands as their possession, coming close to the estuary of the River Plate, the easier route to the Bolivian silver mines. And what is more important, local interests in frontier areas were crystallized in Brazil, and they would claim a broader set of rights and privileges for the colonists in the years ahead. Meanwhile, Gaúchos in Uruguay and Paulistas in Mato Grosso and Paraguay would keep pressuring the Portuguese colonial administration for new territorial acquisitions, especially after the fall of the Spanish Colonial Empire in 1808.[7]

During the 19th century, most of the disputes were over those lands, particularly around the River Plate region and Mato Grosso frontiers, where Brazilian border interests most intensely conflicted with those of their old colonial neighbors and future international rivals. As a result, after demarcation, most of the Brazilian interior was better connected with rivers whose courses crossed the territories of Spanish-speaking nations than with the Brazilian coast. Such was the case of the Brazilian province of Mato Grosso, whose best transportation route was made toward the Paraguay River. Such was also the case of the Missiones' region, in the province of São Pedro do Rio Grande do Sul. São

[7] Gaucho is the name by which the inhabitants of the old province and current state of Rio Grande do Sul are known. Paulistas is the designation for the inhabitants of São Paulo.

Borja, Missiones' most important center, was the home of a growing commerce with the Upper Plate, involving the Yerba Mate and the Tobacco trades. The processes of state formation, the growth of commercial interests, and access to the main rivers constituted the leading elements of disputes during the early years of autonomous existence of the new states of the region.[8] According to historian Sergio Buarque de Hollanda: "In Brazil the rivers, much more than the railroads, provided the main transportation. [Consequently] it was natural that the country sought to obtain almost every one of the River Plate's margins."[9]

The Consolidation of Independence and the Formation of a System of States

Independence brought a new phase in the long disputes over boundaries for the newly autonomous nations of South America.[10] Due to its higher degree of continuity, the Brazilian Empire was able to keep most of its bureaucratic structure and exert control over its territorial units. In particular the Empire had more effective control over distant regions than its neighbors on the Spanish

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[8] On the yerba mate production and its trade see Juan Carlos Garavaglia, "El Mercado Colonial y la Yerba Mate (siglos XVI-XIX), in Nova Americana, Volume 4, 1981, pp. 163-210, Vera Blinn Reber, "Commerce and Industry in Nineteenth Century Paraguay: The Example of Yerba Mate," in The Americas, 42 (1), 1985, pp. 29-53. John Hoyt Williams, "Paraguayan Isolation under Dr. Francia," in The Hispanic American Historical Review, 52, 1972, pp. 102-22 and Thomas Lile Whigham, The Politics of River Trade., especially part 2, "Export Commodities and Development in the Upper Plata, chapter 3, "Yerba Mate," pp. 105-07.

[9] Sergio Buarque de Hollanda, História Geral da Civilização Brasileira, Vol. 4 (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1974), p. 248.

[10] On territorial disputes after independence see Gordon Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America (1938, reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1978) and also Tulio Halpering Donghi, História da América Latina (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1975), especially chapter II, "A Crise da Independência", pp. 47-80.

side.[11] For the South American republics, the breaking of ties with Spain in the 1810s and 1820s brought full-fledged nationhood to only a few areas. In most instances, the continent's lengthy history of chaos only gradually gave way to more stable patterns of governance.[12]

As mentioned previously, the Portuguese colonial administration in South America created only a weak cohesion between the different regions that formed the entire colony.[13] Ties were not broken during the Napoleonic wars, as the Portuguese royal family migrated to Brazil (1808), establishing Rio de Janeiro as the capital of a United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and Algarve (1815). After Brazilian independence (1822), in strong contrast to the decentralization of the colonial period, the ruling elite opted for an aggressive centralization. This did not prevent completely the impulse of centripetal forces, but it helped to keep the country together, avoiding territorial fragmentation and political discontinuity.[14]

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[11] On Brazilian more stable transition from colonial to independent status see Zairo Cheibub, "Diplomacia, Diplomatas e Política Externa: Aspectos do Processo de Institucionalização do Itamaraty," MA Thesis, IUPERJ, 1984, Ron Seckinger, "O Estado Brasileiro e a Política Externa no Século XIX," in Revista Dados 19, 1978, pp. 111-33, and Moniz Bandeira, O Expansionismo Brasileiro. O Papel do Brasil na Bacia do Prata: Da Colonização ao Império.(Rio de Janeiro: Philobiblion, 1985).

[12] Jorge I. Dominguez, Insurrection or Loyalty: The Breakdown of the Spanish American Empire (Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Richard Graham, Independence in Latin America: A Comparative Approach (1972, reprint, New York: McGraw Hill, 1972); David Bushnell & Neill Macaulay, The Emergence of Latin America in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[13] A. J. R. Russel-Wood, "Local Government in Portuguese America: A Study in Cultural Divergence, " in Comparative Studies in Society and History, (16), 1974, pp. 187-231.

[14] The significance of the moving of the Portuguese royal family to Rio de Janeiro still deserves a complete study. For references see Kenneth R. Maxwell, "The Generation of the 1790's and the Idea of Luso-Brazilian Empire," in Dauril Alden (ed.), The Colonial Roots of Modern Brazil, pp. 107-38, João Camilo de Oliveira Torres, A Democracia Coroada Teoria Política do Império do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1957), and Oliveira Lima, Dom João VI no Brasil (Rio de

In contrast with the Brazilian situation, during the first decades after independence, the former viceroyalty of de La Plata, Brazil's most immediate neighbor, was involved for a long period in permanent warfare and political turmoil. These crises were linked to old colonial disputes, when the Spanish preference for Buenos Aires minimized the role of other cities in commercial exchanges. The Viceroyalty fragmented into more or less separate five countries: Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, and Bolivia.[15]

The Argentinean Confederation was formed by the province of Buenos Aires (led by its city-harbor of Buenos Aires), and its sister provinces of the "littoral" (along the Paraná River) and "the interior" (as were derogatorily called those provinces without river connections with Buenos Aires).[16] The arrogant attitude showed by Buonairenses in relation to the needs and demands of the interior was one of the principal causes of the country's divisions.[17] The nature of such rivalries was not restricted to territorial boundaries, but extended to differing notions of nation building, what Nicolas Shumway terms "guiding fictions." This

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Janeiro:Topbooks, 1995). Roderick Barman and Jean Barman, "The Role of the Law Graduate in the Political Elite of Imperial Brazil," in Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 4, November 1976, pp. 423-50.

[15] J.C. Brown, A Socioeconomic History of Argentina, 1776-1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Moniz Bandeira, O Expansionismo Brasileiro, pp. 86-97.

[16] Two good references for understanding the patterns of change and conflict in the relations between Buenos Aires and the provinces were written by James Francis McLynn during the 1980's. See "Economic Trends and Policies in Argentina during the Mitre Presidency" in Jahrbuch Fur Geschichte Vonstaat, Wirtshaft und Gesellschaft LateinAmerikas, n. 19, 1982, pp. 244-284, 1982 and "Political Instability in Cordoba Province During the Eighteen-Sixties," in Ibero-Amerikanished Archiv *N. F.*, J66, hf, 3, 1980.

[17] Buonairense, inhabitant of the province of Buenos Aires. Porteño, inhabitant of the city of Buenos Aires. Those categories were created during the 19th century when a new geography of the River Plate emerged.

resulted in an ill-defined sense of national identity and in the precariousness of Argentina's place in the new continental order after independence.[18]

Map 2 - South America by 1850

Source: La Politique du Brésil ou La Fermeture des Fleuves, 1867, Apendix.

Platine conflicts influenced regional politics as they involved the countries of the region in permanent tension. As a careful examination shows, most of the

[18] Nicolas Shamway, The Invention of Argentina (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 1-24.

conflicts in the River Plate region had as their causes Brazilian and Argentine intentions to preserve borders inherited from their colonial ancestors. If Brazilians succeeded quickly in this task, the less successful Argentineans kept trying for the rest of the century.[19]

Argentina and the Entropic Years

After the invasion of Spain by Napoleon's troops in 1808, the independence of the viceroyalty of La Plata became a question of time and opportunity. After a series of revolts, de facto independence came in May 1810.[20] However, political emancipation did not lead to the formation of a centralized state, that is, a state under the control of unified elites, centered in the province of Buenos Aires. Very soon the links with more distant regions, like those on the Upper Peru (current Bolivia), felt apart. An expedition commanded by general Manuel Belgrano tried to re-annex Paraguay, but local militias loyal to the Spanish Viceroy twice defeated it.[21] The Paraguayans established an independent state a few months later.[22] The Cisplatin Region (Uruguay), closer to the River Plate, was annexed after a long campaign by the Portuguese

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[19] Miron Burgin, The Economic Aspects of Argentine Federalism, 1820-1852 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946).

[20] John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782-1810: The Intendance System in the Viceroyalty of the Rio de La Plata (London: Athole Press, 1958).

[21] Loyalty to the Spanish Viceroy was more a question of opportunity than a commitment. For a summary of the events that led to the Paraguayan independence see Jerry W. Cooney, "The Rival of Doctor Francia: Fernando de La Mora and the Paraguayan Revolution," in Revista de Historia de America, No. 100, Mexico, July-Dec. 1985, pp. 201-29.

[22] About Paraguayan loyalty to the Vice-Roy and the fragmentation of the old Vice-Royalty and an accurate description of the events that led to the Paraguayan independence see John Hoyt Williams, The Rise and Fall of the Paraguayan Republic, 1814-1879, especially chapter II "José

government (then in exile at Rio de Janeiro), in 1816, and became part of the Brazilian-Portuguese Kingdon as the Cisplatin Province. In 1821 the Cisplatin Congress voted for provincial union with the United Kingdom of Brazil, Portugal, and Algarve. Portuguese and, after independence, Brazilians controlled the province until 1828.[23] By that time, as a result of the long war between Brazil and the United Provinces (1825-1828), Uruguay finally got its independence, becoming a buffer state between Brazil and Argentina. Thus, through British mediation, Uruguay became a nation-state, although its politics would be very sensitive to the conditions in the border countries.[24]

Initial fragmentation did not bring internal peace to the remaining parts of the Argentinean Confederation, nor end disputes between different groups of merchants and cattle ranchers. The newly independent areas, with the possible exceptions of Chile and Paraguay (that soon split away from Argentina), were not politically integrated in administrative or in social terms.[25] In most of these

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Gaspar de Francia and the Paraguayan Revolution", pp. 19-42; Thomas Whigham, Politics of River Trade in the Upper Plata, 1780-1870, p. 20-21.

[23] John H. Hann, "Brazil and the Rio de La Plata, 1808-1828", (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Florida, 1964).

[24] On the annexation of Uruguay see Ron Seckinger, op. cit., and Lindolfo Collor, Contribuições para a História da Guerra entre o Brasil e Buenos Aires (São Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1946). For a Uruguayan view of the situation see Alberto Zum Felde, Proceso Historico del Uruguay (Montevideo: Arca, 1967), especially chapter III, "La Cisplatina," pp. 71-110.

[25] Chile, because of its small population, and the concentration of political power in the hands of the Chilean Valley elite, did not face a prolonged period of disputes concerning "who would govern." With the Portales' dictatorship (1830-1837), an initial political cohesion was established, forging a sense of national unity and political integration that would prevail in the years ahead. For Paraguay, the ascension of the Dictator José Gaspar de Francia (1814) restricted any fractional competition. On the singularities of the Chilean elites see Alberto Edwards Vives, La Fronda Aristocrática en Chile (Santiago: Ediciones Ercilla, 1936). On the process of Chilean independence and its initial conditions see Robert N. Burr, By Reason or by Force. Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1839-1905 (1965, reprint Los Angeles: University of

provinces, endemic warfare between militia chiefs (caudilhos) undermined the few possibilities of control that the political center could exert over its extremities.[26]

The fact is that no side could achieve hegemony during Argentina's initial years of nationhood because all of them lacked the necessary military and financial resources to impose a permanent order. As a result, previously existent economic activities were deeply affected, as trade with the mining regions was interrupted. At the same time, bureaucratic capabilities were lost for decades as cruder representatives of local power, without expertise or experience, quickly substituted themselves for old vice royal employees.

Everything for a Nation

During the late 1820's, as Argentinean centripetal tendencies lost momentum, Juan Manuel de Rosas emerged to become Buenos Aires' paramount leader.[27] According to José Guilherme Merquior, Rosas' long regime (1829-1852) was a Hobbesian answer to Argentina's lack of institutional order. Although he was a man of the provinces, Rosas' ascension made him a champion of Porteño aspirations to a larger degree of control over the

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California Press, 1974), especially chapter II, "The Foundations of National Power," pp. 12-32. On the Paraguayan independence process see Julio César Chaves, História de las Relaciones entre Buenos Aires y el Paraguay , 1810-1813 (Buenos Aires: 1949) and El Supremo Dictador (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1964).

[26] For works on social and institutional history focusing in the linkages between families and state in early Argentina see Suzan M. Socolow, The Merchants of Buenos Aires, 1778-1810: Family and Commerce (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), and Mark D. Szuchman, Order, Family, and Community in Buenos Aires, 1810-1860 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987).

[27] According to Argentinean historian Tulio Halperin Donghi, "The ascension of caudilhismo (big bosses), led to "a generalizing ruralization of Porteño basis of power." See his Revolución y

provinces.[28] It also allowed the exercise of a level of social control in Spanish South America rivaled only by the Francia's regime in Paraguay.[29] The main expressions of this power included the control of the rivers in the La Plata estuary and growing tax oppression. With Rosas, river blockades became a tool for permanent blackmail of some areas dependent on open rivers. Due to a tradition of self-sufficiency, some regions, like Paraguay, were able to live in isolation, but the economies of the coastal provinces of Cordoba, Entre-Rios and Corrientes, and even parts of Uruguay were deeply affected by political instability, as pró and anti-Rosas tendencies fought for local power.[30]

Rosas' determination to keep control of the rivers of the Platine system enabled the formation of a powerful anti-Rosas alliance between the Brazilian government and the dissident caudilho Justo José de Urquiza, leader of the Entre-Rios province. Urquiza had been the main Rosista general in that region,

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Guerra: Formación de una Elite Dirigente en la Argentina Criolla (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1994), especially the Conclusion, pp. 380-94.

[28] José Guilherme Merquior, "Padrões de Construção do Estado no Brasil e na Argentina" in John Hall (ed.), Os Estados na História (Rio de Janeiro: Imago, 1992), p. 389.

[29] Similarities between Francia and Rosas' autocracies are restricted to social control because Francia tried to destroy the Paraguayan Creole elites and their peninsular allies in order to forge a nationality. Rosas, in an opposite situation, permitted the crystallization of a cohesive group, centered in the Buenos Aires province. This way, as the action of Francia transformed and even democratized the property relations in the Paraguayan rural world, Rosas, on the contrary, led to an enlargement of the process of oligarquization of the agrarian power in Argentina. For a good biography of Francia see José Ramos Meijia, Rosas y El Dr. Francia (Madrid: Editorial América, 1917), Julio César Chaves, El Supremo Dictador. Biografia de José Gaspar de Francia (4th edition, Madrid: 1964). For a political examination of Francia's government philosophy see Adriano Irala Burgos, La Ideologia del Doctor Francia (Asuncion: 1975).

[30] For Rosas' government I have followed: John Lynch, Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel de Rosas, 1829-1852 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); Carlos Malamud, Juan Manuel de Rosas (Madrid: Ediciones Quorum, 1987); Oscar Ozslack, La Formación del Estado Argentino. Orden, Progresso y Organización Nacional (Buenos Aires: Planeta Argentino, 1997), especially chapter 5, "Azar, Lógica o Voluntad?," pp. 260-74; and Maria Ligia Prado, A Formação das Nações Latino-Americanas (São Paulo: Unicamp, 1987).

but turned against his master as tensions grew.[31] Such an alliance reflected regional integration as well as transformations in the Argentinean economy with her integration into the international commerce in wool. The cattle ranchers wished peace in order to consolidate the economic stability achieved during the Rosas years. Ironically, the same nationalistic goals that forged Rosas' power led to his fall, as navy blockades undermined commercial development. Consequently, Rosas lost momentum among his most important supporters. On the other hand, the Brazilian government saw with rising concern the support given by Rosas to the Blanco party in Uruguay, because Blanco's supremacy affected that country's neutrality as a buffer state. Brazilian Gaúchos were sensitive to any fluctuations in Uruguayan politics. The Farrapos's revolt, Brazilian longer sectional crisis, had just ended in 1845, when, after more than ten years of conflict, Rio Grande do Sul was reintegrated into the Empire.[32] Rosas's interference in Uruguay was considered a threat that could not be tolerated by the Imperial government, because it brought the possibility of renewed civil war to Gauchos' politics. For the second time in twenty years, a

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[31] For an Urquiza's biography see Beatriz Bosh, Urquiza y su Tiempo (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1971).

[32] The Farrapos' War was the longest sectional movement in Brazilian history. From 1835 to 1845 the province of Rio Grande do Sul seceded from the Empire proclaiming the Piratiny Republic. In 1845 military stress and long negotiations brought the province back to the Empire. Farrapos' leaders were pardoned and many of their provincial goals were achieved. For a good analysis of this revolt see Alfredo Varela, História da Grande Revolução (Porto Alegre: 1925), 6. Volumes, Spencer Leitman, Raízes Sócio-Econômicas da Guerra dos Farrapos (Porto Alegre: Graal, 1979), and José Hildebrando Dacanal (ed.), A Revolução Farropilha: História e Interpretação (Porto Alegre: Mercado Aberto, 1985).

question involving Uruguayan politics became the key for Brazilian international intervention.[33]

Brazil was the only country of the region with a permanent navy and a capacity to retaliate which was greater than Rosas's capacity to counterpoise attacks. Urquiza counted then on Brazilian support when he organized an army that would defeat the dictator in the battle of Caseros (1852), opening the window for a more decentralized political order in the Argentina during the following decade. A new project for Argentina was under way. With the formation of an allied government in Uruguay, Brazilians got a treaty of boundaries, commerce, and friendship, signed on October 12, 1851. This treaty regulated the deportation of runaway slaves and the exemption from taxes of the cattle crossing from Uruguay to the Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul.[34]

During the 1850's, neither the province of Buenos Aires nor the Argentinean Confederation accumulated enough force to impose its goals on the rest of the country.[35] Federalists kept control of most of the nation and framed a constitution in 1853. Justo José de Urquiza, Argentina's first constitutional president, foresaw an enlargement of autonomy for the provinces under the umbrella of a rebuilt Argentinean Confederation. As observed by Oscar Oszlack,

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[33] On the political goals of Blanco and Colorado political parties see Juan Pivel Devoto, História de Los Partidos y de las Ideas Políticas en el Uruguay: La Definición de los Bandos, 1829-1838 (Montevideo: Paidos, 1956).

[34] Moniz Bandeira, O Expansionismo Brasileiro, p. 192. From Rosa's defeat until the outbreak of the Paraguayan War, the Brazilian government had considerable influence on the Uruguayan internal policy, transforming that country into an economic satellite.

this solution did not encompass the province of Buenos Aires, still in command of the Plata estuary and its taxes. Porteños refused to participate in the Confederation, rejecting a project of national integration that did not fit their interests and needs.[36] As noted by writer Juan Bautista Auberdi "There was no Argentinean government because there was no Argentinean Republic in the old meaning of such a term." [37]

The province of Buenos Aires slowly recovered from the battle of Caseros and rebuilt its political power, gradually imposing its prerogatives and undermining both the Confederation's economy and Urquiza's leadership. Many years of struggle would still be necessary until that province's ruling elite would suppress, completely, regional impulses and impose on the Federalists a final defeat between 1860 and 1880.[38]

When the Triple Alliance War came (1864), Porteño power was in the middle of its long struggle against a weakened (but not dead) Confederation. It was not clear which side would win the provinces. There was no political center capable of mobilizing enough resources to build a strong army, or a unified

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[35] The Argentinean Confederation was an entity that congregated all provinces opposing Buenos Aires under a single political confederation. It existed from 1852 to the early 1860's when Buenos Aires finally reduced the other provinces to submission.

[36] Oscar Oszlak, La Formación del Estado Argentino, pp. 58-59. For a synthesis of the argument in English see his "The Historical Formation of the State in Latin America: Some Theoretical and Methodological Guidelines for Its Study," Latin American Research Review, vol. XVI, no. 2, 1981, pp. 3-32.

[37] Quoted in Earle D, Macarthy Moreira, "Alberdi e a Guerra do Paraguai. Decodificação de um Texto Polêmico," in Veritas, Vol. 35, no. 140, 1990, p. 565.

[38] On the metamorphosis of the Unitario action see Shumway, The Invention of Argentina, pp. 168-214, and Daniel E. Zalzar, La Evolución de las Ideas de Domingo F. Sarmiento (Sommerville, N.J., SLUSA, 1987).

infrastructure of services to unify the country.[39] Although Argentina was at war with Paraguay, in many provinces Porteños, not Paraguayans, were perceived as the enemy. In these circumstances, the Triple Alliance War, in spite of its international significance, can also be viewed as an essential event in the continuous civil war in which Argentina was immersed during most of the nineteenth century. For Leslie Bethell, the War of The Triple Alliance "was a regional civil war although it had international dimensions." For Uruguayan historian Jose Pedro Barrán the war meant, in the geopolitical perspective, "a triumph of the classical Bismarckian expedient of defeating local resistance through a national war."[40]

The important fact to keep in mind is that the result of the war of the Triple Alliance reinforced the dominion of the central governments of Brazil and Argentina over their rebellious provinces' attempts to establish a new status quo in the region. After the War, international political competition would occur under a system of states dominated by a bi-polar hegemony. The Paraguayan government and the Uruguayan nationalistic faction would no longer challenge this new situation.

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[39] For the importance of the Triple Alliance War for the Argentinean state-building see Fred Murphy, "Latin American State Formation in Regional Context" The Case of Argentina in the War of the Triple Alliance," The Working Paper Series, New School for Social Research, n. 71.

[40] On the Argentinean influence in the events that lead to the outbreak of the Triple Alliance War, see James Francis McLynn, "The Causes of the War of the Triple Alliance: An Interpretation," in Inter-American Economic Affairs, Volume XXXIII, n. 2, Autumn 1979, pp. 21-43.Leslie Bethell, "Introdução" in Maria Eduarda Castro Magalhães Marques (ed.), Guerra do Paraguai. 130 Anos Depois (Rio de Janeiro: Relume Dumará, 1995), p. 22. Pedro Barrán, "Apogeo y Crisis del Uruguay Caudillesco, 1839-1875" in História Uruguaya, Tomo 4, p. 97.

Paraguay: The Limits of Isolation and Integration

Since its end, in 1870, the War of the Triple Alliance has been subjected to a variety of interpretations. Some approaches praise the progress of the Paraguayan state before the war, while other interpretations emphasize savagery and dictatorship as permanent features of the Paraguayan regime during the ante-bellum period (1810-1864). The fact is that Paraguayan society, during this period, diverged from those of its neighbors not because it was entirely unique, but because some common features of Latin America institutional developments were enlarged.[41] The debate has underlined the size and power of the Paraguayan state, in contrast with the weakness of its civil society and institutions. This fact impressed the few travelers that were permitted to visit the country during the "Franciata," and those foreigners who settled and stayed after Francia's death (1840). It still impresses those who compare decision-making in Paraguay with similar processes in other Latin American areas during the same period. But strong states and weak institutions were present in other nations as well, differing mostly in their dimensions, not in their importance.

During the 1960s and 1970s some analysts saw the destruction of Paraguay as a defeat of "Latin American endogenous reason." Such a perspective presented Paraguay as an original society in permanent struggle

[41] In spite of recent interest in Paraguayan history in the United States, very little has been written concerning the social history of Paraguay. One of the few recent exceptions is Jerry W. Cooney and Thomas L. Whigham (eds.) El Paraguay Bajo los López. Algunos Ensayos de Historia Social y Política. (Asuncion: Centro Paraguayo de Estudios Sociológicos, 1994).

against British, Brazilian, and Porteño interests. According to such interpretations, Paraguayan resistance to a more effective integration in Platine commerce and its isolation in relation to the Platine economic agenda was at the root of the War's outbreak. These analysts view the Triple Alliance as a lost cause of Latin American anti-imperialist struggle against the forces of capital, which demanded integration and subordination.[42]

Recent interpretation by authors like John Hoyt Williams, Diego Abente, Thomas Whigham, Ricardo Salles, Vitor Izecksohn and Leslie Bethell have questioned such a "dependentista approach."[43] According to such critics, the Paraguayan War is best understood as the outcome of changes in the region's system of states, and as part of a political process that began with the

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[42]In 1979, the same year Sandinistas defeated Anastácio Somoza, a Nicaraguan historian Jose Alfredo Fornos Peñalba defended a dissertation at the University of California that would become the most representative work of revisionist research. His The Fourth Ally: Great Britain and the War of the Triple Alliance, presented England as mainly responsible for the destruction of independent Paraguay. English financial support to the members of the Triple Alliance was stressed as the differential factor in the Allies' victory. See also his "Draft Dodgers, War Resisters and Turbulent Gauchos: The War of the Triple Alliance Against Paraguay," The Americas, Vol. 38, No. 4, 1982, pp. 463-79.

[43]Dependency Theory is a school of interpretation that flourished during the 1960's and found its zenith during the 1970's. This line of research focuses on the problem of foreign penetration in the political economies of Latin America. This theory explains underdevelopment throughout Latin America as a consequence of outside political and economic influence. For many researchers the War of the Triple Alliance appeared to be an excellent illustration of the validity of dependency theory. See Ronald H. Chilcote, "Dependency: A Critical Synthesis of the Literature," Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 1, 1974, pp. 4-29. For classic examples of the Dependency approach, see especially Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faleto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979) and Peter Evans, Dependent Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). A historical analysis of the emergence of Dependency Theory is found in Gary Gereffi, The Pharmaceutical Industry and Dependency in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), chap I. The most thorough criticism of the mechanical application of dependency to the Paraguayan case is offered by Diego Abente, "The War of the Triple Alliance: Three Explanatory Models," in Latin American Research Review, Vol. XXII, No. 2, 1987, pp. 47-60.

independence of South American colonies and their institutionalization as nation states.[44]

Structural transformations related to advances in centralization and changing political capabilities implied great transformations in the region's international relations. Paraguayan diplomacy underestimated such transformations, pushing the country into a war that was disastrous for its organization as an independent state. In order to give a better picture of the situation, we must outline Paraguayan historical development from Independence until the outbreak of the Triple Alliance War, in December of 1864.

The Route to Autonomy

Paraguayan history between independence, in 1810, and the outbreak of the War of the Triple Alliance, in 1864, is the subject of one of the most fascinating debates among Latin American specialists. The first sixty years of Paraguayan existence as an independent state have been treated as a period of authoritarian rule, and, later, by revisionist historians, as a period of progress and relative social justice.[45] The analyses of the amount of personal power achieved

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[44] Abente, "The War of the Triple Alliance;" Ricardo Salles, Guerra do Paraguai: escravidão e cidadania na formação do Exército (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1990), Thomas L. Whigham, The Politics of River Trade, Vítor Izecksohn, "O Cerne da Discórdia. " A Guerra do Paraguai e o Núcleo Profissional do Exército," MA Thesis, IUPERJ, 1992, and Leslie Bethell, "O Imperialismo Britânico e a Guerra do Paraguai" in Maria Eduarda Castro Magalhães Marques (ed.), A Guerra do Paraguai. 130 Anos Depois (Rio de Janeiro: Relume Dumara, 1995), pp. 131-50.

[45] For the critics see the classical works of Horton Pelham Box, Origins of the Paraguayan War, 2 vols. (Urbana: Illinois, 1927), and Augusto Tasso Fragoso, História da Guerra entre a Tríplice Aliança e o Paraguay (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa do Estado Maior do Exército, 1934), 5 vols. These authors wrote narratives of diplomatic history that followed the Empire's line of reasoning, viewing the War as a conflict that opposed civilization (the Brazilian Empire) against barbarism

by different dictators and of the high degree of state interference in economic activities exemplify this disagreement. Many such interpretations are centered on the long government of José Gaspar Rodrigues de Francia, Paraguay's first dictator, who directed the country's resistance against Argentinean expansionism.[46]

At the time of Paraguayan independence Francia was one of the few men in the country who were capable of governing. He held a high degree in Canonical Law, from the prestigious University of Cordova, and combined great intellectual capabilities with a permanent opposition to both Porteños and Peninsulares. During the process of independence, these qualifications pushed him to the highest post of the republic, from which Francia conducted his long government, struggling constantly against foreign influence in domestic issues.[47] He was able to eliminate competing factions of Paraguayan oligarchies, breaking the back of the Creole elite and smashing the power of Spanish merchants.

(the Paraguayans and their dictator). For examples of revisionist approaches in English see Gilbert Phelps, Tragedy of Paraguay (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975) and Charles Kolinski, Independence or Death! The Story of the Paraguayan War (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1965), E. Nicholas Tate, "Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth Century: The Case of Paraguay, 1811-1870," Ibero-Amerikanishes Archiv Vol. 5, no. 1 (1979), pp. 39-70, and Henryk Szlajfer, "Against Dependent Capitalist Development in Nineteenth-Century Latin America: The Case of Haiti and Paraguay," Latin American Perspectives, Issue 48, Vol. 13, no. 1, winter 1986, pp. 19-44. For a critical review of these works see Edy Kaufman, Authoritarianism in Paraguay: The Lesser Evil?," Latin American Research Review, Vol. XIX, no. 2, 1984, pp. 193-207.

[46] For traveler's accounts about Paraguay see Johann R. Rengger and Marcel Longshamp, The Reign of Dr. Joseph Gaspard Roderick de Francia in Paraguay (London: 1827), Edward a. Hopkins "The Republic of Paraguay Since the Death of the Dictator Francia." American Review (September 1847), pp. 255-256, and Charles Blacksford Mansfield, Paraguay, Brazil and the Plate. Letters Written in 1852-53 (Cambridge, 1856).

[47] For a general survey of the intellectual environment in the University of Cordova during the last quarter of the 18th century see Bernard Moses, "The Colonial University of Cordova," in Richard E. Greenleaf, The Roman Church in Colonial Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knoppf, 1971), pp. 129-37.

Sequentially, Francia's determination to subordinate the army and to restrain the Church's influence gave him a degree of personal control over the entire country that justified his title "El Supremo" (The Supreme).[48]

As a consequence of Paraguayan independence, contacts with the exterior were constantly broken because of the permanent hostility of international rivals and exiled adversaries based in the Platine region.[49] This isolation has been erroneously taken for granted by some authors, to underline a hypothetical Paraguayan desire for complete autonomy and independent development. Recent research has emphasized Paraguayan insistent, although unsuccessful, efforts to re-establish regular commercial links with foreign countries.[50]

Paraguay's isolation during Francia's regime was not self-imposed; rather it resulted from political instability in the region. After independence, conflicts between the new nations in the Rio de La Plata were frequent. These conflicts included Paraguay's victorious defense of her independence against the Provisional Government of Buenos Aires in 1811; the Portuguese invasion of Uruguay six years later; Argentina's conflict with Brazil from 1825 to 1828; Uruguayan interest in the Guerra dos Farrapos (1835-1845); and the effective

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[48] The best literary appreciation about Francia's personality and government is Augusto Roa Bastos, Yo el Supremo (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Argentina Editores, 1964).

[49] For a delineation of the faction struggles in the Upper Plate during this period see Richard Aleen White, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, 1810-1840 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978).

[50] For an overview of the isolationist issue see John Hoyt Williams, "Paraguayan Isolation Under Dr. Francia" A Re-evaluation" in The Hispanic American Historical Review, Volume 52, 1972, pp. 102-22.

alliance of the Argentine provinces of Entre-Rios and Corrientes with Uruguay and Brazil against the government of Juan Manuel Rosas (1852). As a consequence of such events, the Paraguayan state grew in permanent international tension in direct proportion to Francia's rising power within it.

Table I
Brazilian Interventions in the River Plate - Main Episodes, 1816- 1870

Campaign	Duration	Countries Involved	Forces Used	Resolution
Uruguayan Annexation	1816-1821	Vice reign of River Plate Portuguese United Kingdom	Portuguese Colonial Army and Navy	Portuguese Military victory
Cisplatine War	1826-1828	Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina	Army, Navy, National Guard	British Arbitration
Intervention Against Rosas	1864-1865	Brazil Uruguay, and Argentina.	Army and National Guard	Brazilian Military Victory
Intervention in Uruguay	1864-1865	Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay	Army, Navy, National Guard, and Volunteers	Brazilian Military Victory

Sources: Tulio Halpering Donghi, História da América Latina and Joaquim Nabuco, Um Estadista do Império

During Francia's government a national identity crystallized in Paraguay. Such an identity was rooted in a number of distinct factors such as the country's position in the River Plate region, its permanent exposure to Argentine instability, and its isolation because of rivalries with the Porteños and Brazilians. Finally, the ethnic composition of the Paraguayan people, mostly descending from Spanish Creoles and Guarany's Indians, and the widespread use of the Guarany language as the lingua franca, facilitated the perception of their ethnic identity as something distinct from the white, European society to the south in Buenos Aires.[51]

[51] For this point see Juan Carlos Garavaglia, "Soldados y Campesinos: Dos Siglos en la Historia Rural del Paraguay in Suplemento Antropológico, Paraguay, 1986, pp. 7-71.

In addition to symbolic and geopolitical considerations, Francia gave special attention to the condition of the peasants. He developed a policy of access to land and supported a flourishing subsistence economy in order to create a social basis for support among his countrymen. His government also undertook lucrative land expropriations that provided the government with substantial rents. The expropriated lands became State Estancias, that is, they were converted into public lands and used as a tool of state control in order to ensure the peasants' loyalty against the Hispanic oligarchs. Together, such policies were more than sufficient to keep Paraguayans united against the interests of Platine oligarchies and helped to support the three dictatorial regimes that succeeded from 1814 through 1870. But Paraguay was neither progressive nor a precursor of twentieth-century leftist nationalism. It was just a small nation in a desperate struggle for survival, adapting protectionist practices from the Bourbons' administrative reforms.[52]

Carlos Antonio López and Paraguay's Golden Age

In contrast to its earlier years as an independent state, the decade of 1850's was a time of progress and expansion for the small Republic of Paraguay. With the consolidation of Carlos Antonio López's dictatorship (1844-1862), the country entered into a developmental boom, concurrently with a great effort to open its external commerce, after decades of stagnation. These

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[52] On the agricultural reforms and the relations between the Paraguayan state and the peasants there is an interesting debate in John Hoyt William, "Paraguay's Nineteenth-Century Estancias de La Republica," in Agricultural History, Vol. XLVII, n. 4, October 1973 pp. 206-15 and Vera Blinn

developments resulted in political gains for the power groups that directed the country's destiny. They also resulted in much greater involvement in the region's political problems. In the face of new international issues, neutrality would be kept as the tone of Paraguayan foreign policy as long as Carlos Antonio López ruled.

Having inherited a unified nation from his predecessor, the paradigmatic José Gaspar de Francia (1768-1840), López (the father) did not have to face the problems his neighbors confronted in the Platine region. Paraguay had no secessionist movement nor an articulated opposition. These conditions, in addition to the political isolation, reinforced the role of the central state as the country's main entrepreneur, maintaining a tradition that, according to Thomas L. Whigham, had been established by the Spanish bureaucrats during the late eighteenth century. Carlos Antonio López enlarged the state's capacities by legalizing its control over foreign commerce. The monopolies over yerba mate and tobacco gave the government substantial incomes, decreasing the importance of taxes in the nation's economy.

López's land polices were not free of personal interests. In many cases, expropriations reverted to the López family, which quickly became the country's largest oligarchy. In spite of that, there is no evidence that peasants' access to land was menaced. Until the outbreak of the War of the Triple Alliance the

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Reber, "Commerce and Industry in Nineteenth Century Paraguay: The Example of Yerba Mate" in The Americas (42), n. 01, 1985, pp. 29-53.

development of agricultural exports did not interfere with the small farmers. Social peace was maintained in the fields.[53]

During the 1850's foreign technicians, most of them English, supervised this program of economic modernization. These came to implement the main governmental projects, like Asuncion's Arsenal and shipyards, the Ybicuy Ironworks, the construction of the Asuncion-Vila Rica railroad and the extensions of the telegraphic net connecting Asuncion to the main villages and military outposts of the country. Of all the economic initiatives of Carlos Antonio López's government, the most ambitious was certainly the hiring of almost two hundred European technicians with the express objective of quickly modernizing the nation's infrastructure.[54]

Solano López and the Paraguayan Diplomatic shift

It is impossible to understand the causes of the Triple Alliance War without referring to the importance of personal decisions in history. Modern readers may object that it is superficial, or inherently conservative, to emphasize these factors of personality without considering the question of what there was in the Paraguayan politics that prevented the development of any viable alternative

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[53] "Although opportunities to export increased with improved roads and the more favorable commercial policies of Carlos Antonio López, the type of subsistence crops grown did not change from the colonial era...Over half the Paraguayans were small property holders, while the remaining farmers either rented land of utilized unoccupied land." Vera Blinn Reber, "Small Farmers in the Economy: The Paraguayan Example, 1810-1865," The Americas, Vol. 51, no. 4, April 1995, p. 499.

[54] On the contribution of such technicians to Paraguayan development see, Josephina Pla, Los Britanicos en el Paraguay, 1850-70 (Asuncion: Arte Nuevo Editores, 1984). On Paraguayan advance during the López regime see Thomas Lyle Whigham, "The Iron Works of Ybicui: Paraguayan Industrial Development in the Mid-Nineteenth Century" in The Americas (35), 1978, pp. 201-18.

to the leadership of Francisco Solano Lopez. Nonetheless, taking into consideration the extreme centralization of Paraguayan society and the importance of its leaders in the decision-making processes, one is led to the conviction that only a framework emphasizing personal choices makes sense. During the 1860's Paraguayans were victims of both changes in the region's political structure and shifts in Paraguayan foreign policy. Together, such facts became pivotal for the catastrophic decisions taken by López's son, which led to a war that Paraguay could not win.

When C.A. López died, in 1862, his legacy was a progressive one, in terms of both economic development and the higher degree of social stability. His elder son, Francisco Solano López, succeeded C.A. López. However, with the ascension of Solano López, foreign affairs and militaristic issues dominated the Paraguayan political scene on a scale never before achieved. Solano López inherited a country without great internal problems, endowed as it was with a high degree of social cohesion. Ironically, it was probably the consciousness of such basic unity that enabled the new Paraguayan dictator to make the disastrous decisions that led the country to enter a war that would destroy its political order.

Solano López's personality remains an enigma for historians. The Lópezes were the closest thing to an oligarchy Paraguay produced in her first sixty years as an independent nation. Having traveled through Europe and in the Platine countries in diplomatic missions during the 1850's, Solano López possessed military and diplomatic skills that made him the natural successor to

his father. Notwithstanding this background, López early developed a more arrogant and centralist approach to both military and diplomatic issues that contrasted with the brutal simplicity of his predecessors. In contrast to the neutrality of his father's diplomacy, Solano López aimed for a larger degree of influence for Paraguay in Platine matters and developed a militaristic approach to diplomatic issues, including extensive mobilizations of the Paraguayan population in the countryside.[55]

Nevertheless, Paraguayan diplomacy even under Solano Lopez seems to have been governed by a sincere wish to keep a fictitious balance of power in the region at any price.[56] The efforts employed by Solano López to end the Argentinean Civil War in 1862 seem to show his equivocal understanding that Paraguay's great enemy was the Brazilian Empire, not a restored Argentinean Federation.[57] Events would show this to be López's fateful mistake.[58]

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[55] In the Paraguayan case another factor impelling the decision to go to war could be what Thucydides called "honor," that is a sense of being valuated, a sense of being respected, a sense of prestige. See Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (London: Penguin, 1972), especially Book I, pp. 35-123. The theme of "honor" as the main motive for going to war has been recently recovered by Donald Kagan, an admirer of Thucydides' approach. See his On the Origin of War and The Preservation of Peace (New York: Anchor Books, 1996). According to Kagan honor has been a more common reason for the outbreak of conflicts than many economic and political designs.

[56] On the ambivalence of the application of the concept of "Balance of Power" for the Platine scenario see Diego Abente, The War of The Triple Alliance: Three Explanatory Models, pp. 47-67, and Vitor Izecksohn, O Cerne da Discórida chap. I, "A Guerra do Paraguay – Alguns Esclarecimentos Necessários," pp. 10-27. On the concept of "Balance of Power" see Ernest Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept and Propaganda" in James N. Rosenau (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policies: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 318-29.

[57] For the story of Paraguayan diplomacy during the Argentinean Civil War see Juan E. O'Leary, El Paraguay en La Unificacion Argentina (Asuncion: Instituto Paraguayo de Cultura, 1976).

[58] For an appreciation of the role of Argentina in the outbreak of the Triple Alliance War see F. J. McLynn, "The Causes of the Triple Alliance: An Interpretation" in Inter-American Economic Affairs, Volume XXIII, n. 2, Autumn 1979, pp. 21-44.

The Uruguayan Crisis

In 1863 a civil war started in Uruguay involving the parties Blanco (then in power) and Colorado. This civil strife also involved Brazilian and Argentinean interests in Uruguay. Gaúcho cattle ranchers never followed the classical conception of a territorial boundary dividing Brazil and Uruguay. According to José Pedro Barrán, Brazilian citizens controlled 30% of Uruguayan territory in the 1860s. By 1860 Brazilians were the most important foreign group living in Uruguay, accounting for 10 to 20 per cent of her population.[59] The Blanco party adopted a policy of "borders nationalization," that is, to tax Brazilian citizens and control the movements of their cattle and slaves in the Uruguayan border regions.[60] Gaúcho leaders pressed the Imperial government to support the Colorado Party, which favored their interests but was out of the power. The Brazilian diplomat José Antonio Saraiva, plenipotentiary in Uruguayan matters, directed an "appeal" to the Blanco government on May 12, 1864, demanding that the Uruguayan government should:

> [T]ake into consideration our complaints over the serious offenses made against Brazilian subjects residing in Uruguay, whose property, honor, and life did not find protection, protection [that is] warranted by the Constitution of the same republic, in reason of which Brazil and the Argentinean Confederation consented to her political existence.[61]

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[59]José Pedro Barrán, "Barrán, "Apogeo y Crisis del Uruguay Caudillesco," p. 82.

[60] Thus in opposition of the 1851 agreement.

[61] A summary of the Uruguayan events can be found at Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Relatório da Repartição de Negócios Estrangeiros Apresentado à Assembléia Geral Legislativa na Terceira Sessão da Décima-Segunda Legislatura pelo Respectivo Ministro e Secretário de Estado, João Pedro Dias Vieira, Rio de Janeiro, Typographia Universal de Laemmert, 1865, pp. 1-28.

There were many motives behind Brazilian interventionist behavior in Uruguay. Some of them were linked to the latent tensions with the Spanish-speaking republics that had never been resolved after the end of the colonial period.[62] For this reason, during the 19th century, Brazil intervened many times in River Plate affairs. Brazilian intervention and the military support given to the Colorados in Uruguay deeply irritated the Paraguayan government because there were treaties of mutual defense between Paraguay and Uruguay.[63]

The Paraguayan evaluation of the 1864 crisis did not take into account the important institutional transformations that were taking place in the region, following the failure of the Argentinean federalism. The consolidation of national states around projects of centralization led to a decrease in the power of provincial leaders. The emergence of Bartolomé Mitre as president of a united Argentina meant a program of "modernization" and "civilization," that is, of the transformation of Argentina into a modern society, deeply integrated into the capitalist world system. As a consequence of such structural changes, many of the Argentinean provincial leaders, tempted by material progress and modernization, opted for submission to a centralized order. At the same time, reintegration of the province of Rio Grande do Sul into the Empire by 1845 also

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[62] In 1811, troops under the leadership of D, Diogo de Souza invaded the Uruguayan territory, granting land concessions to Brazilian and Portuguese citizens. See Moniz Bandeira, O Expansionismo Brasileiro, p. 73.

[63] According to Fred Murphy, until 1855 the Brazilian Empire kept 5000 military troops based in Uruguay. According to the same author, 15% of the Uruguayan population, by that time, were Brazilian Gauchos. They occupied 30% of Uruguayan territory. Fred Murphy, "Latin American State Formation in Regional Context," p. 9.

restored Brazilian interventionist capabilities in the River Plate. Although national integration was still far from complete, Brazil and Argentina were much more stable and solid nations by the middle of the 1860's than they had ever been before. That situation is defined by Diego Abente as "Power Transition," that is, one where the main country players cannot understand correctly the shifts through which a system of states is going.

The Paraguayan government counted on the support of those same 'caudilhos' and dissident oligarchies that opposed Buenos Aires in her long struggle for nationhood. López expected cooperation from the political chief of Argentina's Entre-Rios province, Justo José de Urquiza. Such support never materialized, as Urquiza graduálly moved to accept the new rules and procedures establish for political competition in Argentina. Those new rules enabled greater prosperity in the pampas even while they diminished the chances of people like Urquiza to come to power. Finally, the Paraguayan dictator also expected that the presence of slaves would undermine the operational capabilities of the Brazilian Army. The problem with such calculations is that they were based on the previous international situation, not taking into account the modifications that had taken place in the region.

In response to Brazilian intervention in Uruguay, Paraguayan authorities apprehended the Brazilian merchant vessel Marquês de Olinda, in December 1864, in Asuncion harbor. Following this, a Paraguayan naval expedition landed in the Brazilian city of Coimbra, initiating an invasion of the province of Mato Grosso. Quickly most of the northern section of that province fell into

Paraguayan hands. In early 1865, López asked permission from the Argentinean government to cross its province of Missiones in order to reach Uruguay in time to help the Blancos, who were by then losing the Civil War with the Colorados.

But the Argentinean president, Bartolomé Mitre, refused permission. The Argentinean Unitarians supported the rebellion of the Colorados in Uruguay because they saw the Uruguayan Blancos, who had been historical allies of Argentinean Federalistas, as a threat to their modernization policies. After the Argentinean refusal, Paraguayan troops invaded the province of Corrientes in April 1865. These reckless Paraguayan military movements led to the worst possible outcome.

Paraguayan troops risked their chances of victory with an initial offensive on two fronts. This strategy proved to be a disaster because the Paraguayans wasted valuable resources (in terms of troops and weapons), invading the Brazilian province of Mato Grosso while at the same time trying to help their Blancos allies in Uruguay. Crossing an enormous territory without adequate means and finally outnumbered by their enemies, the Paraguayans lost their best men and ammunition. They never got to Uruguay, nor did they destroy the allies' vital sources or supply's nets.[64]

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[64]According to George Thompson, from a total of 12,400 men who marched in the Paraguayan expeditionary force to Uruguay, 1900 died or got sick. From the remaining 10,500, 2,500 were killed in the battle of Yatay and 8,000 surrendered at Uruguayana (Brazil). Thompson remarked that most rifles were so old they could not repeat a shot. See George Thompson, A Guerra do Paraguay. Com um Esboço Histórico do país e do Povo Paraguaio, e notas sôbre a engenharia militar durante a guerra (1869 reprint, Rio de Janeiro: Conquista, 1968), pp. 83-92. Thompson was a British engineer who participated in López's inner-circle. He was one of the few foreigners who were commissioned with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

Tropical diseases, hunger, the lack of adequate winter clothes and equipment victimized many troops.[65] By November 1865 most of the remaining Paraguayan troops were back to their territory in order to defend their Southern frontier against an Allied invasion. The remaining expeditionary forces were kept in the distant garrisons of Mato Grosso, isolated from any help.[66]

The next phases of this war were the most bloody and difficult in the entire campaign. After the defeat of the Paraguayan offensive the war turned into one of invasion and conquest of Paraguayan territory. On May 1, 1865, Brazil, Argentine and Uruguay (now effectively governed by Colorados), signed the Triple Alliance Treaty, consolidating military, political and diplomatic agreements that had long been nourished. The Treaty united the region's most powerful countries against Paraguay, creating a completely adverse military balance. The Triple Alliance Treaty clearly stated that the Allied forces would put down arms only after the total defeat of the Paraguayan government. [67]

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[65]Ibid. For a good description of the Paraguayan mistakes during this first phase of the operations see pp. 21-81.

[66]The Paraguayan troops in Mato Grosso lacked any regular supply. One of the reasons why the Imperial army regained the city of Corumbá through a surprise attack was due to the fact that the remaining Paraguayan garrisons were fishing while Brazilians approached. This episode was well described in the memoirs of one Paraguayan general. See Francisco Isidoro Resquin, Datos Historicos de la Guerra del Paraguay contra la Triple Alianza (Asuncion, Compañia Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1895), p. 74.

[67] The nature of such a treaty was subjected to strong controversy. It was to have been kept secret until the end of the war. Its revelation by the English ambassador in Argentina resulted in bitter criticism as many governments (like the Bolivian and the Peruvian) severely criticized its draconian clauses against Paraguayan autonomy.

Map 3
Paraguayan Offensives, 1864-1865



Fonte: John Hoyt Williams · The Rise and Fall of Paraguayan Republic, 1814-1870

Source: John Hoyt Wiliiam, The Rise and Fall of the Paraguayan Republic, 207

Paraguay's fate was sealed, although few could imagine how much effort would be necessary to defeat the Guarany nation.

Chapter 3

The American Civil War: History and Historiography

> On the left bank of the Ohio work is connected with the idea of slavery, but on the right with the well-being and progress; on the one side it is degrading, but on the other honorable; on the left bank no white laborers are to be found, for they would be afraid of being like the slaves; for work people must rely on the Negroes; but one will never see a man of leisure on the right bank: the white man's intelligent activity is used for work of every sort.
>
> Alexis de Tocqueville[1]

> We are not one people. We are two peoples. We are a people for Freedom and a people for Slavery. Between the two, conflict is inevitable
>
> Horace Greely[2].

The coming of the American Civil War has been the subject of diverse historical interpretations since the end of the conflict in 1865. It has been seen as an irrepressible conflict, where opposing sectional economic interests clashed;[3] It has been seen as the tragic result of rapacious political behavior;[4] it

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[1]Alex De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1848, reprint. New York: Anchor Books, 1969), p. 346.

[2] Quoted in Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men. The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 310.

[3]Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (2 vols., New York, 1933), Frank L. Owsley, "The Irrepressible Conflict" in Twelve Southerners (eds.) I'll Take my Stand (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1930), and Arthur C. Cole, The Irrepressible Conflict, 1850-1865 (1934, reprint New York: Macmillam Company, 1969).

[4]Avery Craven, The Repressible Conflict 1830-1861 (Baton Rouge, University of Louisiana Press,

has been seen as a consequence of the lack of alternatives provided by the party system;[5] it has been seen as a constitutional crisis affecting the concepts of law and order.[6] Although many issues divided North and South, most recent historical research has argued that slavery was the central element in the crisis that led to secession and to war.[7]

Slavery was pivotal to the outbreak of the American Civil War because it divided the Union created by the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution into two distinctive sections: a free North and a slave South. This division led in turn to increasing differences in the levels of economic development, in the degree of freedom, in the scale of values, and in each section's capacity to elaborate, develop, and apply new technologies to their environments.

During its first 85 years as an independent nation, America's leaders tried to cope with such sectional differences through the construction of an elaborate political system. When conflicts occurred, a series of political compromises aimed to bring North and South together. One of the reasons why such

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1939), James R. Randall, "The Blundering Generation" in Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXVII (June, 1940), pp. 3-28.

[5]Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850's (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1978).

[6]Phillip S. Paludan, "The American Civil War Considered as a Crisis in Law and Order," in American Historical Review), Vol. 77, No. 4, October 1972, pp. 1013-1034.

[7]Of course this refers to the development that has been taking place during the last fifty years. And such recent developments in American historiography owe much to the efforts of Kenneth M. Stamp and Herbert Aptheker.

compromises were feasible in earlier periods of crisis (like 1787 and 1820) was the symmetry (in resources and means) between the two sections.[8]

Another important reason was the cross-sectional party organization. During the Jacksonian era, both major parties were national organizations divided over local issues. According to David M. Potter Democrats, and Whigs "were both coalitions of local organizations rather than fully developed national political organizations."[9] Together, these circumstances helped to keep sectional antagonism out of the political agenda as much as circumstances permitted.

But, during the 1850's, the system collapsed under the pressure of strong sectional competition. As sectional asymmetry grew, the room for compromise kept narrowing down until the political system proved completely unable to reconcile the growing differences. Conflict over slavery progressively weakened the groups that, during the first half of the 19th century, had fought tenaciously for the maintenance of the Union. The outcome was the destruction of two main features of the ante-bellum republic: the Second Party System, and plantation slavery. Another result was a growing (even if temporary) interference of the Federal government in southern social and political institutions. After the Civil

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[8] Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson (New York: Sharp, 1999), especially chapter II, "Slavery and the Northwest Ordinance: A Study in Ambiguity," pp. 34-56. According to Finkelman Garrisonian abolitionists offered an accurate interpretation of the Constitution as a "proslavery" document, but they were wrong to absent themselves from politics rather than fight for reform.

[9]David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861(New York: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 8.

War, the American nation would be marked by new political and social landscapes.

The above chain of events distinguishes the outbreak of the American conflict from the coming of the Triple Alliance War. The main difference lies in the fact that, while slavery was central to the American sectional disputes, it was little more than a secondary factor in the crisis that brought war to the River Plate region. The Platine conflict had its roots in the regional processes of state-formation and in the turbulent political situation in Uruguay and northern Argentina. Although slavery was also a central institution in the Brazilian society (possibly much more central than in the US as a whole), it has never been considered a central element in the outbreak of the War against Paraguay.[10]

Differently from the Platine conflict, the American Civil War resulted from the conflict around the expansion of slavery towards the western territories. As Ira Berlin has argued, the expansion of cotton and sugar production in the lower Mississippi valley beginning in the mid-1790s transformed the region from "a society with slaves" into a "slave society."[11] The districts along the Mississippi River from above Natchez to below New Orleans included some of the highest proportions of slaves in North America.

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[10]Although it was considered in the military calculus as an element of potential Brazilian fragility by the Paraguayan dictator Francisco Solano López.

[11] Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone; The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 325-57.

During the decades of the 1840's and the 1850's, diverging conceptions of the future clashed. Would the U.S. be a free society, or one in which slavery was a central institution? The Civil War was a final contest to determine which project would prevail. In the War of the Triple Alliance, the Brazilian Empire fought to defend its territory and to keep its status quo as the region's main power. The Empire was not fighting for the creation of a new situation but, as it had done in previous conflicts, to maintain the same situation it had inherited from its colonial background. Both wars led to the increasing importance of the central states on the victorious sides, allowing a temporary increase in each central state's capacity to intervene and interfere with domestic issues at the local level.

A second difference between the processes that led to the outbreak of the two wars relates to the creation of each nation's frontiers. The American Federal Constitution (1787) consolidated the idea of a government of limited powers. It resulted from inter-sectional agreements on the country's basic questions. The resulting Hamiltonian Federalism was a compromise between confederation and centralization, whereby duplication of functions was the order of the day. There were two systems of law, state and federal, two taxing powers, two police forces and two governments having authority over the same territory.[12] In spite of such limitations, through the Constitution it was possible not only to enforce law and

[12]On the concept of Hamiltonian Federalism see Roy F. Nichols, "Federalism versus Democracy. The Significance of the Civil War in the History of the United States Federalism" in Roscoe Pound. Charles H. McIlwain and Roy F. Nichols (eds.) Federalism as a Democratic Process (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1942), pp. 49-75.

order, but also to open the way for territorial expansion. The Federal government was pivotal for American expansion, and this makes U.S. history quite distinctive from the Brazilian experience.

Brazil's current borders were determined primarily during the late 18th century, when Brazil was still a colony of Portugal, while America's borders were not crystallized until an independent state structure was created, one that supported the expansionist aims of some sectors of its population. Among the many reasons for the colonists' dissatisfaction, during the colonial crisis, were the obstacles established by the English colonial administration against territorial expansion. English colonial officers probably feared more the colonist's potential for expansion than Indians' raids. Even though the Native Americans could fight for their lands, they did not challenge British rights in North America. American independence opened the door for American expansionist forces, releasing impulses long restrained. The American borders kept advancing during the first half of the nineteenth-century, enabling a westward migration that did not stop until very late in the same century.[13]

In spite of strong constitutional limitations on the powers of the central government, the American territorial expansion found in the same federal government a crucial agent to fulfill its "Manifest Destiny." The Federal government controlled the army and the keys to foreign agreements and it was

[13] Robert F. Berhofer, Jr. "The North American Frontier as Process and Context," in Howard Lammar and Leonard Thompson (eds.), The Frontier in History. North America and Southern Africa Compared (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 43-75.

constitutionally authorized to declare war and to make peace, and to control the process of admission of these territories as new states.

The great contradiction of American development lies in the fact that the capture of the central government became itself a central strategy for the survival of the southern project, while the southerners were the most aggressive defenders of the Jeffersonian tradition, one that opposed strong federal government. The disturbances resulting from this contradiction manifested themselves in bitter quarrels over the nature of the Federal system and over demands for its redefinition and alteration.

The Economic Prospects

From its independence to the 1850's, all sections of the United States lived through a spectacular development of their economic, demographic, and democratic capacities. Until that epoch, no other society had witnessed such rapid changes in so little time.[14] No other people experienced such great confidence in their prospects for the future than the Americans of the ante-bellum republic.[15] In spite of such hopes, these economic changes brought a new set of challenges for the young nation and her leaders. On many occasions they had to reconcile their original republican ideals with the realities of political,

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[14] American population grew from 4 million in 1790 to 23 million by 1850. The area of the country grew from 890,000 at the time of the inauguration of George Washington to 2,997,000 square miles. Potter, op. cit., p. 7.

[15] An extensive description of American faith in their material progress is presented in James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), chapter I, "The United States at Mid-century," pp. 6-47.

economic, and social change. Territorial increase, immigration, urbanization, and industrialization presented many challenges to the generation of American Founding Fathers. For some of them, like Thomas Jefferson of Virginia, the advancement of commerce and industry posed severe threats to the maintenance of public virtue. Jefferson was not alone in these fears as many of his peers in the political elite shared the fear of the corruption that wealth could bring.[16]

According to the Jeffersonian point of view, the commercial expansion of past republics was the main source of their corruption and decay. Wealth brought inequality, intensifying the potential for class struggles that threatened the social fabric of the American republic. The examples of the Roman Empire, the Dutch United Provinces and, above all, the British historical experience, provided a strong justification for Jefferson's reservations against "commercial-industrialism." Jefferson feared that American Republican virtue, so strongly defended against British enemies, could be undermined by internal forces. This time, it would be threatened not by poor urban crowds, but by a rich and aristocratic minority that would seek to use the powers of government to further their own interests. From this perspective, the concentration of wealth, not

[16]Benjamin Franklin, whose observation of the British society was extensive, became an important reference for the establishment of a negative vision of the effects of economic change and disparity of wealth over the quality of life. According to Drew McCoy, Thomas Jefferson started a similar point of view as Benjamin Franklin. But Jefferson also understood territorial expansion as something essential to the maintenance of the public virtue. See Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic. Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1983). See especially chapter II, "The Republican Revolution," pp. 48-75.

radical republicanism (sanscoulotism), was the potential source of despotism. As underlined by Drew McCoy, "American society was to be revolutionary...precisely because it would not repeat the familiar eighteenth-century pattern of a stark and widening division between the propertied few and the masses of laboring unpropertied poor."[17]

Jefferson's election in 1800 was the result of the anti-Federalist reaction against both Federalist centralization and restrictive legislation in the 1790's. It was a movement that recovered the roots of American republicanism. According to John Ashworth "The opponents of Federalism rallied, formed the Republican Party and won control of the government. In so doing, and in placing Thomas Jefferson at the head of the federal government, they re-structured the American polity and re-established the American democratic tradition."[18]

In spite of his strong reservations about structural modernization and political centralization, Jefferson's administration (as the American third president), was characterized by conciliatory policies. Jefferson was involved in a movement to mediate between traditional and modern ways of thought searching for a balance among the various branches of economic activity. During his presidency, the new republic was troubled by international threats, and the nation too anxious for stability, to abandon completely a centralized organization.

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[17] Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic, p. 66.

[18]John Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism and Politics in the Antebellum Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 30.

Jefferson's pragmatism as president only occasionally modified the Hamiltonian system that prevailed during most of the ante-bellum era.

Following a pragmatic capacity to adapt to the country's fortunes, and in flagrant contradiction with the classical historical examples he so much admired, Jefferson supported territorial expansion as the best means to maintain and strengthen American civic virtue. According to Jefferson and his followers, the availability of land guaranteed that the republic would continue to be dominated by the independent farmer, the ideal citizen of a republic. Anti-Federalists believed that only by openly keeping access to free land would it be possible to keep alive the possibility of framing a nation of small holders, not dependent on the will of the rich and powerful members of the wealthy minority.[19] In one of his most famous comments on the subject Jefferson stated that:

> Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue.... Corruption of the morals in the mass of cultivators is a phenomenon of which no age nor nation has furnished an example. It is the mark set on those who, not looking up to heaven, to their own soil and industry, as does the husbandman, for their subsistence, depend for it on the casualties and caprice of costume. Dependence begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition.[20]

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[19] On Jefferson's vision of the ideal society, see Joyce Appleby, Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy: Republicanism, the Class Struggle, and the Virtuous Farmer (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2000), especially chapter 7, "The Virtuous Farmer," pp. 153-164.

[20]Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, "Query XIX" (1785; reprint, New York, Harper & Row, 1964). Quoted in J. William Harris, Plain Folk and Gentry in a Slave Society. White Liberty and Black Slavery in Augusta's Hinterlands (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), p. 21. Harris' discussion about republicanism is on pages 20-2.

In the South, such a pastoral ideal had a stronger appeal than in the North. Three reasons explain the difference: black slaves were the main exploited group; they provided the bulk of the work force used on the great plantations; and they were excluded from the political system. Under such circumstances, it was easier for southern slaveholding to reach a modus vivendi with the democratic aspirations of non-slaveholding whites. Jefferson, John Taylor and other southern leaders supported a more egalitarian view of the public interest. They defended the superiority of their agrarian social organization over the urban industrial environment. In this agrarian world farmers, be they slaveholders or not, could pursue equal rights and share the same aspirations for freedom and democracy. But such an alliance was possible because the democratic order they envisioned was limited, including only white males. Such an order delineated a racist egalitarian society. J. William Harris explained the working patterns of that society:

> Southerners attempted to reconcile liberty and slavery by appealing to one important conservative strain of republican ideology. Slavery, they claimed, actually enhanced the sense of equality among white men, and confined to the most debased categories of society - menial labor - an inferior race. Every white man was at least one giant step above all slaves in status, and thus, relative to slaves, true republican equality existed in the ruling group of citizens...[21]

In the North, where slavery was not significant, such an alliance was much less feasible because class conflict and social unrest challenged patrician strategies to control the social structure. During the early American republic,

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[21] J. William Harris, Plain Folk and Gentry in a Slave Society, p. 190.

northern elite groups were dominated by the fear of the people and the fear of radicalism, while southern leaders could be more consistent in their claims for democratic political participation (even if restricted by racist considerations). In the South, white claims were not considered a challenge to the slaveholder's power, while in the North the mass of poor whites constituted a potential threat to the maintenance of the social hierarchy. Under these circumstances, northern positions about such issues sounded, for a while, much more conservative than those presented by men like Thomas Jefferson and, later, Andrew Jackson. It was often under the inspiration of the ideas and actions of these southern born leaders that democratic claims for enfranchisement were advanced during the first half of the 19th century. The American democratic paradox is that of a society that advanced the quest for universal white male suffrage, yet did not consider African American's bondage a relevant question.[22]

The Roots of the Sectional Controversy

During Jefferson's administration American territory practically doubled after the purchase of Louisiana Territory (1803). Jeffersonians believed that a free society, with its promise of independence for the yeoman, required territorial expansion. The enlargement of the American boundaries was intended to increase the expanse of real estate that would prolong spiritual and economic regeneration of democratic republicanism. In Jefferson's words:

[22] A fuller discussion would require attention also to the situation of Women and Native Americans, but these were not a main source of sectional conflict.

> However, our present interests may restrain us within our own limits, it is impossible not to look forward to distant times when our rapid multiplication will expand itself beyond those limits, and cover the whole northern, if not the whole southern continent, with a people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, and by similar laws.[23]

However, as expansion enlarged the number of free as well as the number of slave territories added to the nation, it created new sources of tension for the new republic. As a consequence, the question of slavery expansion to the western territories would become a permanent problem in American politics, although not necessarily a disruptive one.

While agreements were desirable, it was possible to maintain the Union compact by limiting slavery expansion to make sure that it did not cross the borders of freedom established by the Northwest Ordinance. These agreements also helped to keep sectional tensions as a subordinate political issue, while local topics and controversies dominated the nation's debates. The basic agreement was to maintain the numeric balance between the free and the slave states. Until 1820, nine new states entered the Union: Vermont (1791), Ohio (1803), Indiana (1816), and Illinois (1818) in the North (as free states) and Kentucky (1792), Tennessee (1796), Louisiana (1812), Mississippi (1817), and Alabama (1819) in the South (as slave states). While the northern population was able to grow fastest than the southern, the Senate kept an even balance, maintaining its veto power in more conservative (pro-southern) hands.

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[23]Quoted by Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), p. 9.

A second point of agreement was that the Federal government should not interfere in a state's internal issues except to protect slaveholders' interests. Initially such a conception was an answer to the growing fear that Federalism inspired in many Americans, especially Jefferson's followers. The prospects of an expanding Federal government frightened political leaders in both sections because it opposed American centrifugal impulses.[24] Thus the States' Rights creed of the anti-Federalists insisted on the right of every state to govern itself according to its interests. The problem was that this pattern of government behavior responded not to the people's will, but to an abstract notion of local autonomy, that is, each state as a sovereign body deciding its own matters. In this way, States' Rights doctrines, originally conceived to safeguard domestic liberties, became a functional support of slaveholders' interests; by preventing the Federal Government from interfering against slavery, they perpetuated slaveholder prominence in the areas subjected to human bondage.

An Asymmetric Geography

Originally the two main sections of the American republic had been fairly equal in population, in their political representation, and in their export earnings. These circumstances, simultaneously with relentless economic growth, supported the achievement of a series of long-lasting compromises that, from the framing of the Federal Constitution, kept their leaders on good terms through the maintenance of an even balance of power between the northern and the

[24]Such impulses were discussed in Chapter I.

southern states. This balance was kept through inter-elite political agreements that began with the establishment of the Northwest Ordinance (1787) and the three-fifths clause. The first agreement banned slavery from the territory Northwest of the Ohio River, making free labor that region's only alternative. In the same Constitutional Convention, the representatives from the North and the South faced the question of each region's representation in the Congress. There were differences concerning how slaves would be counted for electoral purposes. Finally, both groups agreed on the three-fifths clause, that is, a slave would be equal to three-fifths of a free person.

In spite of the widespread sentiment toward compromise, economic and demographic transformations were not symmetrical. The North succeeded much better than the South in attracting immigrants and diversifying its economic activities. Widespread development and territorial expansion created a huge difference between a "free labor" and industrial North and an agrarian South. According to James McPherson:

> Of 143 important inventions patented in the United States from 1790 to 1860, 93 percent came out of the free states and nearly half from New England alone -- more than twice that region's proportion of the free population. Much of the machine-tool industry and most of the factories with the most advanced forms of the American system of manufactures were located in New England.[25]

During the 1820's the expansion of a market-oriented economy was an important factor behind the growing sectional divergence in the United States.

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[25]James M. McPherson. Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 19.

While the North had moved rapidly in the early decades through commercial and capitalist development, the South, loyal to her Jeffersonian inspiration, had remained largely rural and agricultural. For historian Drew Gilpin Faust "Slavery had profoundly inhibited the growth of market relations in the [southern] region, both by preventing the emergence of a free market in labor and by limiting the number of the section's independent consumers."[26] But such asymmetry was not significant enough to put the South in a subordinate position in the nation's geography.[27] Politics was the channel through which southern leaders sought to counterbalance their structural inferiority. Skilled Southern politicians exploited northern unionist feelings to build alignments that made this period of American history very rich in alternatives. If sectionalism did not assume its disruptive powers earlier than it did, this had a lot to do with the southern capacity to control the Federal government's main positions, imposing the defense of the southern interests and needs on a northern majority. In these issues they benefited from their influence over the Federal Government. They also benefited from the ideology professed by the Democratic Party, which pledged a strong commitment to white egalitarianism while ignoring the existence of slavery.

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[26]Drew Gilpin Faust, The Creation of Confederate Nationalism. Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1988), p. 43.

[27]In the long debate concerning the causes of the Civil War partisans of the "blundering generation" view led by Avery Craven and James G. Randall pointed out that the social and economic differences between the sections were not so important and not relevant enough to lead necessarily to war. They blamed the inability of political leaders to cope with compromisable problems for the outcome.

By another token, if slavery prevented the formation of a truly free market in the South, it was nevertheless much more efficient as a labor system than northerners could have understood. The success of cotton culture and the demographic growth of the native slave population destroyed the idea that slavery would gradually die out.[28] Such a perspective had helped to promote the compromises made during the Constitutional debates and had served the Jeffersonian republican ideal. In postponing more effective action, northern leaders, many of them critics of slavery, assumed that manumission would be gradual and ought not to cause social or economic dislocation. Many of them believed that, through individual initiatives of manumission and colonization, it would be possible to eradicate slavery from America.

Until the 1820's slavery was not a central issue in the American political debate, nor were the attacks against the institution perceived as a crusade against the South. The American Colonization Society was founded in 1816 and assumed as its mission the task of sending ex-bondsmen to Africa (especially to the new colony of Liberia). On their side, many southerners viewed slavery as a "necessary evil," that is, an unfortunate legacy from the colonial period. But slaves were a form of property and the right to posses them was guaranteed by the southern interpretation of the American Constitution, the same Constitution that allowed for the peaceful termination of the Atlantic slave traffic by 1807.

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[28]On the growth of the cotton economy see Gavin Wright, The Political Economy of the Cotton South. Households, Markets, and Wealth in the Nineteenth Century (New York: W.W.Norton & Company Inc., 1978). See especially chapter 2, "The Structure of the Cotton-Slave Economy," pp. 10-42.

The victory of the Revolution and the end of the Atlantic slave trade led many northerners to believe that slavery would gradually vanish from the United States. To reinforce such perceptions during the two decades after independence, there was the evidence of slavery's gradual extinction in the northern states and individual initiatives to manumit slaves in Virginia and other southern bastions of bondage. But the American experience differed from other slave societies in the New World basically because of the natural increase of its slave population.[29] According to Robert Fogel, "the US colonies not only overtook but far exceeded the rate of growth of the slave populations elsewhere in the hemisphere...Thus, the United States became the leading user of slave labor in the New World, not because it participated heavily in the slave trade but because of the unusually high rate of natural increase."[30]

The Missouri Crisis in 1819-1821 provided the first major confrontation between purely sectional interests since the end of the Constitutional debates. Missouri's request for admission as a slave state shocked northern public opinion. The Missouri Crisis showed to an astonished northern audience the disruptive potential of the southern defense of the right to push slavery into the West. For the first time party lines were shaken by sectional interests,

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[29]According to Arthur Bestor, the census of 1860 revealed that more than half the American slaves were held in bondage outside the boundaries of the thirteen states that had composed the original Union. See "The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis" in Michael Perman (ed.) The Coming of the Civil War (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1993), p. 77.

[30]Robert William Fogel, Without Consent or Contract. The Rise and Fall of American Slavery (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), pp. 32-3.

threatening the maintenance of the Union as it had existed until then. A conciliatory bargain known as the "Missouri Compromise" (1820) admitted Missouri as a slave state, while in the future slavery would be prohibited in the Louisiana Purchase above the 36 30' line of latitude. At the same time, and in order to maintain the sectional equilibrium, Maine was admitted into the Union as a free state. The Missouri Compromise assured that the balance of power between the representatives of free and slave states would be kept in the Senate. But above all, from then on, it made it clear that slavery was not a backward institution, condemned to perish in face of the progress and development brought by capitalism. On the contrary, it was a powerful force with potential for growth and expansion.

The Great Transformation

The years between the beginning of Andrew Jackson's administration (1829) and the compromise of 1850 were marked by frontier expansion, the standardization of paper money, the protective tariffs, the Indians' removal, and the raising of a militant abolitionist movement. In spite of the variety of such questions that divided northern and southern interests along sectional lines, slavery kept its prominence as the main divisive factor in American society. The transformation of slavery into the America's biggest political issue was not automatic.[31] It had much to do with northern economic transformations, the

[31]And in this sense this work disagrees with interpretations coming from the "irrepressible conflict" school because I attribute great weight to personal decisions. The interpretation of the Civil War as an "irrepressible conflict" was effectively presented in Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (2 vols., New York, 1933).

Republican Party critique of southern social organization, and the violent southern responses to such challenges. But slavery's growth and expansion beyond early expectations of both northern and southern leaders, and its dependence on new fertile lands, were also pivotal elements in the increasing tension that opposed the states north and south states of the Mason-Dixie line. When the inter-sectional consensus finally broke, in 1860, both sections went to war to preserve what each civilization believed to be its superior social organization. Slavery was at the core of these expansionist issues.

The American political situation after 1812 was marked by the absence of nearly foreign enemies. As a consequence, the army, as an institution, had but small significance in the state-making process as a whole, although military heroes, from time to time, could become candidates for executive positions.[32] Although wars against Indians were permanent, the size and importance of the kind of army needed for such campaigns was relatively small. It did not require a high degree of mobilization nor an excessive amount of financial resources because the use of modern military tactics, the spread of white diseases, and the employment of modern warfare technology made the difference. Indians were

[32] During the Ante-bellum republic seven major presidential nominees may be classified as military heroes: George Washington, Andrew Jackson, William Henry Harrison, Zachary Taylor, Franklin Pierce, Winfield Scott, and John C. Frémont. From these only Taylor and Scott can be considered as professional military in the sense that their professional career was their primary occupation. According to Samuel P. Huntington these numbers furnish a conclusive proof that "political power and military professionalism are incompatible in the American climate." For Huntington, "The successful military hero [in politics] has been the man either who was a nonprofessional soldier or who, if he was a professional soldier, abandoned his military trappings and adopted the guise of liberalism." Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and The State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), p. 158.

decimated and progressively spoiled of their lands as waves of white settlers crossed to the West.[33]

Following such a rapid wave of progress toward fresh lands, a new kind of leadership emerged in the political landscape. It reflected the aspirations for broad participation and local power that bloomed in American social culture. Not coincidentally Andrew Jackson was a man from the frontier and an officer. Having being an Indian fighter, a military leader, a slaveholder, and a hero of the War of 1812, Jackson took on a symbolic aura, which represented the values and aspirations of a large spectrum of white American males, from the immigrants in the northern cities to the poor yeoman in the southern fields. Jackson personified the new style of policy-making that emerged after 1800. His successful political career was framed by feelings of independence and autonomy that were endemic among a new generation of American politicians. Such politicians were linked to political machines that did not require men of reputation and cultivation for their operation. Instead, they depended on the work of professionals skilled in techniques of mass mobilization and driven by a passion for organizational efficiency. These were men like Martin Van Buren and his peers at the Albany Regency, who did not owe their positions to birth or to any previous superior social position. Their status was due to their work as builders of political machines. Their prestige depended upon an iron loyalty to

[33]Although it was important to provide the security the settlers needed. For the army life during "peacetime," see Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1986).

their party organizations. Such circumstances enabled them to denounce what they believed to be the elitist course of American politics.[34] With their relentless capacity for political organization, they defeated president John Quincy Adams, the heir of one of the most prestigious American dynasties, in his efforts for re-election in 1828, and brought Jackson to the presidency.

The election of Andrew Jackson and the rise of the Democratic Party would signal great changes in the practices of American politics in the direction of a new party system. According to Richard Hofstadter: "[The Democratic Party] would create opportunities for nominations, patronage, careers, in return for the loyalty it demanded of its members.[35]

Democrats and Whigs, the two main parties, mobilized the American electorate at all levels of public administration, using the spoils of office to motivate party cadres. Through the institution of the spoils system, American democracy would undermine the possibilities for creating an independent bureaucracy on a more European style. Most posts in the government services would become a prerogative of the party in power. Such a configuration reinforced the role of the political parties as national organizations and intermediaries between the common citizen and the national government on a

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[34] According to Douglas Miller, "By the 1820's the politician was becoming a specialist - not the statesmen, lawyer, merchant, or planter of an earlier era." See The Birth of Modern America, 1820-1850 (New York: Macmillam, 1985) p. 155. For a classic account of Jackson's life and times, see John W, Ward, Andrew Jackson, Symbol for an Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955).

[35]Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System. The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 244.

scale never achieved by similar institutions in Latin America or Europe. According to Theodore J. Lowi, the dominant American parties have been labeled "constituent parties" because of their importance in facilitating states' operations.[36] The advent of the Second Party system transformed the parties into organizations with power to control temporarily the Federal government. As interpreters of local political demands, such parties were able to monopolize many of the tasks normally achieved by the permanent bureaucratic organization of national states in other countries. Under these specific constitutional rules, the political parties turned into the main sources of order, continuity, and predictability in government operation. According to Stephen Skowronek:

> The regimen of voter mobilization, party coalition building, and national two party competition provided the extra-constitutional framework necessary to channeling the energies and ambitions of officials in government. The party machinery freed the Constitution from dependence on a patrician class, depersonalized power relations, and focused activity within America's fragmented institutional structure.[37]

In the absence of a professional bureaucracy, parties and courts furnished the operational rules for government routines. Even the positions in the small professional army would become subject of political patronage.[38] Party identification permitted the reduction of conflicts between the various levels of

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[36]Theodore J. Lowi, "Party, Policy and Constitution in America" quoted by Stephen Skrowronek, Building a New American State. The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (1982, reprint, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 26.

[37] Skrowonek, Building a New American State, p. 24.

[38] William B. Skelton, "Officers and Politicians: The Origins of Army Politics in the United States Before the Civil War," in Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 6, No.1, 1979, pp. 22-48.

the constitutional structure as well as some stabilization of administrative procedures by means of patronage, rotation of posts, and external controls over public employers. William Marcy, a member of the Albany Regency, affirmed that triumphant politicians "claim as a matter of right the advantages of success. They see nothing wrong in the rule, that to the victor belong the spoils of the enemy."[39]

Jacksonian polices were aided by the continuous enfranchisement of white males, which in turn helped to make the American presidency less patriarchal. By 1810 a majority of states had lowered franchise requirements to the point where most adult males could vote. By 1824 only three states restricted suffrage in a significant way. With Jackson, the extended franchise was accompanied by the substitution for the caucus system of the institution of "party conventions," as the most convenient process to select presidential candidates.[40] This new political environment created the conditions for the emergence of more popular forms of leadership.[41]

This long shift in the direction of mass political parties had nothing to do with the revolutionary processes that swept the European continental monarchies during the 1840s. It had still less to do with the strong dependence of the Brazilian parties on the central state. In Brazil such parties were still

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[39] Quoted in Miller, The Birth of Modern America, p. 159.

[40]While in South America such activity normally contributed to political oligarquization in America it helped to enlarge the democratic spirit. For an interesting comparison of personal political trajectories see John Lynch, Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel de Rosas, 1829-1852 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).

[41]Ronald G. Walters, American Reformers, 1815-1860 (reprint 1978, New York: Hill and Wang,

headed by eminent leaders who controlled the process of ascension from their top positions. A new form of policy making was taking shape in America, a system that was even open (in many areas) to the then-recent immigrants, and one that reinforced the importance of professional politicians as leaders of such organizations. According to Eric Foner, the primary aim of the Jacksonians:

> [W]as not to redistribute the propriety of the rich, but to open the avenues of social advancement to all laborers.[42]

Jacksonian democrats reflected a middle-class perception of the social order that viewed social opportunity as a key to a more egalitarian order. In reality, no aspect of American political life amazed more foreign observers than the higher degree of political participation of its white male inhabitants. The access to political participation, especially after the advent of the Jacksonian democracy, was a remarkable achievement of the American democracy system. Traveling around the country in the late thirties, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that:

> In the United States in our day the principle of the sovereignty of the people has been adopted in practice in every way that imagination could suggest. It has been detached from all fictions in which it has elsewhere been carefully wrapped; it takes on every possible form that the exigencies of the case require. Sometimes the body of the people makes the laws, as at Athens; sometimes deputies, elected by universal suffrage, represent it in its name under its almost immediate supervision.[43]

1998), p. 7.

[42]Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, p.19.

[43] De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p.60.

The two political parties emerging from this new situation would divide over themes brought to the forefront by Jackson's presidency: the struggle against the second Bank of the United States, the occupation of Mexican territory, the faith in the people, the defense of the rule of the majority, the controversy about subsidies to the industry, the struggle against aristocracy, etc. Both the Democrats and Whigs were national organizations with support in all regions. These parties were not homogeneous organizations, because their composition and political interests expressed a complex articulation of local interests, ethnic affiliations, and state issues. For nearly twenty years these two major parties demonstrated their "ability" to help contain or control the divergence and minimize the conflicts between the North and the South.

Sectional Tensions

Jackson's main sectional challenge came from the heartland of American slavery. From 1829 to 1832, the state of South Carolina, one of the few areas excluded from the democratic revolution brought by the Jacksonian political system, defied the national administration by refusing to collect taxes owed to the national government in an episode known as the Nullification crisis. As William Freehling has shown, behind the tariff question laid the larger issue of Federal power. And the concern with Federal power was prompted above all by the fears over slavery. During the ante-bellum period South Carolinians developed a more fundamentalist defense of slavery than did the people of any other southern state. In many important ways this defense was anchored in an

ideology of "States' Rights" that was aimed to reinforce southern interests in the American nation. Even the elevation of the tariff as an issue among southern militants depended to a considerable extent upon the slavery question. The Nullification movement was intensified by Vice-President John C. Calhoun's resignation and threats of secession and war. The problem was finally solved with a compromise tariff reduction, but the confrontation over the right of any state to invoke nullification to neutralize Federal laws was clear evidence of the strong resistance a southern minority could present to Federal actions. If sectional grievances were clearly behind South Carolina's move, the fear of government interference against slavery was also a symbolic leitmotiv of the movement, and this led directly back to the controversies involving slavery.[44]

During the 1830's, encouraged by the revivalist experiences brought by the Second Great Awakening, a new current of abolition opinion emerged. It was oriented around the demand for "immediate abolition" for all slaves without any compensation of their southern masters. On January 1st, 1831, the first issue of William Lloyd Garrison's Liberator would present this uncompromising view of abolitionism in its perfected form. Soon abolitionist societies appeared in Massachusetts and elsewhere. Abolitionists were not numerically strong, but they could make noise, and they began to circulate material through the mail and

[44]On the Nullification issue see William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War. The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina 1816-1836, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966). Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, 178, and John Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics, pp. 136-137. According to Ashworth [Nullification] was an attempt to unite the South behind a constitutional theory that sharply limited the power of the numerical majority.

send petitions to Congress. As a reaction to such practices, Southern representatives, with the support of northern Democrats, imposed the Gag Rule in Congress. Through these procedures (which remained in force until 1844) antislavery petitions would be received but then immediately laid upon the table, without discussion. But the abolitionist movement was still too small in number and too heterogeneous in its objectives to become a real threat to the maintenance of slavery. Abolitionists were not very popular in the northern cities, as widespread racism and fears about secession undermined their potential appeal. There were also sharp differences between abolitionist militants in terms of the question of political involvement. By the same token, revolts of slaves in the South were not able to affect the established order in that region, but they were able to raise southern fears to paranoid proportions.[45]

The real issues that brought debates over the desirability of slavery to the center of politics were those related to the integration of the territories taken from Mexico. The annexation of Texas (as a slave state) during the 1840's and the War against Mexico added tension to this unsolved issue. The War against Mexico was opposed by a large number of northern Whigs, who feared southern representatives in Congress would push for the admission of more territories as slave states. Thus, the decision to go to war disturbed the balance of power between the North and South, as each section desired to dominate the process

[45]A more substantial discussion of the objectives of the abolitionist movement will be given in chapter 7.

of territorial integration. This process threatened party discipline as representatives were divided by sectional lines. In 1846 David Wilmot, a Democratic representative from Pennsylvania, presented a resolution banning slavery from the new acquired lands where it previously did not exist. The Wilmot Proviso, as the resolution became known, was the source of bitter debates in Congress and the nation came again close to secession. According to David M. Potter, the Wilmot Proviso was the climax to a series of intra-party rivalries that took a sectional form within the Democratic organization, including discussions about tariff reduction and the exit of Van Buren's followers.[46] As a conciliatory response, moderate members of both parties tried to pass a series of separate resolutions to get an agreement. The Compromise of 1850 would be the last successful party bargain aimed to maintain the American unity by peaceful means. By the various parts of the agreement, self-determination and popular sovereignty, not the Missouri Compromise, would be the main tools to determine whether a territory should be accepted as a free or a slave state. The compromise also strengthened the role of the federal administration as a slave catcher through a new Fugitive Slave Law. Under this law, press gangs could go to the North to "recover" runaway slaves. In performing such tasks they would have the protection of U.S. commissioners, conducting hearings and authorizing

[46] Potter, The Impending Crisis, p. 27.

the return of runaways. The slaves caught had no right to appeal, nor to habeas corpus.[47]

The Fugitive Slave Law undermined the position of the northern states as sanctuaries for fugitive slaves, creating an environment of fear and hatred against the South. The image of the "Slave Power" would become, from then on, one of the most powerful symbols of southern despotism and influence over the federal government. Southern political aggressiveness made it appear that the abolitionists and other northern critics of the "southern way of life" had a strong basis for their charge that slave labor degraded free labor and that there was a sinister conspiracy in the government to promote the interests of slavery against those of a free society. Remembering the circumstances of political struggle during the ante-bellum period, former vice presidential candidate Henry Wilson defined the main lines by which northern Republicans viewed southern movements:

> This complete subversion of the natural rights of millions, by which they were "deemed, held, taken, reputed and adjudged in laws to be chattels personal to all intents, constructions, and purposes whatsoever," constituted a system antagonistic to the doctrines of reason and the admonitions of conscience, and developed and gratified the most intense spirit of personal pride, a love of class distinctions, and the lust of dominion. Hence arose a commanding power, ever sensitive, jealous, proscriptive, dominating, and aggressive, which was recognized and filthy characterized as the Slave Power.[48]

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[47]A good account of the Fugitive Slave Law can be found in Donald G. Nieman, Promises to Keep. African-Americans and the Constitutional Order, 1776 to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), see especially chapter 2 "Law and Liberty, 1830-1860, pp. 30-49.

[48]Henry Wilson, "A Slave Power Conspiracy" in Michael Perman, ed. The Coming of the American Civil War (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1993), p. 8. For a general discussion about

During the 1850's such an image would to many northerners become a paramount threat to republican liberty. As new questions involving slavery emerged, such as the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Dred Scott decision and John Brown's raid (at Harpers Ferry), the possibilities for compromise were strongly undermined. The emerging opposition forces in the North would take advantage of the situation, identifying themselves as defenders of republican liberties.

The Kansas-Nebraska Act formally erased the Missouri Compromise as the main reference for the limits established to slavery extension in the territories of the Louisiana Purchase. From the Compromise of 1850, there was a shift in the rules for the admission of new states. Rather than the old geographic lines inherited from the Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise, the legislators assumed that the territorial labor organization should be subject to local referendum or popular sovereignty. This enactment gave the inhabitants of the territories, through their legislatures and by means of referenda, the power to determine the character of their local institutions, and particularly to define the kind of labor they desired, so as to admit or exclude slavery. Bloody confrontations in Kansas between partisans of slavery and free-soilers would result.[49]

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the concept, see Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power. The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2000), especially pp. 1-27.

[49] McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, pp. 148-150.

The Dred Scott decision was the result of the appeal of a slave to the Supreme Court. Dred Scott had lived more than two years in free areas and decided to sue for his freedom in court. The Supreme Court ruled that black inhabitants of the United States (freed or slave) could not be citizens and that they were not entitled to constitutional rights. Abolitionist John Brown and his followers adopted a violent position. His raid on Harpers Ferry, a Federal arsenal in Virginia, apparently aimed to set off a generalized slave revolt in the South. With its failure and Brown's execution, he became a northern martyr in the struggle against the Slave Power.

The repercussions of these controversies included the realignment of the discontented northern political forces into a clear sectional party. The appearance of the Free Soil Party in the late forties was followed several years later by the Native American Party (Know Nothing). But these organizations lacked the necessary strength to unify all the discontented groups. Finally, the creation of the Republican Party (1854) enabled the replacement of a Democratic majority by an anti-Democratic majority in the North. In the words of Abraham Lincoln, it was clear that the American nation could not prevail "half slave and half free." Republicans came close to winning the 1856 election with a still-fragile party organization. In 1860, they were able to defeat a divided Democratic party in the presidential race. It was the election of Abraham Lincoln by the Republican Party that instigated the final crisis, through which most of the slave states would secede, provoking the outbreak of the Civil War.

As long as the political system was flexible enough to achieve and maintain compromise, it was feasible to keep northern and southern interests in the same political organization. But as sectional differences over slavery escalated, the bases of early agreements were shaken. Northerners' leaders feared that the southerners were breaking the rules, established during the 1820's, and were trying to dominate the Federal government. The Republican Party proclaimed that it would not interfere with slavery in the states where it already existed. At the same time, it was not willing to give the South any more influence over policy-making processes at the federal level. For their part, the southerners were unwilling to compromise as they feared that the loss of government control would deprive them of the power to protect slavery. By then, southerners were fighting against majority rule, because they were fighting for the federal government's protection of their minority rights. In other words, they were fighting to increase and maintain extraterritorial enforcement to their state laws; that is, to make those laws enforceable by the federal government, acting as an agent for their interests as sovereign states of the Union. Such actions give support to Frederick Douglas's statement that "slavery was a power in the state greater than the state itself."[50]

If, during its first years as an independent nation, changes had been accommodated, the sectional capacity to support such a challenge was stressed by the end of the 1850's. During the 1820's and 1830's, crises like Nullification

[50]Frederick Douglas, "A Battle of Principles and Ideas" in Perman, op. cit., p. 17.

did not disturb the country's unity, although they could raise apprehension. But the acquisition of half of Mexico's territory in the War of 1848 brought a new set of challenges that could not be solved by the tools provided by the Second Party System. Under the pressure of sectional interests the Second Party system broke down and a clear regional organization, the Republican Party, emerged to vindicate the northern interests. By the middle 1850's, the chances of an imminent conflict between the North and the South were no longer distant and far from absurd. As northern Democratic leaders began to take sides and the party split apart, no agreement was capable of maintaining the southern states in the Union.

Summarizing

The origins of the American Civil War differ remarkably from the origins of the Paraguayan War. The Civil War was preceded by long disputes involving different visions of the American national organization. The Paraguayan War resulted from disputes around territorial hegemony, especially those concerning the control of the main rivers and the influence of national states over semi-desert territories.

While the coming of these wars differed enormously from one case to the other, the military structures of both the American Union and the Brazilian Empire showed some similarities. During their first decades as independent nations Brazil and the United States forestalled the development of strong armies in order to preserve social and political stability.

Map 4
A Brazilian Map of the American Civil War, 1861



Source: Atlas Histórico Escolar, Brazil, MEC, 1973, p. 57.

In America this policy was linked to both the fear of European despotism and of the accumulation of too much power under a single branch of the government. The division of military power among the army and the states was one of the most concrete compromises of the Constitutional process that created the American national state. For this reason, most military functions were

handled at the state level. Brazilian reduction of the army's size, undertaken during the 1830's, was connected to the dangerous examples furnished by the Spanish republics' instability, and to the disturbances produced by the old army organization during the immediate post-independence period. Thus, in both of the two largest states in the hemisphere the amount of dissuasive power either country had at the outbreak of both the Civil and the Paraguayan conflicts was not proportional to the dimensions of each war. The capacity for taxation was not a fundamental element of the state-building process in either country, so there was no need for a strong monopoly of the coercive means, nor reason for a strong national army in any of the countries. The effects of two prolonged wars would affect radically these scenarios.

Chapter 4

From Inertia to Rebellion
The Crisis in Brazilian Recruitment, 1866-1868

> In any case the war would be even more disastrous to us if we had to take from industry and agriculture their working hands through violent means, which could result in harsh reactions.
>
> Senator Nabuco de Araújo,
> Minutes of the Council of State,
> November 1866

Introduction

The War against Paraguay was a landmark for Brazilian society and is still one of its points of civic reference. It was the first time a military campaign developed into a logical sequence of previously planned movements in order to advance formally established objectives. The complexity of the situation led to the creation of long lines of supply to support the army in operations outside the country. It involved many distant Brazilian provinces in the war effort, turning the mobilization into a national phenomenon. The War of the Triple-Alliance may be described as a total war experience because it led to a national mobilization. As a "total war", the conflict against Paraguay led to an involvement of every major institution of imperial society: government, public institutions, political institutions, and the population of every region, race, ethnicity, class and status. There was a

military mobilization based on universal recruitment and the creation of a military infrastructure in the rearguard. There was also the construction of a powerful war machine under the state's coordination. This situation led even to the reorientation of the financial sectors to make possible the feeding and supply of the growing military forces until the total defeat of the Paraguayan army.[1]

As in the American Civil War, the conflict against Paraguay enabled a collective and bureaucratic effort of the whole society and, as for the American Civil War, this effort was achieved only slowly. Consequently, the war faced the burden of unpopularity and resistance. In symbolic and in concrete terms, the challenges brought by the mobilization were important because they reminded Brazilian leaders of structural deficiencies in their country's state-building process. Such deficiencies reinforced old fears about the precariousness of the Brazilian social order. They also revealed the lack of bureaucratic development and military expertise in the country. Finally, the War against small Paraguay would create new tensions involving the control of the internal social order, exposing the problems posed by disputes over the local control of the recruitment and the politicization of military service. These problems had always

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[1]Many Brazilian city streets, squares, and neighborhoods were named in honor of episodes and heroes from the War of the Triple Alliance. Vitor Izecksohn studied this phenomenon in his "Introduction to "O Cerne da Discórdia," (M.A. Thesis, IUPERJ, 1992), pp. 1-27. For general accounts of War, memory and symbols see Lawrence M. Baldwin and Michel Grimaud, "How New Naming Systems Emerge: The Prototypical Case of Columbus and Washington" in Names. Journal of the American Name Society, Vol. 40, Number 3, September 1992, pp. 153-166, Maurice Agulhon, "La 'statuomanie et la Histoire" in Etnologie Francaise, Vol. 8, 1978, pp. 145-172. James M. Mayo, "War Memorials as Political Memory" in The Geographic Review, Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 62-75, Joseph Zikmund II, "National Anthems as Political Symbols" in The Australian Journal of Politics and History, Volume VX, No. 3, December, 1969, pp. 73-80, and Miguel Angel Centeno, "Symbols of State Nationalism in Latin America," in European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, No. 66, June 1999, pp. 74-106.

challenged the Army's capacity, but this time, due to the rashness of the international campaign, they revealed acute limitations in the capabilities of the country, alarming the sectors responsible for Brazil's defense to an unprecedented degree. The raising of men and resources would be the Achilles heel of the Brazilian government during these crucial years of its institutional development.

While most authors agree on the war's relevance in Brazilian history, it is also true that, until recently, the conflict has been analyzed basically as a continuous process, with the basic situation unchanged for the entire campaign. This approach, very common among more traditional military and diplomatic analyses, is not completely absent even in revisionist approaches that appeared during the nineteen-sixties and seventies. It minimizes the tensions usually associated with the campaign's execution, reinforcing a more homogenous vision of the conduct of the war. Sometimes the campaign is pictured as a heroic episode, while on other occasions it is portrayed as a complete disaster. In either case the conflict is portrayed in a very homogenous framework. Political variations in internal affairs or the role of strategic decisions are minimized as secondary details that do not change the overall picture: the conduct of the war was unpopular because its origins were unpopular.

My interpretation of its many phases emphasizes discontinuity and underlines the differences between the dispositions of the groups involved and in the timing of their actions. The war presented problems of a kind not before faced by the military commanders. The result was political and social tension in

the rearguard, which affected the sequence of the campaign. Among these problems was the growth of recruitment, which affected the lives of thousands and changed the relationship between Brazil's center and its peripheries. Recruitment also interfered with the power of local bosses, based as it was on the loyalties of their clients, suddenly removed by central authorities. But the popular mood was not uniform, and its variations depended on the quality of the relations between state and society in the 19th century Brazil.

This chapter discusses the situation faced by the Imperial government during the interval from January of 1865 to December 1868. During this period, the conduct of the campaign against Paraguay faced a crisis due mostly to the lack of efficient means to mobilize the Brazilian population, thus transforming civilians into soldiers. The root of the problem lay in the unexpected dimensions reached by the war. Its long duration and the strategic dilemmas faced by the military command made it bloodier than could have been foreseen. Because such a war could not be fought with the usual military resources, the state needed to increase, temporarily, its demand for human and material resources. In particular, eighteen thousand professional Brazilian troops were not enough to fight a prolonged war, therefore the government needed to enlarge its army quickly.[2]

Many sectors of Brazilian society reacted against these increasing demands. The Barons attacked the transfer of their workers to the battle fields

[2] These numbers correspond to official estimates. They are presented in John Schulz, O Exército na Política (São Paulo: Edusp, 1994), p. 216.

for obvious utilitarian reasons, while the poor free workers also reacted against conscription, because it temporally erased the differences of class and status, reducing them to the level of the worst social scum.[3] The crisis underlined the deficiency of the state's capacity to extract resources, especially when recruiting its population. From the middle of the 19th century, conflicts over registration and the adoption of the metric system had opposed tradition against rationalization, but with the war, conflicts of interest between the Imperial bureaucracy and local political bosses became much more intense. State power interfered with traditional arenas of private regulation, recruiting clients and protégés, forcing larger contingents of the free population into the Army, and finally increasing its demands for the liberation of slaves for the Army.[4] As the campaign extended, popular resistance against enlistment created great tension in the relations between the government and the Barons in all the areas of the country.[5]

Those reactions were so widespread because the state modified, even if temporarily, its pattern of relationship with society. For a better understanding of the nature of the crisis, it will be necessary to discuss briefly relationships

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[3] Social stratification was very strong among the poor whites. Those involved in permanent work tasks counted on the planter's protection while vagrants and other non-assimilated poor inhabitants were clearer targets of recruiter agents. I am using the term Baron to characterize those big local bosses with a certain amount of power over land and people.

[4] For an analysis of previous conflicts over the registration and rationalization issues see Guillermo Palacios. A Guerra dos Marimbondos: Uma Revolta Camponesa no Brasil Escravista (Pernambuco 1851-1852) (Rio de Janeiro: CPDA/UFRJ, Mimeo, 1989).

[5] A more embracing vision of the impact of recruitment over the poor sections of the Brazilian society can be found in Joan E. Meznar, "The Ranks of the Poor: Military Service and Social Differentiation in Northeast Brazil, 1839-1875," in Hispanic American Historical Review, Volume 72, number 3, 1992, pp. 335-51.

between the center and its peripheries from independence until the third quarter of the 19th century.

The Patterns of Early Brazilian Military Organization

Brazilian independence in 1822 did not mean the expulsion of the Portuguese functionaries and their immediate substitution by Brazilian-born people. When the Portuguese were finally expelled from the Imperial bureaucracy, during the 1830s, the government reduced the size of the army as much as circumstances permitted. As shown by Michael McBeth, during the first Empire the Brazilian Army was a permanent source of trouble. Conflicts between Brazilian and Portuguese officers, troop mutinies, and episodes of insubordination were frequent and exposed the country's precarious state of institutional organization. The troops' revolts severely undermined civilian authority when the country needed stability and order above all. During the Cisplatine campaign (1825-1828), tensions reached a peak as a group of Irish and German mercenaries revolted in Rio de Janeiro, causing great turmoil.[6] The Brazilian defeat and the loss of the Cisplatine province exposed the inadequacy of the Brazilian Army, underlining the danger presented by large concentrations of troops in the main cities.[7] After Emperor Pedro I's resignation, the intense political factionalism penetrated deeply into the officer ranks, enhancing its

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[6] Oliveira Lima, O Movimento da Independência; O Império Brasileiro, 1821-1889, 2nd. ed. (São Paulo: Melhoramentos, n.d.), pp. 420-25.

[7]Michael McBeth, "The Politicians and the Generals: The Decline of the Brazilian Army during the First Empire, 1822-1831," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Washington University, 1972). Rio de Janeiro city experienced a foreign mercenary rebellion in June 1828. According to McBeth, the riots originated from tensions between drunken soldiers and the civil population of Rio, pp. 92-5 and 161.

potential for disruption and aggravating the growing problem of military insubordination. Commenting on the state of anarchy presented by the troops, a contemporary observer noted that "the Army that took an active part in the abdication of Pedro I was so insubordinate that it lacked the necessary unity to give some kind of authority to the winning revolution."[8]

During the Regency period (1831-1840) liberals, now in power, demobilized most of the Brazilian professional troops and many of the officer corps, establishing complete civilian control over the military. Most Portuguese-born officers were sent into retirement, while the remaining troops were demobilized or sent to distant garrisons, mostly in the southern frontier provinces.[9] The process of demobilization helped to stabilize the country's institutional situation, but it made the country as a whole more exposed to external threats. Because fortune was on their side, the Brazilian elites did not face strong external threats, but secessionist revolts constantly threatened the country's unity during the Regency period. In spite of that, the decision to restrain the army was rational, as the Brazilian elite saw militarism as the greatest challenge to internal peace. Demilitarization was in accord with the logic

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[8]Justiniano José da Rocha, "Ação; Reação; Transação" in R. Magalhães Júnior (ed.), Três Panfletários do Segundo Reinado (São Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, Coleção Brasiliana, vol. 286, 1956), p. 177.

[9]According to McBeth, all salary increases and promotions were suspended indefinitely to pressure officers to resign. A law from August 30, 1831, suspended all recruitment and limited the Army size to 10,000 officers and men (approximately half of its size in 1830). See Michael C. McBeth "The Brazilian Recruit During the First Empire: Slave or Soldier?" in Dauril Alden and Warren Dean (eds.) Essays Concerning the Socioeconomic History of Brazil and Portuguese India (Gainesville: The University Presses of Florida, 1977), p. 85.

of Brazilian political competition, and it was praised as a perfect solution by liberal thinkers:

> The democracy employed two heroic medicines against mutinies and insurrections: the Army discharge and the creation of the civic guard [National Guard]. Those were two great facts that brought most notable consequences: the public order in the capital was preserved and could overcome every attempt of assault.[10]

Political Decentralization and Social Control

After 1831 the Brazilian defense system became increasingly based on volunteers, private groups organized into the National Guard. The Guard was created by a decree of August 18, 1831. It was an essentially civilian military organization, subordinated to the Ministry of Justice, not to the Army. It had been created as a liberal response to the threats presented by the military mutinies and revolts of the first Empire (1822-1831). Those liberals feared the internal disturbances coming from an insubordinate army even more than external attacks coming from the Spanish-speaking republics. Above all, they knew how nasty the experience of permanently organized armies had been for those Spanish speaking republics, where political instability had led to the destruction of their territorial integrity.[11]

The Guard was closely linked to the local powers, as it transferred many prerogatives related to the social control from the army to the Barons. Affiliation

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[10] Justiniano José da Rocha, Ação, Reação e Transação., p. 180.

[11] For a better appreciation of the derogatory perception by which the Brazilian elite analyzed the political situation of their neighbors see Amado Luiz Cervo, O Parlamento Brasileiro e as Relações Exteriores (1826-1889) (Brasília: Ed. UNHB, 1981) especially chapter III "O Equilíbrio no Prata e a Neutralidade," pp. 16-26. Few works have analyzed the role of the Brazilian Parlament in the formulation of the Imperial foreign policy.

with the Guard was heavily dependent on income. It encompassed as members all free Brazilian men between the ages of 18 and 60. For admission a minimum family income of 200$000 (Two hundred thousand contos) was required.[12] This organization, modeled on the French National Guard, progressively replaced the Army as the main provider of law and order in the Brazilian hinterland.[13]

Due to its intimate links with the Empire's local leaders (landowners, slaveowners, magistrates, and liberal professionals), the National Guard assumed a peculiar form of partisan politicization. Cleavage in its ranks reflected those of the political parties. Its elective character (until 1850), and the preponderance of staff linked to the political parties, meant that the social position and political affiliations of its members were more valuable than military skills. During the 1840's, central state interference grew as the elective character of the Guard also was subordinated. But local authorities still controlled the designation of functions to an important degree.[14]

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[12] Antônio Edmilson Martins Rodrigues, Francisco Calazans Falcon e Margarida de Souza Neves, A Guarda Nacional no Rio de Janeiro, 1831-1918 (Rio de Janeiro: PUC, 1981), pp. 14-9.

[13] Recent research has shown that this amount was not so high. Some studies point out that the Brazilian electoral system incorporated a substantial parcel of the national population to the electoral system, something around 10% of the total population or half the men in electoral age according to the 1872 census. See Richard Graham, Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Brazil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990) especially chapter 4, "The Theater of Elections," pp. 101-21. See also Herbert S. Klein, "Participação Política no Brasil do Século XIX: Os Votantes de São Paulo em 1880" in Revista Dados, Vol. 38, no. 3, 1995, pp. 527-44.

[14]On the definition of the Empire private forces I am assuming some of Victor Nunes Leal's assumptions concerning the character and composition of the local power in Brazil. In his classical work Coronelismo, Enxada e Voto (Rio de Janeiro: Alfa Ômega, 1948), Nunes Leal pointed out the fact that propriety of land was not the only source of power in the interior, underlining the connections between local bosses (Coronéis) and the state as sources of prestige and influence. See chapter I, "Atribuições Municipais," pp. 7-35. For the nature of the conflicts around the control of National Guard's designations see Thomas Flory, Judge and Jury in Imperial Brazil. 1808-1871. Social Control and Political Stability in the New State (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), especially part III "Reaction and the Conterreform, 1837-1871", pp. 129-200.

The Brazilian experience differs greatly from that described by the German historian Otto Hintze for most Western European countries. According to Hintze, in those states, the national army was the core of the state-building process, and the formation of the armies "transformed and determined the structure and the life of the more remote organs and functions of the state."[15] Unlike those examples, the Brazilian process of state building was made simultaneously with the decentralization of coercive military means. The Army as a permanent institution with a national impact did not cease to exist, but it lost most of its earlier prominence. For the Brazilian nation, during the early troublesome years of its existence, the demobilization of the Army enhanced stability and helped to consolidate the political order.[16]

Militias and the Gaúcho War System

Until the outbreak of the Paraguayan War, the National Guard as whole kept the internal peace, while some provincial militias and the remaining military units were responsible for the maintenance of external security. Recent academic research has extensively demonstrated that the army recruited personnel from the lower sectors of Brazilian society.[17] The small Brazilian army

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[15]For Hintze the phases of organization and concentration of violence in the hands of the states related significantly to the historic European continental armies. In those countries the centralized power of the kings expropriated seigniorial prerogatives. See especially "The Formation of States and Constitutional Development: A Study in History and Politics" and "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," in Felix Gilbert (ed.) The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975). pp. 157-77 and 178-215.

[16] Jeanne Berrance de Castro. A Milícia Cidadã: a Guarda Nacional de 1831 a 1850 (São Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1977).

[17] Meznar, "The Ranks of the Poor," Petter Beattie, "Transforming Enlisted Army Service in Brazil 1864-1948: Penal Servitude Versus Conscription and Changing Conceptions of Honor, Race, and Nation," (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Florida at Coral Gables, 1994). Hendrick Kraay,

centered its recruiting actions on those who could not count on the protection of an influential person or who had no godfather to exempt them from this hard service. Vagrants, potential criminals, and jobless men were the main targets of the "recrutadores." For most of the 19th century, service in the army was considered to be a brutal and dangerous activity, fit only for society's undesirable individuals. In the army, their conditions of life were regulated by the procedure of Count Lippe's regiments.[18] Those unhappy persons who served in the army considered their fate worse than that of slaves. Not only they, but their military chiefs also, thought that fate a terrible one. General Cunha Mattos, a deputy at the Brazilian parliament, well summarized these feelings in 1826, when he asserted that "the worst disgrace in the entire universe is to be a recruit in Brazil. It is a real punishment; a common soldier is considered a miserable slave."[19]

"The Army in Bahia, Brazil, 1808-1889," (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 1995), especially chapter III, "The Enlisted Men," pp. 255-305. Fernando Dores Costa, "Os Problemas do Recrutamento Militar no Final do Século XVIII e as Questões da Construção do Estado e da Nação," in Análise Social, Vol. 30, no. 130, pp. 121-55. Fábio Faria Mendes, "O Tributo de Sangue: Recrutamento Militar e Construção do Estado no Brasil Imperial, Tese de Doutorado, IUPERJ, 1997.

[18] Count Wilhelm de Shaumborg-Lippe was a disciple of Fredrick the Great who was commissioned to reorganize the Portuguese Army during the Seven-year's war. His influence on the Portuguese Army was strongly felt at the end of the 18th century, especially because he provided the Portuguese army with its first penal code constituted by twenty-nine laws, eleven of which prescribed capital punishment for aggravated crimes ranging from desertion to wartime mutiny. Lippi was a loyal follower of Frederick The Great's assertion that soldiers should fear their officers "even more than any danger." Frederick The Great quoted in Guibert Bullow, "From Dynastic to National War." In Edward Mead Earle (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (1943, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 49-76. On the Count of Lippe's influences over the Brazilian army see William, Count of Schaumburg-Lippe, Regulamento Para o Exercício e Disciplina dos Regimentos da Infantaria dos Exércitos de Sua Magestade Fidelíssima (Lisbon: Régia Officina Typografica, 1794). Manoel Joaquim do Nascimento e Silva, Synopsis da Legislação Brasileira ate 1874 Cujo Conhecimento Mais Interessa aos Empregados do Ministério da Guerra, 2 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia do Diário do Rio de Janeiro, 1874), Vol. 2, p. 153, Beattie, "Transforming Enlisted Army Service ...," pp. 42-3, and McBeth, "The Politicians and the Generals..., "pp. 256-60.

[19] Quoted in McBeth, "The Brazilian Recruit," p. 81.

From the late 1840's on, the Brazilian state relied on the Gaúcho militias for its international military conflicts. After the end of the Farrapos' War (1835-1845) the province of Rio Grande do Sul had been reunited to the Empire's territory and became the nucleus of interventionism by nature of its military organization. Because of its strategic position, closer to the Platine Republics than any other, Gaúcho society was extensively militarized, with troops directed both to self-protection and to rapid interventions in the border countries.[20]

According to Fernando Uricoechea, in Rio Grande do Sul, the bureaucratic control of the professional military over the National Guard was more permanent, more systematic, and more generalized than in other regions of the Empire. In these circumstances, the commandant of an Army Division in the region could also become a commandant of the National Guard.[21] The interconnection of those organizations (the Army and the Guard) generated contradictory situations in the region, but it also crystallized the loyalty of Gaúcho warriors to the Empire.[22] These groups of private warriors formed the basic units

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[20]Rio Grande do Sul was the only province to keep frontiers with the three other nations in the Platine Estuary: Uruguay, Argentina and Paraguay. The other Brazilian border provinces had borders with one or two countries. But those were a kind of no man's land due to the lack of roads or villages. Since its reintegration the province achieved increasing importance in Imperial military politics. See Joseph Love, Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971). According to John Schulz, one fourth of the Brazilian troops served in this province. O Exército na Política. Origens da Intervenção Militar (São Paulo: Edusp, 1996), pp.84-6. The inhabitants of the province of Rio Grande do Sul were known as Gaúchos. So the term has a different meaning when compared to the Argentinean definition. For the Argentineans, the term Gaucho designated semi-nomad groups of landless people that moved from farm to farm without establishing more permanent links as a working force.

[21] Fernando Uricoechea, O Minotauro Imperial. A Burocratização do Estado Patrimonial Brasileiro no Século XIX (Rio de Janeiro, DIFEL, 1978), pp. 251-52.

[22] During the Farrapos War (1835-1845), Andrade Neves, one of the Gaúcho's most famous military chiefs (who died in Paraguay in 1869), occupied the post of Lieutenant Colonel of the

of action in the River Plate region. But Rio Grande do Sul was also a turbulent area with a long history of struggles between the province's secessionists and the central power. It was also a region where authorities had historically faced rebellions (sometimes simultaneous) of slaves and deserters.[23] The proximity of the Platine borders encouraged slaves and recruiters to desert to the other side. From 1738 there were registers of runaways in the city of Rio Grande. These fugitives looked for refuge in lands beyond the Uruguayan border. This development was so widespread that it is possible to infer that the connection between the concepts of border and freedom were linked in the social imagination of Gaúcho slaves. As Maestri Filho puts it:

> In the South, since colonial times, the slaves had a more secure destiny: the lands beyond the border. Enslaved blacks that reached the Spanish lands were received as free men. Some treaties contrary to this principle were signed but never executed. In Uruguay, Entre-Rios, etc., the ex-slave could get employed for wages. This Gaúcho [society] singularity possibly diminished the incidence and importance of other forms of resistance.[24]

The frontier thus can be considered one of the most important alternatives of slave resistance in Rio Grande do Sul. One of the particularities of Gaúcho society was the social interaction with countries that emancipated slaves before

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National Guard. Neves refused to enter the Army with the rank of "Alferes," because he feared that, by assuming a subaltern position, he would lose his large range of action. See Cap. de Paranhos Antunes, Andrade Neves, o Vanguardeiro! (Rio de Janeiro: Bibliex), pp. 41-2. Fernando Urecoechea appropriately named Rio Grande do Sul as "The Imperial Minotaurs."

[23]On the roles of desertion and slave insubordination for the perception of threats against Gaúcho's social order see Paulo Roberto Staudt Moreira, "Sobre Fronteira e Liberdade - Representação e Práticas dos Escravos Gaúchos na Guerra do Paraguai" (1864/1870)," paper presented in the XX Reunion of the Brazilian Historian Association (ANPUH), Florianópolis-SC, July 1999.

[24] Maestri Filho, Mário. O Escravo Gaúcho (Rio de Janeiro: Brasiliense, 1984), p. 73.

Brazil did. The capacity to enforce law and order was thus connected to the control of the frontier and, sometimes, control of neighboring territories. When the degree of control was smaller, as during Rosas' dictatorship in Argentina, runaways were more frequent. Possibly for this reason, Gaúcho interest in the Uruguayan politics was very strong.

This singular situation reveals how external and internal questions could be interconnected in Brazilian politics through the Gaúchos' interests. The lack of a professional military force impelled the Imperial government to compromise with the Gaúcho elite. Sometimes, as during the Intervention in Uruguay (1864-1865), it impelled the Imperial government to undertake an expensive military campaign just to support the Gaúchos' interests, forcing an undesirable, even if only occasional, alliance with the Argentineans.

For the resources used during these interventions, no large professional Army was necessary. Brazil's adversaries in the Spanish republics were mostly "caudilhos," that is, local political bosses, who did not have well-organized armies. In most Platine countries, local elites faced huge internal struggles and lacked the resources to build and maintain permanent armies.[25] Fighting these caudilhos typically meant finding allies among the local opposition groups. During the intervention against Rosas and Oribe (1852), their local adversaries provided most of the infrastructure to supply the Brazilian forces. The social

[25]Even during the Cisplatine war, when a National Army still existed in Brazil, the Marquis of Barbacena, commandant of the Imperial Army, mentioned that in the peak of the campaign the troops numbered just 7,200; see Marquis of Barbacena to Emperor Pedro I, May 29, 1827, AHMI,

costs of military mobilization for the Brazilian government were relatively low. The superior capacity of the Brazilian military forces was so clear that it exempted the government from the need to make expensive military expenditures.

The patterns of reciprocal loyalty in the relations between the central government, the political bosses, and their clients supplied the needed resources. In spite of that, the deficiencies resulting from the lack of efficient planning and the dependence on forces in Rio Grande do Sul were criticized by some observers, according to whom the country "should abandon the patrician and Gaúcho system of army organization and adopt a kind of organization similar to that of the European nations."[26]

While criticism could be directed against the organization of military operations, there were no immediate pressures pushing heavily for administrative reforms. The system worked well in view of the challenges faced before 1863, and reforms were postponed. Only the impact of a major war, with its demand for soldiers and material resources, could shake this structure. The war against Paraguay forced the Imperial government to strengthen the army and recruit heavily in all the sectors of its society.[27] To understand the conditions

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II - POB, 01/16/1827, Hor. c. 1-9, quoted by McBeth, "The Brazilian Recruit During the First Empire," p. 82.

[26]Francisco Félix Pereira da Costa, História da Guerra do Brasil contra as Repúblicas do Uruguay e Paraguay (Rio de Janeiro: no editor, 1870), vol. III, p. 39. Peres da Costa worked as a war correspondent for the Correio Mercantil, a prestigious carioca newspaper.

[27]According to Octávio Tarqüinio de Sousa, by May 1832, regular troops had practically disappeared from Rio de Janeiro and other major cities of the Empire. See Três Golpes de Estado (Rio de Janeiro: 1960), p. 99, quoted in Michael McBeth, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

in which the recruitment deteriorated during the Paraguayan war, it is necessary to follow the course of the war.[28]

The Paraguayan Campaign

The first wave of recruitment for the Brazilian army (December 1864 -- May 1865) furnished an adequate contingent of soldiers that helped to drive the Paraguayan forces out of Rio Grande do Sul and complete the invasion of Uruguay. By May 1865, Uruguayan Allied government headed by the former rebel leader Venâncio Flores was supporting the Triple Alliance Treaty, leaving Paraguay alone in the struggle.[29]

During this first phase of operations, the enthusiasm of Volunteers impressed authorities who were used to finding the population extremely resistant to recruitment. These troops were reasonably motivated because the invasion of Brazilian territory, without a previous declaration of war, furnished fuel for patriotic demonstrations and spontaneous mobilization in many areas. This initial wave of collective mobilization was supported by many manifestations of patriotism, some of them coming from provinces very far away from the theater of operations. Those actions underlined a feeling of general enthusiasm

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[28]An additional advantage of the Empire was the fact that Brazil was the only country in the region that had a War Navy. This resource was pivotal in the transportation of troops and in the search of harbors and fortresses. During the War of the Triple Alliance, a navy blockade closed much the Paraguayan river, helping to isolate that country for most of the war. In spite of that, the Navy was severely criticized for its lack of mobility. For a defense of the Navy's position against such criticism see Visconde de Ouro Preto (Afonso Celso de Assis Figueiredo), A Esquadra e a Oposião Parlamentar (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Franceza, 1868).

[29] According to Wanderley Guilherme do Santos in order to win the war the ratio of Paraguayan casualties against Allied casualties would have to have been 1 to 3. See his "Guerra do Paraguai: Lição para os Conflitos Contemporâneos" in Revista Dados, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1987, p. 315

during the campaign's early phases. Ricardo Salles, based on the Army reports from 1865 and 1866, has given us a well-documented picture of this state of patriotic spirit. Provincial Reports present additional evidence of widespread enthusiasm.[30]

Figure 1 - The Enthusiasm for War

Source: A Semana Illustrada, Rio de Janeiro, June, 1865

In the northeast province of Alagoas, more than three thousand miles distant from the front, a citizen called José Severiano de Mello petitioned the provincial president to present three of his sons and three daughters to participate in the campaign. In his petition from April 4,1865 Mr. Mello stated that his feelings were due to "The true love for the fatherland that has always inflamed my heart; its flood of electric fire that pushes me to the battlefields, to

[30] Ricardo Salles, Guerra do Paraguai. Escravidão e Cidadania na Formação do Exército, (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1990), pp. 98-101.

take my part in this glorious campaign of my fellow countrymen against the Paraguayans!"[31]

In Maranhão, another distant northwestern province, similar expressions of support appeared. In a private letter to the Minister of War, the provincial president listed many individual initiatives supporting the national effort. Citizens brought relatives, protégés, and clients to enlist in the newly created Corps of Volunteers. Others enlisted themselves simultaneously with friends, sons, and brothers. As noted by Salles, donations were not limited to the rich sectors of the society, but encompassed many groups and professional affiliations. Such was the case in the small village of São José da Penha, where Luís Antônio Rodrigues, a professor of basic studies, a category exempt from recruitment, offered to contribute until the end of the campaign with ten per cent of his salary. The coastal pilot (prático mor) of the São Marcos bay, Domingos da Silva Ribeiro, offered ten per cent of his profits (gratificação) to help in the war efforts.[32] Public employees, small tenants, tailors, and other petty functionaries also offered donations. The provision of recruits went so well during these first months that it enabled the provincial president of Bahia to complain that:

> The only limit [to enlistment] was due to the orders of the Imperial government, included in its notice from October 21, 1865, stopping the organization of new corps and stating that only one more

[31] Fala Dirigida À Assembléia Legislativa Provincial das Alagoas no Dia 05 de Maio de 1865 pelo Ex. Sr. Presidente da Província. Maceió, Tipografia Progressista, 1865, pp. 23-24.

[32]ANRJ/SPE/ IG125, fl. 186, Augusto César Reis to Visconde de Camamú, 25 April 1865.

should depart for the front. Otherwise, the movement would have no other limit but the unfailing feeling that inspires it.[33]

In Pitanguy, a small town in the interior of the province of Minas Gerais, 52 Volunteers presented themselves spontaneously. In addition, a "Society for the Love of the Fatherland" (Sociedade Amor da Pátria) was created, to collect donations (in currency) for the campaign. At the Volunteers' departure there was a mass and a meeting of the Town Council, with the playing of the national anthem, and a young lady dressed like an Indian delivered a flag to the Volunteers. On the day of the Volunteers' departure, the town's entire population came for the farewell. Similar demonstrations took place along the Volunteers' progress toward the provincial capital (Ouro Preto). Patriotic feelings were present on a previously unknown level, because the war underlined the significance of the fatherland as an important source of social identity among the whole population.[34] In view of the success of the enlistment campaign and the initial wave of victories against Paraguay, the leaders of the Liberal Cabinet that governed Brazil at that time became very optimistic, as it appeared to them that the somewhat precarious state organization would be enough to achieve victory. Through a decisive battle, soon the Paraguayans would be forced to surrender to the Empire and the war would be over. Such optimistic feelings were

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[33]ANRJ, Relatório Apresntado A Assembléia Legislativa Provincial da Bahia pelo Excelentíssimo Senhor Presidente o Comendador Manuel Pinto de Souza Dantas no Dia 1o. de Março de 1866. Bahia, Typografia de Tourinho e C.e, 1866, p. 21.

[34] General Paulo de Queirós Duarte, Os Voluntários da Pátria na Guerra do Paraguai (Rio de Janeiro: Bibliex, 1981), pp. 13-16. The same episode is quoted in Ricardo Salles, Guerra do Paraguai..., p. 98, Fábio Faria Mendes, "O Tributo de Sangue," op. cit., p. 226, and José Murilo de Carvalho, "Cidadania: tipos e percursos" in Estudos Históricos, Vol. 9, No. 18, 1996, pp. 350-351.

expressed by the president of Rio de Janeiro, the richest Brazilian province, who wrote, "Deeply inspired, the [Liberal] Cabinet, relying on the national enthusiasm and through the creation of the corps of Volunteers saw them coming from every corner of the Empire to take their part in this Holy War. It became an acknowledged truth that Brazil does not need a numerous permanent army to maintain its integrity and its rights...."[35]

But the Imperial government did not rely only on popular patriotism to increase the size of the army. The roots of early successes in recruitment were also located in administrative innovations put into place just after the first operations. Anticipating difficult obstacles ahead, the Empire took preventive actions to improve Brazilian military capacity in the event of a prolonged conflict. Given the impossibility of undertaking a larger process of reform, the government tried to create pockets of efficiency inside the Army.

The first measure was the Decree 3371 from January 7, 1865, by which were created the Battalions of Voluntários da Pátria (Volunteers of the Fatherland; henceforth, Voluntários), to be organized in many provinces. As shown by Peter Beattie, the creation of "Voluntários" was part of a strategy to turn the army into a more honorable place for Brazilians from all classes. Voluntários offered additional advantages to their members that could not be achieved by normal recruits such as higher pay, shorter enlistment lengths, discharge bonuses, land grants, preference for Public Services positions,

[35] Relatório com que o Sr. Conselheiro de Estado Bernardo de Souza Franco passou a

pensions, and family support (in case of death). Its creation was aimed not only at a faster increase of the army, but also at enlisting more virtuous men, avoiding the difficulties brought by traditional methods based on forced conscription or even dragooning. The point to be stressed is that the government's appeal was made to all kinds of people, even to those who lived in regions not directly linked to the frontier areas in the South. In this sense, the war against Paraguay led to a nationalization of recruitment, crossing classes and geographic barriers. The call for arms helped temporarily to reinforce an integrative idea of the fatherland as had never been done before. Through the creation of Voluntários, the government also symbolically equalized all soldiers, because the Brazilian Emperor, Pedro II, was number one in the Volunteers list.[36]

In spite of the great flux of Voluntários, the Imperial government lacked the bureaucratic structure necessary to operate recruitment at full scale. This circumstance made the cooperation of local bosses, normally great planters with prestige and influence, pivotal for the success of any initiative. When hostilities against Paraguay began, the Imperial government still depended on the Barons' good will to raise a strong army. During the first months of mobilization, Imperial authorities relentlessly appealed to their patriotism, hoping for their help. In a letter addressed to a big planter, the Marquis of Olinda, President of the

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Administração da Província do Rio de Janeiro à José Tavares Bastos. Niterói, 10 May 1865, p. 4.

[36]According to Beattie through the creation of the corps of Voluntários "The Empire hoped to overcome the prejudice that surrounded regular army service." See Beattie, "Transforming Enlisted Army Service in Brazil 1864-1940," pp. 93-4.

Ministerial Council, exemplified the kind of compromise that mixed the planters and the government in support of the recruitment[37]:

> The manifest deficiency of our army and the urgent need to increase and support it in a convenient way... obliges the Imperial government to address the farmers and landowners to demand their consenting for the recruitment of Volunteers for the Army... Your Excellency is one of these planters whose patriotism is necessary to the Imperial government. By yourself or, in association with other farmers, you can make the complaints of the outraged and unrevenged fatherland be felt, filling the glorious commission the Imperial government entrusted to you.[38]

As exemplified in this quotation, the government relied on the cooperation of the planters even for the constitution of the new corps of Voluntários. These men were normally chiefs of National Guard militias in the interior and their cooperation was pivotal for the success of any government initiative. All Provincial presidents encouraged the involvement of such persons in the recruitment process, appealing to their influence and prestige. In a dispatch to the Minister of War, the President of São Paulo recognized this dependency. Describing his contacts with a Paulista local boss, Nicolau Vergueiro, the President emphasized the advantages of Voluntários as compared with normal recruits: "I also told him (Vergueiro) that, as the provincial police authorities were taking care of the recruitment for the army, he should be smart and underline [to them] that the listed Volunteers are not subject to it [Army recruitment] and that he should certify them [the Voluntários] in the government's name that, on the

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[37]President of the Council of Ministers was a position similar to that of Prime Minister in the English system, although the Emperor's confidence was much more important in the Brazilian case.

[38]MHN - GP4.10.11. Marquês de Olinda to João Maria Pires Camargo, 14 Aug. 1865. The word "fazendeiro" was many times used in the official reports to designate planters.

occasion of recruitment, we will fulfill all the warranties and promises presented in the Decree 2271 of March 7."[39]

In spite of good intentions, the creation of Voluntários did not solve the chronic problems related to logistics and infrastructure, problems due to the state's inability to provide adequate housing and training to a quickly growing army. In three letters from São Paulo, the Provincial President complained to the Minister of War about the precarious supply of guns and uniforms. Hardly disguising his irritation, the chief executive protested that:

> The Corps of Volunteers we are organizing in this city [São Paulo] is composed of 235 soldiers that are being housed at the penitentiary due to the lack of available installation in the barracks. This corps lacks discipline. There is no discipline without the constitution of commands. I will need instructions. Unhappily, I do not have instructors. [Soldiers] have neither guns nor uniforms. I told the Ministry that I had ordered some linen shirts to give to this corps a military appearance. My procedures have not been approved to this date....[40]

In the initial phases, the organization of troops depended heavily on the infrastructure provided by the local bosses. That was due to the lack of adequate means to recruit and mobilize ordinary citizens. The commendatary José Vergueiro, again, gives a good example of the kind of cooperation these sectors could furnish. In January 1865, this planter and politician visited the towns of Rio Claro and Limeira in the new coffee areas of Western São Paulo. On the road, Vergueiro addressed a letter to all "planters and important persons," explaining

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[39]ANRJ/SPE/ IG1 159, Cx. 587, fl. 552, Correspondence from the Provincial President of São Paulo with diverse authorities. From João Crispinaro Soares to Conselheiro Henrique Bauepaire Rohan, 29 January 1865.

his efforts to form a second corps of Voluntários. Commenting on Vergueiro's' actions the Provincial President wrote that: "I authorized this gentleman to give military instruction to this corps and also to house them, as it is necessary."[41]

The combination of central and local authorities in the same person was common and strengthened the bargaining power of the Barons when they dealt with Imperial authorities. The president of São Paulo recognized the limits of his powers when recruiting. Describing his impotence in face of the behavior of an indolent boss, this man complained, "It is relevant to note that the president of one of these towns is also the Lieutenant Colonel of the National Guard's Battalion of the district! It is clear that very little should be expected from this person."[42]

Depending too much on the good will of both the bosses and the population, the government admitted its lack of bureaucratic initiative, that is, its incapacity to extract resources directly from society. As long as conditions were favorable, these groups of planters could work in favor of government measures. But such a strategy depended on the duration of the war: the shorter it was, the better for everybody. With a long campaign, with its continuous drain of resources, enthusiasm would not stay at its high peak for long. Senator Nabuco de Araújo, a leading Imperial politician, lamented that the Brazilian people was

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[40]ANRJ/SPE/IG1 159, Cx 587, fl.582. João Soares to Visconde de Camamú, 21 Feb. 1865.

[41]Ibid. João Crispiniano Soares to Conselheiro Henrique de Bauepaire Rohan, 29 Jan.1865.

[42] ANRJ/SPE/IGI 159 - cx. 587, fl. 741. Joaquim Floriano de Toledo to Ângelo Muniz da Silva Ferraz. São Paulo, 25 May 1866.

turning despondent just because, "its main feature was enthusiasm not perseverance."[43]

This situation raises the question of internal cohesion, a subject central to social studies of war and national mobilization. It has been often suggested that war increases the internal cohesion of the warring state. However, some analysts of warfare, such as Arthur A. Stein and Bruce M. Russet, have pointed out that this relationship is more complex. A war may increase internal cohesion, but only under a variety of specific conditions, including the perception of an external threat to the society. If this perception decreases, as was the case during the Paraguayan campaign, cohesion no longer increases.[44]

In the Brazilian case, the possibilities of cohesion vanished as the long campaign and the permanent recruitment of freed workers became less compatible with the interests of the planters and their associates. These key sectors also had immediate concerns linked to the control of their work forces. If vagrants and beggars could be easily conscripted, normal field workers were protected as much as possible. The transfer of free workers or slaves to the battlefield was viewed with suspicion, and sometimes with indignation. This situation leads us to a consideration of the importance of patron-client relations in Brazilian social history.

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[43] José Honório Rodrigues (ed.), Atas do Conselho de Estado (Brasília: Senado Federal, 1978), p. 81.

[44] Arthur A. Stein and Bruce M. Russet, "Evaluating War: Outcomes and Consequences" in Ted Robert Gun (ed.), Handbook of Political Conflict - Theory and Research (New York: The Free Press, 1980), p. 413.

Designating National Guards

A second and more controversial measure to increase the size of the army came through the Decree 3383 of January 21,1865. This edict specified that 14,796 troops of the National Guard be transferred to the front. The consequences of such a measure for the internal balance of power were very serious because, according to the Imperial Constitution, the troops of the National Guard could not leave the country. When the government designated National Guards for the war, it touched a sensitive area, because the Guard was a traditional bastion of the landowners and other powerful local bosses. To be a member of the Guard was the best excuse a free man could offer to escape recruitment. Under the umbrella of the National Guard, these individuals could avoid the normal recruitment procedures through their loyalty to their immediate bosses. The prestige of these bosses was also related to the protection they could provide for their protégés. By transferring corps of the National Guard to the front, the Imperial government was interfering with direct sources of authority that traditionally resided in the local bosses. The unwritten pact between the central and local powers was violated by this decree, as it destroyed the image of the Guard as a sanctuary against normal recruitment. It also undermined the set of practices in operation since the 1830s. As emphasized before, these practices helped to give legitimacy to the centralization process in Brazil during its turbulent first decades as an independent nation. By the 1860's, they were sanctioned by custom and accepted as tradition. Their suppression also undermined the position of the state as an arbiter in conflicts between planters.

To make things worse, police corps were also transferred from their normal patrolling functions and mixed with Battalions of Voluntários, leaving the rearguard unprotected against slave rebellions. This situation placed still more stress on the remaining units of the National Guard, because they had to perform additional surveillance functions. The president of Rio de Janeiro emphasized the burden of non-designated National Guards in the province, emphasizing that: "It is not only the service of designation that weighs on the National Guard, but also the offer of the police force to march voluntarily to the campaign. By reason of the law 1370... the [police] has been substituted for the National Guard even in the surveillance of the province fortresses that was usually made by the Army but has been done, since 1865, by this Guard."[45]

In Rio de Janeiro, a province with a large slave population, the transfer of the police corps spread a feeling of insecurity that was expressed by the commander of a unit of the National Guard located in Vassouras, an important coffee center in the rich area known as the Paraíba Valley. Answering to the government's demand for more troops, this commander complained that, "the force already ready to march is so thin that it is barely fit for the normal services. These services have been made with much sacrifice and we can't provide the necessary number even to guard the town's jail."[46]

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[45] Relatório que apresentou a Assembléia Legislativa da Província do Rio de Janeiro o Senhor Benevenuto Augusto de Magalhães Taques. Nicterói, October 1868, p. 2.

[46] Relatório do Presidente da Província do Rio de Janeiro Benevenuto Augusto de Magalhães, Nicterói, Oct. 1868, pp. 3-4.

The above episodes illustrate the problems related to the transfer of troops and the inadequacy of the bureaucratic structure. But more serious challenges lay ahead. By the second half of 1865, when Paraguayan forces had been expelled from Brazil's southern territory and the Uruguayan Blanco government was defeated, the precarious structure of recruitment had become evident. When Imperial authorities began to organize the second corps of the army, they noticed a major change in the mood of the population. As the theater of war moved from Imperial territory to northern Argentinean provinces, the enthusiasm of the population vanished and resistance became endemic. The situation worsened with the first significant defeat of the Triple Alliance in the battle of Curupayti.

The War Dynamics and Recruitment Amplification

From April 16, 1866, when the Allied forces crossed the Paraguayan borders, through September of the same year, the invasion of Paraguay was a successful series of victories. The weakened Paraguayan army, which had lost so many soldiers during its offensive, was again defeated and suffered serious casualties in the battles of Tuyuti on May 24,1866, and Curuzú, when it tried to regain the initiative.[47] As a result of such reverses, the Paraguayans kept retreating to the Paraguayan River margins, concentrating their forces on the fortified trenches around the Humayta fortress. These were months of intense skirmishes, and peace initiatives made no progress.

Map 5 - Brazilian Offensives, 1866-1870



Source: John Hoyt Williams, The Rise and Fall of the Paraguayan Republic, 1810-1870, p. 213.

The fragility of the Brazilian military organization only became evident after its defeat in the battle of Curupayti (September 22, 1866), where the allies lost around 4,000 troops.[48] This defeat paralyzed the campaign, creating an

[47] Tuyuti is still the biggest set battle in Latin American history. Of a total of around 17,000 causalities, the Paraguayans had 13,000. After that battle, the Paraguayans lost completely their strategic initiative.

[48] According to Dos Santos, in Curupayti the allies lost 4,061 soldiers: 2,011 Brazilians and 2,050 Argentineans. This battle signaled the end of a significant presence of the Argentine troops in the front. See his "Guerra do Paraguay," op. cit., p. 322.

environment of great perplexity among Brazilian troops. Slowly politicians and military leaders began to understand that they now faced a cohesive enemy whose army had been recruited through universal conscription. In spite of its technical limitations, it was well disciplined and loyal to its leader. Now, the Paraguayans were fighting to defend their territory and could offer a much more determined resistance than any opponent the Brazilians had faced before.[49]

In an interesting comparison between the Triple Alliance War and the conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan, Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos observed that military superiority is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to define a conflict's outcome. Under certain circumstances, industrial backwardness does not make military defeat inevitable. In situations where the weaker nation does not surrender and the stronger does not change its objectives, as the Americans did in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan, the only rational strategies are 1) a shift in the original military objectives; 2) the complete destruction of the militarily inferior nation. Brazilian behavior in Paraguay offers a tragic example of the second alternative, because its military superiority was not sufficient to determine the conflict's outcome. The Paraguayan retreat did not mean the end of their disposition to resist, and such a change of circumstance made the outcome unpredictable.[50] All operations were

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[49] A detailed description of battles and campaigns in the Paraguayan territory can be found in Juan E. O'Leary, El Paraguay en La Unificacion Argentina. La Guerra de la Triple Alianza (Asunción: Instituto Colorado de Cultura, 1976).

[50] Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, "A Guerra do Paraguai: Lição para os Conflitos Contemporâneos" in Revista Dados, Vol. 30, no.3, 1988, p. 313. Drew Gilpin Faust in her analysis of Confederate Nationalism shows similar concerns. Late nineteenth-century experiences can

interrupted for seventeen months. During this period, Argentineans and Uruguayans retreated (due to internal troubles), while the Brazilian government worked desperately on the home front to reinforce its army and follow up on the campaign. The enormous number of casualties, due mainly to desertion and diseases, intensified the need to reinforce troops and to pursue a longer campaign.

The erosion of the Alliance armies became evident in the reduction of troop numbers, implying more urgent efforts for the recruitment of new contingents. The terrible sanitary conditions and the lack of adequate food caused most casualties. According to the testimony of Menenio Agrippa (pseudonymous of José Fernades Pereira Jr.), of the 51 battalions that invaded Paraguay, only 14 were still organized in 1867. Of 45,000 men, only half were ready for combat. But it would be naive to believe that these problems only began with the interruption of the campaign. Truly, the paralysis only accentuated circumstances that had been building since the second half of 1865. While true enthusiasm was the hallmark of the initial steps in Brazilian recruitment, resistance (individual or collective) was always present and kept growing during the war. In many respects, the resistance on the internal front was as serious as Paraguayan war efforts.

But how did the crisis in the external and internal fronts intermingle? This work has stressed the existence of hierarchical differences among the three

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enlighten the discussion of such problems on a less militaristic approach. See The Creation of Confederate Nationalism. Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana

main sources of soldiers for the army: the Volunteers, the Designated National Guards, and the conscript soldiers or recruits. Voluntários entered the army of their own will. Their motives were considered more altruistic than those of any other group. They were symbolically and materially rewarded for their actions. Designated National Guards were subject to political consideration and had some degree of negotiating power. Conscripts or recruits were at the bottom of society and normally belonged to categories considered as socially undesirable. These differences were clear from the moment of enlistment, because previous status determined place in the military strata. As the campaign progressed, these differences were progressively erased as socialization in the same units leveled status differences among soldiers. As a consequence, resistance became common among all sectors of the population. Under these circumstances, the internal responses to the war's circumstances were related not just to historical deficiencies in the enlistment of recruits, deficiencies that had been accentuated in wartime due to the great lack of manpower. They were also related to the perception of changes in the current patterns of selection. The more enlistment progressed toward universalization, the more acute protests turned out to be.

Delays at each step of the war made it impossible to regroup the existing army, increasing the demand for new soldiers. Turning to its hinterlands, the Empire demanded more manpower to fill the lacuna. Notwithstanding these efforts, the population was no longer willing to contribute. Slowly, but

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State University Press, 1988), p. 3.

progressively, Brazilians of all classes and regions turned against recruitment and resisted government measures. There were individual acts of insubordination, as well as collective actions, intended to keep recruits and National Guards in their places of residence. The resulting tensions between the center and periphery developed into the most acute situation since the 1840's.

The Micropolitics of Desertion

In 1867, while describing the problems related to his recruitment efforts in the province, the president of Minas Gerais gave a detailed picture of the obstacles he had to overcome to provide more soldiers to the Imperial Army. This president complained acutely about the enormous number of problems he faced during a period in which preparation for a new offensive against the Humayta fortress was at its peak. Trying to justify his poor record to the Minister of War, the president wrote him a confidential letter explaining the difficulties he faced while transporting recruits to the Court:

> Your Excellency has no idea of the efforts I have been making to capture and send recruits. While in prison they receive visits of (important) people that counsel them to resist the guards, force the doors, and run away.[51]

This president accused various important elements of the society of Minas Gerais, including physicians, priests and parish judges, of conspiracy. By their permanent opposition to the government (that is, the Liberal Party in power), they undermined the actions of recruiter agents by convincing soldiers to desert.

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[51] AHMI, I-DPP-22.1.867 - met.c. From Vicente Pires da Mota to Marquis de Paranaguá. Ouro Preto, 24 May 1867.

This description underlines a web of relations opposed to recruitment, involving most sectors of Minas society.

As bad as the lack of confidence in the government could be, it was not as shocking as the fate of those who were recruited. The most remarkable parts of this confidential letter are those that discuss the conditions of recruits who were marched through the hinterlands. In discussing this subject with the Minister of War, the president offered some of the sharpest images of the deterioration of Brazilian enthusiasm and the popular support for desertion. Describing the risks of mutiny while marching, he justified the use of handcuffs and irons, even taking into consideration the strong impact such a view of dragooned soldiers, marching against their will, could have on the population on the road:

> I gave orders for the handcuffs, with which the recruits march, to be taken off in [the city of] Petropólis, to avoid making them arrive at the Court in chains, as they depart from the diverse points from which they are sent.[52]

This president regretted these practices but recognized that, without such safeguards, it would be virtually impossible to deliver recruits to the court. Answering the Minister's suggestion that he maintain appearances by unchaining the recruits each time a village was entered, the president complained that:

> Every time we [needed] to unchain them, we would need a blacksmith...[but] where to find them? In any case, in these villages escapes would be unavoidable. Each inhabitant, each farmer, and even...each authority would hide those they could. Believe me this is the entire truth.[53]

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[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

Why did the initial patriotic motivations give way to such widespread demonstrations of resistance?

Even at the beginning of the operations, desertion was a significant fact in many provinces. The president of Alagoas, in one of the few comparisons made between the rates of enlistment and desertion, noticed a huge difference between the number of individuals enlisted and those that effectively went to the war:

Table II
Recruitment in the Province of Alagoas 1865

	Presented	Sent to the Court		Per cent of Evasion
Voluntários	134	129	(96.3%)	3.73
Transferred National Guards	101	73	(72.3%)	27.72
Recruits	680	422	(61.9%)	38.08
Freed Slaves	26	26	(100%)	0
Total	941	650	(69.2%)	30.92

Source: Provincial Report of Alagoas Province, May 1865

The third column permits a comparison between the number of those originally recruited and those effectively sent to the court, that is, to the capital of the Empire, to proceed directly to the theater of war. At the beginning of the campaign, when all provincial reports showed the best possible picture, the total rate of evasion in Alagoas was above 30 per cent. The highest rates were among Transferred National Guards and Recruits. In these two categories were concentrated the individuals who were not voluntary soldiers. They were forced to go by conscription (in the case of recruits), or through arbitrary acts transferring National Guards. About one third of the National Guards evaded,

while 38.1 of recruits never arrived at the capital. Such a reality contrasts sharply with the picture presented by donations and other patriotic actions at the beginning of the operations.

The situation in Alagoas does not seem to be unusual when we look at other provinces. The timing of desertion can be better followed through a report presented by the president of Maranhão, a northern province on the border of the Amazon region. From twelve Guards who left from the village of Tutoia, only one arrived in the provincial capital. During the passage of the Guards through São Luís (the provincial capital), 66 deserted, 71 did not show up to embark, 94 were dismissed by his predecessor, and 67 fell ill at the hospital. From those that qualified to board, 26 were dismissed because of disability and 40 more because of legal exemptions. Thus, from a total of 910 Maranhense guards designated for transfer, only 546 (60%) embarked for the capital. Such a combination of desertion, exemption, and pretended illness was typical in all regions, thus severely undermining the recruitment capabilities.[54]

No province presented a stronger contrast between the two initial waves of recruitment than Rio de Janeiro. The Empire's richest province and the coffee plantation region's heart, Rio was also closer to the Court than any other.[55] These circumstances ought to have made the province more sensitive to the

[54] ANRJ/SEP/IG125 - Cx. 530, fl. 76. Tenente Coronel José Caetano Vaz Júnior to Conselheiro José Antônio Saraiva. São Luís, 14 Aug. 1865.

[55] Rio de Janeiro city was the Brazilian capital from 1763 to 1960. From 1961 to 1964 it was the capital of the Guanabara state. It is Rio de Janeiro's state capital since 1975.

appeals of the Imperial government.[56] The first wave of Volunteers showed that most enlistment was spontaneous, rather than a mobilization following from traditional coercive resources such as the police corps

Table III
Recruitment in Rio de Janeiro, 1865

Source	Dec. 1864 to May 1865	Percent of total recruitment	May to Sep. 1865	Percent
Provincial Police Corps	510	17.0	0	0.0
Volunteers	2458	82.0	473	27.7
Recruits for the Army and the Navy	32	1.0	644	37.7
Designated National Guards	0	0.0	459	27.0
Deserters imprisoned and sent to the Headquarters	0	0.0	130	7.6
Total	3000	100.0	1706	100.0

Source: Provincial Reports of Rio de Janeiro, 05.1865

In the first wave of enlistees (Dec./64 to May/65), 82% of those enlisted came from voluntary groups. Feeling very confident about the supply of recruits, the provincial government dispensed with the services of 1,384 National Guards previously designated. Soon its decision proved to be a foolish one, because the second wave of recruitment (May/1865 to September/1865) showed a drop of 43.1% in the total number and 80.1% in the Volunteers contribution. By then,

[56] The political alignment between the Fluminense elite and the Imperial government was proposed as a hypothesis by Ilmar Rohloff de Mattos in his book O Tempo Saquarema (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1988).

non-volunteer groups, including those that had deserted during the first call, were providing 72.3% of the troops.[57]

Figure 2 - Desertion portrayed in the press

"If the Door is closed" - a recruit is "rescued" through the window.
Source: O Cabrião, Sao Paulo, 1867, June 28, 1866

In Minas Gerais, a province well known for its resistance to recruitment, the provincial report also shows the preponderance of non-volunteer groups but, in contrast to Alagoas and Rio, coerced groups were in the majority from the beginning. Minas counted a population of 1,600,000 (16% of the total population of the Empire at the time).[58] The Imperial government requested an initial quota of just 1,200 (0.075 of the total). In spite of the small number requisitioned, only

[57] The small dimension of the initial contingents shows that the Imperial government also underestimated the dimensions of the war, probably expecting a quick surrender of the Paraguayan government.

21% of the stipulated number were effectively presented. From 251 men sent to the front during the campaign's first months, only 5 (1.9%) were Voluntários while recruits and National Guards made up 216 (86.4%). The remaining 30 (8.3%) were filled through the recruitment of freed slaves, whose enlistment was not still considered a state question at this time.[59]

The Bishop of Mariana, an important mining center closer to the capital, was very concerned about the shortage of recruits and sounded his official disappointment during his proclamation of November 1866. Attending to a request of the provincial president, Saldanha Marinho, this Bishop addressed a "proclamation" to all members of his dioceses proclaiming the Church's official support of the war. The Bishop expressed the government's disappointment with the province's low degree of cooperation, emphasizing that "When the fatherland demands your assistance to your brothers [and] when they call for your help to obtain the victory [you] run to the forests or pretend illnesses so as to be dismissed! So many cowardly acts do not seem proper of serious people.... If we have always to be ready to appear in front of the lord's tribunal, why not in the middle of bullets, bayonets and torpedoes!"[60]

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[58] The estimate of 10,000,000 inhabitants for the entire Brazilian population would be better applied for the first census made in 1872.

[59]ANRJ, Relatório que à Assembléia Legislativa Provincial de Minas Gerais Apresentou no Ato da Abertura da Sessão Ordinária de 1865 o Desembargador Pedro de Alcântara Cerqueira Leite, Presidente da mesma Província .Ouro Preto, Typografia de Minas Gerais, 1865, p. 22.

[60] MHNRJ, GP.412, "Uma Proclamação de Dom Viçoso aos seus Diocesanos." Mariana (MG), 6 Nov. 1866. Later in his life Saldanha Marinho became one of the most prominent leaders in the Republican movement. How much his experiences as a Provincial president convinced him to change his political options is difficult to state.

The fear of death was stronger than these religious appeals. One year later, the next president complained that even priests were campaigning in the interior against the draft:

> There are preachers everywhere to infuse fear in the population who are ready for the war. In [the city of] Queluz, Dr. Lafayete and his brothers and relatives are permanent missionaries of this propaganda.... Just now I am suing a vicar from Diamantina ...because [he] spent his Sundays counseling (from de pulpit)! that [the people should] resist, run, but not go to the war because this is like a plague created by a corrupt government to destroy all Conservatives and peace lovers.[61]

Figures from the important province of São Paulo show how the tendency toward forced conscription had progressed by late 1866.

Table IV
Soldiers Recruited in São Paulo, October 1866 to May 1867

Source	Number	Percent
Volunteers	87	6.5
Volunteers for the Army	81	6.1
Volunteers for the Navy	51	3.8
Recruits	693	52.0
National Guards	419	31.6
Total	1331	100.0

Source: Provincial Report from São Paulo, 1867

According to the above data, during the third wave of recruitment (October 1866 to May 1867), more than 80% of all men sent to the front came from non-volunteer ranks. These numbers support the veracity of contemporary reports describing the increasing role of conscription. São Paulo, at the time, was a flourishing coffee plantation society. It had been receiving slaves from the northwest provinces in huge proportions but still faced the consequences of the

[61] MI, I-DPP-22.1.867 - met.c. Vicente Pires da Mota to Marquis de Paranaguá. Ouro Preto, 24 May 1867.

interruption of the international slave traffic. Under such circumstances, it seems logical that voluntary enlistment was low. Free laborers were becoming absolutely necessary to the work on plantations. Naturally, larger planters tried to defend their work force reserves against conscription, and such behavior can explain partially why important provinces, such as São Paulo and Minas Gerais, did so badly in their contribution to recruitment. But resistance was endemic and spread progressively to the country as whole. Later in the same year of 1867, the president of Minas Gerais provided testimony about the degree of tension provoked by recruitment. Complaining about the scarcity of recruits and the unwillingness of National Guards to cooperate, the president described a terrible picture with respect to National Guards, emphasizing that, "Almost all active National Guards who were ready to march took refuge in scattered points that offered the necessary resources to survive and where the response of the authorities was late. [They] formed large groups of deserters, both designated and recruits that could not be captured due to the lack of material supplies."[62]

Many causes contributed to the decrease in the voluntary contribution during the second and third waves of recruitment. According to the President of Alagoas, this situation was due to "the natural decline of the early manifestations of offended patriotism, the sedentary character of her [provincial] population, the traditional existing horror in relation to the Wars in the South of the Empire, and, above all, to the exaggerated and terrifying news coming from the theater of

[62] Relatório que Apresentou ao Ex. Sr. Vice-Presidente da Província de Minas Gerais Dr. Elias Pinto de Carvalho por Ocasião de Passar a Administração em 3 de Julho de 1867, p. 21.

operations concerning the mortality because of the weather conditions, the fatigue caused by the marches, and the epidemics that decimated the army."[63]

The president of Maranhão complained that recruits evaded service by running away, hiding, or using legal exemptions. These remarks should be seen in the context of a popular Brazilian saying according to which "God is great but the wilderness is greater!," one that captures well the popular wisdom of the poor in Brazil. Many individuals or groups who could not count on any kind of protection hid in the forests to evade conscription. Soon, those with some form of protection followed them. The terrifying news coming from the South was combined with collective resistance to army service. Serving in the army became identified with the worst forms of slavery. Consequently, as soon as the war lost its initial romantic glamour, resistance became the order of the day.

News and rumors spread quickly, reinforcing the crystallization of an environment hostile to recruitment, but some individuals had more difficulty in avoiding service than others. Those without some kind of protection were the preferred targets of recruiters in all provinces and responded with individual acts of rebellion. In the small town of Rio Bonito, in the province of Rio de Janeiro, a superior commander described for the National Guard commanders the criteria used to designate substitutes. This senior officer presented a guard from the 7th. Infantry Battalion called João Batista Pereira Junior, who had been designated

[63] Relatório com que o Dr. Esperidião Eloy de Barros Pimentel, Presidente da Província das Alagoas Entregou a Administração da Mesma Província no dia 10 de Abril de 1866, ao 1o. Vice-Presidente Dr. Galdino Augusto da Natividade e Silva. Maceió, Typografia do Bacharel Félix da Costa Moraes, 1866, pp. 18-19.

as a substitute for another guard, who had evaded service through legal exemption.[64] His description of this substitute included all the characteristics of a social undesirable person. According to this commander:

> His behavior as a Guard and individual is terrible. Married around two years ago to evade recruitment [he] abandoned his wife after eight days.... [D]uring this time he has been making a living through robbery [while] seeking refuge in the forests. [Because he knew] he would be captured sooner or later he has been so disgraceful as to self-mutilate the index finger of his right hand. This wound is completely cured and [he] is now completely ready for the service he has been designated for. This command asks your Excellency, in favor of discipline, and also to show him as an example to those that take advantage of mutilations and amputations, to give him the fate that his cowardice deserves in order to not have imitators.[65]

There is no doubt that recruits tried to evade service by running away and hiding, or by more dramatic actions such as impromptu weddings or self-mutilation. Exemptions by legal means, substitution, or political influence were common and regularly helped individuals to avoid service. These exemptions were based on the personal relations that linked National Guard commanders to their men. They offered a much more formidable excuse than the individual resistance could provide. Those National Guards who were designated to the front looked to traditional webs of social relations to build obstacles against recruitment. When such strategies failed they were still able to "buy substitutes." These strategies had been used in previous conflicts with relative success, and it

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[64] Substitutions were widely used as the surest way to leave service. In spite of the criticism associate to this practice law sanctioned it.

[65] APRJ, Documentos da Presidência da Província, 1862-1867. Coleção 215/216, caixas 175/176. João José Marinha to Eduardo Pendayba de Mattos, Nicterói, 1867.

was natural that terrified men looked to their bosses in order to receive exemptions. [66]

As mentioned before, the transfer of the National Guards to the front was the source of a variety of conflicts. From the beginning of the war, provincial reports were full of descriptions of conflicts between recruiting agents and designated guards. During the war against Paraguay, the political will of the Imperial government became heavily focused on the transfer of these Guards. Pressures coming from the center became stronger than before, as imperial officials insisted that the preservation of national integrity was more important than any private reservations could be. Such circumstances clashed with traditional conditions of bargaining prevailing until then, and the range of private negotiations between bosses and officers was narrowed in the face of a seemingly permanent shortage of ordinary soldiers to undertake a long campaign. Provincial presidents were stimulated to press the National Guard commanders to send the largest possible number of recruits. Some of them, such as the vice-president of Maranhão, tried to justify his province's poor record, blaming the Guards' behavior while exempting their commanders of responsibility. In his provincial report of August 1865, the president stated that, "There is no doubt about the National Guard Commander's good will," but he complained that designated soldiers, those Guards that were sent to the front,

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[66]Substitution was an international practice in societies were universal military recruitment was not instituted. See Nuria Sales de Bohigas, "Some Opinions on Exemption from Military Service in Nineteenth Century," in Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1968, pp. 261-289.

used all means to avoid marching. "When all failed they ran for the forests, and it was necessary to make them go to the capital escorted as recruits."[67] This vice-president appropriately called the organization of the new corps as "an insane task."[68]

Other presidents were not so indulgent about the National Guard commanders' behavior. Many recognized commanders' partiality when faced with the designation of their men. These Imperial agents recognized that, when confronted with a choice between to their loyalty to the fatherland or their local relationships, local bosses did not hesitate to protect their clients. In a letter to the Minister of War, the president of São Paulo complained about the Guard's inertia. Disappointed with the lack of cooperation, he confessed that, in spite of his efforts to recruit, the reality was that, "I do not count on the cooperation of the commanders of the National Guard [because] they began to send me representations where they constantly remind me of the evils brought by the designation of the National Guard troops."[69] In Minas Gerais the Commanders were also directly blamed for the lack of recruits. Commenting on the poor state of the army, the president complained that, "The designations, generally irregular, were not even made at some superior commands."[70]

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[67]In the provincial reports the term "recruit" was often used as synonym of imprisoned men, that is, those that were not recruited on a Voluntary basis.

[68]ANRJ/SPE/ IG125 - Cx.530 - fl. 76, Tenente Coronel José Caetano Vaz Júnior to Conselheiro José Antônio Saraiva, São Luis, 14 Aug.1865.

[69] ANRJ/SPE/IGI 159.Cx. 587, fl. 741. Joaquim Floriano de Toledo to Conselheiro Ângelo Muniz da Silva Ferraz. São Paulo 25 May 1866.

[70] Relatório que Apresentou o Ex. Sr. Vice-Presidente da Província de Minas Gerais Dr. Elias Pinto de Carvalho por Ocasião de Passar a Administração. Ouro Preto, 3 July 1867, p. 21.

Sometimes exemptions were given as a consequence of the special position occupied by recruits in the economy. Those working in strategic areas such as railroads and mail offices were able to avoid service. In a report of October 6, 1866, the Minister of War answered a query concerning the legal situation of a National Guardsman of the 3rd. Battalion of Infantry. The Guardsman was designated to the war, but he was also an employee of the Dom Pedro II railroad. The minister argued that, "In spite of the fact that the railroad became [recently] state-owned, all the employees still have legal exemption from National Guard service, because the exemption was not conceded in favor of the company, but in favor of their employees, because of the nature of their service."[71]

Even in Rio Grande do Sul, a traditional provider of troops and horses, the situation was not going very well. In a private letter to the Minister of War, in November 1866, General Manuel Luís Osório, the most prestigious military leader of the Liberal party, described the precarious situation there.

> The delay in the reunion [of troops] comes from circumstances very difficult to modify: many people were hidden in the jungle, and many others have taken refuge in the Oriental state (Uruguay). It is very difficult to reunite such dispersed elements. Speaking of the Oriental State I should mention to you that I asked General Flores permission to take [our] soldiers there and send them for the service of war.[72]

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[71] Relatório Apresentado a Assembléia Geral Legislativa na Primeira Sessão da Décima Terceira Legislatura pelo Respectivo Ministro e Secretário de Estado Martim Francisco Ribeiro de Andrada. Rio de Janeiro, Typografia do Correio Mercantil, 1867, p. 5. Similar exemptions for mail employers existed in the US. Section two of the Enrollment Act provided exemption for public officials. See United States Statutes at Large, Vol. XIII, pp. 731-737.

[72] IHGB, Lata 312 - Pasta 31 - Coleção Marques de Paranaguá, General Osório to Visconde de Paranaguá. Pelotas, 15 Dec.1866. General Venâncio Flores was the president of Uruguay

Also known by his noble title of "Marquis of Herval," Osório was one of the most experienced Brazilian generals and one of Rio Grande do Sul's most prestigious military chiefs. His correspondence reveals the problems associated with recruitment in a province traditionally important to war mobilization. One problem was the high degree of partisanship in politics, which increased tensions during the election period, as shown by his discussion of the problems associated with the recruitment of the third corps: "the difficulties are many and they come from everywhere and I try to make everybody forget about such political hostilities and just hear the voice of the nation."[73]

Osório's testimony also shows how political competition inside the army affected the loyalty, not only of the Gaúcho militias, but also of cattle-ranchers and saladeros (many of who had lands in Uruguay). In 1867 Osório calculated that around eight thousand Gaúchos had deserted through the Uruguayan frontier. As the Gaúcho elite had land on both sides, it is plausible to suppose that these bosses encouraged mass desertions to preserve the loyalty of their men. Thus, the very province whose demands led to the war and whose leaders had stressed their capacity for cooperation could no longer contribute.[74]

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between 1865 and 1868. Until the 1930's General Osório was the patron saint of the Brazilian national army. On Osório's myth see Celso Castro, "Entre Caxias e Osório: A Criação do Culto ao Patrono do Exército Brasileiro," in Estudos Históricos, Vol. 14, n. 25, 2000, pp. 103-118.

[73] IHGB, Lata 312, Pasta 31, Manuel Luís Osório to Marquis de Paranaguá. Pelotas 15 Dec. 1866.

[74] IHGB, Lata 372, Pasta 17. Osório to Marquis de Paranaguá 31 Mar. 1867.

Another alternative answer to the government's demands was to recruit adversaries' protégés or to take from these opponents the command of battalions. In Maranhão the vice-president underlined that, "Amidst all these problems the Superior Commanders [of the National Guard] and Battalion Commanders make 'white hand' [a local term meaning "to be too liberal"] toward everyone's recruitment and send the sick, the elderly, the under aged, the widow's only sons, everyman that has the more positive legal exemptions."[75]

The president of Minas Gerais complained that, "the works of the qualification (designation) councils were very irregular. Many iniquitous designations were made [because] the spirit of [the partisan] party dictated them."[76] In the province of São Paulo the president also remarked that, "after recruiting the single and able for the service, the designations fallen over many that had exemptions, and those that do not have it hide in the trees."[77] Joaquim Manoel de Macedo, an influential advisor at the Imperial court, reinforced the vision of recruitment as a weapon to intimidate the poor at the election time:

> No party or faction which calls itself a party can throw stones at any other. They all employ or have employed forced recruiting with the ultimate immoral end of the blatant oppression of the poor people.[78]

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[75] ANRJ, IG125 - Cx. 530, fl. 76. From Lieutenant Coronel José Caetano Vaz Júnior to Conselheiro José Antônio Saraiva. São Luís, 14 Aug. 1865.

[76] Relatório que à Assembléia Legislativa Provincial de Minas Gerais apresentou no Ato de Abertura da Sessão Ordinária de 1865 o Desembargador Pedro de Alcântara Cerqueira Leite - Presidente da Mesma Província. Ouro Preto, Typografia de Minas Gerais, 1865, p. 22.

[77] ANRJ - IGI 159, cx. 587, fl. 741. Joaquim Floriano de Toledo to Ângelo Muniz da Silva Ferraz. São Paulo 25 May 1866.

[78] Joaquim Manoel de Macedo to Count of Eu, 5 Sept. 1867, IHGB, cx. 276, pasta 19. Also quoted in William Sheldon Dudley, "Reform and Radicalism in the Brazilian Army, 1870-1889," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1972), p. 68.

Complications arising from partisan competition were constant and affected the procedures even at higher positions in the battlefields. In October 1866, disputes between the two main Brazilian military commanders, the Conservative Polidoro da Fonseca and the Liberal Porto Alegre, were intense. When news came concerning the nomination of another Conservative leader, the Marquis de Caxias, as the military commander of all the Triple Alliance troops, arrived to the encampment, Porto Alegre asked to be dismissed. This kind of rivalry continued, although with less intensity, after Caxias assumed the army command. But in the rearguard, partisan political disputes led to instability in command positions and affected local balances of power. It was a common strategy to enlist political adversaries or to deprive them of commands over their own forces. In the district of São Miguel, in the province of Rio Grande do Norte, an officer of the National Guard was removed from his functions as district sub-delegate by the president of that province. According to the Justice Report, as soon as the change was implemented his political enemies "rejoiced publicly in their happiness, going to the extreme of provocation." Feeling offended, the dismissed officer tried to avenge his honor, attacking his opponents with a cane. What in normal conditions could have been a mild conflict escalated, involving partisans of both sides and finally resulting in the death of two slaves and one Indian and injuries to six more people. Fifty soldiers were sent to reestablish public order in town.[79]

[79] Relatório do Ministério da Justiça Apresentado à Assembléia Geral Legislativa na Segunda

After the retirement of the Argentinean commandant, Bartolomeu Mitré (September 1866), Emperor Pedro II nominated the Conservative Marquis of Caxias to the command of all Triple Alliance forces. Caxias was a legend in the Brazilian Imperial tradition, and his nomination was aimed at rationalization and standardization of functions and practices of the command forces. But Caxias was also a politician, and his nomination intensified internal disputes in the provinces by depriving many liberal provincial presidents of their recruiting prerogatives.[80] The rivalries between factions led to administrative discontinuity, with the removal of commanders and the detachment of regiments encouraging even more desertions. In a private letter to the minister of war, a removed Gaúcho commander complained that:

> These facts indicate to me that my command will be taken from me very soon and this is the reason why I am telling you about all these circumstances just to emphasize that: I've never refused to give my weak services in these times, as neither I nor my friends have chosen this situation to...speculate in politics; and far from preparing a new army [there is] only personal politics, to prepare the terrain for electoral victories, neutralizing supposed adversaries.[81]

To secure an additional supply of southern troops, the Imperial government suspended Congressional elections in the province of Rio Grande do Sul during the second semester of 1866. In a special meeting of the Council of State held on August 23rd. many councilors agreed that the realization of

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Sessão da Décima Terceira Legislatura pelo Respectivo Ministro e Secretário de Estado Martim Francisco Ribeiro de Andrada, Rio de Janeiro, Typografia Perseverança, 1868, p. 7.

[80] The political effects of Caxias' nomination will be seen later.

[81] IHGB, Lata 312 - Pasta 31 - Coleção Marquês de Paranaguá. From Severino Ribeiro D'Almeida a João Lustosa da Cunha Paranaguá. Pelotas 31 Dec. 1866.

elections and the violence inherent in the electoral process were not compatible with the recruitment process. Councilor Pimenta Bueno went as far as to declare that:

> [T]hose would not be free elections because the voters would not go to the pools or they could be recruited while entering or exiting the churches.[82] The government would not be able to keep the law because arbitrary [local] police authorities would do as they wished in defense of party interests.[83]

In the early months of 1867, while the organization of the third corps was still in progress, the president of Rio Grande do Sul saw more problems on the horizon. Describing the lack of means to defend the province in the face of external attacks, he complained to the Cabinet of the president that:

> Many desertions have been taking place at...different points of this province, even in the camp of general Baron of Herval. I keep sending to the first corps all deserters who have been caught, including those coming from the Third corps. ...I beg your Excellency to provide a monthly supply of two hundred contos to help with the urgent expenses required for formation of the Third corps.[84]

The report of so many cases supports the hypothesis that, by the second half of 1865, desertion had become a national phenomenon. Partisans of deprived groups saw recruitment as just another source of power exercised against themselves. As a consequence, disputes over who would be designated eroded the National Guard's position. In its turn, the Guard revealed its lack of

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[82] Elections normally took place inside churches.

[83] José Honório Rodrigues, Atas do Coselho de Estado, Meeting held on August 23, 1866, pp. 49-59. A broader explanation concerning the Council meetings will be provided in chapter VI.

[84] AHMI- 93 - I - ZGVMel.c 1-6. Francisco Ignácio Homem de Melo to Zacharias de Góes e Vasconcelos. Porto Alegre, 19 Feb.1867.

potential to support the country in the event of a more intense kind of war. The Justice report from 1867 clearly recognized such deficiencies, emphasizing that: "The [current war] experience confirmed the need to reform the National Guard. This militia who was created to defend the order and the public liberties is very far from its finality...."[85]

Desertion, individual or collective, was a serious challenge, but did not necessarily undermine the whole recruiting process. This form of resistance was neither life-threatening nor well organized, but it nevertheless expressed contempt for the law and inhibited the enrollers' efforts to enforce it. A much graver threat to the Empire's internal peace was the large number of collective rebellions against recruitment. Some of them were supported by National Guard commanders or had the assistance of other important local authorities, such as judges, priests, or planters. These revolts expressed the disillusion of various sectors with government agents' interference with their private lives. This interference lacked legitimacy in their eyes because it disrupted the local and regional balance of forces. Under the impact of these external forces, the resistance of inertia gave way to violent manifestations of collective action, some of which seem to follow the pattern common to the 18th century British riots analyzed by E. P. Thompson.[86]

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[85] Ministério da Justiça - Relatório Apresentado a Assembléia Geral Legislativa na Primeira Sessão da Décima Terceira Legislatura pelo Respectivo Ministro e Secretário de Estado Martim Francisco Ribeiro de Andrada, Rio de Janeiro, Typografia do Correio Mercantil, 1867, p. 4.

[86] Nothing could better describe the concept of "resistance of the inertia " than Marc Bloch's description of the situation in medieval Europe: "The lord's abuse of force had no longer any

In his analysis of the social universe of the English working class revolts during the 18th century, Thompson emphasized the role of tradition and custom in the plebeian culture of Britain. According to Thompson, the crowds were defending a "Moral Economy" based on the existence of customs in common, shared by those populations. A common vision united the crowd and the gentry around basic attitudes toward life, commerce, and authority. The urban and rural poor believed that the operations of the free market worked against their interests, and thus they denied that planters, bankers or simple merchants had an absolute right of property in their necessities of life and reaffirmed the traditional idea of a "just price." In pre-industrial British society, when some new political force tried to modify customary practices, it faced the workers' reaction in the form of riots and revolts.[87] Eric Foner also applied this perspective of a "moral economy" when analyzing the behavior of urban crowds in Philadelphia in late colonial America. According to Foner, in this colonial society the popular visions of social consensus, including the control of prices, were in basic conflict with the idea of the "invisible hand" of the market. The opposition to British colonial taxation reaffirmed colonists' assumptions that the idea of economic freedom should be subordinate to the general good of society.[88]

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counterweight except the amazing capacity for inertia of the rural masses-often, to be sure very effective-and the disorder of the lord's own administration." Marc Bloch, La Société Feodale (Paris: Éditions Michel Albin,1968), p. 352.

[87] E. P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century" in Customs in Common (New York: The New Press, 1991), pp. 185-258.

[88] Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 148-149.

During the Triple Alliance War, the expansion of government prerogatives in Brazil interfered with another kind of market, that is, with established loyalties which took the form of private contracts between planters and their clients. Such state interference with traditional rituals of social control led the provincial populations, especially those living in small villages and districts in the far interior, to appeal for protection to local sources of power against the unreasonable advance of the state. An explosion of local rebellions sought to push recruitment agents out of villages and districts and restore previously existing conditions of livelihood. No rebellion achieved the level of earlier secessionist movements, but some of them seriously challenged the execution of governmental power. In this sense the moral economy of Brazilian populations opposed the state's universalist intentions in a movement that rejected the progress of rationalization in the name of tradition.

There was no uniform strategy in those revolts. Some actions expressed individual resistance to recruitment agents, as in the city of Penedo, Alagoas on October 13, 1866. In a typical personal confrontation, Albino Vieira de Castro, a designated National Guard, stabbed to death Manoel Leandro do Nascimento, the second Lieutenant in charge of the recruitment. The assassination took place in a public square when this officer gave Albino an "order of imprisonment." In the town of Pioca, in the same province, another designated National Guard was less lucky and got killed while fighting two recruiters' escorts. A similar situation arose in the village of Imperatriz in Alagoas. There, a recruit shot the bloc

inspector while he was recruiting. In the locality of Maióba, Maranhão, a boy was killed by a stray bullet from the gun of the uncle of another recruit who had just been caught by an escort.[89]

Many such conflicts involved neighbors divided along partisan lines. While some inhabitants tried to execute the government's orders, others resisted. But there were cases when resistance against recruitment united an entire community against the government. In these cases resistance could escalate from spontaneous acts of individuals into a state of open collective rebellion, involving not only family and friends but also the entire community. Such a situation happened in the city of Pacatuba, in the province of Sergipe. Many deserters were hidden in the forests around the town. An escort was sent by the provincial president to re-capture them "by reason or force." What followed was described as a "fierce struggle," during which three people, including the mother of one of the refugees, died. [90]

Sometimes, after being caught, recruits mutinied while on their way to prison. This was the case in the town of São João del-Rei, Minas Gerais, where

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[89] Ministério da Justiça - Relatório Apresentado a Assembléia Geral Legislativa na Primeira Sessão da Décima Terceira Legislatura pelo Respectivo Ministro e Secretário de Estado Martim Francisco Riberio de Andrada. Rio de Janeiro, Typografia do Correio Mercantil, 1867, p. 3. By the Brazilian law, magistrates had the right to divide their districts into blocs of less than twenty-five families and to name a deputy into each one. These "inspetores de quarteirão" were exempt from the service on the National Guard. According to Thomas Flory these exemptions "generated the keenest resentments." Thomas Flory, Judge and Jury in Imperial Brazil, 1808-1871. Social Control and Political Stability in the New State (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), pp. 93-94.

[90] Relatório do Ministério da Justiça apresentado a Assembléia Geral Legislativa na Quarta-Sessão da Décima-Segunda Legislatura pelo Respectivo Ministro e Secretário de Estado José Thomas Nabuco de Araújo. Rio de Janeiro, Typografia Universal Laemmert, 1866, p. 4.

a group of seventeen recruits and deserters mutinied against their escorts, resulting in one death and three serious injuries.[91]

No set of actions undermined the Imperial authority as much as the attacks against escorts and jails.[92] From 1866 to 1868 the Reports of the Ministry of Justice are full of such cases, which multiplied as the provision of recruits dropped. Some of them were due simply to misunderstandings based on rumors. Such was the case in an incident that occurred in the little town of Mar de Espanha, Minas Gerais, where Portuguese immigrants were employed on the works of the "União e Indústria road." Erroneously supposing some that of their fellows were "imprisoned for recruitment," these workers assaulted the jail to prevent them from being marched to the provincial capital. The delegate and many escort soldiers were severely injured while resisting this unexpected invasion.[93]

At other times, attacks came from the deserters themselves, who organized gangs in the forests. In the district of Cruz do Espírito Santo, Rio Grande do Norte, what was described as "a group of deserters and criminals"

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[91] Idem.

[92]Assaults against jails resulting from local controversies concerning impressment were in the root of some provincial rebellions during the 1830's. One of the strong provincial revolts, the Balaiada, began by the release of nine conspirators from a Maranhense cell, in 1838. For a contemporary description of the Balaiada see Domingos José Gonçalves de Magalhães, "Memória Histórica e Documentada da Revolução da Província do Maranhão" in Novos Estudos CEBRAP, no. 23, março de 1989, pp. 14-66 and Luiz Felipe Alencastro, "Memórias da Balaiada. Introdução ao Relato de Gonçalves de Magalhães" in Novos Estudos CEBRAP, no. 23, March 1989, pp. 7-13. The rebellion began through an attack performed by a man called "Cara Preta" (Black Face), against a town jail to release some relatives.

[93] Idem Ibidem.

attacked the recruitment escorts and the town's jail, releasing all the prisoners.[94] In the Parish of Águas Belas, Province of Pernambuco, a group of "armed persons" attacked the patrols in charge of recruitment, killing one soldier and losing one recruit.[95]

Chart II



Source: Justice Report, 1868.

On certain occasions, relatives commanded these attacks, as in the city of Icó, Ceará, where "a large group of relatives and friends" released a designated National Guard. "Happy with their success the crowd paraded through the city streets carrying in triumph the released man." At other times, attacks were led or

[94]Relatório do Ministério da Justiça Apresentado à Assembléia Geral Legislativa na Segunda Sessão da Décima Terceira Legislatura pelo Respectivo Ministro e Secretário de Estado Martim Francisco Ribeiro de Andrada, Rio de Janeiro, Typografia Perseverança, 1868, p. 7.

[95] Justice Ministerial Report, op. cit., 1866, p. 3.

supported by local authorities who disagreed with the central authorities' procedures. Usually, the involvement of authorities was indirect, as in the village of Pau D'Alho, Pernambuco, where a group of armed men attacked the prison, liberating 34 recruits. According to the Justice Report, four of the prisoners had been previously convicted as murderers and seven had been accused of other crimes. In spite of that, all were released by the assailants who, during the struggle, killed three sentinels and hurt many others. Following those actions, deserters looked for refuge in the forests owned by Lieutenant Colonel Luiz Albuquerque Maranhão, a sugar cane planter and National Guard officer, who was indicted as the movement's main supporter. It is impossible to know what happened to this citizen, but probably no juridical action took place because of his important position in local politics.[96]

In other cases involvement was direct, touched off by actions that were perceived as abusive to local interests. In Aguas-Belas, Pernambuco, the second Lieutenant of the National Guard Manoel Cavalcanti de Albuquerque Barão, followed by many individuals, assaulted the town jail to liberate a recruit. Similar actions took place in the parishes of Canelada, Correty, Capoeiral, and Bonito. In the village of Imperatriz, Alagoas, a group of armed people commanded by a bloc inspector attacked a patrol and rescued some recruits.[97]

Sometimes family collective actions were followed by involvement of authorities, as at the district of São Caetano da Raposa, Pernambuco, where

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[96] Idem, 1867, p. 3.

relatives of the National Guard Joaquim Manoel Outeiró attacked the town's jail to release him from the hands of the recruiter agents. In the struggle Manoel was released, but another family member, Antonio Leite de Lima, who commanded the action, was imprisoned. Immediately two groups appeared in front of the police chief house to demand his freedom. According to the Justice Report "one was commanded by the Parish Judge and the other by a second Lieutenant." After this "reunion," and failing to obtain his freedom by pacific means, they were able to rescue their friend by force. In the village of Imperatriz, Pernambuco, Lieutenant-Colonel Joaquim da Silva Corrêa appealed for one of the soldiers of his battalion who had been designated to the war. Not obtaining the release of his Guard, the Lieutenant reunited some 150 men and, in conjunction with the sub-delegate, attacked the jail, so as to release "his recruit" and all the other convicts. But nineteen guards who stayed loyal to the delegate repelled the attackers. Using the "prestige of his social position," this National Guard attacked the village again, this time followed by an entourage that included family and friends. This time they were successful and performed what was described as "a series of depredations." It can not be known if they were able to finally rescue the recruit, but according to the Justice Report "Such vertiginous spirit did not fit the pacific nature of the Brazilians and could not endure..."[98]

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[97] Justice Ministerial Report, 1866, p. 3.

[98] Justice Ministerial Report, 1868, p. 11.

After discussing all the problems brought about by designations, the president of São Paulo bitterly recognized the inefficacy of the National Guard in a skeptical vision:

> Since it [National Guard] was converted to its present finality [external war] it became very oppressive for most of the population. Today it became necessary to proscript all the hopes associated with the expression "nation in arms." ...The experience of the current war erased all illusions...The resistance offered by inertia is worse than that offered by violence....[99]

In spite of that, there was neither time nor political will to advance a cycle of more encompassing reforms. The Report of the Ministry of War of 1867 pointed to these deficiencies as the cause of an enormous waste of men and resources. According to minister Paranaguá:

> The current war made still clearer our need to have a permanent army, if not numerically big, at least disciplined and well armed. It should provide for our internal security and tranquillity, [and] at the same time will become the support of our national integrity. If the Empire had (one), when its honor was offended by the Paraguayan government, our territory would not have been invaded; The war, against all modern principles of the military science would not have continued for such long time; the number of immolated victims would have been much smaller; the public money would not have been wasted on such a vast scale; in short, the fatherland sacrifices would have been much smaller.[100]

Dealing with slaves and criminals

The worst scenario involving revolts was the possibility of slave uprisings. The fear of rebellion was characteristic of every slaveholder group in the

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[99]ANRJ/SPE/ IG1 159 - Cx. 587, fl. 741. Joaquim Floriano de Toledo to Conselheiro Ângelo Muniz da Silva Ferraz, 25 May 1866.

[100]Relatório Apresentado à Assembléa Geral na Primeira Sessão da Décima Terceira Legislatura, pelo Ministro e Secretário d'Estado dos Negócios da Guerra, João Lustosa da Cunha Paranaguá, Rio de Janeiro, Typografia Nacional, 1867 p. 1.

Americas. After the episode of Santo Domingo, where a slave rebellion led to the only war of national independence successfully waged by rebellious slaves, every small signal of discontent was viewed as threat to the public order. It is not important in this case whether, in Brazil as well as in the US, revolts were circumscribed, involving small groups or limited by geographic conditions, but not spreading to the entire slave community. Their threat was perceived as real and the fear of them contributed to the latent conflict between the masters and their captives.[101] As Stuart Schwartz notes, the long chain of slave revolts marking the passage of slavery into the nineteenth century "made the dangers and costs of slavery clearer than they had ever been."[102]

With most coercive resources far from the provinces, slave rebellions were a risk always to be taken into consideration by the Imperial elites in all of their divisions. With the designation of National Guard troops and the mobilization of the police corps for the war, it was evident that the Brazilian rearguard was weaker and less ready than ever to deal with runaways, rebellions, and other forms of disruption of bonded labor. Perceiving such fragility, the chief of police of Rio de Janeiro requested the use of disabled soldiers, because he was "convinced of the public utility of such a measure in relation to the public order and tranquillity constantly challenged.... I appeal to your Excellency to obtain the

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[101] On these fears see João José Reis and Eduardo Silva, Negociação e Conflito: a resistência Negra no Brasil Escravista (São Paulo: Cia. das Letras, 1989) and Celia M. Azevedo, Onda Negra, Medo Branco. O Negro no Imaginário das Elites: século XIX (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1987).

[102] Stuart B. Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia, 1550-1835 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 488.

necessary authorization to permit the engagement of disabled soldiers of the army as members of the provisory police corps...."[103]

Taking advantage of the shift in course of the Imperial coercive apparatus toward foreign enemies during the Paraguayan war, slaves occasionally rebelled. At the Carmo Convent at the province of Pará on July 8, 1865, the slaves expelled their new overseer and assumed control of the convent. The substitution of a supervisor by the slaves suggests a relatively more conservative character for the revolt. This was probably a negotiation over working conditions, not an insurrection. In spite of that, some sectors could still see the influence of international events behind the slaves' movements.[104] Lamenting the awful situation faced by his province, the President of Pará believed that the institution of slavery in that area was threatened, among other reasons, because, "with [the end] of the war in the United States, there is rooted among [the slaves] a belief that all will be freed soon."[105]

Other revolts brought more serious consequences In Maranhão, a province with a history of rebellions by slaves, Indians, and runaways, slaves organized a maroon close to the parish of Vianna in the district of São Bento.[106]

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[103] ANRJ - IG1 146, cx. 582, fl. 636. Antônio José Lino da Costa to Eduardo Pindahyba de Matos. Niterói, 10 Sep. 1867.

[104] In his Roll, Jordan, Roll. The World Slaves Made (New York: Vintage Books, 1972). Eugene Genovese described similar processes of negotiation over slaves' conditions of life and work for the South of the United States. See especially book one "God is not Mocked," pp. 1-158.

[105] Justice Ministry Report, 1866, op. cit., p. 8.

[106] During the early 1830's Maranhão was the place of a huge popular revolt uniting slaves allied to poor whites. The Balaiada was one of the strongest social movements in the Regencial period and its memory was sufficiently alive to raise fears in all the parts of the elite.

Based in their new camp, these runaways began to raid neighboring farms. In the face of this serious situation the designation of the National Guards was temporally suspended while a group of forty soldiers was sent to put an end to the rebellion.[107]

In Rio Grande do Sul, revolts were frequent during wartime. On February 14th, 1866 the sub-delegate of São Francisco de Paula had to mobilize the free inhabitants of the region to prepare against a threat from a group of runaways joined by National Guard deserters who had refused to march. Panicked planters worried about every rumor. As mentioned by the sub-delegate of Mostardas, they were very concerned about the departure of the 6th. corps of the National Guard because:

> Many of the same farmers have a great number of slaves, and when [they lose] their supervisors or administrators or overseers, [they] do not know which means to use to prevent an attack [from the runaways].[108]

According to the police authority, some slaves were imprisoned and "moderately punished without proofs." But nothing was discovered that could objectively incriminate these slaves. According to the police sub-delegate, in view of the permanent risk, it would be better to exempt supervisors from recruitment. In some ways, such a succession of false alarms opened the window for another possibility: that cattle-ranchers might be manipulating such

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[107] ANRJ/SPE/IG125, cx. 530, fl. 44. Francisco Américo Menezes Dória to Visconde de Paranaguá. São Luís, 23 July 1867.

[108] AHRS - Secretaria de Polícia, maço 8. J. William Harris found similar conflict in Georgia, during the final years of the war. In 1863 and 1864, petitions poured into the office of Governor Joseph Brown, requesting exemptions. See Plain Folk and Gentry in a Slave Society, p. 178.

fears to obtain the release of their overseers, in view of the stress created by the Paraguayan war. But their fears could not be totally ignored.

According to Paulo Moreira, a leading student of Gaúcho politics, the War against Paraguay added to the fear of insurrection the suspicion that insurrection could be supported by foreign elements. In March 1865, the sub-delegate of Bagé communicated the formation of a militia of ten soldiers with the objective of avoiding a slave insurrection encouraged by "the Barbarian assassins from Montevideo's government." In a secret letter dated from February 2, 1865, the police delegate of Jaguarão told of the invasion of the province by 1,500 men under the leadership of General Basilio Muñoz. Along with many other kinds of damage, the invaders took the slaves they found, and with "the promise of being freed they were able to bring some." In another letter of February 07 the same authority declared that:

> Eight slaves were sent to me from the district of Arroio Grande. They had been imprisoned as suspects of convenience in the slave's insurrection that was planned in the time when our frontier would be invaded by the forces of Montevideo. According to the testimony of colored Florêncio, slave of Marcos José da Porciúncula, ...(he) declares that he had been invited by oriental [Uruguayan] José Benito Varela that...had invited [him] to go to the Oriental side telling him that this would be the way to enjoy freedom. It seems to me that some plan was accorded and, due to unknown circumstances was aborted. I keep performing more severe investigations to see if it is possible to discover the agents of such plotting because I have news of some slaves in this city as having been accomplices in this assault.[109]

[109] AHRS - Delegacia de Polícia, maço 7.

Gaúcho slaves and deserters had the added know-how of the use of arms and military expertise. They could give to Brazilian enemies important information concerning preparations for war and the organization of the Gaúchos defense system. Even without general rebellion, it seemed impossible to ignore the potential damage that slave revolts could cause to everyday life in such a frontier area.

Final Remarks

This chapter has tried to answer the question "Why were slaves recruited for the war against Paraguay"? It showed how difficult it was to extract recruits from society to fill the ranks of the Imperial Army. Such problems were not new in themselves but, under the pressure of a huge international campaign, they exposed the powerful limitations on the state's capacity to increase its military force. Slavery was at the base of the problem because it clearly prevented the formation of a strong army. At the same time that it limited the enlistment of a significant proportion of the adult males, it also created an unstable situation at the rear in the country's cities and fields.

From the beginning of the war, individual or collective donations of slaves had taken place in many parts of the country. But these were limited initiatives, not large enough to solve the chronic problems related to recruitment. By the middle of 1866, the enlistment of slaves had become a question of state and became a priority for the Imperial leaders. The recruitment of freed slaves would offer another acute challenge for the Brazilian authorities, as it implied an expansion of the state's capacity to extract more resources from their citizens in

time of trouble.[110] No question troubled the center-periphery relationship as much as that and no other crisis so clearly indicated the urgent need for a more encompassing cycle of reforms. In the next chapters we will analyze the specifics of this process and how it was performed.

[110] On the impact of the war for the creation and rising of taxes, see Maria Valério Junho Pena, "O Surgimento do Imposto de Renda: Um Estudo Sobre a Relação entre Estado e Mercado no Brasil," in Revista Dados, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1992, pp. 337-370.

Chapter 5

The Crisis of American Recruitment System: Union Army Recruitment, April 1861- July 1863

> To conduct a whole war, or its great acts, which we call campaigns, to a successful termination, there must be an intimate knowledge of State policy in its higher relations. The conduct of the War and the policy of the State here coincide...
>
> Carl Von Clausewitz (1832)[1]

> We have here an evidence of the wonderful strength of our institutions. Without conscriptions, levies, drafts, or other extraordinary expedients, we have raised a greater force than that which, [was] gathered by Napoleon ... Here every man has an interest in the Government, and rushes to its defense when dangers beset it.
>
> Simon Cameron (1861)[2]

> The greatest mistake made in our civil war...was in the mode of recruitment and promotion.
>
> William T. Sherman[3]

The Civil War was the most intense conflict faced by the American nation during the 19th century. As a large multifront war, it required unprecedented

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[1] Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (1832, reprint, London: Penguin, 1987), p. 156.

[2] Simon Cameron, Report from the Secretary of War, December 1861. Quoted in David Martin Osher, "Soldiers citizens for a disciplined Nation: Union conscription and the construction of the modern American army," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1992), p. 107.

[3] William T. Sherman, Personal Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, vol. 2, pp. 387-88. Quoted in Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won. A Military History of the Civil War (1983, reprint, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991), p. 274.

levels of mobilization, recruitment and training. It involved civilian populations as victims and supporters in the war efforts. It led to more American casualties than almost all the twentieth century contests combined. Union losses alone were almost as great as all U.S. losses in World War II.

The conflict demanded a state structure capable of coping with a vast and integrated war effort, leading to spectacular processes of institutional change and bureaucratic organization. These proceedings redefined national sovereignty through such procedures as the nationalization of the government-citizen relationship and the transformation of slaves into soldiers.

Similarly to the Brazilian situation during the Paraguayan campaign, the consequences of this war would not be confined to the defeated regions of the South. The struggle would bring unexpected effects to most areas of the Union, challenging an entire system of government. Some of these changes affected traditional assumptions concerning such vital matters as "states rights," conscription, personal liberty laws, the centralization of national power, and the voluntary character and composition of the army. They also reinforced the role of the Federal government as the main recruiting agency of the armed forces. The emphasis on states' rights was progressively replaced by centralization, with the Federal government assuming a main role in military affairs, fiscal policy, and economic development. [4]

[4] The Republican administration resorted to a series of unprecedented measures to enforce its authority and face the increasing expenses generated by the war. Two of them deserve immediate mention: the Legal Tender Act and federal taxation helped to finance the costs of the northern war efforts.

These changes affected the lives of the people of the loyal states in many ways. They interfered with usual policy-making practices affecting the relations between individuals and their communities. These transformations were profound enough to affect the social basis of support given by communities to the continuous efforts to feed and expand the army. As a consequence, simultaneously with the struggle against the Confederates, there took place a conflict over the identity the Union itself on the home front, a conflict Lincoln called "the fire in rear." [5]

While much has been written about the economic transformations propelled by the war in the North, less attention has been paid to the moral economy of recruitment and its connections to American social organization. How was the control of recruitment transferred from the states to the Federal government? What kind of conflicts did that transfer generate? Under which conditions did cooperation between local leaders and Federal officers become possible? How did the local population react to the growing intrusion of the central government into their lives?

This new situation was caused by the failure of volunteerism and the introduction of America's first draft system, through the Enrollment Act, in March of 1863.[6] The approval of this important war measure by the Congress was part of a more general shift in the nature of the war. From this perspective, the

[5] The expression was used during a conversation with Charles Sumner in January 1863. Quotation taken from James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. The Civil War Era (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980), p. 591.

[6] The Confederate conscription law was passed in the spring of 1862.

military events and the politics of war assume a still greater historical significance, because they reveal the crucial role of military mobilization in promoting political centralization and establishing more direct links between citizens and the Federal government. They also produced social conflict on a scale not previously experienced by common citizens in antebellum America. Finally, they helped to delineate the multiplicity of issues that emerged as a result of the constantly changing complex interaction between the growing military needs of the Republican administration and the strong commitment of citizens to their communities.[7]

This chapter focuses on the initial steps of Union recruitment. It places the development of conscription within the context of the struggle over the nature and control of citizen soldiers. It examines the relationship of recruitment to social and political hegemony, with particular reference to the issues of state power and local resistance. It also pays special attention to the relationship between partisan politics and enlistment. My focus is on the period from the summer of 1862 to the spring of 1863, a period that, according to Herman

[7] Although conscription has always been discussed in the studies of the Civil War, the focus on the political and social repercussions of recruitment dates from the 1974 work of Robert Sterling " Civil War Resistance in the Middle West," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1974). During the early nineties further contributions focusing on draft resistance emerged from such authors as Grace Palladino, Iver Bernstein and David Osher. These studies helped to establish a connection between the impact of federal legislation and specific local long-term issues. See Grace Palladino, Another Civil War. Labor, Capital, and the State in the Anthracite Regions of Pennsylvania, 1840-68 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990); Iver Bernstein, The New York Draft Riots. Their Significance for American Society and Politics in the Age of the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Osher, "Soldiers Citizens for a Disciplined Nation."

Hattaway and Archer Jones, marked "the greatest Confederate and poorest Union efficiency."[8]

Recruitment was a critical issue in the sectional conflict, and it demands a broad and multilayered consideration. As in the Brazilian case during the Paraguayan Campaign, the Civil War period has to be looked not as a single, unbroken development cycle, but as changing according to diverse circumstances. When the circumstances were adverse to the Union efforts, as they frequently were, the federal government needed to create the conditions required to keep the war effort at full strength. Creating and enforcing a national conscription system in a governmental tradition based on the preeminence of states' sovereignty raised constant problems for the administration and created a paradox for its political leaders.

Setting the Stage

The Lincoln administration's shift in the direction of emancipation and "total war," during the summer of 1862, was the most important social and political consequence of the successful Confederate resistance on the battlefield. Both moves required a strong commitment from northern society to the "new" war goals as well as a Federal government strong enough to enforce compliance with them. But riots and popular revolts in five states demonstrated that many would resist the increasing sacrifices demanded by the quest for reunion.

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[8] Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won, p. 274.

The dilemma faced by Lincoln and his supporters lay in the fact that the greater war effort tested the limits of state power in such areas as "personal liberty laws" and the control of state militias. There was enormous community resistance in certain areas, showing the limits of state action in a society that accepted as a fundamental principle the idea that the defense of the nation was a primary responsibility of every citizen, not one reserved to a distant central state.

While most authors agree upon the importance of these transformations in the nature of the war, their effects upon the civilian populations of the North are still subject to extensive debate. All social groups experienced personal sacrifices, but some authors question whether the burden was evenly distributed among classes, regions and ethnic minorities. Was it a rich man's war but a poor man's fight, as some say?[9]

When the Civil War began, the capacity of the North to raise a strong army was restrained by the traditions of American civic culture. Most Americans had been historically hostile to the idea of a centralized standing army, as they had been to a centralized state and centralized taxing authorities. Localism,

[9] It would be impossible to measure the impact of the war effort over the whole northern society; enormous geographic and social diversity would make it an impossible mission for the limits of this chapter. However, in the last two decades, excellent studies have been filling this gap for some of the regions most affected by the recruitment. See Phillip Shaw Paludan, A People's Contest: The Union and the Civil War 1861-1865 (1988, reprint, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996).

antimilitarism, and individual liberty were highly valued, and government interference against these values were viewed with alarm by most.[10]

For this reason, the evolution of American military institutions from the eighteenth century followed a path contrary to that observed in Europe. While the power of Western European states was based on their centralized capacity to organize and maintain standing armies, Americans revived the concept of militias, an institution linked to the British tradition but already decadent by 1800 in most continental societies in Europe.[11] Militias answered to a notion of citizenship whose loyalties were fundamentally local. They also answered to the general scarcity of resources and shortage of labor prevalent in the thirteen colonies. These material conditions contributed to a general distaste for long-term enlistment and permanent standing armies. In such a system, citizens turn into soldiers, in the apt expression of John Whiteclay Chambers, when they "choose to be."[12]

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[10] On the classical Republican assessment concerning the efficacy of militias and the threat posed by permanent standing armies see J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), especially chapter XII "The Anglicization of the Republic. Court, Country and Standing Army," pp. 401-22.

[11] Charles Tilly defined the process undertaken by the Western European countries as an "accumulation and concentration of coercive power," in a procedure that parallels Karl Marx's "primitive accumulation" of capital. See Charles Tilly, "Logics of Capital and Coercion" in Coercion, Capital and Europen States, AD 990-1992 (1990, reprint, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 16-19.

[12] John Whiteclay Chambers II, To Raise an Army. The Draft Comes to Modern America (New York: Free Press, 1987), pp.13-39. Recent reevaluations have contested this pattern for the Revolutionary period. Charles P. Neimeyer found that the upper classes generally neglected to sign up, and that the Revolutionary army was composed of African-Americans, Irish, Germans, Native-Americans laborers-for-hire, and white men without fixed addresses, who rarely cared anything about the high ideals being spouted in the drawing rooms and conference halls. They were real soldiers. America Goes to War: A Social History of the Continental Army (New York: New York University Press, 1997), especially chapter 1, "Few Had the Appearance of Soldiers: The Social Origins of the Continental Line," pp. 1-8.

For most of the colonial period, militias were responsible for the defense of the thirteen colonies. The militias diverged in their organization, terms of enlistment, and forms of recruitment and training. During the War of Independence there was a mobilization of a permanent paid contingent, gathered through long-term enlistment. This suggested that a standing army could emerge as a result of the colonies' victory against England. However, the main result of the Revolution was the rejection of the paramount features of European bureaucratic development, especially the conception of a legitimate monopoly of violence enforced by a central state.

Samuel Huntington has pointed out how this rejection was expressed in the Constitutional debates. According to Huntington, the framers of the Constitution did not fear the dangers of a standing army as such.[13] The phenomenon of militarism was not yet known during the second half of the eighteenth century. The Framers, rather, feared "despotism," especially that coming from a strong centralizing state, a specter that haunted most Americans of the early republican period. The pervasive fears of centralized authority, standing armies, and excessive taxation were the most obvious characteristics of the Anti-Federalists, but they also were present in a lesser degree on the

[13] According to Huntington, the Constitution does not enforce a clear distinction between political and military responsibilities. The Constitution divides civilian responsibilities on military affairs in many distinct administrative levels. Within the federal system of government, the militia clauses divide control over the militia between the state and the national governments. Within the national government, the separation of powers divides control of the national military forces between Congress and the President. Within the executive branch of the national government, the Commander in Chief clauses tend to divide control over the military between the President and departmental secretaries. See The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), p. 169.

Federalist side. Such a perspective was not only present among elite members, it pervaded all the sectors of the active citizenry who participated in the political life of the early republic.[14]

The resulting Constitution does not provide directly for "objective control," a term commonly associated with civilian control, that is, the exclusion of the military from political power. Instead, the Constitution furnishes a complicated system of checks and balances whose main objective is to prevent any branch of the administration from concentrating too much military power in its hands. Consequently, according to Huntington, objective control was achieved "in spite of," rather than "as a result of" constitutional provisions. It was an unintended effect of the fear of aristocratic despotism.[15]

The nationalists failed in their intention to build a powerful standing army because state militias furnished an appropriate counter-weight against the growing power of the Federal organization. According to John Whiteclay Chambers, the pattern that prevailed included three main components: a small professional army, some state militia units, and local corps of volunteers. Such a structure prevailed because it "permitted a relatively weak central government to reinforce quickly the army in order to defend the nation."[16] It also reinforced dual

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[14] For the popular formulation of Anti-Federalist conceptions see Saul Cornell, "Aristocracy Assailed: The Ideology of Backcountry Anti-Federalism," in Journal of American History, 76, March 1990, pp. 1149-172.

[15] "Objective civilian control has been extraconstitutional, a part of our political tradition but not of our constitutional tradition....[The Framers] did not foresee the rise of military profession; consequently, they did not provide for civilian control." Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 190.

[16] John Whiteclay Chambers, To Raise an Army..., p. 29.

solutions for related problems: the control of power, the defense of the nation, and the division of military responsibilities among the states and the federal government. The lack of financial resources and the scattered character of the population restricted still more the structural potential for creating a permanent standing army.

Americans sanctioned decentralized institutions to cope with their defensive/offensive military needs. They gave preference to state militias, because those furnished the best possible solution for the military challenges they faced. Even in the South, where potential threats coming from slaves and Indians were stronger, militia organizations provided enough power to maintain the social order. Keeping the central government weak did not challenge territorial integrity because the roots of the political pact lay in the states and were enforced through agreement in Congress. Without powerful neighbors, and taking advantage of America's strategic isolation, the militia system basically worked well. As Tocqueville wisely observed, the country's fortunes resulted from an original combination of both geographic isolation and human skill, "Detached by geography as well as by choice from the passions of the Old world, it neither needs to protect itself against them nor to espouse them."[17]

American hostility toward standing armies resembled the position of mid-nineteenth century Brazilian liberals in many aspects. However, it differed fundamentally in one: Americans reserved much more power to local

[17] Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1848, reprint, New York: Anchor Books, 1969), p. 228.

government than Brazilians did. Their prejudices against standing armies resulted from a widespread concern about despotic government, not from the need to preserve a centralized monarchy from military turbulence. Consequently, militias met the tasks of internal security, territorial expansion, and the balance of constitutional powers in ways that favored local interests at the same time that they reinforced territorial integrity. In this political landscape, the idea of conscription reminded Americans of the worst aspects of European societies. A militia organization composed of local volunteers, highly motivated, furnished the most adequate counter-image to examples of European despotism. As Tocqueville observed "Compulsory recruitment is so contrary to the habits of the people of the United States that I doubt whether anyone would ever dare to bring in such a law."[18]

During the nineteenth century, growing reliance on the state militias constantly embarrassed the federal government, turning the lack of a standing army into what Stephen Skrowonek has called "a standing problem." Coordination between the military interests of the federal and states' governments was never complete, leading to some very confused situations. When President Madison called up the militia during the War of 1812, the governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to cooperate. They justified their position by declaring that only the states could decide whether the circumstances justified the call or not. Later in the same war, such local/federal

[18] Ibid, Democracy in America, p. 228.

conflict occurred again, when the militia on the Niagara frontier refused, on constitutional grounds, to enter Canada in support of the regular army forces.[19]

For most of the antebellum period, the regular army was very small, ranging between 4,000 and 16,000 men, scattered in many garrisons around the national borders. The states retained the primary responsibility for raising troops when the nation required them. The governors of each state had virtual control of when their men were raised, when they went, and even (sometimes) where they served. To accomplish such control, governors relied not on a strong bureaucratic organization, but on the strength of the system of parties, an institution that, in the words of Eric L. McKitrick, had been "historically the chief agency for mobilizing and sustaining energy in American government."[20]

Anti-professional, pro-militia sentiment was strong in most political sectors, including the emerging Republican Party. It was reinforced by Jacksonian doctrines of states' rights, frugal government, and the virtues of the common man.[21] This mentality survived the early national period and was still

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[19] Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State. The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (1984, reprint New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). For the discussion concerning the army problems, see chapter II, part 4, "Patching the Army," pp. 85-120.

[20] Eric I. McKitrick, "Party Politics and the Union and Confederate War Efforts" in William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (eds.), The American Party Systems. Stages of Political Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.120.

[21] One of the positive effects of the militia organization lay in the fact that it reinforced suffrage reform by extending the right to vote to all persons enrolled. For the relations between the service in the militias and the extension of political rights, see: Merril D. Peterson (ed.), Democracy, Liberty and Property: The State Constitutional Conventions of the 1820's (Indianapolis: 1966), pp. 272-73, 280 and Melvin Yazawa. "Citizenship." in Jack P. Greene (ed.), Encyclopedia of American Political History: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas. 3 vols. (New York: Scribner, 1984), vol. I, pp. 109-209.

strong when the Civil War began. Voicing this feeling, Dennis Hart Mahan accentuated in 1860 the virtues of the militia organization: "This is our best and I trust will be looked to always as our only safeguard from danger within as well as without."[22] Only a few voices, including those of Alexander Hamilton, John C. Calhoun, and some professional officers, were raised in criticism against the situation.[23]

The North and the Politics of Secession

From December 20,1860 to February 1, 1861, the secession of South Carolina and the rest of the lower South shook the temporary unity in the North that had been achieved to ensure Lincoln's election. During the interregnum between the election and Lincoln's inauguration, the North seemed to be more divided than the South over the risks of territorial disintegration. To make things more uncertain, there was no agreement about the proper behavior of the next administration. President Lincoln himself, isolated in Springfield, did not show clear signs of his intentions.[24]

In spite of the gravity of the situation, it was not clear whether secession of the lower South would or not prevail; nor was it clear whether war would be the final outcome of decades of political disagreement. Outside a hard core of

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[22] Quoted in Russel Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought From Washington to Marshall (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), chapter IV.

[23] Most Republican leaders as Simon Cameron, William Seward, Henry Wilson, Salmon Chase, and Abraham Lincoln had joined militia companies when young and still viewed the institution as a positive asset in American politics. Consequently we can assume they did not have an a-priori position in favor of centralization in this special issue until late in the war.

uncompromising "Radical Republicans" favoring coercive measures, most northern political factions favored some sort of negotiation, envisioning an "acceptable compromise" capable of restoring the old Union. Compromises had been achieved during previous crisis and it was expected that the pro-compromise forces would be able, again, to conciliate the divergent interests.[25]

The Democratic Party, still a relevant political machine, was strong in both sections. Even inside those states that followed South Carolina and seceded, many important areas held strong pro-Union minorities, and the vote for secession had been surprisingly close in Georgia and in certain parts of the cotton kingdom.[26] More importantly, both sections shared a similar language, national symbols, a memory of the common inheritance of historical events, and devotion of the same forefathers. Both also shared a strong reverence for what they believed to be the American republican culture.[27] But these initiatives and

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[24] Kenneth Stampp, And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-1861 (1950, reprint, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), pp. 179-203; David M. Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), pp 134-155.

[25] David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 90-120; John Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism and Politics in the Antebellum Republic, Volume 1: Commerce and Compromise, 1820-1850, especially chapter 6, "Slavery, Economics, and Party Politics, 1836-1850," pp. 366-492. Mark Grimsley, "Conciliation and Its Failure, 1861-1862," in Civil War History, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, December 1993, pp. 317-35.

[26] For a good account on the small margin for secessionism in Georgia see William W. Freehling and Craig M. Simpson (eds.) Secession Debated. Georgia's Showdown in 1860 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); also Michael Johnson, Toward a Patriarchal Republic: the Secession of Georgia (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), especially pp. 79-107.

[27] And even in those states that opted for secession, differences were very narrow. According to David M. Potter, in Louisiana the pro-secession difference was 1,763 votes out of a total of 38,665. In Alabama, the so-called "Cooperationists ," who opposed immediate secession, had between 36 and 43 per cent of the votes. In Alabama, the difference was 7,500 in a total of 28,100. In Texas, governor Sam Houston opposed secession and refused to convene the legislature. So, outside South Carolina, margins for secession were not strong enough to make anybody certain that secession was inevitable, see, The Impending Crisis, pp. 496-97.

points of convergence could not overleap a basic question: would the southern elite concede control of the government to a hostile antislavery majority?[28]

Notwithstanding the decentralized structure of the antebellum state and the small size of the Federal government, its power was relevant enough to provoke slaveowners' fears of a disruption of their ascendancy over socially subaltern groups. Potentially, Federal interference might come through the operation of essential institutions, such as the mail and the courts systems as well as the operation of traditional patronage practices involving the relations between the states and the Federal government. According to David M. Potter, by 1860, the Southern elites feared above all "...the power to appoint Republican judges, custom collectors, and postmasters in the South."[29] Such power, they believed, could disrupt their power on the plantations. Their state of mind was well captured in an editorial published by the Charleston Mercury, in October 1860:

> If, in our present position of power and untidiness, we have the raid of John Brown...what will be the measures of insurrection and incendiarism, which must follow our notorious and abject prostration to Abolition rule at Washington, with all the patronage of the Federal Government, and a Union organization in the South to support it?...[30]

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[28] One of the strongest fears among Southerners was that a Republican administration in Washington would lead to a wave of slaves' insurrections. On this point, see Carl N. Degler, Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States (New York: Macmillam, 1971), pp. 47-51; Kenneth M. Stamp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South (New York: Vintage Books, 1956), pp. 132-40 and Winthrop Jordan, Tumult and Silence at Second Creek: an inquiry into a Civil War slave conspiracy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993). The best source is Steve Channing, Crisis of Fear: Secession in South Carolina (New York, Simon and Schulster, 1970).

[29] Potter, The Impending Crisis, p. 477.

[30] Charleston Mercury, 11 October 1860, quoted in Kenneth M. Stamp (ed.), The Causes of the Civil War (1959, reprint, New York: Touchstone, 1991), p. 151.

Georgian Thomas R. R. Cobb summarized the precariousness of the pro-slavery position under a Republican executive:

> The Executive branch of the Government alone can protect us. The President only can call out the Army and the Navy. The President only can appoint Commissioners, and Marshals, and Judges, to execute the Fugitive Slave Law. The President only can protect us from armed invasions and secret incendiaries. I admit that it is so feeble that we can hope but little from it, even with a friend as President - with a foe, what we can hope?[31]

The Republican Party had come to power in the Northeast and Middle-West areas of the country on a platform of limiting slavery to the states were it still existed, restraining its expansion into the Western territories, and sweeping the "slave power" from the Federal government. The party was deeply committed to a strong intervention of the federal government in infrastructure, and the judicial system. Certain sectors tried to picture the party as "the defender of the white man," in a clear rejection of slave labor relations. Others openly criticized the southern social organization as an inferior and backward social experiment. Lincoln himself recognized in February 1860 that a Republican victory would put clear limits to slavery affirming that, "The Federal Government, ..., has the power of restraining the extension of the institution."[32]

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[31] Thomas R. R. Cobb Secessionist Speech, Monday Evening, November 12, 1860, in Freehling and Simpson (eds.), Secession Debated., p. 25. The extent of southern panic was well expressed at an incident in November, 1860. Slaves at Georgetown, South Carolina, were whipped for celebrating Lincoln's election by singing a hymn with the verse :We'll soon be free Till the Lord shall call us home." The southerners accused the slaves of meaning "The Yankee" when singing "the lord". See Susie King Taylor, Reminiscences of My Life. A Black Woman's Civil War Memories, edited by Patricia W. Romero and Willie Lee Rose.

[32] Abraham Lincoln, "The Cooper Institute Address, 27 February, 1860," in Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed., Abraham Lincoln. A Documentary Portrait Through His Speeches and Writings (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p.137.

In spite of the great tension, the disposition to compromise was favored, above all, by the indeterminate position of the upper southern states, especially the most important of them, Virginia. Many people believed that if the upper South stayed in the Union, secession could not last too long. Such a perspective prevailed long after the opening of the Civil War showed the extent of Confederate commitment to independence. It had enormous consequences for the slow shift of Union leaders toward total war and abolition during the first year of the conflict.

First Phase: Enthusiasm

By 1861 the North was a heterogeneous, multi-ethnic society involved in a relentless process of economic development and territorial expansion. Robert H. Wiebe has described the antebellum social organization as made up of "island communities," as the constitution of a national market had not yet destroyed the parochial structures prevalent in most states.[33]

The 1860 census found a population of 22,339,989 for the entire region, excluded the populations of western Virginia, eastern Tennessee and other Confederate pockets loyal to the Union.[34] The northern railroad net encompassed 21,973 miles and the North's 1,300,000 industrial workers were employed in 110,000 manufacturing establishments. Northern states

[33] Robert H. Wiebe. The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (1967, reprint, New York: Hill and Wang, 1995). See especially chapter 3, "Crisis in the Communities," pp. 44-75.

[34] The populations of such regions not only opposed secession but rendered substantial numbers of recruits to the Union armies. See Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism. Yeoman Farmers

manufactured 97 percent of the country's firearms in 1860, 94 percent of its cloth, 93 percent of its pig iron, and more than 90 percent of its boots and shoes. In spite of such impressive numbers, the evolution of the war would show how little superiority in resources might mean when confronted with a cohesive enemy, determined to achieve and maintain its independence.[35]

When the Confederacy finally opened fire against Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, it reinforced momentarily loyal northern sentiment by giving the cause of Union a cohesive force, somehow lost during the winter of 1861. By the attack, Confederates became the aggressors, the traitors to both the American flag and the nation's cause. Patriotic feelings united the North and penetrated deeply most towns and counties. During the first two years of the conflict, most soldiers who enlisted in the North did so because they "chose to do so."[36]

President Lincoln announced on April 15, that "combinations too powerful to be suppressed" existed in the South and called 75,000 troops for a three-month term of service. This call is normally recognized as being the official inauguration of northern mobilization. But informal actions taken by some state governors, especially John Andrew of Massachusetts, were already positioning their state militias for war. These governors, many of whom had taken office before Lincoln's inauguration, were not limited by the same clauses that

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and the Transformation of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 129.

[35] Numbers presented by Hattway and Jones, How the North Won, pp. 17-18.

[36] James M. McPherson, For Cause & Comrades. Why Men Fought in the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 16.

restricted preemptive action coming from the President or from his Secretary of War. Consequently, they took steps to transform their local militias into combat units, anticipating the presidential call. After the Presidential call and for most of the first year, governors proceeded with the utmost energy in their recruiting activities, always keeping the responsibility for the raising of troops in their hands.[37]

Table V
Recruitment for the Union Army, 1861

Date of Presidential Call	Number Furnished
April, 15	91,816
May, 31	2,715
July 22-25	697.965

Source: Thomas L. Livermore, Numbers & Losses in the Civil War in America, 1861-65 (1900, reprint, Carlile/PA John Kallmann, Publishers, 1996), p. 50 According to the author, possibly 16,000 regulars on rolls January 1861, should be added to the numbers shown in table V.

As in the war of Brazil against Paraguay, initial calls produced enormous mass meetings and farewell ceremonies where regimental flags were presented, soldiers were praised, and speeches were delivered. Even for a society used to volunteerism, the first exhibitions of enthusiasm surprised many observers. George Ticknor, a Harvard professor born during George Washington's government, wrote that, "The whole population, men women, and children seem to be in the streets with Union favors and flags."[38]

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[37] By April 13, Massachusetts had 5,000 men prepared for combat. Osher, Soldier Citizens for a Disciplined Nation, pp. 102-103. John Andrew, a Republican deeply committed to abolitionism, was also an enthusiast of state militias, resisting the advance of the central government into recruitment during the war.

[38] Quoted in McPherson, For Cause & Comrades, p. 16. In this sense, many of the young volunteers were reproducing some of the feelings described by Fred Anderson for late colonial America, during the Seven Year's war campaigns. See A People's Army (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984).

During these first weeks, the call for soldiers encountered few problems. Feeling outraged by the machinations of the "southern conspiracy," thousands of volunteers enlisted spontaneously in militias organized under the states' auspices. These volunteers had scarcely any military experience because, for the most part, their peacetime activities were very limited, rarely going to the point of real military training. At that time, the general feeling was that the war would be short, and the rebels would soon be brought back to the Union.[39]

Meetings in support of the Union cause were held all around the country. The war fever extended to all ages and classes, crossing party lines. A local newspaper in Keokuk, Iowa, reflected the nonpartisan spirit in April, 1861, noting that some citizens in town gathered and declared publicly "that we know each other, no longer as Democrats and Republicans, but as lovers of liberty, and supporters of the Constitution of the United States, as framed by our forefathers." Henry Tapen voiced the same feeling when he wrote Lincoln that "We are no longer Democrats and Republicans -- We are under one flag -- the flag of the glorious Union."[40]

Lincoln's call for troops was also answered in areas where Democratic Party forces prevailed. Such was the case in the coal-mining districts of

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[39] James McPherson portrayed that state of spirit as the "rage militaire" – an expression commonly associated with the French experience in combat. Knowing nothing of the risks and consequences of total warfare that they would experience, many of those volunteers thought about the war experience as an adventure, an opportunity to see a world very different from that of their daily lives. See For Cause & Comrades. p. 16.

[40] Hawk-Eye (Burlington, Iowa), 20 April 1861, p. 4. Quoted in Sterling, "Civil War Resistance in the Middle West," p. 31. Henry P. Tappen to Abraham Lincoln, 19 April 1861, The Lincoln Papers, vol. II, p. 572. Quoted in Osher, Soldier Citizens for a Disciplined Nation, p.112.

Pennsylvania. Grace Palladino's study of draft resistance showed how the initial call for troops was enthusiastically answered in this region. These districts had a significant foreign population, with Irish Catholics predominating. By June 1861, a Republican newspaper not known for its sympathy toward Catholic immigrants noted, with enthusiasm, that English, French, German, Scotch, Irish and Welsh "have banished all differences and [are vying] with each other in their expressions of loyalty to the country of their choice."[41]

At this point, the raising of troops was fully in the hands of the state governors. According to David Osher, this state of affairs reflected the "privatization of civic responsibility," that is, a compromise between a fragile Federal organization and empowered local communities.[42] But political cooperation between the federal government and the states was made easier by the fact that, by 1861, all northern governors were Republican, who represented both the state organizations and the national coalition responsible for bringing Lincoln to Washington.[43]

Although the governors controlled the process of recruiting, they depended on the good will of the local political bosses or prominent men who

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[41] Palladino, Another Civil War, p. 85. Erasing partisan competition was a spontaneous process in certain regions as well as it was the result of political craft in other areas. According to Robert Sterling, in Illinois, the Democratic leader Stephen A. Douglas used his tremendous influence to remove the war issue from the realm of partisan politics. See Sterling, Civil War Draft Resistance in the Middle West, pp. 32-5.

[42] Osher, Soldier Citizens for a Disciplined Nation, p. 95.

[43] William Best Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors (1948, reprint, Gloucester: Massachusetts, Peter Smith, 1972); Allan G. Bogue, The Earnest Men: Republicans of the Civil War Senate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), especially pp. 125-150; The Congressman's Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), especially pp. 29-59.

aspired to become officers in the newly formed companies. At the local level, recruitment was connected to the popularity of local notables whose prestige was fundamental in the success of those regiments that were raised and equipped. Paul Ledman has shown the force of personal prestige in Port Elizabeth, Maine. In this relatively wealthy coastal community, prominent citizens advertised in local newspapers, appealed to acquaintances, and spent their own money in "raising expenses." In reward for their services, such notables often achieved the rank of colonel in the initial regiments recruited. Ledman has demonstrated that without the commitment of such persons during the initial volunteering period, recruitment would have been a much more difficult task. [44]

In the absence of a national bureaucracy, personal commitment and local party structures were the best sources of successful recruitment. As Lincoln himself recognized in 1862,

> The Republican organization, in all its principles, in all its practices, and by all its members, is committed to the preservation of the Union and the overthrow of the Rebellion. It is the power of the State and the Power of the Nation.[45]

The force of localism was so strong that, in most companies, officers were recruited in the same communities as their soldiers. This circumstance strengthened the parochialism normally associated with the act of mustering in. Consequently, both a chain of command and a complex network of kinship

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[44] Paul L. Ledman, "A Town Responds: Cape Elizabeth, Maine in the Civil War" (M. A. Thesis, University of New Hampshire, 1999), p. 38.

[45] "Oneida County Proceeding of the Republican Party Convention" held at Rome, NY, September 26, 1862, published in the Utica Morning Herald. Quoted in Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State, p. 30.

governed the military hierarchical relations of these locally raised units. These links were strengthened by the practice, common at the beginning of the war, of electing junior officers. As James McPherson has explained:

> In the American tradition,...,citizen soldiers remained citizens even when they became soldiers. They voted for congressmen and governors, why should they not vote for captains and colonels?[46]

Local and ethnic pride reinforced the links between soldiers. They impelled many men to enlist and at times kept them in their units far beyond what their personal interest would have dictated. Fear of acquiring a reputation for cowardice in the eyes of associates forced many to come to terms with their fears and fight along neighbors, relatives and acquaintances.[47] This particular discipline was reinforced by the fact that many units were organized around communal activities like Temperance Associations, Sunday schools, and churches. In other cases, regiments were recruited from ethnic communities, reinforcing the links between immigrant commitment and local pride. The relationship between the first volunteers and their communities remained strong until the end of the war. It helped to keep many veterans committed to the Union cause, allying the national pursuit of the war with a strong sense of group identity.[48]

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[46] McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 327.

[47] On the role of personal courage among the volunteers' early motivations, see Gerald F. Linderman. Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War (New York: Free Press, 1987), especially chapter 3, "Courage as the Cement of the Armies," pp. 43-60.

[48] McPherson, For Cause & Comrades, p. 54. See especially chapter VI, "A Band of Brothers." According to James W. Geary, the majority of men, 1,342,110, joined the Union forces prior to the "Conscription Act," when patriotism was still a significant motivation. See We Need Men. The Union Draft in the Civil War (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1991), p. 82.

Northern Public Opinion and War Limits

As Republican governors lobbied for more recruits, thousands flocked to be enlisted before the war was over. The loyal states' capitals turned into big camps. In such a spirit, Ohio Governor, William Dennison, answered the administration's first call for a quota of thirteen regiments by declaring that, "owing to an unavoidable confusion in first hurry and enthusiasm of.... our people, a much larger force had already mobilized." The governor added, "without seriously repressing the ardor of the people, I can hardly stop short of twenty regiments."[49] So strong was the general enthusiasm, and so precarious was the military organization, that Maine Senator William Fessenden exhorted Secretary Cameron to increase recruitment quotas writing "The People are now at your back, full of enthusiasm and wrath. Take advantage of it."[50]

But the Lincoln administration's capacity to take advantage of the popular mood was limited by its ideas concerning the war, by political considerations, and by the prejudices prevalent in the northern society. As James McPherson has observed, the Civil War was "[a] conflict where political leadership and public opinion weighed heavily in the formation of strategy."[51] In this environment, politics and strategy interacted because it was basically "a political war, a war of

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[49] War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington DC, 1889-1901) Series 3, vol. II, pp. 298-300, henceforth quoted as O.R.

[50] P. Fessenden to Simon Cameron, 9 May 1861, OR, III, 1, pp. 181-182. See also Osher, Soldier Citizens for a Disciplined Nation, p. 113.

[51] McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 332.

peoples rather than of professional armies."[52] Pressures from political parties and state power groups were carefully taken into consideration by the administration in all aspects of the war effort, from the designation of the officers corps to the selection of the racial groups that could be admitted in the army.[53]

An important area in which the limitations of prejudice conflicted with strategy involved the enlistment of African Americans. From the beginning of hostilities, black leaders such as Frederick Douglass, J. Stella Martin, J.W.C. Pennington, William Wells Brown, Martin Delany, Henry Highland Garnet and John Mercer Langston, backed by white abolitionist and black publications, were asking for the enrollment of African Americans. These leaders saw the restoration of territorial integrity and black enrollment as related tasks. In May 1861, Frederick Douglas summarized such feelings:

> The simple way...to put an end to the savage and desolating [war] now waged by slaveholders, is to strike down slavery itself, the primal cause of that war.
> ... let the slaves and free colored people be...formed into a liberating army, toward into the South and raise the banner of Emancipation among the slaves.[54]

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[52] Ibid.

[53] A number of prominent democrats were commissioned to improve the party's commitment to the cause of the Union. Some such as George B. McClellan, had previous personal military experiences in the Army. Others, like David Hunter, were not military professionals but received their commissions. If political connections mattered for those persons, it needs to be mentioned that even in the group of professional soldiers, who attended West Point and were sympathetic to the administration, political commitments also helped to advance carriers. Important future military commanders as Ulysses S. Grant and William T, Sherman were nominated in part because of their political connections with Republican state political bosses. One of the keys to their war success as commanders was their understanding of the connections between the war and political needs.

54 Philip S. Foner, ed. The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 4 vols. (New York: International Publishers, 1982), Vol. 3, p. 94.

But the federal government did not accept such pleas and initial offers of African Americans to enlist were dismissed as unnecessary and undesirable. Racial prejudice was especially strong among foreign immigrants and those recently arrived from the South, an important part of the Midwest's population. Many people in these states felt closer ties to the agrarian South than to New England city dwellers. Economically, they were dependent on the Mississippi River and the southern port of New Orleans for much of their trade and transportation. Three northwestern states - Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa - had enacted laws to bar blacks from their states. The war heightened their fear that hordes of black laborers would descend upon their region and displace them from their jobs. As stated on a letter from a Massachusetts' corporal to the president, "When the war trumpet sounded...the Black man laid his life at the Altar of the Nation, - and he was refused."[55]

During the first year of the war, many northern leaders saw the conflict as a war for the Union, which should be fought only by white men. Demography seemed to be on their side, because the North had 3.5 times as many white men of military age as the Confederacy and a total ratio about 2.5 to 1 among those

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[55] These fears were not new Leon F. Litwack has analyzed how northern blacks had been systematically excluded from the best opportunities provided by the urban market during the antebellum period. The war intensified such feelings due to the fear of a migration of masses of runways. For the antebellum period see Litwack, North of Slavery. The Negro in the Free States, 1790-1860 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), especially chapter V, "The Economics of Repression," pp.153-86.; also V. Jackie Voegeli, Free But Not Equal; The Midwest and the Negro During the Civil War (1967, reprint New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 1-9, 98-9. This study furnishes a detailed description of the socio-political environment in the North during the Civil War. Corporal James Henry Gooding to Abraham Lincoln, 28 Sept. 1863, quoted in Virginia M. Adams, ed., On the Altar of Freedom. A Black Soldier's War Letters from the Front. Corporal James Henry Gooding (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1991), pp. 118-20.

actually willing to serve. Consequently, they took for granted northern superiority in all kinds of resources and imagined that this power would bring a rapid resolution to a conflict of limited duration. Major General George B. McClellan defined the essence of this kind of warfare in a letter to Lincoln in August 1861 when he explained his strategy for campaigning in Virginia, "We have not only to defeat their armed and organized forces in the field, but to display such an overwhelming strength as will convince all our antagonists, especially those of the governing, aristocratic class, of the utter impossibility of resistance."[56]

Northern efforts to reunite the country did not lead yet to a rupture with racial stereotypes. Even those who considered recruitment of blacks and Indians to be reasonable, feared the reaction coming from the conservative branches of the Union coalition. Some feared that arming free blacks and runaway slaves could bring "fatal and dangerous dissatisfaction in the army;" and thus "it would do more injury than good."[57] Others, less concerned about African American destiny, believed the war should reunite the country, not create an additional focus of social tension. Important as the conquest of the Confederacy might be, it should never interfere with property rights or assumed racial hierarchies. Thus, while there was basic agreement on the main goal of keeping the Union together, other less

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[56] McClellan to Lincoln, 4 August 1861. Quoted in Joseph T. Glatthaar, Partners in Command. The Relationships Between Leaders in the Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1994), p. 59.

[57] Theodore C. Pease and James G. Randall (eds.), The Diary of Orville Hickman Browing. (Springfield, 1927-1933), vol. I, pp. 555, 558-60. James McPherson noticed in his sample "relatively few Union volunteers mentioned the slavery issue [as a relevant motivation], when they enlisted." For Cause & Comrades, op. cit., p. 19. In his study of northern soldiers, Bell Willey pointed that scarcely one in ten Union soldiers "had any real interest in emancipation per se." See The Life of Billy Yank (1952, reprint, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), p. 40.

substantive questions, such as emancipation or the status of the southern states after reunion, were conveniently kept out of the political debate. On July 4, 1861 Lincoln still envisioned a war of limited goals, explaining that he had "no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with slavery in the states where it exists."[58] At this time, northern leaders believed secession could be reversed through the use of limited measures. The "Anaconda plan" presented by General-in-Chief Winfield Scott exemplifies such a strategy. Scott hoped to slice vital portions of the area in rebellion and, in conjunction with a naval blockade, envelop the insurgent states and terminate the war with as little bloodshed as possible. The army should occupy as much Confederate territory as possible without engaging in long bloody campaigns. A war of movement, not of permanent attrition, was the preferred option. Given this limited conception of warfare, expropriation of any form of property, as punishment or revenge, was rejected by the administration. The New York Times reflected the sentiments of most northerners in May 1861, when it editorialized: "The war on the part of the people of the North is not against the States or the institutions of any State. It is against treason and in defense of the best government in the world."[59]

The Dynamics of the Civil War

During the first year of campaign, President Lincoln and his military leaders aimed for a decisive victory (possibly in a major battle), which, they believed, would

[58] Blaster (ed.), Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. IV, p. 263.

[59] New York Times, 10 May 1861, quoted in Howard C. Perkins (ed.), Northern Editorials on Secession, 2 vols. (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1964), vol. 2, p. 830.

bring back the Southern states.[60] What they soon learned, however, was that major battles, even if won, might fail to break the back of the rebellion even if they came frequently and at much cost.

The presidential call for volunteers led to the second and final wave of secession involving the states in the upper South, including the painful loss of Virginia. Aside from being the most important state in the Confederacy, Virginia was also the home of many military leaders, and it was closely identified with the nation's patriotic heritage. In spite of this loss, and those of North Carolina, Arkansas and Tennessee, the upper border states of Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky and Missouri were kept in the Union. Together, the Border States had a combined population of approximately 3,137,000 and an area of 152,000 square miles. They constituted a pivotal asset for the Union during the first inconclusive months of the war. In those states, slaves were still considered property and subject to the Fugitive Slave Law. Their allegiance to the Union was far from complete, as a large proportion of the border population supported the Confederacy and viewed the Union army as an occupation force.[61] The

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[60] In this sense, they probably reasoned as German strategist Carl Von Clausewitz who declared three decades before that "fighting is to war...what cash payment is to trade, for however rarely it may be necessary for it actually to occur, everything is directed to towards it, and eventually it must take place all the same and must be decisive." Clausewitz quoted in John Keegan, The Face of Battle (1976, reprint, London: Penguin, 1978), p. 28. According to Keegan, this economic analogy delighted Marxist philosopher Freedrich Engel's to such an extreme he included Clausewitz in the Marxist Temple du Génie.

[61] A famous example of Border support to the Confederacy was the Orphan Brigade in Kentucky. The 4,000-men 1st Kentucky Brigade was organized their home state, which remained in the Union. The soldiers, whose allegiance was Confederate, were forced by circumstances to train in Tennessee. In February 1862, the Confederate army was forced out of Kentucky, and with it went the 1st Kentucky Brigade, never to return during the war. This forced exile gave the unit its nickname, "Orphan Brigade."

enforcement of Federal authority in those states was elusive. Union border policy was extremely cautious and formed a major obstacle to a quick radicalization of the war. In particular, the maintenance of the border states' allegiance moderated the administration's racial and recruitment polices during the first year. In the border states, as in other loyal states, the war effort was based on cooperation between local and Federal authorities. But such cooperation would only work as long as the interests of local and federal politics coincided.[62]

Second Phase: Tension

When operations began, few if any Union policy-makers foresaw the consequences of the war effort for relations between the center and the periphery of American society. Although war enthusiasm alone fueled support for the initial northern mobilization, it did not give leaders a clear vision of the tasks that lay ahead. The military strategists of the Lincoln administration underestimated both the force of Confederate nationalism and the level of cooperation its non-slaveholder groups would offer to secession.[63]

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[62] A curious example of the Federal caution is in recruitment. While most Border States did not fill their quotas for recruits in 1862 and 1863, no draft was ordered in those areas.

[63] In his analysis of Augusta's Hinterlands - Georgia, J. William Harris pointed that although poor men could go "shoulder to shoulder" with slaveholders, such cooperation was not free from hierarchical and social tension. As the war progressed and conscription expanded, rich men managed to avoid Confederate service more often than did the poor. Consequently, in that region, southern "façade" of social unity would be progressively shaken as war sacrifices mounted. See Plain Folk and Gentry in a Slave Society, especially chapter 5, "Strains of War," pp. 140-166. For a different vision of similar problems see Peter S. Bearman, "Desertion As Localism: Army Unit Solidarity and Group Norms in the U.S. Civil War," in Social Forces, 70:2, December 1991, pp. 321-341. Through his analysis of enlisted men from North Carolina, Bearman argues that localism and not class was the main element for the erosion of Southern identity in that group.

In addition to enthusiasm, the Confederacy had an enormous territory, rich in natural resources; it was equipped with good military leadership; and it was inhabited by a population highly motivated to fight. During the Revolutionary War, similar conditions helped the weaker army to prevail. Technological developments in modern weaponry also reinforced the superiority of the defense. Consequently, the war would require a more formidable effort to defeat the rebel armies, occupy the land, establish lines of communication and force into a submission an entire country than northerners imagined. Men and resources would have to be multiplied far beyond initial estimates.[64]

After a year of war, however, the impression that the South would succeed in winning its independence was becoming stronger. In April 1862 the Confederate government passed its own Conscription Act, enrolling most of the male population in condition to serve, showing the country's willingness to defend itself from northern invasion. Soon it became clear the country could only be reunited through a complete defeat of the Confederate armies. As the last prospects of compromise vanished, the hopes for friendly reunion would be increasingly associated with

[64] On Confederate nationalism see Drew Gilpin Faust, The Creation of Confederate Nationalism. Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), David M. Potter, The South and the Sectional Conflict (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), and Gary W. Gallagher, The Confederate War. How Popular Will, Nationalism, and Military Strategy Could Not Save Off Defeat (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997). According to Faust "Scholars have continued to fear that accepting the reality of Confederate nationalism would somehow imply its legitimacy..." Ibid., p. 3. For an analytical comparison between the challenges posed by the American Revolution and the Civil War see, John M. Murrin, "War, Revolution, and Nation Making: The American Revolution versus the Civil War," Research Paper, Philadelphia Center for Early American Studies, 1984.

copperheadism and treason, a stigma that attached to peace Democrats in the North during the last two years of the conflict.[65]

While the Confederacy took firm steps to build its army, both the Federal administration and the military bureaucracy lacked the skills that would be needed for a stronger mobilization. In 1860, the office of the Secretary of War and the military bureaus employed 93 people, including 14 clerks. In the Department of War things did not look better: without counting troops, this pivotal Department employed 248 people across the nation. If this organization was weak in peacetime, it proved terribly unreliable in an increasingly violent conflict with its permanent demand for men and resources.[66]

The difficulties in raising an army began to show up as soon as regiments were gathered in the camps. American military tradition, political factionalism, the lack of infrastructure, the scarcity of adequate military equipment, and bad management quickly contributed to a deterioration in field conditions. Many troops were poorly dressed and fed. Constant delays in the soldier's pay contributed to the growing dissatisfaction, intensifying the demands for bounties and other local selective incentives. While demand for men grew, some troops were left on their

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[65] The classic work on Southern conscription is Albert Burton Moore, Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1924). J. William Harris analyzed how opposition to conscription affected Georgia's devotion to republican liberties. See Plain Folk and Gentry in a Slave Society, 147-53. For the significance of conscription to the southern war effort see James W. Geary, We Need Men..., pp. 3-5. Geary pointed the fact that the South could not rely on high bounties to raise her troops because of the scarcity of financial resources. Hattaway and Jones estimate that around 87 percent of southern white males of arms-bearing age served in the Confederate army. See How the North Won, p. 721.

[66] Osher, Soldiers Citizens for a Disciplined Nation p. 101.

own in cities and camps where they gathered. Word came from Philadelphia that "Ohio troops now here have been on our streets as beggars for food."[67]

Many of these problems were worsened by the dynamics of the conflict. After the first battles, romantic assumptions about glory and heroism vanished. The Civil War introduced a new technology of long-range warfare, propelled by the rifle and the Minié bullet that rendered the Napoleonic style of decisive battle obsolete.[68] Highly effective, new long-range weaponry reinforced the defensive capabilities, giving the Confederates an extra advantage. This circumstance prolonged the war and multiplied the scale and severity of casualties beyond anything Americans had ever conceived. It eventually transformed war so that armies had to endure long, constant periods of terror and violence while the civilian infrastructure of transportation, industry, and agriculture became as critical a target as the soldiers themselves.[69]

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[67] Sterling. Civil War Draft Resistance in the Middle West, p. 39. All these hazards were described in detail in the letters soldiers wrote home. In these uncensored documents recruits described the worst aspects of camp life. They complained about poor food, sickness, fatigue, boredom and delayed payments. To add to the confusion, the contents of such letters were often read to a broad public, a circumstance that made the work of recruiting officers still more difficult. Disturbed by the lack of adequate conditions one of these soldiers described the problems faced while in route to front: "We were huddled together more like a lot of pigs than human beings...I was compelled to sleep on the floor... Our rations we could hardly force down. In fact most of it was rotten or nearly so. The water was very dirty. Yet we were glad to get enough of it.

[68] According to Eric Foner, in this sort of war "the effectiveness of political leadership, the ability to mobilize economic resources, and society's will to keep up the fight are as crucial to the final outcome as success or failure in individual battles." Eric Foner and Olivia Mahoney, A House Divided. America in the Age of Lincoln (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990), p. 79.

[69] The siege of Vicksburg (May 22 to July 4, 1863) in Tennessee furnishes one of the best examples of how the civilian population could become a target of the war efforts. After months of siege the town finally surrendered in July 4th, 1863. This special holiday was not celebrated there for decades after the end of the war.

Pictures and sketches taken on site and published by illustrated magazines like Frankie Leslie Illustrated and Harper's Weekly exposed the war's realities to populations far behind the battlefields. The Civil War was the first conflict that received immediate press coverage. Consequently, communities would be well informed about the risks and perspectives faced by those who enlisted. Enthusiasm also decreased due to the circulation of the casualty lists, showing an increasing number of soldiers dying from infectious diseases, spread by poor sanitation in the camps.[70]

During the winter of 1862, recruitment in the North ground to a halt. Men were less and less willing to enlist for long periods of time to the detriment of their private activities. Most potential recruits were afraid of suffering the consequences of mismanagement and lack of care, common during the first months. They also feared missing the harvest and a chance to help their relatives and friends in their communities. With rising inflation and frozen military salaries, the discrepancies between what soldiers received in the army and normal salaries in the market grew larger. As campaigns became longer, permanence in the army meant more and more sacrifices for families and relatives in the rearguard. It prevented these same individuals from enjoying the opportunities provided by the economic boom that spread in many parts of the North as a consequence of an increasing demand, fed by the war.

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[70] According to Jeffrey Bolster and Hilary Anderson, the connection of photography and war during the American Civil War proved "another step in the modernization of combat" becoming "as much a part of the Civil War as the rifle." See Soldiers, Sailors, Slaves, and Ships. The Civil War Photographs of Henry P. Moore (Concord: New Hampshire Historical Society, 1999), p.10.

In the spring of 1862, enthusiasm was renewed with successes in the front, bringing a new wave of excitement to northern public opinion. The view began to change for the better when a new secretary of war took charge. Edwin McMasters Stanton, a Democrat committed to the war effort, became Secretary of War, with the promise of a better organization of the war effort.[71] With Stanton in Washington and the energetic George B. McClellan at the head of the army of the Potomac, both the training and the supply of the Union army were reorganized. Special attention was given to the Army of the Potomac and to the spring campaigns on the eastern front.[72] McClellan's obsession with every detail and his strong administrative capacity convinced soldiers, politicians, and civilians that Lincoln had finally found his general. Preparations looked toward a short campaign, to be followed by the occupation of the Confederacy's capital, Richmond, during the spring.[73]

But confidence was again shackled when secretary Stanton discontinued recruitment through General Order 33, in April 1862, following the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson in the West. His order reflected a rising optimism and the overconfidence of the administration in McClellan's leadership. But soon, the

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[71] In December 1861 secretary Cameron issued instructions that governors were not to send any more regiments forward unless they were requested to do so. If such a procedure was intended to some money, or if its main objective was just to give a better direction to the army businesses, its reckless effects were heavily felt during the winter. This decision probably stemmed from the lack of administrative organization during Cameron's term.

[72] Such was the enthusiasm on the northern ranks that about June 1st, 1862, the slaves at St. Simon's Island were told there would soon be a settlement of the war. See Tailor, A Black Woman's Civil War Memories, p. 38.

[73] On McClellan's administrative capacities and his relations with the Democratic Party and the Lincoln administration see "Lincoln, McClellan, and Union Failure in the East" in Joseph T. Glatthaar, Partners in Command, pp. 51-94.

order proved to be a major mistake. From May to July, General McClellan continually demanded more troops to support his long delayed, then thwarted attacks against Richmond. The northern manpower shortage intensified during the spring campaigns because of a combination of war reverses and renewed economic opportunities in the North. In the Shenandoah Valley as well as in the western theater, progress was slow and costly.[74] As long as Vicksburg resisted, it was impossible to make the Mississippi River a conduit for Union troops and supplies. On the home front, the combined effects of an improving economy and the agricultural work cycle also discouraged many potential recruits. Those who headed households were less willing to leave families and dependents behind, as the army payments came slowly.

Third Phase: Federal Reaction

Public depression in the North rose during the spring of 1862, when news came of the failure of the Peninsular campaign, McClellan's attempt to take Richmond. Patriotic feelings began wearing thin and volunteers became increasingly harder to find. The period, from June 1862 to July 1863, can be considered the watershed of northern war efforts. The conflict turned from a campaign to preserve territorial unity into a total war against Confederate society. Months of failure and the relentless resistance by the enemy reinforced the perception that changes were needed if the government were to win the war. Members of the coalition in power became more convinced than ever about the

[74] The battle of Shiloh (April, 1862) cost General Grant 8,000 casualties. Resources were progressively wasted and good news turned scarce as the season came to an end. Data presented

need to undertake stronger measures to reinforce the national power. "These enemies must understand," Lincoln explained to August Belmont during the summer of 1862, "that they cannot experiment ten years trying to destroy the government and if they fail...come back into the Union unhurt."[75] In the next two years, a war between armies would turn into a war of societies, involving the destruction of southern slavery and the annihilation of the Confederate Army. This strategic shift encompassed enormous transformations in the organization of the army as well as in the structure of American government, especially in the scope of the federal capacity to recruit, interfering with the traditions and the practices of small and large communities around the country.[76]

The Union government centralized decisions to an unprecedented level and extended the range of recruitment to encompass a larger number of citizens who would not enlist voluntarily. In his war memories, Silas Wright, an assistant of Governor Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, expressed such a shift in the state of mind of those directly connected to the war efforts: "We had learned... that war was such a barbarous institution that it could not be conducted upon democratic principles of our civil authority."[77] At the same time, the dynamics of the war created a new and more radical vision of its objectives and main targets. As

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in John Macdonald, Great Battles of the Civil War (New York: Collier Books, 1992).

[75] Alan Nevins, The War for the Union: War Becomes Revolution, 1862-1863 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), p. 166.

[76] The most important transformation would be of course those connected to the emancipation of the slaves and the recruitment of black soldiers by the Union army, subjects that will be treated separately, in chapter VII.

James McPherson has argued, Lee's victories in Virginia provided the stimulus that would bring about the destruction of his own social environment. Senator William Pitt Fessenden, a conservative republican from Maine, voiced such feelings in July 1862: "The war must be fought on 'different principles'; for the 'white kid-glove warfare was past."[78]

Part of the problem lay in the failure of volunteerism. While war enthusiasm could serve as a strong element in support of mobilization, it alone could not provide the additional numbers needed. Most of those who had enlisted for patriotic reasons were already in the ranks, and additional manpower was becoming scarce. In face of a progressive decline in recruitment and alarmed by the range of tasks lying ahead, authorities began to look for strategies to keep a permanent inflow of new recruits. To accomplish this, the Federal government would need the people's compliance with the government's demands and a Federal government strong enough to assure such compliance would be maintained.

The Militia Act

In order to recover from the unfortunate consequences of General Order 33, the Republican administration decided to coordinate a governors' call for new troops in July 1862. Secretary Seward persuaded all the governors to unite in memorializing the President to call for 150,000 more volunteers. The call

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[77] Silas Wright Burt, My Memories of the Military History of the State of New York During the War for the Union, 1861-1865 (Albany: 1902), p. 85. Quoted in David Osher, Soldiers Citizens for a Disciplined Nation, p. 233.

[78] Fessenden quoted in McPherson, The Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 500.

answered the needs of the army in face of the reverses brought by administrative mistakes and a sequence of reverses on the battlefields. But the Republican governors conveniently issued their request, as if coming from a decentralized/local impulse, not from a Presidential/centralist demand. Although the general perception pointed to the urgent need to increase the military power of the Union, many Republicans feared that a direct presidential request could be interpreted as coming from desperation, increasing the impression of failure associated with the delicate state of the war.

To the "governors' call" of June 28 Lincoln responded with a presidential request for 300,000 more troops on July 2nd. The men who responded to July's first call were mustered in for three years' service. All sides profited from this strategy: while the Federal government avoided a public demonstration of weakness, governors kept the initiative in the eyes of their constituents and the army received reinforcements to support her expected progress over Confederate territory during the summer season.[79]

Meanwhile, Congress discussed and approved the Militia Act. This measure authorized the first real incursion of federal power into the realm of the states. The bill authorized the president to call the states' militia whenever needed, extending the presidential power to issue quotas in the states. It also empowered the federal government to order a draft in those states with deficient or nonexistent conscription laws. In case a state should prove unable to fill its

[79] According to David M. Osher 300,000 was clearly an insufficient number in view of the growing challenges faced in the South.

designated quota, it was expected that the governor would coordinate its own draft, calling for Federal help when needed.[80]

The Militia Act extended the federal recruiting base but it also limited the terms of service of those enlisted to nine months. Such a clause clearly contrasted with the terms of the July volunteers.[81] It allowed each township to claim credit for all the men enlisted, regardless of whether they actually resided or not there. This possibility opened the window to the search for substitutes from other places. If states did not achieve their July quota by August 15, they were to fill incomplete regiments through a draft. Although most states avoided the draft, its perspective stimulated local recruitment, breaking through the lethargy that had prevailed during most of the spring.[82]

The Militia Act marked the awakening of the Federal government to the magnitude of the war, overthrowing traditional volunteer assumptions about volunteers. It also marked the initial steps in the transformation of a fragmented and multiform combat force into a national army. It was signed into law by President Lincoln in July 17, 1862, after a very brief discussion in Congress. This

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[80] This prescription was, nonetheless, never exerted, because state sheriffs, selectmen, and the state militia executed the 1862 drafts.

[81] On a clear contrast with the 3 years length of the July 2 call.

[82] One of most important consequences of the militia Act was its repeal of the 1792 federal law barring blacks from participation in both the state militias and in the regular United States Army. The Militia Act provided for the employment of free blacks and freedmen as soldiers. See James M. McPherson, The Struggle for Equality. Abolitionists and the Negro in the Civil War and Reconstruction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 196. This point will be discussed in chapter VII.

measure marked the North's first step toward national conscription and was supported by both political parties and the partisan press.[83]

Although the Militia Act used a "carrot and stick" approach in order to get the states to recruit more men, the act did not relieve these same states from the work of raising troops, nor did it question the authority of governors and local authorities in this particular area. Many features of the system were kept unaltered. Recruitment procedures remained in the hands of governors, and the formation of regiments and enlistment were predominantly local. Communities raised money and encouraged meetings to obtain new recruits. Militiamen and volunteers stayed in locally raised units and kept electing their officers. These "volunteers" had the privilege of entering into newly formed regiments. Consequently, the range of the act was limited: the national government abdicated the power directly to compel citizens to enlist and to choose lower officers. Governors retained power to directly coerce local authorities to raise the troops, in order to avoid the inconveniences and the stigma of having the federal government draft in their communities.[84]

While states retained control over officering, they did not provide positive leadership in the unpopular area of recruiting. Localism remained strong and delayed the draft in some states for months. Sometimes local authorities were even able to extend the range of exemptions, saving temporarily their political

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[83] Mary Frances Berry, Military Necessity and Civil Rights Policy: Black Citizenship and the Constitution, 1861-1868 (Port Washington: NY, Kennikat Press, 1977), p. 43.

allies and dependents. Under the protection of sympathetic local authorities, many men avoided enlistment through medical exemptions or because of their occupation as railroad employees, state clerks, telegraph operators, post office employees, or firemen. A growing number of potential recruits also applied for ideological and moral exemptions such as "conscientious objection." [85]

One of the more effective ways to increase compliance was the offer of bounties. The bounty system originated in the colonial period and was re-instituted, with great success, during the first year of the war. The Federal government instituted a bounty of 100 dollars to be paid to those who enlisted for a three-year's term of service. Originally this bounty was to be paid upon a soldier's discharge, but, under pressure from the states, the government decided to give 25 dollars in advance to those who presented voluntarily. States, local communities and private individuals soon expanded the bounty system in their anxiety to fill quotas with volunteers, thereby avoiding the stigma and disgrace of conscription. Many towns created their own additional bounties. Cape Elizabeth in Maine duplicated the 100 dollars offered by the Federal government.[86] As the

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[84] For a good summary of active and passive resistance against the draft see John O'Sullivan and Alan M. Mecler (eds.), The Draft and Its Enemies; A Documentary History (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), pp. 61-107.

[85] Conscientious objection, an important issue for pacifist religious groups was also kept for Quakers and some other religious dissenters. For an interesting analysis of Quaker behavior during the Civil War, see Jacquelyn Sue Nelson, Indiana Quakers Confront the Civil War (Indianapolis: Indiana State Historical Society, 1991). Nelson contests general assumptions concerning the Friend's non-adherence to the war effort. Utilizing church records and manuscript collections her major finds indicate that more Quakers from Indiana took up arms in the Civil War than is generally assumed. See chapter 3, "Why they Fight?," pp. 29-44.

[86] According to Robert Sterling, by the war's end, the various public and private agencies had expend almost three-quarters of a billion dollars in bounty money as inducements to reluctant

threat of the draft increased, bounties multiplied, especially in those affluent communities where resources abounded.[87]

Bounties distinguished 1862 volunteering from that of 1861. As enthusiasm decreased, the force of "selective incentives" was pivotal in keeping up recruitment. The richer a community was, the more easily could it get volunteers. Such regional imbalances worked against the poorest areas, which lacked the means to pay for substitutes. In the long run, the multiplication of bounties would break the links between soldiers and their communities, as a growing number of recruits would no longer be connected to the places where they enlisted. But in the middle of 1862 these unintended effects were not clear to most, and they might be avoided if the armies of the Union achieved a rapid progress on the battlefields.[88]

The fear of the draft and the incentives of increasing bounties spread a new cycle of volunteerism in the North. The August 4 troop call, which was directly linked to the Militia Act, was responded to with enthusiasm by many states and the District of Columbia. Overall, the number of recruits surpassed the original demand and thousands were enlisted in new corps of volunteers. Such

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volunteers. See, "Civil Draft Resistance in the Middle West...".p. 656. For Cape Elizabeth, see Ledman, "A Town Responds", pp. 109-13.

[87] For the significance of bounties as a selective incentive for enlistment, see Eugene C. Murdock, One Million Men: The Civil War Draft in the North (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1971), pp. 154-69.

[88] On the bounty system and its effects Eugene Murdock, Patriotism Limited, 1862-1865: The Civil War Draft and the Bounty System (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1967) and Ohio's Bounty System in the Civil War (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963). See also Chambers, To Raise an Army, pp. 46-9.

successes were partly due to the excellent results of the July 2 call, which furnished a surplus for the rest of the year. [89]

Table VI
Quotas and Terms of 1862 Union Volunteers

Date of the Call	Number Furnished
May and June 1862	15,007
July 2, 1862	421,465
August 4, 1862	87,588

Source: Thomas L. Livermore, Numbers & Losses., p. 50.

While most areas exceeded their assigned quotas, the states of Indiana, Ohio, Wisconsin and the border areas fell behind. When these states were unable to draft, their populations suffered repressive measures, generally undertaken by state agents, sometimes with the support of the militia. Those included: the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the institution of a passport system, and, occasionally, a draft. Selectmen and sheriffs appointed by the states organized the draft at the local level when needed. But overall, the drafts were scattered and popular resistance was limited, and authorities, recognized the results as very positive. A Maryland reformer voiced such feelings: "The fear of being drafted [would] compel every loyal man to foster recruiting."[90]

According to Robert Sterling, the Militia Act was halfway point between state recruitment and national conscription. Although it advanced the power of

[89] In spite of that, draft evasion was significant; estimates suggest that approximately forty to fifty thousand men evaded the draft prior to 1864. See Judith Lee Hallock, "The Role of Community in Civil War Desertion," in Civil War History, Vol. 29, no. 29, 1983, pp. 123-134 and James W. Geary, We Need Men, op. cit., especially chapter 8,"Yankee Recruits, Conscripts, and Illegal Evaders," pp. 87-102.

[90] Joseph E. Paine to Charles Sumner, July 7, 1862. Quoted in Osher, Soldier Citizens for a Disciplined Nation, p. 188.

the national government, it did not challenge local prerogatives, nor did it energize a more organized movement of anti-draft resistance. Consequently, the regulations concerning the Militia Act provided a curious composite, with national guidelines superimposed on antiquated state militia statutes. It could work well as long as both center and periphery cooperated, but its efficiency also depended on the results of battle.[91]

In spite of the great enthusiasm that sprouted anew in the North during early summer of 1862, failure on the battlefields still undermined the Union's war efforts. While advances were made in the Gulf states through the extension of the naval blockade, the Union army was defeated in the second Battle of Bull Run in August and was unable to get a decisive victory at Antietam in September. In November, after months of indecision, George McClellan was finally removed from his command. His replacement, General Ambrose Everett Burnside, led the Army of the Potomac into disastrous defeat at Fredericksburg in December, and Union troops retired to winter quarters without achieving the dreamed-of decisive victory in the eastern theater. A great wave of depression fell over the North in the aftermath of Friedericksburg, and confidence in the administration was severely shaken at the same time that internal problems and political dissension damaged the continuous efforts of the administration to reorganize its armies. Politically, the Emancipation Proclamation in January, 1863, temporarily weakened the war coalition.

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[91] Sterling, Civil War Resistance in the Middle West, p. 68.

After Lincoln's preliminary Emancipation Proclamation issued in September, 1862, a great uproar was heard from people who felt they could not support a war to end black slavery in the Confederacy. The combined effects of the Emancipation Proclamation and war reverses brought "peace Democrats" or "copperheads" from their initial attitude of resignation to a more aggressive opposition to the continuation of the war and to the Republican administration. Other Democratic groups, less radical, continued to support the war while demanding a return to the war's initial, limited, goals. These "War Democrats" believed the Union should be preserved, but they did not conceive that slavery should be destroyed, and they had strong reservations about the temporary suspension of the civil liberties in certain areas.[92] Democratic Congressman Daniel Vorhees of Indiana voiced the position of this group, complaining that war enthusiasm would decrease due to the abolitionist measures: "I am showing up this abolitionist policy as a reason why the loyal enthusiasm which impelled men at first to the field, under a mistaken confidence and reliance upon the good faith of this Administration, can no longer be relied on."[93]

The commitment of the Democratic Party to the war effort was still connected to the antebellum local/individualist vision of America, representing

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[92] The Peace or Copperhead faction of the Democratic Party believed that the increased power of centralization of the Republican wartime government had brought hard times and political tyranny to the North. They emphasized the growing sacrifices faced by poor white men and requested a negotiated settlement between the sections as the best way to restore normalcy. See Richar O. Curry, "The Union as It Was: A Critique of Recent Interpretations of the 'Copperheads'," Civil War History, XIII, March, 1967, pp. 25-39.

[93] Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd. Session, p. 1232.

"the great pre-modern cultures within American society".[94] In line with such views, Democrats opposed confiscation of "rebel property" including slaves. George C. McClellan voiced this view also in a letter to Lincoln, predicting, "A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies."[95]

Democratic electoral successes in the 1862 state and legislative elections sparked the re-emergence of the partisan spirit and the possibility of a presidential shift in the next elections. As control of state government meant, in practice, control of recruitment in the state, Democratic governors could become strong obstacles to the Republicans efforts even when out of the government. Democrats could become noisy minorities, as they were in Indiana, Ohio, Connecticut and Pennsylvania.[96]

Among the many structural problems that affected the army in early 1863 was the urgent need to replenish veteran regiments. Since the beginning of the war, different troops had enlisted for different terms of service, varying from three months to three years. Under the volunteer system, recruiting led to the constant creation of new regiments, while veteran regiments kept shrinking as a result of deaths, casualties, furloughs, and desertion. The multiplication of calls and concessions to local needs turned the lack of uniform terms of enlistment into a

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[94] This perspective is suggested in Eric Foner "The Causes of the American Civil War: Recent Interpretations and New Directions," in Civil War History, XX (September 1974), p. 208.

[95] McClellan to Lincoln, 7 July 1862. OR, 1, 11, 1, pp. 73-74.

[96] For a discussion of the events that culminated in the 1862 fall elections, see Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, pp. 249-272.

major problem. If permitted to choose, volunteers would prefer to enlist in new regiments, keeping their links with friends and comrades. The Militia Act had provided soldiers with terms of nine months, which were ready to expire in May, 1863. With most of the two years' terms about to expire at the same time, the situation turned for the worse.[97]

Table VII
Calls by Terms of Service
Union Troops, 1861-1862

Date of Call	Term for Which Called
April 15, 1861	3 Months
May 3, July 22-25, 1861	6 Months
May, June, 1862	3 Months
July 2, 1862	3 Years
August 4, 1862	9 Months

Source; Thomas L. Livermore, Numbers & Losses, p. 50

Another difficulty was that soldiers received differential pay, as the normal 13 dollars per month wages, established in the beginning of the war, were increasingly supplemented by Federal, state, and local bounties. Such incentives acted like a carrot for new enlistment, but they also increased resentment among veterans who had not received bounties. They also increased the Federal and the states' budgets.[98] Those who volunteered at the beginning of

[97] Northern democrats had been severely shaken by the crisis spawned by secession (a crisis in the Democratic party, after all), but maintained their regular organizations everywhere in the North, holding people's allegiances in many areas. The party was rebuilt with the electoral victories of November 1862, regaining part of its pre-war strength. The party was revived at the polls, gaining thirty-five Republican seats as well as many state chairs plus, the governorship of the states of New York and New Jeersey. Joel H. Silbey, A Respectable Minority: The Democratic Party in the Civil War Era, 1860-1868 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977).

[98] This is one instance the records about Civil War are notoriously inaccurate. A man could be paid to substitute for someone else before that person (the principle) was drafted, but be called a volunteer. If his principle was already drafted, then he should have been called a substitute. However, in practice, recruiting officers often called them volunteers as well.

the war resented being paid less despite their greater sacrifices, while newly arrived recruits were paid better just because they had enlisted later. This resentment disrupted reenlistment and risked depriving the Union army of its most skilled combatants.

Until the spring of 1863, the army relied basically on the enthusiasm of the population and the good will of local communities to replace soldiers and keep recruitment at full strength. However, as communities faced increasing sacrifices, their disposition to cooperate with federal authorities dropped throughout the North. By the fall of 1862, Union leaders faced a dilemma similar to the one that the Imperial bureaucrats in Brazil would face four years later: change their strategy or give up the war efforts. The decision was to make the war still more violent, requiring a greater degree of compliance from Northern civilian populations.[99]

Although there were strong similarities between the Brazilian and American dilemmas, Lincoln had a much more sophisticated structure to deal with social and political dissenters. The Republican party's primary objective from the beginning of the war was the reunification of the nation. As it soon became clear, to subdue the rebellion it would be necessary to resort to extreme measures, including the enhancement of centralized authority. The fate of Republicans became tied to the military defeat of the Confederacy. Consequently, the Republican Party worked as the energizing force that

cemented the alliance between state governors and the Federal government. Without such a political structure, it would hardly have been possible to extend Federal authority over the states. In the absence of a bureaucratic structure, the party furnished the best possible alternative to strengthen the central government's capabilities, restraining the centrifugal impulses in the states and transforming the war into what one author has defined as "an enterprise in modernization."[100]

Republican representatives moved in the direction of a more encompassing war legislation, one that would provide for a stronger control of the Federal government over the whole process of recruiting. In February 16, 1863, Senator Henry Wilson, head of the Committee on Military Affairs, presented Senate Bill 511, a conscription measure, aimed to provide the Federal Government with the supplementary powers it needed to enroll troops. The bill was the subject of extensive debates, with Republicans and Unionist Democrats in support, and Peace Democrats in opposition. Senator Wilson introduced the bill in the Senate in terms that revealed a radicalization of the Republican attitude:

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[99] Based on the information recorded by regimental commanders Ella Lonn estimated 113,697 men deserted between the beginning of the war and April 1863. See Desertion in the Civil War (1928, reprint, Gloucester, Peter Smith, 1966), pp. 153-154.

[100] Peter Levine, "Draft Evasion in the North during the Civil War, 1863-1865," in Journal of American History, no. 67, May, 1981, p. 830. According to Levine "Republicans' insistence on the lack of conflict between social classes and their basically middle-class perspective failed to obscure an obvious disdain for a permanent underclass incessant toiling for wages and incapable of economic independence because of an inability to conform to the values and virtues necessary for success in a modernizing society." Ibid.

> [T]he needs of the nation demand that we should rely not upon volunteering, nor upon calling forth the militia, but that we should fill the regiments now in the field, worn and wasted by disease and death, by enrolling and drafting the population of the country under the constitutional authority 'to raise and support armies.'[101]

Peace Democrats opposed national conscription as a matter of principle. They saw the bill as an undue intervention of the Federal government into the life of the states. They denounced such interference as a violation of America's fundamental beliefs in the primacy of the individual and the right of choice. As asserted by Democratic Representative John Steele, from New York, "I think it is unjust to the States. I think it is one of a series of measures tending to centralize power unnecessarily, and I think it will alarm and distress the people."[102]

In spite of the opposition's complaints, the Republican majority in both houses succeeded. On February 28th, 1863, Congress approved what was called "An Act for Enrolling and Calling Out the National Forces," commonly known as the Enrollment Act. The Act was signed by President Lincoln on March 3. Through this measure, the President received full power to raise and support armies without state assistance. The new law made all men between the ages of twenty and thirty-five and all unmarried men between thirty-five and forty-five liable to military duty. In a more radical step, the bill absorbed state militias into the national forces. This statute centralized and militarized the draft with the replacement of local elected selectmen and sheriffs by uniformed, nationally appointed provost marshals and federal enrolling officers. The Federal

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[101] Congressional Globe, 37th. Congress, 3rd. Session, p. 976.

[102] Congressional Globe, 37th. Congress, 3rd. Session, p. 1264.

government redefined exemptions at the same time that it extended the draft's reach to state officials and other groups previously exempt. Officers' elections and other democratic links between soldiers and communities were severely reduced or suspended. Soldiers also lost their capacity to choose their units, as military service became compulsory, national, and bureaucratic.[103]

The most significant change came with the designation of Federal Provost Marshals subject to a Provost Marshal General at Washington, DC. These agents had special military powers and could call draft in the districts that had not reached their quota. They reduced the capacity of local functionaries to mediate between the military needs and parochial pressures, and broke the role of local power in recruitment. By the Enrollment Act, provost marshals were entitled to ignore hostile Democratic state and local governments and to enforce authority as they pleased, defining treason and containing the local opposition to the Washington regime. According to Iver Bernstein the Enrollment Act, more than any other Civil War legislation "[B]rought the presence of the federal government into the community, into the waged workplace, and into the household - into nearly every corner of working-class life.[104]

In spite of its centralizing character, the Enrollment Act, failed to provide a "fair tool" for recruitment. Fairness was lost from the beginning by a series of

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[103] The text of the law can be found in The United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 13, pp. 731-37. For an excellent interpretation of the Congressional debates, see James W. Geary, "The Enrollment Act in the Thirty-seventh Congress." Historian 46, 1984, pp. 562-582. See also Sterling, "Civil War Draft Resistance in the Middle West," especially chap. V, "National Conscription Comes to the North," pp. 132-65.

[104] Bernstein, The New York City Draft Riots, p. 8.

exemptions and opportunities for commutation and substitution that were negotiated in the Congress. For those with enough money to pay, it was just a matter of negotiation on the informal markets for men that spread in the North. For those who could not find a substitute, commutation clauses and community efforts furnished a palliative. The more affluent communities raised money to commute their inhabitants' services, filling their deficient quotas through the hiring of outsiders. The system spawned factious competition between communities for recruits and produced the twin evils of bounty jumpers and brokers. Those free riders took advantage of the rules and profited from the situation. Many times these "selective incentives" interacted, as substitutes responded to the increasing offer of bonuses by enlisting in those towns that paid better.

As the year 1863 advanced and war needs grew, prices for substitutes rose. The enforcement of the draft during the summer and the fall of 1863 coincided with the development of insurance clubs and the efforts by factory owners and political machines to aid those unable to pay for their own exemptions and unwilling to be conscripted. Commutation costs were fixed at $300, about two thirds of a workingman's annual income. Democratic Senator James W. Nesmith of Oregon, a member of the Military Affairs Committee, remarked that permitting draftees to "commute their patriotism" would lead to the

nation's death. He ironically suggested an appropriate epitaph: "Died of Commutation."[105]

Northern communities reacted in different ways to the increasing demands for manpower. Some communities complied by raising funds for substitutions or commutations. A local study of Cape Elizabeth, Maine shows that the town's quota was increasingly supplied by outsiders. According to Paul Ledman the proportion of enlisted soldiers born in town fell from 51.7% during the first year to only 6% after the impact of the draft. Such an influx of outsiders can be explained by high bonuses provided by an affluent community.[106]

This strategy, however, was not available to all communities, depending on each town's capacity to raise enough funds. Evidence points to a situation in which the richest communities benefited to the disadvantage of the poorest sections of the country. One result was increasing resentment among poorer groups. In the summer of 1863 the act was answered by a wave of resistance, and riots broke out in the main eastern cities and in the Middle West. There was no planned opposition against the draft, because most people agreed that something should be done to put down the rebellion. Catholic and Democratic authorities urged their communities to cope with the increasing war demands. But many of the less affluent communities saw commutation as an instrument that reinforced the political hegemony of the Republican party and the economic

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[105] Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, 1st. Session, p. 227.

[106] On the impact of the first national draft over Cape Elizabeth, see Ledman, "A Town Responds...," pp. 71-103. See also table 4-12 on p. 121. Although the town had voted a bounty, its main source of income was provided by the private efforts of its draft-eligible citizens to obtain their own substitutes.

power of industrialists and merchants, penalizing Democrats, immigrants and the poor. Charges of incompetence, dishonesty, political immorality and political partisanship were thrown at many officials who worked in the new recruitment machine. A parody of a popular song mocked the growing interference of the federal government in the citizen's personal lives.

> We're coming, ancient Abraham, several hundred strong
> We hadn't no 300 dollars and so we come along
> We hadn't no rich parents to pony up the tin
> So we went unto the provost and there were mustered in.[107]

Robert Sterling's work on the Midwest showed a strong correlation between anti-draft resistance and class, partisan affiliation, and religion. Democratic counties with smaller incomes and higher percentages of foreign immigrants, especially Irish and German Catholics, were more likely to have riots than more affluent Midwest communities. Sometimes draft dodgers, deserters and resisters used every device and artifice imaginable, including outright violence, to escape what they perceived as the injustice and inequity of the draft.

In the Midwest, the resistance to enrollment was most widespread in Wisconsin, Illinois and Indiana. In these states popular reaction went from mere complaints in the Democrat press to open insubordination, including attacks on provost marshals' property and person. Sometimes resisters targeted federal agents or local appointees responsible for draft enforcement. Rioters usually targeted the books and lists containing the names of those subject to

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[107] Quoted in Basil L. Lee, Discontent in New York City, 1861-1865 (Washington: 1943), p. 90; See also Nuria Sales de Bohigas, "Some Opinions on Exemption from Military Service in Nineteenth-

conscription, but some riots were more violent; thirty-eight enrollment officers were murdered in ambushes or by crowds. Consequently, many enrollment officers and district provost marshals had to be protected by army units.[108]

Popular revolts raised two specters for government authorities: copperheadism, treason and internal dissension on the one hand, and irrational disorder on the other. Both fears were clearly stated in the final report of the Provost Marshal General's Office, Peter Fry. Fry called acts of resistance crimes perpetrated by the poorest, lower class immigrants, not connected to the American patriotic heritage. To Fry, the actions of the crowds were not rational but resulted from the stimulus of opportunistic Democratic politicians who opposed the war for partisan reasons. New York Congressman Olin voiced such fears when he defended the use of force by the federal authority during the debates on the draft, emphasizing that, "the Government [should] arm itself with every power that lies in the strong arms and loyal hearts of the people."[109]

Similar perceptions of anti-draft motivation can be observed in the pioneer historical analyses made by Eugene C. Murdock and Fred A. Shannon, based on the information presented in the "Official Records of the Civil War." They focused attention on the political-engineering of the war, especially on the role of the Federal government as an enforcer in a modern society during a

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Century Europe." Comparative Studies in Society and History, 10, April 1968, p. 268, and McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 602.

[108] Martin Stephen, Jailed for Peace: the History of American Draft Law Violators, 1658-1985 (Westport: Conn., Greenwood Press, 1986).

[109] Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3d. sess., 1863, vol. 41, pt. 2, p. 1214.

modern kind of warfare, rather than on the particular justifications of the groups negatively affected by this modernization. Both argued that draft resistance could be best explained by opposition to the Lincoln administration's determination to win a war for the Union.[110] More recent, multilayered, approaches emphasize the diversity of interests involved in the resistance against the draft, as well as the connections between the Republican efforts and the cultural backgrounds of some resisting groups. These groups did not necessarily oppose recruitment or the Union cause, but they resisted what they perceived to be unjust features of the process. Taking into account previously existing local conflicts, analysis reveals that popular resistance reflected a plurality of grievances and local complaints, aggravated by the transformation in the nature of the recruitment.

As demonstrated by the classic studies of collective action developed by George Rudé, Eric Hobsbawn, and E. P. Thompson, it is possible to identify in the crowd's apparent disorder organizational forms and coherent logics of action.[111] Recent local studies by Robert Sterling, Grace Palladino, David Osher, and Iver Bernstein show that popular violence did not result from mere "copperhead manipulation." Resisters interpreted factionalism and political partisanship as part of a Republican attempt to subdue long-established

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[110] Eugene C. Murdock, Patriotism Limited, 1862-1865 : The Civil War and the Bounty System (Kent: Kent State University, 1967) and One Million Men: The Civil War Draft in the North (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1971). Fred A. Shanon, The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1865 (1928, reprint, 2. Vols. Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1965).

[111] George F. E. Rudé, The Crowd in History. A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848 (New York: Wiley, 1964); Eric J. Hobsbawn, Primitive Rebels. Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York: Praeger, 1963); Edward P. Thompson, Customs in Common (New York: W. W, Norton, 1991).

institutions connected to local autonomy. The military occupation of such areas reinforced the fears of "political despotism" denounced by local Democratic newspapers, and reinforced by people's beliefs in the virtue of local government, racism and class antagonism.[112]

In the anthracite region of Pennsylvania, local provost marshals cooperated directly with the bosses of the largest coal companies, linking the draft with the suppression of unions and repression of its labor leaders. In Illinois, martial law was declared in many districts where Democrats predominated, temporarily subverting long-established local institutions. These actions were perceived as illegal interference by the national government into local business, interference that reinforced the position of industrialists and merchants long connected to the transformations taking place in the structure of American markets. In the special case of immigrants, the threat of a draft revived memories of one of the most hated institutions of European politics, the draconian laws that regulated recruitment in their native societies. Consequently it is not surprising that immigrants stood out among early resisters.[113]

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[112] Grace Palladino also underlined the role of women in the early movements of resistance occurring in Pennsylvania Carbon counties. In these area the most common sign of contempt was provided through male evasion with few violent demonstrations, Another Civil War, pp. 99.

[113] For cooperation between provost marshals and the coal companies in Pennsylvania, see Palladino, Another Civil War, especially chapter VII, "The Return to Order: The Provost Marshal and Organized Labor, 1862-1865," pp. 140-162. According to Palladino, "Provost Marshals Charlemagne Tower, Samuel Yohe, and Stephen N. Bradford moved well beyond their mandate to enforce the draft...enforc[ing] managerial prerogatives in the mines."

The Draft and Republican Dilemmas

One of the most dramatic episodes of resistance against federal recruitment occurred in New York City in July 1863. During five days, armed mobs interrupted the enforcement of the first federal conscription, challenging federal authority in the most important American city. The riots originated in New York's political and social environment but were enhanced by the circumstances of the war, especially by the grievances resulting from the threat of an imminent draft whose burden would weigh heaviest on the poorest white inhabitants of the city. For some participants, the riots signified a contest for political power between Democratic immigrants and reformist Republicans. But for many observers, the riots were a challenge to the new rules and laws that had emerged from the war.[114]

According to Iver Bernstein, the draft riots must be seen in the context of an ongoing process of urban change, with ramifications at the regional and national levels. An important issue was provided by the disputes over the control of the labor market. Reporting in the aftermath of the 1863 New York City Draft Riots, a New York Tribune editorial provides an indication of how deeply threatened some whites felt by black labor: "The mob exults in the belief that if it failed in its other objects, it has at least secured possession of the labor of the city, and has driven the blacks to seek work elsewhere."[115]

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[114] Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won, p. 440.

[115] Philip Foner and Ronal Lewis (eds.), The Black Worker: From Colonial Times to 1869: A Documentary History (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1969), p. 22.

At the national level, the main fuel was provided by the implementation of the Enrollment Act in the city. The provisions of the act touched three explosive issues in New York social life: relations between the wealthy and the poor, between blacks and whites, and between the city and the nation.[116] So, what began as a protest against the draft turned into a direct attack on the wealthy and on Republican Party institutions, as well as a grotesque racial pogrom.

As a consequence of the five-day riot, the federal government prudently canceled the draft in New York, avoiding the declaring of a state of emergency. The federal administration avoided more serious interference in local New York issues, recognizing Democratic hegemony in the country's biggest city in exchange for its tacit loyalty. New York's quotas were filled through the increase of recruitment in other states, in a process that would bring renewed episodes of political and social tension during the months to come.

New York's experience with riots has much to tell us about the ambiguous results of the draft policy during 1862-1863. If the draft exemplified a push toward centralization, its failure was clear by the fall of 1863. It revealed the limits of radical legislation to expand the federal government. If the Republican government was forced to compromise on conscription, however, this left unsolved the need to raise an army adequate to the task. The anti-draft riots were only the most visible aspect of the problem. As Peter Levine has shown, protest took many forms and turned into a widespread phenomenon during the

[116] Bernstein, The New York City Draft Riots, p. 8.

spring of 1863. Resistance crossed the barriers of class and ethnicity, involving a decline of compliance even in the most loyal areas. The combined effects of illegal and legal strategies of avoidance were more harmful to recruitment than active resistance.

Table VIII
Results of the 1863 Draft

Names Drawn	Failed to Report	Discharged	Examined	Physical Exemptions	Other Exemptions	Paid Commut-tion	Substituted	Held to Personal Service
292,441	39,415	460	252,566	81,131	83,264	52,288	26,000	9,881
100%	13.47%	0.15%	86.36%	27,74%	28.47%	17,87%	8.89%	3.37%

Source: Peter Levine, "Draft Evasion in the North During the Civil War, 1863-1865, p.819; Data collected on Final Report of War, by Provost Marshal General (Washington, 1866), pp. 165-212.

Of 292,441 individuals originally drawn in the 1863 draft only 9,881, or 3.4% were effectively held to serve themselves. Resort to discharges, commutations and substitutions severely undermined the efficacy of the draft, and 83 percent of those liable to conscription found legal means to avoid service.[117]

In order to resolve the dilemma posed by the limits to national power it would be necessary to fill the ranks with other groups, challenging old prejudices and opening the army to racial minorities previously excluded. African Americans provided a perfect solution for the Republican dilemma, because, from the

[117] Peter Levine, through a statistical analysis of the Civil War records, found that illegal evasion in districts that tended to vote non-Republican and to contain Catholics and foreign-born residents while "legal" evasion was more likely to occur in areas containing native-born, non-Catholic populations. Overall both groups (native Protestant and foreign Catholic) avoided the draft through different strategies. See Peter Levine, "Draft Evasion in the North during the Civil War, 1863-1865," in Journal of American History, no. 67, May 1981, pp. 816-34.

beginning of the war, it was clear that a mass of available men in the South were at hand to substitute for northern volunteers. Blacks comprised less than one percent of the northern population, but formed a large portion of the population in the Confederate states.[118] Such an option offered a much smaller financial and social cost to the government and might lower the costs for substitutes. The boom of black enlistment during the second half of 1863 was one of many possible responses to the North's difficulties. It would assume a pivotal role in the enormous expansion of the army in the last two years of the conflict. If prejudice had prevented the federal government from using African Americans before, the realities of war had, by 1863, provided enough reason to change. The shock of war would, therefore, lead to one of the biggest transformations in the history of racial relations in America.

[118] In 1860 the population of the seceded states was 9,103,332. Of these, 3,521,110 were slaves. According to E. B. Long, approximately 520,000 slaves fled to Union lines during the war. See, The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac 1861-1865 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1971), p. 702.

Chapter 6

Manumitting and Enlisting the Slaves Brazil: December 1866 – August 1868

> I would like to ask if the [Triple] Alliance still exists
>
> Viscount of Jequitinhonha[1]

> In Brazil the threat is much more serious and dangerous; it is within us; the danger is inside the country, can surprise us and disturb the public order and the civil society..."
>
> Senator Nabuco de Araújo[2]

Introduction

On November 14, 1867, José Jobim, a respected citizen of Engenho Novo, then a rural section of the Brazilian capital, wrote a letter to his friend Thomas Gomes describing the misadventures of one of his domestic slaves. To replace a recently manumitted slave cook who had served him for more than twenty years, Jobim went to a traditional slave market, located at Rua da Saúde (Health Street).[3] He looked for a particular black woman at the auction who came from the district of São Marcos with good references. It seems a negotiation

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[1] José Honório Rodrigues (ed.), Atas do Conselho de Estado, Meeting of 13 Oct., 1866, p. 62.

[2] Ibid. Meeting of April 2, 1867, p. 206.

[3] It was impossible to discover the fate of the cook after she obtained her freedom, if she was kept on at her master's house or if she was just sent way.

between the prospective slave and Jobim took place during the auction, because she was able to include first her daughter in the deal and, later in the day, her teenage son, Carlos. Together the slaves cost around 2:800$000, 1000$000 each for the new cook and her son Carlos, 800$00 for her daughter.[4] The sources do not reveal the origins of the new slaves. It is impossible to know whether the mother was Brazilian or African born, or whether or not they had come from a rural environment through inter-provincial traffic. The three slaves performed domestic functions: mother and daughter were cooks, and the son was a bull cart driver.

Shortly after arriving at Mr. Jobim's establishment, Carlos began to cause great trouble among the household slaves. According to the sources, he lied and stole, and he chased most of the slave women, causing great resentment among the other male servants.

Carlos was blamed for constantly disappearing from work. The young man also encouraged other male slaves to follow him into the streets where, armed with irons, they joined in disorderly mobs. Finally, when Carlos intentionally destroyed the bull wagon, his master decided to sell him to the army as a soldier for the Paraguayan war. Among Brazilian masters, splitting up families was a common form of punishment of disorderly slaves. But such a

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[4] The whole case is in José M. da C. Jobim to Thomas Gomes, Engenho Novo, 14 November 1867, AHMI, 101 - maço 141, doc. 6925 (POB). One dollar was equal to 2$174 (two thousand one hundred seventy four reais). Consequently, the three slaves cost US$ 1290.00. The mother and the daughter cost US$ 460.00 while Carlos cost US$ 370.00. For exchange value of Brazilian Milréis in U.S. Dollars, see Julian Smith Duncan, Public and Private Operations of Railways in Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), p. 183.

drastic measure often encouraged strong domestic resistance. Carlos's mother protested his sale as much as she could and was finally driven to attempt to poison Jobim's food, but another loyal slave (or possibly one with a grudge against Carlos) denounced her before she could do it.

Surprisingly, when inspected for recruitment, Carlos told the military committee he was a "broken slave," that is, not healthy enough to serve in the army.[5] It seems his statement to this effect had some degree of truth. After a brief inspection, the committee accepted his word and refused to induct him.[6]

Now the unhappy Mr. Jobim realized that he had been deceived twice: first in paying a high price for an unhealthy individual; secondly in buying a troublesome slave. In desperation he decided to send Carlos to the Paraíba Valley, probably aiming to sell him as a field worker to one of the coffee plantations.[7] But Carlos had no intention of working on farms and escaped while on his way to the valley.[8] After a series of short imprisonments and escapes, Carlos was able to return to Rio de Janeiro, where the police caught him once again.

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[5] According to the narrative Carlos informed the recruitment inspectors about his health condition.

[6] Medical examinations of recruits were often superficial. In his memoirs of the war General Dionísio Cerqueira described his own inspection as a young soldier. After presenting himself at the general headquarters as a volunteer, Cerqueira was inspected by a careless physician who merely observed him without touching his body. No medical exams, in the true meaning of the term, were performed. See Dionísio Cerqueira. Reminiscências da Campanha do Paraguai (1910, reprint, Rio de Janeiro: Bibliex, 1980), p. 48.

[7] On the strategic importance of the Paríba Valley, see chapter I, p. 27.

[8] Carlos evasion occurred at Barra do Piraí, then the last station of the railway that would link Rio de Janeiro city to São Paulo city through the Paraíba Valley.

The narrative suggests some interconnection between the police and the slave catchers because Mr. Jobim was notified of Carlos's final capture by the owner of the slave market at Rua da Saúde, where he had been sold, not by the authorities. This businessman probably had good connections, not only with the police, but also with the military authorities, because, after some negotiation, he was finally able to enroll Carlos in the army with no further medical objections. Carlos was sold to the nation for 1400$00 (or U.S. $644.00), the highest possible price for a slave in his condition. Mr. Jobim recovered his original investment while the intermediaries received another 400$00 (or U.S. $184.00), as their commissions. Both the owner and the agents could proclaim their patriotism for helping to defend the nation by getting rid of an undesirable slave. Jobim finally achieved his revenge. In his narrative he claimed that Carlos had been tricked into enlisting.[9]

The picaresque story goes beyond a mere description of Jobim's troubles with his slaves or his attempt to salvage his reputation in the "good society" of Rio de Janeiro city. It invokes the circumstances of recruitment of Brazilian slaves for the Paraguayan War. It offers an opportunity to analyze the relations between slave owners and the Imperial state, centered on the great changes which occurred in the structure of the Brazilian slave market during the 1860s, as

[9] It is possible that some urban slaves might well have judged their semi-free status preferable to confinement in the army barracks. This hypothesis has been presented by Hendrik Kraay, "The Shelter of the Uniform: The Brazilian Army and Runaway Slaves, 1800-1888" in Journal of Social History, Vol. 29, n. 3, March 1996, pp. 637-57 and Mary C. Karash, Slave Life in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1850 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 338. Kraay's concludes that most evidence contradicts the hypothesis, although the above case reinforces his initial hypothesis.

well as the relations between public and private agents in Brazil. It gives a good picture of the key role of personal relations in all sectors of Imperial society. Finally, it offers impressive evidence of the way in which the war effort, nationalism, and emancipation policies were linked together during the 1860s in Brazil.

Jobim's letter implies that military service was considered to be the best use of undesirable slaves. The state paid high prices for troublemakers, which reimbursed their owners and enriched the intermediaries. Enlisting slaves was good business for those who profited from the enlargement of the army. The slaves, however, had no active role (except the precarious one for Carlos of choosing between disobedience and escape). For most slave recruits, their final destination was subject to the higher interests of their white masters. The nation paid the bill.[10]

This chapter will examine two questions raised by the narrative above. Most importantly, how did the recruitment of the Brazilian slaves and their transformation into "free-soldiers" became a question of state? Secondly, what was the response among the supporters of the monarchy, the planters?[11]

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[10] It was impossible to follow Carlos' fate after enlistment.

[11] Until the 1870's the bulwark of monarchic support came from the big farmers, especially the coffee planters of the province of Rio de Janeiro. Those who owned slaves and land saw the Emperor as the best arbiter for their interests. On the relations between Rio de Janeiro farmers and the state, see José Murilo de Carvalho, A Construção da Ordem. A Elite Política Imperial (DF: UNB, 1980) and Ilmar Roholoff de Mattos, O Tempo Saquarema (São Paulo: Hucitec,1987).

The Historiographical Debate

The racial situation during the Paraguayan conflict has a much more limited historiography than the one on black soldiers during the American Civil War. The subject has been usually a secondary chapter in the classic narratives of the War and its outcome. Those narratives merged the contribution of black soldiers into the celebration of the Brazilian nation in its struggle against tyranny in South America.[12]

During the 1960s, Nelson Werneck Sodré, a nationalist historian, opened new ground by linking the postwar tension between the army and the monarchy to "a better knowledge of the black situation." The succession of military crises in the 1880s opposed the younger officials (Mocidade Militar) and Paraguayan veterans to the monarchical civilian elite, leading to the fall of the monarchy in 1889.[13] According to Sodré, a feeling of sympathy, strengthened during the war, united an emerging middle-class officer stratum to the former slaves, and was directly responsible for the army's shift in the direction of social reform. Sodré's analysis set the path toward a common concern of most recent historical debates: the post-war consequences of multi-racial experiences, it has been argued, led to rising criticism of Brazilian social injustice, a behavior crystallized

[12] Emilio Carlos Jourdan, História das Campanhas do Uruguay, Mato Grosso e Paraguay-Brasil, 1864-1870 (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1893), Lovis Schnneider, A Guerra da Tríplice Aliança contra o Governo do Paraguay (Rio de Janeiro: 1875), Theotônio Meireles Silva, O Exército Brasileiro na Campanha do Paraguay (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia do Globo, 1875), José Bernardino Borman, Guerra do Paraguay (Curitiba, Jesuíno Lopes e Cia., 1887), Augusto Tasso Fragoso, História da Guerra entre a Tríplice Aliança e o Paraguai (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa do Estado Maior do Exército, 1924).

during the critical years of the Paraguayan campaign when whites and blacks fought side by side, intensifying the politicization of the army's corps of officers.[14]

Other recent analyses have been more skeptical about these supposed connections. While recognizing the relevance of the black soldier for the Brazilian war effort, recent scholars have attributed greater importance to the role of the slaves in their struggle for citizenship. They argue that the contribution of black soldiers was more directly effective in their postwar struggle against social hierarchies, not just indirectly, through their influence on the Imperial army officers. The analysis of judicial procedures in the post-war period by the latter group of historians showed a multiplicity of grievances and the complaints of exceptional black veterans fighting for justice and social recognition of their role as patriots. For Dale T. Graden, blacks fighting on behalf of Brazil against Paraguay contributed to the widening antislavery expression of the late 1860s.[15] Ricardo Salles explored the contradictions that were evident in the expansion of the army as a national institution and its search for a stereotyped vision of the Brazilian citizenry.[16] Jorge Prata de Souza emphasized the deception of those

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[13] For a summary of the events that lead to the fall of the monarchy, see Celso Castro, Os Militares e a República. Um Estudo Sobre Cultura e Ação Política (Rio de Janeiro, Zahar, 1995), especially pp. 85-104.

[14] Nelson Werneck Sodré, A História Militar do Brasil (1965, reprint, Rio de Janeiro, Civilização Brasileira, 1979), pp. 135-53.

[15] Dale Thurston Graden, "From Slavery to Freedom in Bahia, Brazil, 1791-1900," (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Connecticut, 1991), pp.157-220.

[16] Ricardo Salles, Guerra do Paraguai: Escravidão e Cidadania na Formação do Exército (Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1990).

blacks who served in the army, who felt betrayed in their post-war expectations.[17] Hendrik Kraay, based on data taken from the province of Bahia, observed that officer slaveholding (both during and after the war), conformed to the patterns of urban slaveownership, confirming the long-noted, widespread nature of Brazilian slaveholding. Consequently, he argues that, in regard to slave property, the war marked no turning point in the army's racial behavior.[18]

Without disagreeing with the conclusions of these recent analyses, it should be noted that, except for Ricardo Salles, they share a methodological limitation common in many social historians' approach to Latin America: their lack of interest in state-led reforms. Notwithstanding, even if we discard the idea of a racially progressive role for the army, as Kraay and others have done, there was still ample room for changes in the post-war panorama, and the crucial fact remains that most of these changes were propelled by the action of the Imperial state.

The impact of the war effort and its racial implications created a large opening for bureaucratic and political transformation in Brazil, and they also brought ordinary Brazilian citizens into contact with the national government as never before. The resulting impact challenged the political consensus forged in the 1850s, and reshaped the behavior of the main political actors. After the war, the imperial state once again assumed the initiative in formulating abolitionist

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[17] Jorge Luiz Prata de Sousa, Escravidão ou Morte. Os Escravos Brasileiros na Guerra do Paraguai (Rio de Janeiro, Mauad/Adesa, 1996).

[18] Hendirk Kraay, "Slavery, Citizenship and Military Service in Brazil's Mobilization for the Paraguayan War," in Frank Cass Journals, Vol. 18, No. 3, December 1997, pp. 228-56.

policies, greatly polarizing Brazilian political debate. The slow pace of social transformation does not diminish the power of the war's legacy, nor does it minimize the war's effects on the Brazilian poor. The relevance of those changes for a nation "invented by the state" cannot be dismissed simply as "conservative adaptation." This process strengthened the Imperial capacity to formulate national policies oriented toward social reform, showing that there can be life above the grassroots.[19]

Preliminaries

The relationships between slavery and military service in Brazilian society were paradoxical. Slavery prevented a large number of individuals from serving in the army and the navy but also made slaves a captive market for substitutes.

Manumissions for the military service did not begin during the Paraguayan war. They were part of a tradition with origins in Brazil's early history. The Luso-Brazilian military had armed its freed slaves since colonial times. Slaves fought for and against Portugal in the series of conflicts involving the control of the sugar-cane growing regions before Brazilian independence.[20]

Describing the unpopularity of the recruitment and the bad state of the Portuguese colonial militia in Brazil, C. R. Boxer acknowledged that the recruitment of colored people was one of a set of extreme measures taken by the colonial authorities to improve the colony's military capacity. Despite the

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[19] I will return to this point on chapter VIII.

[20] During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries French and Dutch explorers repeatedly invaded many Brazilian regions. For additional information on this subject see J. Capistrano de Abreu,

reluctance of the local whites, black and white "social undesirables" served alongside each other in two regular infantry regiments. Such militias were organized under a hierarchy of color, each armed group being under the command of a white but dark-hued officer.[21]

The organization of segregated and multiracial militias was common to both Brazilian northern and southern provinces. In the Northeast, during the colonial war against the Dutch, battalions of black men fought under the command of Captain Henrique Dias, a freed man of color who supported the Portuguese side.[22] In the Southwest region some provinces also admitted Afro-descendant individuals as soldiers. The French naturalist August Saint Hilaire observed that, in the province of Minas Gerais, regiments that should have been composed only of whites could sometimes accept mulattos in their ranks. For the naturalist such concessions were due "to favor," not to the military needs of the Portuguese colonial state.[23]

In the special circumstances in which it happened, the enlistment of Afro-descendants in Brazil did not create racial egalitarian attitudes, nor did the

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Chapters of Brazil's Colonial History, 1500-1800 (1907, reprint, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 52-90.

[21] Charles R. Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil, 1865-1750. Growing Pains of a Colonial Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 142.

[22] The expression "Henriques" was associated to those battalions that were organized in the Northeastern part of the country afterward. On Henrique Dias and the struggle against the Dutch in Brazil see C. R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415-1825 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 119, 162. For an analysis of the symbolic appropriation of the myths of Henrique Dias and his black warriors, see Evaldo Cabral de Mello, Rubro Veio. O Imaginário da Restauração Pernambucana (Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1997, 2nd Edition).

[23] August de Saint-Hilaire, Viagem pelas Províncias do Rio de Janeiro e Minas Gerais (Rio de Janeiro: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1938), vol. II, p. 321.

services rendered by the former slaves result in full citizenship for them.[24] Even when these services brought freedom, manumissions were linked to what the historiography on slavery classified as "onerous manumissions," that is, in exchange for money or services."[25] There were neither special programs for settlement of former soldiers in distant regions nor additional programs to adapt these persons to their newly acquired free status. As historian Carl Degler points out: "[The] use of Negroes as soldiers in the colonial period in Brazil, in short, was not the result of the prior acceptance of the black man as an equal but of the need of him as a fighter."[26]

After independence, the emerging Brazilian leaders maintained such practices. The provisions of October 23, 1823 and September 10, 1824 permitted slave owners to be compensated when they gave their slaves to serve in the Brazilian war of Independence.[27] The reference of January 21, 1828, shows that, through the orders of Emperor Pedro I, edicts were published

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[24] The most comprehensive treatment of black soldiers in the colonial Americas is Peter M. Voelz, Slave and Soldier: The Military Impact of Blacks in the Colonial Americas (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1993).

[25] On the concept of "onerous manumission," see Robert W. Slenes, "The Demography and Economics of Brazilian Slavery, 1850-1880," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1976), p. 516, Sillvia Hunold Lara, "Campos da Violência. Estudo sobre a Relação Senhor-Escravo na Capitania do Rio de Janeiro, 1750-1808," (Tese de Doutorado, Universidade de São Paulo), 1986, p. 219, Vilma Paraíso Ferreira Almada, Escravismo e Transição. O Espírito Santo (1850-1888) (Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1984), pp. 148-9. For a summary of the discussions, see Peter L. Einsenberg, "Ficando Livre: As Alforrias em Campinas no Século XIX," in Estudos Economicos, Vol. 17, No. 2, May-August, 1976, pp.175-226.

[26] Carl N. Degler, Neither Black nor White. Slave and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), p. 79. Such a perspective does not exclude the hypothesis that military life could bring positive changes for those blacks directly involved, that is, former recruits coming from the Brazilian poorest social groups.

[27] As soon as independence was secured such measures were canceled. They were probably never effective.

envisioning the acquisition of slaves for the war against the Argentine Confederation. Finally, freed slaves participated in the provincial revolts of the 1830s and 1840s.[28]

The predominantly black or mixed composition of then-Brazilian troops clearly demonstrates the predominance of men of African descent among the Imperial forces. Once recruiting from the lower social stratum of Brazilian society began, it would be a logical outcome that most Brazilian soldiers should come from social groups where dark-skinned men predominated. For the planters it offered an additional incentive: it helped to protect them against slave riots as it split the African community still more.[29]

In spite of the widespread presence of blacks and mulattos in the ranks, Brazilian military service was not open to the non-free sections of society. The Imperial Constitution of 1824 expressly guaranteed property rights. As private property, slaves could not be expropriated by the Imperial or provincial governments. Even if the government compensated owners, those would have to manumit their slaves before enlistment. Consequently, enlistment was open only to those who possessed civil liberties or those freed by the will of their masters to defend the nation-state under exceptional and extreme conditions. But no consensus existed about when a situation could be considered "extreme,"

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[28] Except for the Revolt of Males (1835), no other riot directly questioned the existence of slavery.

[29] This hypothesis was presented by Jeane Berrance de Castro "O Negro na Guarda Nacional" in Anais do Museu Paulista, Vol. 23, 1969, pp. 149-72.

nor over the kind of compensation slave owners would receive, should such a situation present itself.

From the beginning of the campaign against Paraguay, ex-slaves were reinforcing the ranks of the Brazilian army. The enlistment of such individuals occurred basically through impressment, donation, or substitution, or when slaves ran away from their masters and enlisted as if they were free. No specific demands were made by the state to acquire slaves because the general assumption was that the war would be short - one or two battles and the Paraguayans would give up. At the beginning of operations most Brazilians agreed with the Argentinean president Bartolomeu Mitre, who called all citizens to "run to the Barracks in 24 hours, to the battle-fields in 60 days, and to Asuncion in six months."[30]

In spite of this initial expectation, many people still refused to go to war. For these individuals, the easiest way avoid enlistment was to present a qualified substitute. Such was the case in Vassouras, in the Paraíba Valley, where an informal bargain took place. Twenty-nine National Guardsmen had been designated for the War. As was becoming usual, the recruiters took refugee in the forests in the outskirts of town, creating a focus of social tension in the middle of the coffee region. The rich political bosses solved the problem through the donation of thirty freed slaves for the war. As compensation, the Imperial State released the original 29 National Guardsmen, who had neither left town

[30] Quoted in Diário do Coronel Manuel Lucas de Oliveira (Porto Alegre: Edições EST, 1997), p. 54.

nor been punished for desertion. In that case, a combination of influential local bosses and quick replacement worked in favor of those originally recruited.[31]

While such practices were sometimes criticized by the reformist sectors of the national army, substitution was a widespread practice. Substitutes also permitted the proprietors to pay for the exemption of their protégés or to buy new recruits to be offered to the nation. More important, although the recruitment of freed slaves through substitution could sometimes result from one or another sort of outside pressure, it did not violate the rights of property. Consequently it did not oppose the state to the barons.[32]

A real market for substitutes flourished during this early period of the War. Free or slave sections of society could provide substitutes. Either enlisted soldiers or professional officers could present them. Many times relatives offered replacements to exempt their loved ones. The Report of the Ministry of War records only 948 slave substitutions nationwide for the five years of war. The two regions with most substitutes were the city of Rio de Janeiro and the traditional troops provider, Rio Grande do Sul. Rio de Janeiro presented 437 and Rio Grande do Sul 305. An example is the case of Elias, a thirty-four year old Gaucho, from the region of Pelotas. Son of "a mulatto of free condition," Elias was still a slave when Luiz Xavier da Silva bought him for 1:200$000 (U.S.

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[31] APRJ, PP 2.2-4, Cx. 16, Coleção 8. Ofícios 18 to 23 October 1867, quoted in Jorge Prata de Souza, Escravidão ou Morte. Os Escravos Brasileiros e a Guerra do Paraguai (Rio de Janeiro: Mauad/Adesa, 1996), p. 63.

[32] As the prices of exemption 600$00 (U.S. $246) were inferior to the normal prices of slaves, it could be a good business to just pay instead of buying individuals for the recruitment. But it was a very high amount to be paid by the poor.

$552). The letter of manumission clearly stated that Elias would be freed on condition that Camilo Xavier da Silva, son of Luis, be exempted from both the recruitment and service in the National Guard. Such substitution would require from Elias a length of service between six and nine years in the ranks, if he survived the campaign.[33]

Because slaves were becoming more expensive as the war progressed, the quality of those sent to the army was sometimes questionable. Complaining about this problem, the Marquis of Caxias, Commander in Chief of the Brazilian forces after October 1867, exemplified the kind of tension that could exist between the military command, the political bosses, and the recruiting agents. In April 1868, four months before the Humaytá fortress was taken, Caxias refused to accept seven freed slaves, at the same time keeping the originally designated National Guardsmen in the ranks. This conflict took place in the middle of a struggle between Caxias and the Provincial president, when Caxias was concentrating military decisions and prerogatives in his hands. But it is important to underline that, at this point, most recruits had been trained for a certain amount of time, consequently, the replacement meant an exchange of experienced soldiers by immature recruits. As the old Marshal described it: "I cannot accept such substitution because these individuals do not have the

[33] APRS, J-69, Codice J-60, fl 1v.

qualities needed in a soldier in times of war. They will never be ready to replace the soldiers already in service."[34]

What was the fate of the returned slaves? That is a difficult question to answer. According to the evidence, it seems that most of them, once refused, were not returned to slavery. In some cases the government maintained payments, once those slaves, such as Carlos, had already passed the enlistment exams. Others, while free, had to fulfill some obligations to their masters. According to Paulo Roberto Staudt, these individuals had to negotiate their freedom with previous owners, serving them for a certain number of years. That was the case of Thomas Furtado, a rejected substitute who signed a contract promising to work for eleven years for his master, until his debts were paid.[35]

Runaways were also common in many provinces, thus creating points of tension between the Imperial state and the masters. In the face of the reduced number of individuals willing to march, and aided by the precarious bureaucratic organization of the enlisting committees, it was not difficult for slaves to present themselves with false names, especially in periods of massive mobilization.[36]

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[34] Marquis of Caxias to Francisco Inácio Marcondes Homem de Melo, Para-Cué (Paraguay), 12 April 1868. APRS, B1.071 - Avisos do Ministério da Guerra - 1868/1869.

[35] Thomas Furtado to José Silveira Filho, Porto Alegre 13 February 1867. AHRS, fl. 55, livro 19. Quoted in Paulo Roberto Staudt Moreira, Faces da Liberdade, Máscaras do Cativeiro: experiências de liberdade e escravidão percebidas através das cartas de alforria - Porto Alegre (1858-1888) (Porto Alegre: Arquivo Público do Estado/EDIPUCRS, 1996), p. 67.

[36] And in this sense the Brazilian situation differed remarkably from the American case. In the United States, especially after the war of 1812, a color bar was maintained to exclude blacks, both slave and free, from the army. In spite of the courage demonstrated by persons of African descent, the American Army progressively closed its doors to those individuals until some events during the Civil War modified such attitudes. For the enlistment of African Americans previous to the Civil War, see Richard Rollings introduction to Black Southerners in Gray. Essays On Afro-Americans In Confederate Armies (Murfreesboro: Southern Heritage Press, 1994), pp.1-35. See

Without free regions to which they could run, the army provided a refuge for some slaves who blended into the corps. For these individuals, their experience in the Army was an improvement on the lives they had in the fields.

With a multi-racial army recruited from free and freed sectors of its population, who were not often visually distinguishable from captives, it was not possible to avoid the occasional recruitment of runaway slaves.[37] On these occasions the uniform worked as a shelter to disguise the previous condition of runaways and could provide them with the additional sympathy of fellow soldiers in the barracks. In spite of this, the Imperial government returned at least 36 runaways and took measures to avoid repetition of such cases.[38] In a circular letter to the President of Rio de Janeiro, the minister of war stressed the inconveniences brought by those circumstances emphasizing that: "We should avoid the repetition of cases where, voluntarily or through recruitment, the army accepts individuals who are later discovered to come from the slave condition. We need to be very careful and check cautiously the individuals that are presented."[39]

Sometimes even free individuals went through bizarre situations demonstrating that the status of some freed slaves after manumission was not

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also Adam Rothman, "West India Regiments at the Battle of New Orleans and Beyond," Paper prepared for the American Historical Association Annual Meeting, January 1999.

[37] And this was the source of great misunderstandings about the status of Brazilian soldiers. Some authors took for granted that the large number of people of black descent meant they were slaves.

[38] Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, "Silences if the Law: Customary Law and Positive Law on the Manumission of Slaves in 19th century Brazil" in History and Anthropology Vol. 1, n. 2, 1985, pp. 427-43.

completely autonomous. In some cases, after being manumitted, such persons still owed cash payments to their former masters for a certain period of time. In these cases, freedom did not break the barriers of personal subordination, as slaves emerged to free life still dependent on their previous owners. The soldier Ricardo was a freed slave in Rio Grande do Sul who enlisted in the army in 1866. After he left town, his former owner, a widow, petitioned the president of the province re-calling her servant. In the petition she lamented her poor condition, declaring "he could not enjoy liberty without paying me the amount of 1:160$000" (U.S. $534). The provincial president refused to release Ricardo, answering that, taking into consideration the letter of manumission, there was no doubt that he was free and the contract between Ricardo and his previous owner could not be used as an exemption for the military service. In this case, the urgent need to enlarge the army favored public freedom over private obligations.[40]

The impressment of slaves was very similar to the conscription of the free sections of society described in chapter IV. In many provinces difference in color between slaves and free poor people was not easily perceived. Under such circumstances, slaves could be impressed while walking in the streets or when running errands for their masters. If the slave preferred army life it would be difficult to force his return unless the owner discovered where he was and

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[39] João Lustosa da Cunha Paranaguá to Esperidião Elóy de Barros Pimentel, 20 August 1866. APRJ, Coleção 8, Pasta 10, maço 12 (1866).

[40] APRS, Correspondência dos Governantes, maço 109 - Ofícios do Presidente da Província ao Chefe da Polícia em 14. Feb.1867.

petitioned the army. The authority on Brazilian manumissions, Peter L. Eisenberg, following Warren Dean, observed that during the census of 1872, for the first time, the pollsters made a distinction between slavery and ethnicity. Eisenberg postulates that Brazilian society tended initially to identify the color of the skin with specific legal conditions (e.g., mulatto to freed men). Later in the 19th century, Brazilian society began to dissociate color of the skin and the individual legal condition. It is feasible to suppose that press gangs could easily accept those lighter-skinned individuals as if they were freed slaves.[41]

Once recruited, many slaves changed their names in order to avoid being discovered. This was the case of a slave called Baltazar, impressed during the Uruguayan campaign (Aug. 1864 - Feb. 1865) and enlisted in the Third Battalion of Volunteers. In November 1866 his owner petitioned the president of the province demanding his return, but the Quartermaster General declared it impossible to find his name on the list. Many times, links of comradeship built between the slaves and their officers were the best protection they could have.[42]

Although a mass of free people were possibly available, their recruitment was subjected to the limits imposed by their patrons and protectors. These obstacles limited the capacity of the Imperial state to obtain a permanent provision of manpower to reinforce the Imperial Army. Without adequate means

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[41] Peter Eisenberg, "Ficando Livre: As Alforrias em Campinas no Século XIX," pp. 187-8, quoting Warren Dean, Rio Claro. Um Sistema Brasileiro de Grande Lavoura (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1977), p. 72. Terms such as "pardo," "mulato," "criolo," and "cabra", provided some of the designations for freedmen. These terms assumed different meanings as the century advanced.

[42] From the Quartermaster General to Barão of Boa Vista. Uruguayana, 07 November 1865. AHRS, Lata 198, maço 1.

to extract from the Brazilian people a regular "tribute of blood", authorities had to concentrate their recruiting efforts on unprotected persons. Considering the permanent scarcity of voluntary soldiers, slaves represented a natural source of substitutes, especially where their concentration was considered a threat to the public order, that is, in the main cities and particularly in the Court. If cities provided ideal refuges for runaways, they were also places of permanent suspicion, where a runaway was liable to be recruited as any vagrant.[43]

Donations were less common and restricted to the first stages of the campaign. They can be included in the first wave of patriotic demonstrations described in chapter IV. This was the case for Manoel Antonio Ayrosa, who manumitted Pedro, a light mulatto, under the condition that he serve in the army for the duration of the campaign. This type of manumission became rarer as the war progressed, virtually disappearing after 1866. The few donations already made were considered sufficient proofs of patriotism, and donors were symbolically rewarded with titles of nobility.[44]

Unlike the U.S. situation, there were no popular demonstrations against the mixing of free and slave troops. Among other explanations are the facts that blacks had been serving since the beginning of the war and that the racial composition of the Brazilian ranks helped to contain any possible tensions

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[43] According to the data provided by Fabio Faria Mendes, voluntary enlistment decreased from 41,4% in 1864 (first year) to 8,16 during the efforts undertaken in the years 1867-1868. See "O Tributo de Sangue: Recrutamento Militar e Construção do Estado no Brasil Imperial," (Ph.D. Dissertation, IUPERJ (Brazil), 1997), pp. 217-19."

involving racial prejudice. Evidence in favor of this hypothesis is the experience of eleven companies of Zouaves (freedmen soldiers from Bahia), counting 676 troops, who departed from Salvador during the first year of the campaign.[45] These segregated companies did not last long: due to administrative measures they were mixed with other troops as soon as they arrived in Paraguay. No segregated battalions fought during the Paraguayan War.

For many free blacks, the war offered also an opportunity to prove their value and bravery in combat and an additional chance to be integrated into the mainstream of society. Among those free black men who served was Cândido Fonseca Galvão, also known by his self-proclaimed title of Dom Obá II. The Grandson of an African tribal king, the said Dom Obá volunteered with 30 other comrades from the town of Lençóis in the Bahian backlands to take part in the campaign. Decorated for bravery and wounded in battle, he became a war hero in Rio de Janeiro, where Cândido finally settled after he was mustered out. The postwar trajectory of Don Obá II shows the importance of participation in the campaign for the postwar black community in Rio de Janeiro, as Cândido became a reference for the aspirations and demands of both War veterans and African descents.[46]

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[44] "Relação dos Offerecimentos feitos ao Governo para as Urgencias da Guerra" in Report from the Ministry of War, 1865, also quoted in Ricardo Salles, Guerra do Paraguai: escravidão e cidadania na formação do exército, p. 101.

[45] The name Zouave was copied from the French African armies in Algeria where black soldiers fought on behalf of their metropolis during the colonial wars.

[46] For a historical analysis of Dom Obá's life and times see Eduardo Silva, Prince of the People. The life and Times of a Brazilian Free Man of Color. (London: Verso, 1993).

Summarizing, the recruitment of slaves during the initial steps of the campaign was not numerically significant, but offered an opportunity for some slaves to escape exploitation in spite of the hardships of the campaigns and the chances of dying in combat. If, before 1866, the recruitment of these individuals was limited by the voluntary motivations of their owners, war conditions offered opportunities for large changes in the moods of the government agents. In several provinces, the draft of free men met violent resistance. In some areas, especially in the Northeast, São Paulo, and Minas Gerais, mobs attacked enrollment officers, forcing the Provincial presidents to send troops to carry out the draft.[47] Under such exceptional circumstances the state could appeal to the masters groups because national security was at risk. The country's military situation between 1866 and 1868 created a perception of national crisis that reinforced this kind of state appeal.

The Military Situation

As explained in chapter IV, the struggle against Paraguay offered few indications that an external threat could strengthen the Brazilian civic feelings for long. The efforts to recruit and train citizens faced enormous resistance after the initial months of the conflict. Few free individuals were willing to serve outside the Imperial borders, facing the risks of combat and disease.[48] Powerful bosses and

[47] Many such cases were described in chapter IV.

[48] According to the Reports from the Ministry of War for the years 1867-1868, one fourth of the Brazilian forces were permanently sick.

even Imperial agents conspired against conscription, defending their domains to the point of making recruiter efforts pointless in some regions.

The primitive state of bureaucratic development in Brazil reinforced the huge obstacles that restricted the attempts of the government to build a powerful army. The lack of popular enthusiasm, endemic after 1866, completed the scenario, undermining the enormous military deficiencies of the Empire. Commenting on the nature of the war Counselor Pimenta Bueno, a member of the Emperor's closest circle, reminded his peers about the nature of the war: "This is not a campaign that will be ended through one or two battles that will bring glory to the Prince. This is a war of resources, a series of attacks against trenches and fortifications, a continuous series of guerrilla, that will be very depressing."[49]

The prolonged campaign created a series of conflicts at the national level, which reflected increasing social tensions in both cities and the countryside. Little by little the war efforts tended to increase divisions within imperial society, especially in the relations between the central and the local powers. Such circumstances were interconnected with a series of logistical problems at the front. By the end of 1866, it was not clear whether the Triple Alliance would be able to prevail. The troops were bogged down around a swampy region on the right bank of the Paraguayan river, "a land in which no one does well," as a

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49 José Honório Rodrigues (ed.), Atas do Conselho de Estado (Brasília: Senado Federal, 1973-1978),Vol. VI, p. 65.

corporal described it.[50] This region did not offer adequate conditions for tactical movements, nor was it particularly conducive to use of cavalry.[51] The Brazilian financial situation was delicate and there were no concrete prospects for an early, successful termination of the war. To make things worse, the Paraguayan government gave no signs of surrender. The territorial instinct is normally a powerful drive in all defensive campaigns, but the Paraguayans' defense of their homeland turned to be one of the most determined and costly in the history of warfare.[52]

While the Paraguayans kept control of the Humayta fortress, a well-fortified collection of trenches, they controlled the upper Paraguay River, blocking the main route to Asuncion.[53] After a series of military disasters, the only thing Paraguayans could fight for was to avoid invasion. The basic aim of the Paraguayan government, like that of the Confederacy during the Civil War, was to defend their nation against conquest. The Paraguayans hoped for an honorable armistice that could preserve their territorial and political autonomy.

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[50] Francisco Borges Ribeiro to Agostinha Maria de Jesuz, Humaitá, Paraguay, 16 April 1869, AHEX/RQ, JJ-259-6322. Quoted in Hendrik Kraay, "Soldiers, Officers, and Society; The Army in Bahia, Brazil, 1808-1889," (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin), 1995, p. 500.

[51] Until the Paraguayan War, the Gaucho cavalry had been the basis of Brazilian military in her actions in the River Plate.

[52] While underlining the demise of the Confederate will, James McPherson called attention to the fact that the Confederate war effort, where 5 percent of the population perished, seem feeble when compared to the 56 percent of the Paraguayan adults who died during the war. Although McPherson's data can be contested, Paraguayan numbers still provide a good contrast to what degree territorial defense can push national sacrifice. See Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 856.

[53] Some historians considered Humayta as the South American Sebastopol, in a direct reference to the Russian stronghold during the Crimean War. It seems Alliance leaders overestimated the strategic importance of such trenches, contributing heavily to the army's paralysis. Consequently, during this period, many proposals of negotiation came from Bolivia, Peru, and Chile, as well as from the United States. The fact that they did not prevail does not diminish their importance.

From June 1865 on, the Paraguayans could "win" the war only by not losing.[54] This position was expressed in the testimony of a Paraguayan soldier, collected by a Brazilian young officer, captain of engineering Benjamin Constant Botelho de Magalhães. In a letter to his wife he described his contacts with the enemy:

> During three days the shooting stopped completely and the Paraguayans (soldiers and officers) came to our lines to talk to us. They brought us presents like bowls (cuias), and said that they had no intention to keep fighting us. They know everything that happens in our army, in our politics, and keep calling our men to talk [saying]: we are your friends and don't like to shoot you. The supreme government will take care of the peace negotiations.[55]

The most immediate threat against the continuation of the war came however, not from the Paraguayan resistance, but from the possibility of a rupture in the Triple Alliance, the political and military agreement that supported the war. Few sectors in Brazil accepted comfortably a diplomatic and military alliance with any Spanish-speaking republic. Memories of old regional rivalries, dating from the colonial period, were still strong enough to generate mistrust among Brazilian regional leaders about any cooperation. Gaucho officers were especially sensitive because they had a long history of border conflicts with the Argentineans. During the war, the maintenance of a special brigade in the Gaucho lands was constantly pledged because, no sector completely trusted the

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[54] And this was the Paraguayan message at the meeting that reunited Solano Lopez, Bartolomeu Mitre, and Venancio Flores at a place called Yatayti-Corá in 12 September 1866 when Solano Lopez presented his proposal to end the war. For the meeting, see Adolfo J. Baez, Yatayty-Corá: una conferencia histórica (Buenos Aires: Imprenta y Papelería Juan Perroti, 1929).

[55] Benjamin Constant to Cláudio Luís da Costa, Tuyuti (Paraguay) 29 November 1866. Quoted in Teixeira Mendes, Benjamin Constant – Peças Justificativas, pp. 118-19. Vitor Izecksohn, "O Cerne da Discórdia. A Guerra do Paraguai e o Núcleo Profissional do Exército." (M.A. Thesis, IUPERJ (Brazil), 1992), p. 105. Renato Lemos (ed.), Cartas da Guerra do Paraguai. Benjamin Constant na Campanha do Paraguai (Rio de Janeiro: IPHAN, 1999), pp. 63-4.

Uruguayan and the Argentinean allies. Benjamin Constant defined the fragile cooperation among the allies through an ironic remark:

> This alliance far from diminishing the racial hate that existed between Brazil and those miserable republics has been serving to give them a stronger development. God willing, before we return to Brazil, we could tear [this Alliance] on the battlefield.[56]

According to Triple Alliance agreements, all Brazilian troops should fight under the command of the Argentinean president, General Bartolomeu Mitre. During the first two years of the campaign, this provision was respected, although, for the Brazilian officers, it was extremely difficult to work under the command of a traditional Brazilian rival. Consequently, relations were marked by deep mistrust on both sides.[57]

The designation of the Argentinean president as commandant in chief of all the Alliance's armies was a consequence of many factors. The most significant were that most of the route to the Paraguayan invasion passed through Argentinean territory, and that the elite of Buenos Aires gave great importance to the war as a tool for political centralization.

In the middle of the 1860s the Argentinean institutional situation was still very delicate. Many provincial chiefs openly criticized the Porteño hegemony and

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[56] Benjamin Constant Botelho de Magalhães to Cláudio Luis da Costa Quoted in Renato Luís do Couto e Lemos (ed.), Cartas da Guerra, p. 113.

[57] Brazilian commandant of the Second Corps of the Army Viscount of Porto Alegre believed that Mitre's actions aimed to demoralize Brazilian military in face of their allies/adversaries; see Viscount of Porto Alegre to João Lustosa da Cunha Paranaguá, Tuiuty (Paraguay) 19 October 1866 in IHGB, Lata 312 pasta 12.

its economic domination over the rest of the country.[58] Under these circumstances the presence of Mitre as the supreme commander of the Triple Alliance troops was functional for the pro-center forces in their long struggle to consolidate their Argentinean national project. For those Argentineans, the war was the long desired opportunity to defeat Federalist adversaries both in Uruguay and Paraguay.

At the same time they fought external enemies, Argentineans expected to undermine the dissension they were facing in their own country.[59] In sum, for Argentina the Paraguayan war was both an external conflict and a civil war that involved the problem of national loyalty much more intensely than in Brazil.[60]

Chart III shows the progressive growth of the Brazilian participation when compared to the size of their allies' contribution. Between 1866 and 1867 the relative size of the Brazilian troops increased from 57.6% to 89.1% of the total. This increase in the importance of the Brazilian army was not followed by an expansion in the number of troops. Especially after the second half of 1867, the number of recruits decreased when compared to the two first years.

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[58] The meanings of the terms Porteño and Buenairense were defined at chapter II. For an analysis of the center-periphery relations during the Argentinean state-building process see José Carlos Chiaramonte, "La Cuestión Regional en el proceso de gestación del Estado Nacional Argentino. Algunos problemas de Interpretación" in Waldo Ansaldi and Jose Luis Moreno (eds.), Estado Nacional y Sociedad en el Pensamiento Nacional. Antologia Conceptual para el Analysis Comparado (Buenos Aires: Cantaro, 1996), pp.169-203.

[59] Leopoldo Allub, "Estado y Sociedad Civil: Patrón de Emergencia y Desarrollo del Estado Argentino (1810-1930)" in Waldo Ansaldi and José Luis Moreno (eds.), Estado Nacional y Sociedad en el Pensamiento Nacional, (Buenos Aires: Cantaro, 1996), pp.109-57.

[60] Brazilians retained the command of the fleet.

Chart III



Source: Wilma Peres Costa, A Espada de Dâmocles, p. 331.

In spite of all the internal turmoil sparked by the Brazilian war efforts, the decision to continue prevailed. While the resistance against recruitment in Brazil was intense, no internal group had enough political force to undermine completely the direction of the events.[61] There were strong regional differences in the scale of provincial sacrifices, but no powerful sector openly resisted the Imperial government. Revolts had a more local than national range, involving disputes among provincial factions over who would be the dominant oligarchy. Political parties could fight each other at a local scale while they were nationally committed to the war efforts. Consequently, for the Brazilian people, in spite of the many regional and local conflicts, the war was still viewed as a national

cause: slaves did not revolt in mass, nor did centripetal forces take advantage of circumstances to rebel against the Empire.

In contrast with the Brazilian situation, in Argentina the war exacerbated political conflicts that had been constantly nourished in bloody insurrections during the century. Those earlier rebellions linked provincial oppression to national tensions, sparking turmoil in many provinces. Federalist ideas in Argentina had a stronger appeal than they had in Brazil, and were supported by the constitution of 1853. Consequently, the war create still larger divisions in the country, throwing up huge obstacles that undermined national mobilization, forcing the conscription of mercenaries.[62]

The Argentinean Federalists disrupted the efforts to organize a large Army as much as they could.[63] Even a regional leader such as Urquiza, who nominally supported the war, did not permit his province to send troops to the battlefields. Mobilization was the sole responsibility of Buenos Aires, and its implementation led to an increasing regional repugnance against the Porteño and Buenairense power groups. Those groups faced resistance that was not limited just to armed

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[61] Those numbers represent just an estimate once it is currently impossible to obtain accurate data concerning the size of combatants in the three forces.

[62] For a personal description of the life conditions of immigrant soldiers in the Argentinean army see Ulrich Lopacher and Alfred Tobler, Un Suizo en la Guerra del Paraguay (Asuncion: Editorial del Centenario, 1969).

[63] Enthusiasm in Argentina for the war was limited to the direct clients of the state, especially those ranchers who could profit by provisioning the armies with horses and salted beef. According to David Rock, Mitre's supporters became well-known as the "Purveyors' Party." See David Rock, Argentina 1516-1982: From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 129.

confronts, but also dominated the debates in the national press and public imagination.[64]

The Black Image in the Platine Mind

The War of the Triple Alliance was fought on many fronts. For the Paraguayans and their allies in the Argentinean provinces, propaganda and diplomacy became alternative battlefields in a desperate struggle for survival. The writer and politician Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810-1884) made the most important public condemnation of the war. Alberdi was the intellectual mentor of the Argentinean constitution (1853) and his book Bases y Puntos de Partida (Basis and Points of Departure) had been used as a blueprint for the Argentinean nationality.[65] Because of his continuing disputes against political rivals, Alberdi lived long periods in exile. During the years 1865 and 1866, Alberdi wrote from Paris a series of articles condemning the Argentinean participation in the war. The articles had a clear objective: to undermine Bartolomeu Mitre's position in Argentinean politics, opening the window for a Federalist-oriented direction.[66]

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[64] By 1868 foreigners provided an important number of the Argentinean troops, mainly Belgian and Italians. A foreign observer underlined the point. See Richard Francis Burton, Letters from the Battle-Fields of Paraguay (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1870), pp. 325, 362.

[65] Juan Bautista Alberdi, Bases Y Puntos de Partida para la Organización Política de La República Argentina, derivadas de la ley que preside el desarrollo de la civilización en la América del Sur. Exerpeted in Tulio Halperin Donghi, Proyecto y Construction de Una Nación (Argentina 1846-1880) (Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1980), pp. 74-111.

[66] Alberdi works on the Paraguayan war are: "Las Disensiones de las Republicas del Plata y las Maquinaciones del Brasil" (March 1865); "Los Intereses Argentinos en la Guerra del Paraguay con el Brasil" (July 1865); "Crisis Permanente en las Republicas del Plata" (February 1866); "Texto y Comentario del Tratado Secreto de la Triple Alianza contra el Paraguay" (May 1866). 1869 these articles were edited in a single book called La Guerra del Paraguay. References here are to the 1988 Argentinean edition, published in Buenos Aires by editorial Hyspanoamerica.

Alberdi presented the war as the result of Brazilian territorial rapacity. His central hypothesis is that, due to the limits imposed by the torrid weather (prevailing in most Brazilian regions), the Empire would look for more temperate lands on the Platine estuary to satisfy her territorial ambitions. The small republic of Paraguay was protecting the "new world" against the slaveholding and expansionist Braganzas of Brazil.[67] The main consequence of the Brazilian victory would be territorial expansion and the replacement of a white native population by black slaves. According to such a perspective, Argentina had been mistaken in joining this crusade, because her people had historically opposed Brazilian expansionist aims. Alberdi even predicted an eventual clash between the two powers over the Paraguayan spoils. The Empire in particular was blamed for seeking to control the fluvial and political destinies of the River Plate region due to her geographical limitations.[68]

It does not matter whether the vision corresponded to reality or not. This point of view was very effective in crystallizing a derogatory vision of Brazilian intentions in the war. Positivism and racial determinism were interconnected ideologies by the middle of the 19th century. Under such pseudo-scientific points of view it was easier to classify the Brazilian presence as a kind of nasty and

[67] Braganzas was the lineage of the Brazilian royal family, a dynasty connected to Portuguese and Austrian connections.

[68] This geographic deterministic approach was strong even among American newspapers. The New York Herald, the major interpreter of the war in the United States, also sympathized with the Paraguayan cause.

backward return to the colonial years.[69] It provided an important source for Paraguayan propaganda as it furnished fuel for racist discussions in the Platine press, especially in the provinces most deeply affected by the progress of the war.[70]

The racial composition of the Brazilian army was a major theme of the Paraguayan war press. In their illustrated newspapers the Paraguayans displayed racist cartoons that portrayed the Brazilian Emperor and his main military chiefs as monkeys. The Brazilian soldiers were referred to the Guarany term "camba," meaning "the monkeys." Illustrated papers like The Cabichui (wasp in Guarany language) and Sentinela (sentinel) abused the language of allegory and caricature, projecting a comparative view of their racial superiority over the Brazilian African background. Many of these cartoons bore captions in Portuguese, underlining the precarious condition of troops camped around the Paraguayan river. They emphasized the incompetence of the Brazilian military chiefs and suggested that this failing was due to the African ancestry of the Brazilian leadership. Such representations appeared as a serious subject of concern for the critics of the military conduct of the war because they touched a

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[69] For a general account on the relations between racism and geographic determinism, see Seymour Drescher, "The Ending of the Slave Trade and the Evolution of European Scientific Racism" in Seymour Drescher, From Slavery to Freedom. Comparative Studies in the Rise and Fall of Atlantic Slavery (New York: New York University Press, 1999), pp. 275-311.

[70] During the war the Paraguayan government published small brochures in Europe. One of them, under the title La Politique du Brésil ou La Fermeture des Fleuves, published in Paris in 1867, defended the hypothesis that Brazil made war just to close all South American rivers. This anti-blockade position was clearly in accordance with the Paraguayan struggle against the river blockade, a major aspect of the war.

fundamental issue: the self-image the Empire was trying to project in South America.

Figure 3 - The Emperor and his commanders portrayed as Monkeys



Source: El Centinela, Paraguayan Front Newspaper May, 9, 1867

During the first year of the war the Argentinean province of Corrientes had been occupied by the Paraguayan troops for six months. The population of this upriver Argentine province resented economic subordination to the port city and had periodically revolted against Buenos Aires. Correntinos and Paraguayans shared many cultural values coming from their common Guarany background: language, ethnic composition, and aspirations to autonomy. During the 1840's both governments had even signed treaties of cooperation and self-defense. Rivalries between Correntino and Porteño groups undermined any cooperation between those populations and the Argentinean war efforts.[71]

The fragile economy of this province was severely disrupted during the Paraguayan occupation because the contacts with the Littoral were totally

[71] I am not affirming that the Paraguayan occupation was pacific.

broken. The situation deteriorated steadily with the terrible sanitary conditions prevailing in the Brazilian forces. Their concentration close to the city of Corrientes, after October 1865, brought the infamous cholera morbus epidemics that placed still more stress on the delicate relationship between Correntinos and Brazilians. The spread of the infection deeply affected those populations. According to Benjamin Constant, from an original population of 16,000, eight thousand were refugees in the interior, as they were afraid of both contamination and recruitment. Describing the situation, Constant underlined Correntinos' strong racist attitudes against Brazilians, emphasizing that, "The Correntinos say that the Cholera is the worst of all evils we brought to them because it is devastating their population. They blame 'the monkeys' for the epidemics. You can't imagine how disgusted against us they are."[72]

The northern Argentinean provinces of Entre-Rios, Corrientes, and Missiones were strategic for the provision of resources for the Brazilian army. The eruption of a series of revolts in Argentinean northern provinces at the end of 1866 put at risk the Brazilian military situation. These revolts were led by the caudilhos Saá and Felipe Varela. From San Luis, San Juan, La Rioja, Catamarca, Salta and Jujui, the wave threatened Cordoba, Santa Fé, Entre-Rios, and Corrientes, forcing the Argentinean government to bring back 6,000 soldiers from the Paraguayan front.

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[72] Benjamin Constant to Cláudio Luís da Costa. Corrientes (Argentina), 11 April 1867. In Teixeira Mendes, Benjamin Constant - Peças Justificativas, p. 140. Vitor Izecksohn, O Cerne da Discórdia. A Guerra do Paraguai e o Núcleo Profissional do Exército. M.A. Thesis, IUPERJ (Brasil), 1992, p. 140. Renato Lemos (ed.) Cartas da Guerra, p. 155.

The practical consequences of this chaos followed quickly. The wave of revolts forced the Argentinean leader to abdicate military command. Mitre resigned in February 1867, thus giving Brazilian military officers complete control over the strategic decisions related to both the operations in Corrientes, and those against the Paraguayan army. Four hundred Brazilian troops landed in the city of Corrientes, establishing peace and securing provincial loyalty to the war effort. At the end, these revolts were completely defeated, weakening an important focus of insubordination in the Argentinean republic. Finally, with the assassination of Urquiza, in 1868, Federalists lost their principal leader with nationwide appeal. Provincial power decreased a great deal during the next decade, although revolts still occurred during the 1870's.[73]

Under the circumstances, the Brazilian army was left to fight virtually alone during the most severe phases of the campaign. Such a difficult situation created an even greater need for human and material reinforcements. Consequently, from September 1866 to July 1867, Brazilians had to prepare a new offensive against Paraguay, while simultaneously enforcing peace in northern Argentina. The intensification of the war efforts occurred during the peak of the crisis in the structure of the recruitment.

[73] Notwithstanding the persistent outbreak of provincial revolts, the tide definitively changed in the direction of the Unitarian forces, resulting in complete hegemony of the pro-center forces in most provinces. A complete hegemony was only completely established around the 1880's. See Jose Luis Moreno, "Incorporación de la Argentina al Mercado Mundial (1880-1930)" in Waldo Ansaldi y Jose Luis Moreno, Estado Nacional y Sociedad en el Pensamiento Nacional. Antologia Conceptual para el Analysis Comparado (Buenos Aires: Cantaro, 1996), pp. 215-33.

Ironically, war circumstances forced the Imperial army to reinforce the Argentinean central authority in that region, in favor of provincial subordination to a centralized nation. It was an unexpected effect that the Brazilian occupation forces would turn into enforcers of the stability of a traditional adversary. Such was the option of the strategic command during the months the campaign was paralyzed. It can be explained only by taking into account the difficult strategic conditions faced at the front.[74]

The Argentinean crises gave the last blow to any illusion that the war could be won without extreme measures.[75] The situation required immediate actions. If a decision to continue should prevail, the Imperial state would have to go beyond any previously existent policies. This perspective was exposed in a confidential letter from the Minister of War to the President of Rio Grande do Sul, linking the Argentine situation to the urgent need to enlist slaves. According to Minister Paranaguá:

> The outbreak of the revolution in [some provinces of] the Argentine Confederation is very intense and can turn into a national revolution, requiring the transference of Argentine forces to repress the rebellion. This measure will weaken the forces in operation against the government of Paraguay and can put us in the contingency of having to pursue the war without Allied support.... Your Excellency needs to free the slaves that should be designated to the service of war, be they offered for free or through an amount

[74] This subject was extensively treated in the private correspondence of Marquis de Caxias with the Minister of War. See ANRJ, Codices 932 and 934.Correspondences of the High Command with Diverse Authorities.

[75] Argentina remained a nominal partner in the Triple Alliance after 1867. According to some accounts such a situation prevailed just because of secret threats from Brazil that any move toward a separate peace would be treated as a casus belli. See Efraim Cardozo, "Paraguay Independiente" in Antonio Ballesteros y Beretta (eds.), Historia de America y de los Pueblos Americanos, Vol. XXI (Barcelona, Salvat Editores, 1949), pp. 1-401.

> designated by the Ministry of Finances. The Imperial government considers the manumission of slaves to serve as a relevant service and recommends Imperial recognition through Imperial munificence to those who cooperate.[76]

These circumstances cleared the path for a government decision to support a massive wave of emancipation and the recruitment of slaves coming from all parts of the territory. Consequently, at both the national and provincial levels, the war effort forced government officials and slaveholders to address questions concerning the future of slavery in Brazil. Among those questions, special attention was given to the inevitability of abolition. The war effort also reinforced the role of the Emperor as the head of the emancipation efforts, a situation that would bring important consequences, after the war, from the perspective from which the monarchical institution was viewed.

The decision to enlist slaves

The decision to give freedom to and arm a more significant number of slaves to fight against Paraguay was officially taken by the Emperor Pedro II in November 1866. As we will see, it was not exactly "one decision," but a series of movements, retreats and negotiations envisioning a faster increase in the Army's capacity to assimilate a larger number of slaves in its ranks. Unlike in the U.S., there were neither organized social movements nor the pressure of public opinion behind the government's action. The question was discussed behind closed doors as a matter of national security.

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[76] João da Costa Paranaguá to Homem de Mello. Rio de Janeiro, 07 February 1867. AHRS, Códices B1070 - Avisos do Ministério da Guerra.

That "decision" resulted from long reflections and debates that led to a series of steps designed to enforce more encompassing legislation concerning emancipation. While discussing the subject, the Emperor followed the private advice of the State Council and took a first step in November 1866. That resolution was linked to the urgent need to reinforce the Army, but it was also officially limited just to some sectors where slavery was not considered vital, that is, slaves coming from the Nation, the Imperial House, and the convents and monasteries, whose freedom would be considered priority for the war efforts.[77]

The question was carefully analyzed and discussed in the meeting of the State Council of November 6, 1866. The State Council was an institution made up of privileged spokesmen for the political elite. They met periodically under the coordination of the Emperor to debate pivotal questions. These meetings aimed to give the Monarch advice on the most important matters of politics and public administration. Their importance lay in the fact that most councilors were important members of the Imperial elite at the peak of their careers. The Council had a small membership and the discussions covered most of the pivotal themes of public administration. Opinions were freely expressed. As a tool for consultation the Council had great influence over Imperial decisions.[78]

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[77] All those sectors referred to State related activities.

[78] In 1973 the Brazilian Senate published the minutes from the meetings of the Council of State. See Brasil, Senado Federal, Atas do Conselho de Estado Pleno, direção geral, organização e introdução de José Honório Rodrigues (Brasília: Centro Gráfico do Senado Federal, 1973-1978, 14 vols.), henceforth referred as "Atas." For more information see Visconde de Uruguay, Ensaio Sobre o Direito Administrativo (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1960), especially chapter XXVI; João Camilo de Oliveira Torres, O Conselho de Estado (Rio de Janeiro: Edições FDR, 1965) and José Murilo de Carvalho, Teatro de Sombras (Rio de Janeiro: Vértice/IUPERJ, 1988), pp. 107-38.



Source: Atas do Conselho de Estado, Vol. VI, Terceiro Conselho de Estado, 1865-1867.

As shown in charter IV, during the Paraguayan War the number of meetings sharply increased due to the urgency and importance of the questions to be decided. From January 21, 1865, to August 31 1867, there were seventeen sessions of the State Council: two in 1865, eight in 1866, and seven in 1867. The main issue of the period was the conduct of the Paraguayan War. Of the 17 proceedings, six discussed themes related to the war: financial problems, recruitment, the presence of the Prince Consort at the front, cancellation of provincial elections, and the transformation of slaves into soldiers.[79]

[79] Many other questions although not directly linked to the war resulted from problems whose relevance the war stressed. Such was the case of emancipation, discussed in two crucial meetings during the month of April of 1867. Such was also the question of the country's financial situation and the need to create new taxes also discussed in April 1867.

Through the reading of the proceedings it becomes clear that most counselors supported the continuation of the war. The general opinion was that any peace without a complete victory would reinforce the view of the Empire as weak, incapable of defeating even a small nation like Paraguay. Echoing the general feeling, Counselor Nabuco de Araújo, one of the most active voices, asserted that under the prevailing conditions "the government should avoid the contingencies of a kind of peace that would bring shame for present generations and indignation for future generations."[80]

Three questions constituted the focus of that meeting: 1) If the war continues, would it be good policy to manumit slaves to increase the number of soldiers in the army? 2) Which kind of slaves should be given preference for enlistment: those coming from the nation, that is, owned by the government, those from the religious orders, or those coming from private owners? 3) How to take that What steps should be taken next?

The proceedings show there was no consensus among members of the Council about the need to enlist a mass of slaves, suddenly to be transformed into defenders of the nation. During the meeting, ten councilors recorded their opinions concerning the first question, personally or through written statements. Five voted in favor and five voted against. Most Councilors gave priority to the

[80] Atas, Vol. VI, p. 81.

enlistment of slaves owned by the nation, the Imperial house, or by religious orders over those employed on plantations as private property.[81]

Direct State Property

The slaves of the Nation were individuals owned by the state through the Nation's farms or state-owned industries. The farms of the Nation received in custody all African contrabands, that is, those slaves captured while being illegally introduced into the country after the prohibition of the international traffic.[82] These African-born individuals were left under Imperial custody for a certain number of years before being released.[83] Their semi-captive status permitted the State to dispose of them as she wished: a few were sent to the public farms, while others were sent to the Imperial iron and powder factories or to the Imperial arsenals. That was the case of Antônio, a free African working in the War Arsenals after 1849. In March 1862 Antônio petitioned the Ministry of War to be emancipated. To support his case Antônio pointed to the fact that he had fulfilled his probationary period. From his petition it becomes clear that free fellow workers at the arsenal encouraged him to pursue his rights.[84]

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[81] Councilors Viscount of Abaeté, Pimenta Bueno, Sousa Franco, Viscount of Sapucí, and Nabuco de Araújo favored it while Councilors Viscount of Jequitinhonha, Viscount of Itaboraí, Marquis of Olinda, Paranhos, and Torres Homes voted against it.

[82] The public farms were located in Santa Cruz, a distant district of Rio de Janeiro. For a complete report on the these farm's situation during the 1860's, see Proposta e Relatório do Ministério da Fazenda Apresentados à Assembléa Geral Legislativa na Quarta Sessão da Décima Segunda Legislatura pelo Ministro e Secretário de Estado dos Negócios da Fazenda, João da Silva Carrão, Rio de Janeiro, Typografia Nacional, 1866, especially Map 116.

[83] And in this sense the Brazilian contrabands resembled those Confederate slaves received in the Union fortresses during the Civil War, although similarities end here.

[84] AHEx/RQ n. 650/1863. It was not possible to know whether Antônio was or not freed but the officer's remarks attest that his information was true, emphasizing his good behavior while at the army's service. One year later the military officers were still judging his request.

In some provinces, Africans could be distributed among private owners who assumed their custody, exploiting their labor as if they were slaves born in Brazil. That was the case for a situation in the province of Pernambuco, where from a total of 445 Africans, 113 were sent to private individuals or Alagoas, including 84 Africans who were sent to planters.[85] Some of them were illegally sold as if they were Creole slaves, while others blended into the freed population of the cities.[86]

Officially, freed Africans were not considered to be Brazilian citizens. Consequently they could not serve in the army unless they were impressed by mistake or deceived recruitment inspectors and enlisted. But taking into consideration the lack of documentation, it was very difficult to know the origins of some individuals. Referring to a case like this, the Marquis of Olinda informed the Minister of War about a slave who was sent to the army by his son-in-law. The slave was inspected and no problems were found. Finally, inspectors discovered his "slavery marks," that is, the ethnic signs of his African origin. Consequently, Marquis of Olinda requested to have him sent back, as he would not fit the army requirements. Regardless of the great need of men to fill the Army, Africans coming from private owners would not be welcomed in the ranks.

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[85] Relatório apresentado a Assembléia Geral Legislativa na Primeira Sessão da Décima Terceira Legislatura pelo Respectivo Ministro e Secretário de Estado Martin Francisco Ribeiro de Andrada, Rio de Janeiro, Typografia do Correio Mercantil, 1867, p. 6.

[86] The large number of African slaves introduced during the years (immediately) before the abolition of the traffic (1850) created huge stratification among Brazilian captives. In provinces like Bahia they reinforced previously existing divisions among the large African-descent population. The freed Creole population saw the newcomers as inferiors. For more information see Kátia M. de Queirós Mattoso, "No Brasil Escravista: Relações entre Libertos e Homens Livres e entre Libertos e Escravos," Revista Brasileira de História, Volume 2, September 1981, pp. 219-33.

But it seems the government could be more flexible concerning its own Africans.[87]

The lack of resolution about the situation of African contrabands created considerable tension in British-Brazilian relations. Such tension achieved its peak in the "Christie question" in 1862, when British squadrons blockaded Brazilian harbors in the most serious threat the Imperial sovereignty had faced since the struggle for independence. The situation was solved only in 1864 when the Imperial government officially freed its Africans.[88] The war presented an excellent opportunity to employ those already released before they were incorporated into the Brazilian freed population.[89]

When discussing the subject, councilor Nabuco de Araújo underlined a point that has never received adequate attention in the historiography about slavery: the better treatment of both government-owned slaves (Slaves of the Nation as they were called) and those coming from the Imperial Household, when compared to the conditions faced by "normal field workers."[90] Consequently, Nabuco reminded his peers that proposals of freedom directed to

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[87] Marquis of Olinda to Marquis of Paranaguá, 07.08. 1867, AHMI - 94 - I - DPP - 7.3.867 - Mma.bi - 1-8 (I.n.9).

[88] It was not possible to follow the trajectory of freed Africans in the Army. Officially freed Africans were not considered to be Brazilian citizens. Consequently they could not serve in the army.

[89] It is also interesting to note that when the war against Paraguay began relations between Britain and Brazil were still broken. That seems to be additional evidence against the Imperialist hypothesis described in chapter II.

[90] According to a Confederate observer, the slaves from Santa Cruz farm had much better conditions. They received daily payments and education. Their children had a band and they knew how to play the anthems from America, England, and France. See John Codman, Ten Months in Brazil (Boston: 1867), quoted in Conrad, The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, p. 73.

the first and the second groups could be elusive, because those slaves might prefer bondage to freedom.

> [Because] [s]uch slaves and those coming from the Nation have been living under very idle conditions it is possible they will refuse this benefit [freedom to serve] and will try to hide themselves. It is why their capture should be done in secret and with all possible caution. The best possible solution would be to send the police chief, the delegate, and the judge with the doctors and inspectors to catch, examine, and evaluate those slaves.[91]

While discussing the manumission of the slaves from the Nation, councilors also recommended that their wives should be freed.[92] Such concerns point to the growing importance of families among those individuals, meaning the process of family formation was advancing in the state-owned properties, probably due to their better conditions of life.[93] The report of the Ministry of Finances for 1866 shows a total population of 1,427 slaves of the nation. The male population was 707. From these 339 were recruited. Officially 287 (84.6%) slaves were sent to the front, while 67 others, owned by the Imperial house, also shared this same fate.[94]

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[91] Atas, Vol. VI, p. 84. On the treatment of African born slaves there are huge divergences. According to Perdigão Malheiro they were treated worse than Creole slaves. See Agostinho Marques Perdigão Malheiro. A Escravidão no Brasil: Ensaio histórico-Jurídico-Social (São Paulo, 1944), vol. II, pp. 70-2. Quoted in Conrad, The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, p. 68.

[92] Atas, vol. VI, 72-3.

[93] The Reports about the iron works and farms of Ypanema in São Paulo, showed a population of 49 men and 26 women of all ages.

[94] Proposta e Relatório do Ministério da Fazenda apresentados à Assembléa Geral Legislativa na Quarta Sessão da Décima Segunda Legislatura Pelo Ministro e Secretário de Estado dos Negócios da fazenda, João da Silva Carrão. Rio de Janeiro, Typografia Nacional, 1966, Annexes, Table 108. The Emperor also owned a certain number of slaves (Slaves from the Imperial House) employed in Domestic tasks. These servants were the first to be freed. It is impossible to discover the number of women freed as a consequence of the Imperial decision.

Indirect State Property

The religious orders owned a certain number of slaves spread through many church properties all over the nation. It was believed the church owned some 1,420 male slaves able to serve.[95] In spite of the original philanthropic purposes of the Catholic Church, there was no special commitment from priests or from the institution as a whole to free slaves. As opposed to the US, where some churches furnished ideological fuel and personnel for antislavery crusades, Brazilian society debated these questions strictly under the umbrella of the State. The Church was completely absent in public discussions.[96]

Priests could own their slaves as private property, as they frequently did, while the religious orders maintained a certain number of slaves Their stake had great influence on the minor role performed by the Brazilian Church in the struggle against slavery in every one of its phases. Commenting on the subject, Councilor Torres Homem underlined the great contradiction of the existence of slaves owned by the Church, emphasizing that: "It is also a strange anomaly that after eighteen centuries of Christianity, the convents still own a large number of slaves when the Catholic Church has always refuted, struggled and condemned slavery as an institution opposed to the spirit of the Gospel."[97]

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[95] Estimates made by Councilor Viscount of Abaeté, Atas, p. 72.

[96] The Catholic Church, as the Crown's official religion, was also committed to the conversion of non-Catholic groups, which had historically worked as a functional argument for the defense of slavery. In this ambivalent situation, their main intellectual goals were the conciliation of Christian morals with the interests of the Imperial state.

[97] Atas, Vol. 6, p. 89.

As public servants, the priests defended positions that were similar to, if not more conservative than, those of the Brazilian bureaucrats. The fact that the Catholic Church and the nation-state were united in the Luso-Brazilian world was one characteristic of that tradition. It is not surprising that no abolitionist sentiment developed among Brazilian priests as a group. They were divided between their Christian beliefs, which mitigated against slavery, and their fidelity to the needs of the Brazilian State, of which they were employees. According to the future abolitionist leader Joaquim Nabuco, the possession of men and women by convents and by the clergy in general completely demoralized all religious feelings of masters and slaves.[98]

Privately Owned Slaves

The third group, slaves owned by private individuals, was by far the largest, numbering around 1,500,000 individuals. By 1865 slaves were 15% to 20% of the total Brazilian population, fragmented by ethnicity, status, and personal loyalties. There were no accurate registers to give an account of the exact number of slaves in the country. Before 1872 there was no legal need to register slaves, and slave owners did not need vouchers.[99] There were no regular demographic censuses, only estimates that took as their basis some counties and provinces. The only statistical registers available are those from the

[98] See Joaquim Nabuco, Abolitionism, p. 132. Joaquim Nabuco was the son of one of the Imperial Councilors, Senator Nabuco de Araújo.

[99] According to Robert Conrad, in 1862, it was calculated that if all proprietors suddenly needed to prove their legal property over their servants, three fourths of all Brazilian slaves would be considered free. See The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, p. 55.

province and city of Rio de Janeiro, and these date from 1849.[100] Even with such limitations in knowledge, some councilors believed that by recruiting ten per cent of the estimated total in condition to march, it would be possible to obtain around 24,000 soldiers from private owners. [101]

But those were individuals between 12 and 50 years old, that is, in the peak of their productive lives. Such slaves were as essential to the Brazilian planters as to the army. Worse than that, by the middle of the 1860s, due to the termination of the Atlantic traffic and the difficulty of reproducing slavery under Brazilian conditions, they were becoming a scarce good in plantation regions. Slavery was facing its biggest crisis in Brazilian history, with an increasing concentration of slaves in the Southwest regions that contained more than half of the Brazilian slave population. These circumstances pointed to a possible resistance to slave conscription from masters, particularly those owning large gangs.[102]

Additional problems were related to the lack of registers accounting for the exact number of slaves in the country. Resistance against the expansion of the civil registers was a phenomenon widespread not only among slave owners; it

[100] Rio de Janeiro, with its 450,000 captives, possessed a larger number of slaves than Cuba in the same period.

[101] The Viscount of Abaeté, a councilor deeply committed to the use and generalization of statistics, defended that position.

[102] Those conditions have been discussed in chapter one.

was deeply entrenched in all classes and prevented the government from knowing precisely the number of slaves ready to be enlisted. [103]

Table IX
Free and Slave Populations by Region[104]
Estimates for 1874

Provinces	Free	%	Slave	%	Total	%
North	573,354	84.2	107,680	15.8	681,034	100.0
Northeast	3,753,239	89.6	435,687	10.4	4,188,926	100.0
South	624,982	83.4	124,949	16.6	749,931	100.0
West	203,503	92.8	15,854	7.2	219,357	100.0
Southwest	2,839,519	77.81	809,575	22.2	3,649,094	100.0
Court	226,033	82.8	47,084	17.2	273,117	100.0
Sub-totals	8,220,620	84.2	1,540,829	15.8	9,761,449	100.0

Source: Directoria Geral de Estatistica, Relatorio e Trabalhos Estatisticos (Rio de Janeiro, 1875), pp. 46-62; Relatorio do Ministerio da Agricultura, 10 de maio de 1883, p. 10.

Debates focused on the question of releasing conscripted slaves. Many councilors condemned any expropriation without compensation. The Marquis de Olinda feared any measure could bring unexpected consequences because, "slavery is a misfortune that should not be touched." For others it was dangerously linked to the prospect of immediate emancipation. Finally, a third group, more concerned with public administration, feared the poor financial state of the country could not support indemnifying the slave owners.

Those in favor saw recruitment as an essential measure for the nation's military needs. Viscount of Abaeté went so far as to propose the expropriation of

[103] For an appreciation of the meaning of slavery in Brazil as a cross-class institution see Stuart B. Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia 1550-1835 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 439-67. Analysis of inventories and testaments show that even the poor and the freed sectors occasionally possessed slaves.

[104] North: Amazonas, Pará; Northeast: Maranhão, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe and Bahia; South: Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, Santa Catarina; Southwest: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo. West: Goiás, and Mato Grosso; Court: City of Rio de Janeiro.

those slaves for public need in the name of national defense. Councilor Nabuco de Araújo anticipated that the difficulties in mobilizing the free sectors of the population would increase because of circumstances like the scattered distribution of the population, the absence of regular forces to follow runaways, and political intrigues. Consequently, to organize the military power of the country, based only on the free sections, would take a longer time than it was possible to wait. Under such circumstances, the prolongation of the war against the small Paraguayan Republic would take more labor from industry and agriculture, aggravating the shortage of free workers once "Brazilians were characterized by enthusiasm not by persevering into a mission."

Nabuco defended the enlistment of slaves, especially of those who constituted a threat to the maintenance of the public order. He focused mainly on the urban slaves, a group deeply affected by inter-provincial traffic and over whom there were less rigid rules of social control. Those would be the main targets of his recruitment efforts and there would be no contradictions in this because:

> [T]he slaves bought [by the state] are freed, consequently they will become citizens before they are turned into soldiers: they will become soldier-citizens. Thus, at the same time and through the same act it is possible to make a great service to the emancipation, which is the cause of civilization and another service to the war, which is a national cause; thus [the army] will receive soldiers endowed with the values of freedom, disciplined by their custom of obeying.[105]

[105] Atas, pp. 81-5.

Nabuco foresaw in mobilization an opportunity to resume debates on abolition. Such debates had been frozen since 1850, when the Atlantic traffic was abolished. Finally, he argued for recruitment of the rebellious urban slaves, whose concentration in the main cities constituted a permanent danger to the maintenance of the public order. Nabuco referred to individuals like Carlos, the slave described at the beginning of this chapter, over whom the mechanisms of social control were weak. Targeting the urban slaves, the war would reduce one of Brazil's main problems of social organization without undermining the agricultural activities so important for the economy. Recruitment would thus complete the task that the internal traffic in slaves was advancing: freeing cities from turmoil and threats brought by the concentration of slave groups in permanent contact with freed and free members of the urban crowds.

Another defense of the enlistment of slaves was made by Councilor Pimenta Bueno, this time from a much more racist perspective. This councilor divided his answer into five points: 1) Politically, instead of diminishing the free population, the state should shrink the number of slaves; 2) The Policy would be a kind of emancipation that gives destination and occupation to those emancipated; 3) Although this labor would be useful in agriculture, the sons, relatives or clients of [the free] workers are much more needed. Many of them represented the nuclei of future working families, nuclei that the war would snuff out; 4) Brazilian society was not homogeneous, it was preferable to spare the most civilized and virtuous class of society, and not the other, less civilized and

virtuous and possibly dangerous. Between evils it is better to choose the lesser; and finally 5) The recruitment of free men would become more and more difficult.

In Bueno's Social Darwinist line of reasoning, the war would bring about a racial improvement of the Brazilian population. By destining blacks for death on the battlefields, it would diminish their proportion in the total Brazilian population. Consequently, war sacrifices would, in his opinion, "improve" the Brazilian racial composition at the same time that they could solve the most immediate military problems.[106]

Those opposed to any official recruitment policy for slaves appealed to both materialist and moral considerations. The Viscount of Jequitinhonha classified such action as "inconvenient, indecorous, ineffective and very onerous to the public coffers." Confronted with the possibility of formation of freedmen battalions, Jequitinhonha went to the extreme of counseling a return to the use of foreign mercenaries, a practice long abandoned by the Brazilian army. Jequitinhonha was followed in this "lesser evil" position by the Viscount of Itaboraí for whom:

> Foreign [mercenaries] are less dangerous than the slaves taken from the state of abjection in which they live to be armed on the next day, enhancing in their hearts the bad will, indisposition, and the anger they accumulated during their captivity because they understand that their freedom came not by feeling of justice or generosity but just by the need to oppose them to their masters' enemies.[107]

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[106] Journalist Julio José Chiavenatto erroneously interpreted this perspective as the final result of the recruitment process. In his book O Negro no Brasil. Da Senzala a Guerra do Paraguai (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1982), the enlistment of the Brazilian slaves was viewed as a sort of "Final Solution" for the racial plurality prevailing in the Empire.

[107] Atas, pp.73-5.

Comparing Slave Societies

During the meeting, Councilors constantly appealed for comparative analysis. Most of the examples used came from European countries and their colonies. In their considerations, those countries were linked to the elite's national self-image: a monarchy connected to the values and practices of European nations. But the recently ended American Civil War was also an important reference because American policies concerning recruitment were the subject of inquiries and comparisons.

The American situation was compared with the Brazilian case by both sides. Pimenta Bueno referred to the U.S. example to defend the enlistment, connecting the Union situation to the patterns provided by the classical civilizations of Greece and Rome "which were not embarrassed to appeal for the help of their captives in times of trouble." Nabuco de Araújo emphasized Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation (September 1862) and the final Emancipation Act (January 1863) as good precedents for the Brazilian case. According to his perspective, the American experience showed that recruitment of freed slaves could be done without social turmoil.

Refuting the similarity between American and Brazilian experiences, Councilor Torres Homem pointed out that the Union's massive enlistment of blacks was related to the abolition of the institution in the South, a cardinal point of that struggle. This measure was not a threat to northern society because the North had a relatively small number of native inhabitants of African descent.

Freedom was given to all of the southern slaves, without affecting economic and social conditions in the North, where a free labor economy flourished even during the colonial period. Enlisted former slaves fought for their own freedom which was reason enough to maintain strict discipline. Consequently, even those slaves who did not participate directly in the fight would also benefit from that struggle. In Brazil, by contrast, freed slaves would be still fighting for a slave state, and the lack of any prospects for immediate abolition would encourage revolt instead of social cooperation.

In their discussions about the slaves' attitudes, Councilors always it took for granted that slaves would answer as a "group of interest." They did not consider that personal relations, patronage, ethnicity, and parental loyalties might fragment the racial attitudes of the captives. In the councilor's minds the slaves' reactions were measured by a single, monolithic, "Black Behavior." Again, the shadows of Santo Domingo were still present.

Curiously, Councilors did not discuss examples of other Latin American countries. In South America, many of the Spanish speaking republics used freed slaves as soldiers during the first half of the nineteenth century.[108] British explorer

[108] For an extensive discussion concerning slavery and recruitment in the South American Republics see Voelz, Slave and Soldier, and Núria Sales de Bohigas, Sobre Esclavos, Reclutas y Mercaderes de Quintos (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1974) especially "Esclavos y Reclutas en Sudamérica, 1816-1826," pp. 59-135. According to De Bohigas recruitment was connected to demographic decrease. In the Argentinean territory the black population decreased from 1/4 to 1/14 in the interval from 1810 to 1843. I believe such a hypothesis still needs to be tested, but the fact is that many authors have pointed out an astonishing decrease of the population from African descendent during the first decades after independence. On the Afro-Argentinean population see George Reid Andrewa, The Afro-Argentine of Buenos Aires, 1800-1900 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980). The mobilization for the war against Paraguay is discussed on pages 113-37.

Richard Burton underlined in his "Letters" that Argentina and Uruguay thinned the ranks of their local black populations by utilizing them as cannon folder.[109] During the war, Paraguay also used her small black population, freeing slaves for the army.[110] The only reference to the neighboring republics was made by Councilor Torres Homem, who feared the impression this special kind of recruitment would produce in "the neighbor republics and in the civilized world." According to Torres Homem, the Empire would be criticized by the republics for recruiting slaves to fight against one of the smallest states in the Americas.

In discussing the perceptions of the slaves, Councilors feared recruitment could foment rebellions among those remaining on the farms, disturbing economic activities at the rearguard. Many Councilors insisted that, for the good of Monarchical stability, recruitment should never be confounded with immediate abolition. Councilor Torres Homem emphasized that it made no difference whether slaves were freed by the state in the name of civilization or just to make soldiers for the war; the moral effects over the mass of slaves not included would be the same. He also recalled the public prejudices of the free soldiers who would be suddenly leveled to slaves in the ranks.[111]

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[109] Richard Burton, Letters from the Battle-Fields of Paraguay, p. 122.

[110] For a detailed account about Afro-Paraguayan communities see Jerry W. Cooney, "Abolition in the Republic of Paraguay: 1840-1870" in Jahrbuch fur Geschichte von Staat Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, n. 11, pp. 149-166 and James Saeger, "Survival and Abolition: The Eighteenth Century Paraguayan Encomienda" in The Americas, Vol. 38, n. 1, July 1981, pp. 59-85.

[111] This position was very ambiguous because it would never be possible to split, for practical purposes, both perspectives and also because in the mass of soldiers serving in the front there were no news of racial oriented rebellions.

Reflecting on the opinions of his councilors and taking into consideration the precarious state of the army, the Emperor turned to the enlistment of slaves. To make it clear that such a move would not be confused with emancipation, two steps were taken. On the same day the council again met, the Emperor freed all slaves from the Nation and Religious orders through Decree 3725. The Decree emphasized that those slaves would be freed on the condition that they become soldiers immediately and serve for a period of nine years. Soldiers' wives were also automatically freed by the same decree. A serious step had been taken now, and the Emperor would have to face the consequences.

Extracting manpower from their owners

In spite of the small number of individuals effectively freed during this first wave, sectors of the Church still resisted. The order of the Carmelites is a good example of the lack of cooperation Imperial authorities could find even in sectors with "carnal relations" with the monarchy. In an official letter from December 1865 the Archbishop of Bahia informed the Minister of War that: "due to the deplorable state of the Carmelites proprieties it would not be possible to furnish a significant number of individuals."

According to this superior priest, from 106 individuals living on their best farm, only eight slaves were in condition to march. Comparing his situation with that of the Saint Benedictine order, which gave 10 slaves at the same time, this Archbishop emphasized that "giving eight individuals, poor as the Carmelite's were, represented much more than those given by the richer order of Benedictine."

In an anonymous letter from November 1866, a person claiming to be a "loyal servant of his majesty" put in doubt the Carmelites situation, making the following revelation:

> The Carmelite order possesses around one thousand slaves of both sexes of different ages in the provinces of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Espírito Santo, and Pará. From those it is possible to take a lot of people. But the current Superior Priest rented many of their farms, with good slaves, to speculators. From these farms it would be possible to extract a large contingent for the army. I should advise the government not to accept any excuses that could frustrate the government's intentions. The government should rescind all contracts and nominate an honorable person to choose the better slaves for the service of the army. This will bring profits for the country and for civilization.[112]

It seems the author of the letter was correct in his criticism, because in April 1865 a superior from the Carmelites convent wrote another letter listing the total of slaves effectively freed to serve. In this new document the Carmelites became more generous, announcing their order could free a total of 45 individuals distributed in many properties, some of them rented.[113]

From the four individuals originally offered, this religious order was able to increase by ten times its initial proposition, achieving a total of 45 over a period of four months (Dec -1866 to Apr. 1867).[114] It is also noteworthy that the Court and the northern province of Pará gave more individuals than the provinces of

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[112] Anonymous to Marquis de Paranaguá, Minister of War, Rio de Janeiro, 20 November 18866. ANRJ, SPE, Codice 572, doc 6, fl. 19.

[113] According to a document released in April 1867 six of the Carmelite's slaves were working in farms rented to private individuals. See AHMI – 96 – I – DPP – 25.4867

[114] The final distribution of the Carmelite Slaves freed by province was: Para (17), Court (14), São Paulo (14). From these 6 were rented to private owners. See AHIM – 96 – DPP – 25.04.867.

São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.[115] In the same letter the Carmelites, reminded the Imperial government of the "necessary compensation." The Church's Ecclesiastical authorities did not agree with expropriation, demanding money in exchange for their servants. The final reports list a total of 95 individuals coming from the Convents and Monasteries.[116]

If the government faced problems in extracting soldiers from the Church's slaves how much more difficult would the relations with private masters be? The Council clearly was unwilling to expropriate slaves owned by private proprietors. During no period of the war were slaves directly recruited. Under such circumstances government officers made a "series of appeals" with the express aim of convincing masters to voluntarily donate some of their slaves in the name of the fatherland. Some of those appeals were answered positively, but others faced strong opposition. José de Souza Breves, one of the richest planters in the province of Rio de Janeiro, provides a good example of this resistance. Replying to an official letter from the President of the province inviting him to join in the government efforts, this important citizen explained that:

> during the past year...I destined six slaves [to serve] but these showed bad will and looked for protection with some of my friends, refusing the benefits of freedom...at the same time, eleven of my slaves "mixed and Creoles" after committing smaller offenses also left my farms and it seems they entered the ranks as Volunteers offering to march for the theater of war. Being this the situation, I

[115] From Frier Fausto de Monte Carmelo to Marquis de Paranaguá, AHMI - 96 - I - DPP - 25.04.1867 - Mon.c.

[116] According to the Report of the Ministry of War from 1872, the total number of slaves coming from the Convents/Monasteries amounted just to 95 individuals or 2.4% of the total amount of troops listed in that Report. See "Mappa da Força que cada uma das províncias do Império concorreu para a guerra do Paraguay....", Brazil, Minister of War, Relatório, 1872.

> offered freedom to all of those that enlisted as well as to the others that followed the same destiny. I believe my patriotic intentions are justified.[117]

Of course other rural bosses voluntarily donated some slaves. For these, an additional problem would be who would be responsible for the transportation of their slaves to the Court in Rio de Janeiro. Very concerned about this problem, the president of São Paulo declared that "...[if] the slave owners have to pay, none would send their slaves to the court and risk receiving them back when refused."[118]

In spite of the good intentions of some planters, the proportion of freed slaves never numbered more than one or two per planter. A total of 799 slaves were freely donated, together with 948 used as substitutes. This number fell below the 1807 individuals freed by public funds. If conditions on the battlefields persisted, the Imperial government would be in serious trouble during the next year, as the planters and their associates in the main cities were becoming less willing to cooperate with efforts to free and enlist slaves.

A turn in the military circumstances on the battlefield made the situation more favorable to the Empire. From December 1867 on, a series of victories led to the final taking over of Humayta in August 1868. After that important victory, Paraguayans could not pose enough resistance to stop the march of events. The

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[117] Joaquim José de Souza Breves to Esperidião Eloy de Barros Pimentel, 2 Feb. 1867. ANRJ, IG1 146, cx. 582, fl. 663.

[118] José Tavares Bastos to João Lustosa da Cunha Paranaguá, 2 March, 1867.ANRJ - IG1 159 cx. 587, maço 1867, fl. 820.

war, for all practical purposes, was won, and conquering the remaining Paraguayan posts was a question only of time and weather conditions.

Numbers and Losses in the Enlistment of Slaves

The problems in determining the number of freed soldiers who served during the Paraguayan War are exactly the same as for free individuals. Numbers coming from the same reports of the Ministry of War do not coincide. The Report of 1872 tried to give some uniformity to this ocean of data, summarizing totals for the five years of campaign.

Table X
Total of Soldiers enlisted in the Army:
Free and Freed men 1865-1869

Free Soldiers		Slave Soldiers		
Volunteers	37,438 (43.1%)	Donations	799	(20.0%)
Designated National Guards	31,198 (35.9%)	Substitutions	948	(23.7%)
Regular Army Soldiers	17,465 (20.1%)	Government Owned	287	(6.9%)
Substitutions	794 (0.9%)	Imperial Household	67	(1.7%)
Total	86,895	Convents/Monasteries	95	(2.4)
		Compensate Emancipations	1.807	(45.1%)
		Total	4003	(100%)

"Mappa da Força com que cada uma das provincias do Império concorreu para a guerra do Paraguay....," Brazil, Minister of War, 1872 Report".

Most of the emancipation efforts were concentrated on State-related activities. Fifty-six percent of all emancipated individuals came from areas related to the Imperial donation, such as the Imperial Household or the Imperial farms, or indirectly related as the Church. Half of private contributions were filed through substitutions. Private donations represented only about two percent of the entire war efforts. The lack of willingness of the planters can be attributed to

the permanent slave labor crisis, but even taking into consideration the difficult circumstances faced by the plantation economy, their cooperation fell far behind the Councilors' most skeptical perspectives. No expropriation took place, although some slaves could have been mistakenly taken from their owners. Overall, the State supported the heaviest burden of the recruitment and showed itself unable to extract a significant number of individuals. The territorial division of recruitment provides interesting information to support these conclusions.

Table XI
Recruitment of Slaves by Region, 1865-1869

Region	Number	Percent
North	66	1.8
Northeast	985	24.6
West	0	0
South	396	9.9
Southeast	359	8.9
Court	2196	54.8
Total	4003	100.0

Source: "Mappa da Força..." Report from the Ministry of War, 1872

Numbers show the great contribution of Rio de Janeiro city to the war efforts. In some ways the data could confirm councilor Nabuco de Araújo's expectations that the recruitment of slaves should be focused on the urban slaves, especially those living in the capital. But a more careful analysis underlines the enormous weight of the state-related activities in recruitment. As the capital of the Empire, the Court was much more sensitive to both political pressures and Imperial manumissions, and it was also the place of the Empire where the presence of the central State was felt most intensely. From the 2196

slaves freed for recruitment in the city of Rio de Janeiro, 60.5% came from state-related activities, most of them bought by the government.

In terms of the regional distribution it seems the enlistment followed the same logic as the internal traffic. Regions like the Northeast and the South contributed proportionally much more than the Southeast, which housed half the country's slave populations. Such evidence supports the hypothesis that coffee planters did not cooperate as expected, maintaining their slaves untouched against the wishes of the Imperial government. To the 4003 slaves freed for the army 2257 more must be added. This second group came from slaves originally enlisted in the Navy, making a total of 6260 individuals. This number corresponds to 4.4% of the total 91,298 soldiers that fought in the war according to the Report of 1872.[119]

The relatively small proportion of the total recruitment can be better appreciated when compared to the dimensions of the war effort from the beginning of the process November-1866 to August -1868, when manumissions for the army were officially suspended. According to alternative lists provided by the Reports of the Ministry of War, during the years 1867 and 1868 around

[119] Recent research emphasized the lack of uniformity in the prices of those slaves freed to enlist. Jorge Prata de Souza found in the Court (Rio de Janeiro City) an average 1:985$000,(U.S. $ 913.00) Escravidão ou Morte, p. 72. Dale T. Graden found the medium price in Bahia as 1:300$000 (U.S. $ 600.00), concluding slaveowners were paid top prices. Graden, "From Slavery to Freedom...," p. 172. Hendrik Kraay found the following average prices: Maranhão 1;272$542 (US$ 585.00); Pará: 1:133$333 (U.S. $ 604.00); Pernambuco: 1:382$979 (U.S. $ 610.00). Prices in Rio de Janeiro and Bahia oscillated according to period. Hendrik Kraay, "Slavery, Citizenship and Military Service in Brazil's Mobilization..., "p. 240. Paulo Staudt found for the city of Porto Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul's capital a variation between 800$000 (U.S. $ 368.00) and 1:300$000 (U.S. $ 598.00). Paulo Satudt, Faces da Liberdade. Máscaras do Cativeiro, p. 65. Finally, Ricardo Salles suggests that the prices for slaves in 1870 varied between 2:000$000 and 3:000$000 (or 920 and 1,380.00 U.S. dollars).

15,000 troops were sent to the war theater, 3,897 (26%) of whom were freed slaves. In 1868 an estimated 1,873 slaves were recruited. They made up 23% of the 8,241 soldiers sent to Paraguay. The recruitment of freed slaves was thus a fundamental resource to enable Brazilian victory, keeping the supply of new troops to acceptable levels. If freed slaves made up a relatively small proportion of the tota! army contingents they were notwithstanding an essential element of the last three years of the campaign, when the sources of free soldiers were drying up. Consequently it is very probable that freed slaves had a crucial role in the occupation of the Paraguayan territory after the end of the war.[120]

The situation faced by the Union during the American Civil War differed remarkably in the scale of the mobilization. Black soldiers recruited during the last two years of the conflict helped to maintain the Union military superiority against a weakened but far from dead South. From the 180,000 African Americans enlisted, an estimated 140,000 came from the Confederate states. Blacks provided between 10 and 13 percent of the combatant forces. After the end of the war around 80,000 troops were kept in the South as an army of occupation. Although raw numbers in America were much more impressive, the Union army faced strategic needs that were very similar to those of the Imperial army. Consequently, in the Empire as well as in the Union North, the recruitment

[120] Frank D. McCann has conjectured that the occupation of Paraguay to the end of the 1870's had a major impact upon the military's political sense. According to the Army Reports produced during the 1870's around 2500 troops of occupation were in Paraguay. Those troops were on duty basically to prevent an Argentinean occupation of additional territory. Some soldiers stayed permanently in Paraguay after the end of the occupation see Josefina Pla, Hermano Negro. La Esclavitud en El Paraguay (Madrid: Paraninfo, 1972), especially chapters XI and XII, pp. 159-72.

of black soldiers turned out to be a fundamental step to maintain the work of an army of invasion. If we add the enormous contingent of free blacks that had been fighting since the beginning, the Brazilian army shows a predominance of people of African descent, in contrast to the prevalence of European elements in the American situation. The numerical preponderance of black people in the Brazilian ranks would cause great concerns among the Imperial military commanders.[121]

Perceptions and experiences at the battle-fields

The importance of the presence of freed slaves in the army was clearly perceived by the most important military leader, the Marquis of Caxias. Through his personal correspondence it is possible to infer the impact of the socialization of former slaves in an army that went through an intense process of reorganization. His official correspondence underlines the fear that the Imperial social order could collapse at the battlefields as a consequence of the great racial heterogeneity.

While in the position of Commandant in Chief of all the armies in campaign against Paraguay, Marquis of Caxias showed a continuing concern about the breakdown of the disciplinary system that distinguished the soldiers from their officers. After his arrival in Paraguay Caxias worked to undermine the intense politicization in the officer's ranks and to centralize all command procedures. He viewed the large number of freed slaves in the army as the

[121] For the American army see chapter VII.

greatest potential threat to the maintenance of discipline. In a confidential letter to the Minister of the War, in December 1867, Caxias communicated his feelings about the kind of slaves that were sent to the army:

> Your Excellency knows that the Brazilian Army houses many soldiers that just left the burdens of slavery to turn into defenders of the dignity of the Brazilian nation. Unfortunately, the great majority of these individuals represented the worst degraded elements of slavery. The slave of good habits, kind and educated in the customs of obeying and respecting, rarely reached the campaign. It is very difficult to maintain order and discipline and to sustain the subordination and the obeisance with such elements.[122]

According to Caxias, the concentration of so many recently freed individuals in a large army justified the implementation of discriminatory procedures to prevent what Caxias considered "the permanent threat of insubordination." A curious example was the payment of bounties, an important element of the Army reorganization process. Caxias defended the delay of the payment of salaries to the troops while officers and non-commissioned ranks received their salaries on time. Caxias justified his position in a confidential letter addressed to the Minister of War in September 1868, two months after the fall of Humayta:

> It was always my opinion that it is convenient to keep the payment of salaries to the officer corps just on time while recruits and regular soldiers should always have three or four months of delay before receiving their bounties. Discipline and public finances will profit from such circumstances because the epidemics and the battles leave an enormous lacuna among the men and such losses bring profits to the state.[123]

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[122] Marquis of Caxias to Viscount of Paranaguá, Tuyu-Cuê (Paraguay), 4 December 1867 in ANRJ, Códice 924, Livro 2, Reservados, Confidenciais e Cartas, fl. 72.

[123] Marquis of Caxias to Baron of Muritiba, Surubi-hy (Paraguay), 26 September 1868. ANRJ, Códice 924, Livro 4- Reservados, Confidenciais e Carta, p. 268.

Another element in Caxias' plan was the decoration of those soldiers who distinguished themselves for bravery in combat, an important element of military identity. During the Paraguayan War an increasing number of individuals coming from the slave condition placed an unexpected strain on the perceptions of the old military leader. Because bravery was a "quality" distributed among all classes and races, it could not be restricted just to the officer ranks. In many circumstances soldiers coming from the lower stratum of society could distinguish themselves for courage in combat, especially in a kind of war where infantry charges supplanted the cavalry élan. Such courage could equalize, temporarily, soldiers and officers, especially if they received the same medals. Consequently, the Marquis of Caxias feared that "relaxation, indiscipline and bad example [would lead] to the breakdown of the basis on which our armed forces are established."[124]

It seems that Caxias's precautions were taken into consideration by the Imperial government because, at the end of 1867, there was created a special medal for bravery, different from all other existing decorations in the Brazilian army. These were made from the bronze taken from Paraguayan cannons and destined solely for privates. As for as the Brazilian high Command would be concerned, the war should not reinforce social or racial equality.[125]

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[124] Marquis of Caxias to Viscount of Paranaguá, Tuyu-Cué (Paraguay), 4 December 1867. ANRJ, Códice 924, Livro 2 - Reservados, Confidenciais e Cartas, p. 66.

[125] In 1864 Dictator Solano Lopez ordered all church bells to be fused in order to make additional cannons. An original of such a medal is currently displayed in the permanent exposition of the Museu Histórico Nacional in Rio de Janeiro.

The military reforms undertaken at the front would lead to unexpected effects with great consequences for the future of the army and monarchical stability. Although Caxias did not aim to destroy the monarchical regime, his actions reinforced the military ethos of the officer corps, turning it into a bureaucracy that was extremely critical of the Imperial regime.[126]

Numbers and Historical Interpretation

Numbers registered in the Brazilian reports of the various ministries are not accurate and cannot give the final word about the demography of recruitment. In part due to this lack of accuracy, different interpretations have appeared during the last ten years concerning the exact number of slaves who went to war and their importance for both the war efforts and the emancipation that took place in the 1880s.

Ricardo Salles argued that the number should be increased to 10 per cent of the total mobilization. Robert Conrad calculated that 20,000 slaves were freed as a result of war mobilization. Based on research in the archives of the old province of Rio de Janeiro, Jorge Luiz Prata de Souza estimated that there were many more letters of manumission than in official numbers already stated. Hendrik Kraay assumed the numbers shown in the reports are basically correct

[126] Analyzing the Mississippi situation during the First World War period, J. William Harris remarked that white racial fears concerning African American courage during the War could lead to the break down of the etiquette of race. See J. William Harris, "Etiquette, Lynching, and Racial Boundaries in Southern History: A Mississippi Example" in The American Historical Review, Vol. 100 no. 2, April 1995, pp. 387-410. The attitude of the Marquis of Caxias demonstrated similar concerns, although his actions aimed to reinforce the disciplinarian methods of the Brazilian army, not the behavior of the entire society. But the implications are equally racist, as Caxias would go as far as to suppose the soldier's bravery but not officer's could come from his ingestion of alcohol.

and pointed out that the discrepancies are most likely related to the recruitment for the navy, a significant element in an important naval base, as Rio was by that time. Kraay accepted the information provided by the military war reports, especially the synthesis produced by the end of the war, taking 6,000 freed slaves as the most accurate estimate. Through an extensive research in Gaucho archives, Paulo Roberto Staudt found just half of the number of slaves listed in the army reports as the contribution of Rio Grande do Sul. If the data do not always confirm the high estimates of Robert Conrad, they nonetheless underline the connections between the war efforts and measures more directly concerning the process of Emancipation.

Immediate Political Repercussions of the Enlistment

The enlistment of slaves was an important element of the debate over the future of slavery in Brazil. Emancipation in British, French, and Danish colonies and the victory of the Union in the American Civil War made powerful Brazilian groups realize that conditions had turned against the institution so decisively that any explicit defense of slavery would be fruitless.

From the year of independence to 1850, the Empire negotiated externally and internally the end of the Atlantic traffic. Delaying the end of traffic against the interests of the British Empire proved to be a difficult process. At some points, national pride and territorial integrity were challenged to the point of humiliation. During the 1850s and the early sixties, the Empire was relatively peaceful, but the effects of the slave labor crisis would soon be felt again. During the 1860s,

progressive legislation, coming from the central state, addressed for the first time the delicate question of emancipation.

The main consequences of the Paraguayan war reflected the Imperial attitude toward slavery. During the war, slavery was viewed as detrimental to the military efforts because it undermined mobilization and caused fears on the home front. The future of slavery was, not coincidentally, discussed along with the war efforts. The war seemed to show that the nation could not be strong while there were slaves at home, ready to rebel. Facing powerful obstacles on the battlefields and pressed by increasing international criticism, Imperial political leaders began to shift their attitudes toward a policy of gradual emancipation. They understood, as a later historian wrote, that slavery's influence was so pervasive that, "Nothing escaped, nothing was beyond or above or outside the slave institution."[127]

The victory of the Union in the American Civil war forced powerful Brazilian groups to realize that conditions had so decisively turned against slavery that any explicit defense of the institution would be fruitless. By the late 1860s, only Brazil and Cuba held slaves in the Americas. While Cuba was still a Spanish colony, Brazil was an independent nation and a monarchy, seeing itself as connected to the main European patterns of civilization. Under these

[127] Frank Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen, p. 117.

circumstances, Brazilian politicians reflected on the American experience and discussed the similarities and differences between the two countries.[128]

Since 1864, Dom Pedro II had been very concerned about the outcome of the American Civil War. In a private conversation with his then newly appointed liberal Prime Minister, Zacharias de Góis and Vasconcelos, the Brazilian Emperor declared that the direction of events in America compelled the Brazilian government to consider the future of slavery "because the same thing that happened during the abolition of the traffic should not happen again."[129]

By 1867, the third year of the Paraguayan war, the enlistment of slaves had become a fundamental strategy for the defense of the Imperial state. This development was rife with contradiction, with slaves being used in the context of the wave of nationalism touched off by the invasion of Brazilian territory. The Paraguayan War unified all classes around the idea of a fatherland and brought a new attachment to the patriotic heritage. A national struggle, it involved the common efforts of the whole population, above all its fighting sectors. Those slaves manumitted to fight were freed at the very moment that they were elevated to the highest point on the nation's altar.

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[128] On the process of abolition of slavery in Cuba, see Rebecca J. Scott, The Transition of Free Labor, 1860-1899 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). Parallels between the Cuban and the Brazilian process are many, including the gradualism, that is, the slow path each process took until a complete abolition of slavery.

[129] Quoted in Heitor Lyra, História do Império de Dom Pedro II, 3 Vols. (São Paulo: Melhoramentos, 1940), pp. 235-6. The Emperor referred to the struggle against the international slave traffic discussed in Chapter 1. From the year of independence to 1850, the Empire negotiated externally and internally the end of the Atlantic traffic. Delaying the end of traffic against the interests of the British Empire had challenged national pride and territorial integrity to the point of humiliation.

A new decision-making cycle began with this unprecedented mobilization of people of African descent as soldiers. At the center of this process was the Crown's initiative, hampered as it was by the action of Emperor Pedro II. In his Speech from the Throne from May 1867 (five months after the authorization of enlistment was issued), Dom Pedro II answered the appeal of the French Abolitionist Society and clearly signaled his position in support of emancipation. The Brazilian government informed the world in the name of the Emperor that measures would be taken toward emancipation as soon as the war was over, stating that:

> "The captive element in the Empire will deserve your consideration in such a way that the higher interest linked to emancipation will be considered, respecting current property and without causing great instability to our industry and agriculture."[130]

Writing sixteen years later, the abolitionist leader Joaquim Nabuco declared that the Imperial Speech from the Throne was for emancipation, "like a bolt of lightning in a cloudless sky."[131] According to the future abolitionist leader, the "Speech" made it clear that the Emperor would pursue abolitionist measures as soon as the war ended. Such an initiative, coming from the highest Brazilian authority and four months after the manumission of most state-owned slaves, alarmed planters and supporters of slavery around the country. These sectors feared the government was moving too fast in the direction of abolition and that

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[130] Anais do Parlamento Brasileiro, Câmara dos Senhores Deputados, 1o. ano da 3a. Legislatura, Sessão de 1867, Tomo 1 (Rio de Janeiro: Typografia Imperial e Constitucional de J. Villeneuve, 1867), p. 96. The "Speeches of the Throne" were a traditional event of Brazilian Imperial politics. Through the "Speeches" the emperor announced the main legislations as well as the states' goals for the forthcoming year.

planter's immediate interests would be harmed. The fears of immediate interference in the market for slaves were not realized, but they had a profound impact on the mood of the powerful planter class. If their immediate interests were not entirely homogeneous, the defense of slavery provided powerful cement and unified them around their long-term policies.[132]

One of the stronger critics of the Emperor's position was the writer and politician from Ceará, José Martiniano de Alencar. In 1867 he published a series of letters under the name of Erasmus. In these letters Alencar criticized both the answer of Pedro II to the French philanthropists and the recruitment of slaves. Referring to the high expenditures related to the conflict against Paraguay, Alencar called the emperor "the soul of the war," blaming him for the delays in the campaign and the sacrifices it had cost the Brazilian people. Alencar was especially critical of the "Speech of the Throne," which he described as a surrender of the national interests to the "fanaticism of progress."

Alencar defended the slaveholders' causes with arguments that resembled those used by Georges Fitzhugh in the ante-bellum U.S. South.[133]

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[131] Joaquim Nabuco, Abolitionism, p. 49.

[132] Analyzing the positions of different groups of planters during the debates of the "Agrarian Council," held in Rio de Janeiro in 1878, Peter L. Eisenberg concluded that the Brazilian farmers, as any other class in history, faced internal divisions. However, these divisions did not follow geographical cleavages. According to Eisenberg, there were no strong differences among the Brazilian regional power groups concerning the status of labor. See his "A Mentalidade dos Fazendeiros no Congresso Agrícola de 1878" in José Roberto do Amaral Lapa (ed.), Modos de Produção e Realidade Brasileira (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1980), pp. 167-94.

[133] George Fitzhugh was the best known defender of slavery in the antebellum South and his writings went far beyond his native Virginia. Some of his comparisons between slave and wage work are still very useful for research concerning working conditions and productivity in slave as

Unlike the southern Fire-Eaters, Alencar did not blame a region or a group of people, but the person of the Brazilian monarch, for the evils perpetrated against the institution of slavery. He accused the Emperor of being more sympathetic to the interests of the "foreign passions" than to the Brazilians who were abandoned to their own faith:

> You did nothing to liberate the country from the infection of immorality. Your lack of interest about everything not connected to the War and your obstinacy about it leads you to tolerate things that are terrible for those that admire your character.[134]

Alencar opposed the Paraguayan War first because he thought this episode revealed the "despotic character of the government" and second for the troubles he thought it could bring to productive activities. According to him, the decision to make war or not should be made by the parliament, not by the Emperor. Through the reinforcement of his authority in a crucial period of the Brazilian history, the Emperor had put at risk the stability of Monarchical institutions, undermining the basis of the representative government, as it existed until that time.

Alencar's opinions about slavery are complex. He correlated the end of slavery to changes in the patterns of economic growth and changes in Brazil's

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well as in early industrial societies. His most important works are Cannibals All ! or Slaves Without Masters (Richmond: 1857); Sociology for the South, or The Failure of Free Society (Richmond: 1854). Analyses of Fitzhugh's works include Harvey Wish, George Fitzhugh, Propagandist of the Old South (Baton Rouge: 1943); Eugene Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made. Two Essays in Interpretation (New York: Wesleyan University Press, 1969), especially Part II "The Logical Outcome of the Slaveholder's Philosophy" and Drew Gilpin Faust (ed.) The Ideology of Slavery. Proslavery Thought in the Antebellum South, 1830-1860. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981).

[134] José de Alencar, Ao Imperador. Novas Cartas de Erasmo (Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia de Pinheiro e Co. 1867), p. 7.

position in international commerce. Brazilian slave owners, he wrote, should not be blamed for the outcome of more than three centuries of slavery. The international movement in favor of immediate abolition sounded to Alencar's ears like an enormous hypocrisy.[135]

Much as Alencar, the Brazilian slave owners had a peculiar vision of the Brazilian reality. For them, private economic interests should set limits to the action of the Imperial state.[136] According to their interpretation, the actions of international philanthropic societies were contradictory because Europe furnished "the big stomach" for slave-produced products. The demand for Brazilian tropical goods was concentrated in the same countries that were the center of abolitionist demands or, in Alencarian terms: "the European philanthropists while smoking a good Havana cigar and drinking an excellent coffee from Brazil discourse against slavery, pretending the most humanitarian intentions. Why don't they repeal moralistically such products made from the

[135] This radical defense of slavery did not prevent Alencar to accept the position of Minister of Justice in the Conservative cabinet of 1869. The Emperor's revenge came in 1871 when he refused to nominate Alencar as Senator for the province of Ceará. That event caused his political death. Disappointed with the developments of Imperial politics, Alencar died of tuberculosis in 1874. He is better known currently for his romantic and nationalistic literature than for his political writings.

[136] For a summary appreciation of Alencar's ideas concerning slavery see the following texts: "Carta ao Visconde de Itaboraí sobre a crise financeira de 1866" in Obras Completas, Vol. IV, pp. 113; A Propriedade (Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, 1883); and especially the introduction made by Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos under the title "A Teoria da Democracia Proporcional de José de Alencar" in Dois Escritos Democáticos de José de Alencar (Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ, 1991), pp. 9-50. Only during the last ten years have the political ideas of José de Alencar been re-discovered by historians and political scientists.

sweat of the African arms? In their theory the sugar and the tobacco are the backbone of the slavery. Notwithstanding they enjoy them secretly"[137]

Of course, according to this line of reasoning, the state should defend the slaveholders when any international power interfered with slavery. The nature of the political pact was such that the state's intervention was not seen as a transgression against the prevalent "laissez-faire" economics, if made to protect the social and economic status quo. If slave owners as a group did not deny the importance of the war, they saw it as a secondary issue and tried unsuccessfully to direct the Imperial action.[138]

Summarizing, the war undermined the trust between the rich land bosses and the Imperial state at a moment when the interests of slave owners had been weakened by enormous changes in the markets for slaves and the products produced by slaves. The war threatened at least the shadow of expropriation, a phantom that had haunted the Brazilian oligarchy ever since independence. It helped to damage the links that maintained the imperial pact thus confirming Joaquim Nabuco's vision of the war as a watershed in the history of Imperial politics.

To make things more grim to the planters, the war effort brought a temporary expansion of the fiscal power of the state, leading to a reorganization

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[137] Ibid, p. 28.

[138] Of course this particular interpretation of the European liberalism did not go as far as to defend individual rights. Planters behaved as a collective body who saw the state as a defender of the national interests, that is, their interests in keeping their slaves. For a broader interpretation of the Brazilian oligarchic liberalism see Vitor Izecksohn, "Construção, Crise e Reforma do Estado no Brasil: uma pequena história política," in Revista Praia Vermelha, November 2000.

of some taxes at the same time as others were created. Such a move required additional extractions from agriculture. To face the burden of continuous expenditures, the state needed to extract more resources from society. This was done through inflation, external loans, and the creation or enlargement of taxes. The growth of the military share of the national budget during the war shows that no other expenses were cut to face such crucial situation.[139]

Consequently, the decision to pursue a complete military victory contributed to undermining the good will of the planters toward the monarchy at the same time that it increased the size and the importance of the national army, a fact that would have strong consequences for the Monarchical order in the decades after the end of the war. This was a slow process, but it contributed importantly to the progressive erosion of monarchical legitimacy as well as to the progressive decline of slavery. In the words of Joaquim Nabuco: "The Paraguayan War was the watershed of the Brazilian Empire."[140] After this multi-faceted conflict, nothing would ever be the same.

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[139] So serious was the financial crisis that it led Marquis of Caxias to propose the interruption of the campaign. In a letter to the minister of War dated from August 1867, the Marquis explained his understanding that the war was already won and that no advantages would be gained by pursuing the Paraguayan dictator until his capture. The Emperor did not accept his proposal. See Maria Valéria Junho Pena, "O Surgimento do Imposto de Renda: Um Estudo sobre a Relação entre Estado e Mercado no Brasil" in Revista Dados, Volume 35, no. 3, 1992, pp. 337-70.

[140] Nabuco, Um Estadista do Império, p. 126.

Chapter 7

Forged in Inequality
The Recruitment of Black Soldiers in the United States: September 1862 – April 1865

> When this war is won, there will be some black man who can remember that, with silent tongue, and clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well poised bayonet, they have helped mankind on to this great consummation.
>
> Abraham Lincoln[1]

> Once let the black man get upon his person the brass letter U.S.; let him get the eagle on his button, and a musket on his shoulder, and bullets in his pocket, and there is no power on earth or under the earth which can deny that he has earned the right of citizenship in the United States
>
> Frederick Douglass[2]

> I came to fight not for my country, I never had any, but to gain one.
>
> Private Charles Reason
> 54th MA Infantry[3]

The enlistment of black men in the Army of the United States was authorized under the provisions of the Second Confiscation Act (Aug., 1862), the Militia Act (July, 1862) and the Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1863). All three

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[1] John T. Hubbell, "Abraham Lincoln and the Recruitment of Black Soldiers," in Papers of the Abraham Lincoln Association, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1980, p. 19.

[2] Douglass' Monthly, April 1863, p. 818.

[3] Quoted in Gerald Schwartz (ed.), A Woman Doctor's Civil War: Ester Hill Hawks' Diary (University of South Carolina Press, 1984), pp. 51-2. Private Reason was a twenty-year-old runaway from

were conceived during the spring of 1862, when the recruitment crisis threatened the provision of new troops for the Union army.[4] The Militia Act emancipated slaves who worked for the army or the navy. This act stated that the enrollment of militia should include all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, permitting, in some interpretations, the recruitment of black men.[5] The Second Confiscation Act extended freedom to those slaves coming from areas under Union control, whose owners were disloyal. The Emancipation Proclamation declared free all slaves in the Confederacy, except those in the Border States, and in the Union-occupied parts of the Confederacy. Progressive legislation resulted from Congressional as well as Presidential initiatives. This was part of a general move toward a more determined pursuit of military victory, a move that captured the nation's imagination during the spring and the summer of 1962. This transformation resulted from unexpected developments in the conflict and the capacity of Republican leaders to learn from experience, one of many qualities presented by the Civil War generation.[6]

Maryland who died from gangrene complications after being wounded during the attack on Fort Wagner.

[4] Although it was only presented in September, Lincoln shared a draft of his proclamation with his Cabinet in a meeting held in Washington on July 21, 1862. Following the advice of secretary Seward, he delayed the Proclamation until a military victory demonstrated that its release was not an act of despair. Although the battle of Antietam was not a clear-cut victory it served the purpose. See Frank E., Vandiver, The Long Loom of Lincoln (Fort Wayne: Louis A. Warren Lincoln Library and Museum, 1987), pp. 10-15; Thomas F. Schwartz, "Salmon P. Chase Critiques First Reading of the Emancipation Proclamation of President Lincoln," in Civil War History, Vol. 33, no. 1, 1987, pp. 84-7, John Hope Franklin, The Emancipation Proclamation (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963).

[5] This modified the racial exclusion presented by the 1792 Federal Militia Act. See United States. Statutes at Large, Vol. XI, p. 592 and 599, for details on black recruitment.

[6] For the adaptability of the Republican leadership see Eric L. McKitrick, "Party Politics and the Union and Confederate War Efforts," in William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (eds.), The

These developments were mediated by debates involving public opinion to a degree unimaginable for Brazilians. While in Brazil debates were restricted to Imperial bureaucrats, Cabinet members, and landowners, the American debates embraced the complexity of northern society, involving immigrants, industrial workers, the press, politicians, abolitionist activists, and the northern African American population. Emancipation and recruitment were among the most important developments in the political debate concerning the conduct of the war, bringing questions of social and ethnic diversity to center stage.[7]

Progressive legislation was part of a general transformation in the ideological justification of the war, as it evolved into an effort to destroy the basis of southern power. Emancipation and recruitment of blacks were not pre-ordained projects; instead they evolved out of necessity. The Union Army's insatiable demand for soldiers, a changing attitude in the northern policy toward black troops, and increasing recognition of slavery as the central issue of the conflict pushed the Lincoln administration slowly to take steps toward black enlistment. Like the Prussian military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz, Lincoln understood that war was the continuation of politics by other means. He calibrated his conduct of military operations according to the interplay of military and political considerations, moving forward from his initial goals to embrace

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American Party Systems. Stages of Political Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 1117-151.

[7] On American public debates in the press, see J. Cutler Andrews, The North Reports the Civil War (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955) and John Stanchak, Frank Leslie Illustrated Civil War (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1992). On the Paraguayan War and the Brazilian

emancipation as a war aim essential to victory. This evolution played a crucial role in the growth of the central government's authority through the creation and maintenance of a large army. It also brought ordinary Americans into contact with the as never before.[8]

This chapter analyses the circumstances that led to the recruitment of blacks and their incorporation into the Union army. It investigates the conditions under which the Republican administration decided to recruit African-Americans, and examines the political controversies surrounding the recruitment and the organization of black troops. It discusses the motivational factors that impelled blacks to enlist at a time when white motivation and enlistment were falling. It stresses the roles of centralization and bureaucratization as fundamental factors in black enlistment. In doing so, I expect to answer some of the questions that inspired this dissertation. Which motivations impelled blacks to enlist? How did racial hierarchies cope with political and military centralization? How did the black soldier's military experiences in America compare and contrast with those of his Brazilian counterpart?

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press see Mauro Cesar Silveira, A Batalha de Papel. A Guerra do Paraguai Através da Caricatura (Porto Alegre: L&PM, 1996).

[8] When affirming their functionality to centralization I am not assuming such process as a result of previous planning. It was instead the non-anticipated consequence of a kind of war that challenged many American beliefs. Lincoln's attitudes have been the subject of vigorous historiographic debates. Authors diverge about the meaning of presidential changes, some recognizing them as part of a real political advance while others underlining the conservative aspects of Lincoln's war policies. Howard C. Westwood, "Lincoln's Position on Black Enlistments," in The Lincoln Herald, Vol. 86, no. 2, 1984, pp. 101-112; John T. Hubbel, "Abraham Lincoln and the Recruitment of Black Soldiers," in Papers of the Abraham Lincoln Association, Vol. 2, 1980, pp. 6-21; Arvarh E. Strickland, "The Illinois Background of Lincoln's Attitude Toward Slavery and the Negro," in Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, Vol. LVI, no. 3, 1963; George M. Fredrickson, "A Man But Not a Brother: Abraham Lincoln and Racial Equality," in The Journal of Southern History, Vol. XLI, no 1, 1975, pp. 30-58.

There is now a consensus among historians that African American enlistment as well as the contribution of black laborers transformed the status of black Americans. This point has been underlined in the analyses of black soldiers during the Civil War, produced since World War II. Most of these writings focused on the federal government's slow acceptance of black enlistment, the subsequent recruitment of black troops into the Union army, the efforts made by a few northerners to raise black units, and the battlefield experiences of notable black regiments. Taking as their departure point Joseph T. Wilson's The Black Phalanx,[9] historians have shown that blacks were not passive observers of the destruction of slavery, and thus challenged the traditional historiographic approach that viewed the conflict as a white man's war.[10] However, it should be emphasized that these same works did not connect black recruitment with the draft crisis. Accepting blacks in the army lessened the effects of the draft on white American citizens by filling states' quotas.[11]

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[9] Joseph T. Wilson, The Black Phalanx. African American Soldiers in the War of Independence, the War of 1812 & Civil War (1890, reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, 1994).

[10] In spite of the contributions made by Joseph T. Wilson and W. E. B. Dubois, the prevalent vision before the Second World War portrayed black participation as not significant. The usual notion was established in 1928 by historian W. E. Woodward in his biography Meet the General Grant (1928, reprint, New York, Liveright, 1946). According to Woodward: "The American Negroes [were] the only people in the history of the world that ever became free without any effort of their part." See page 7.

[11] This position is better expressed in Dudley Taylor Cornish, The Sable Arm: Negro Troops in the Union Army, 1861-1865 (1956, reprint, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987) and Joseph T. Glatthaar, Forged in Battle. The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers (New York: Meridian Books, 1990) who, however, do not establish connections between black recruitment and the Enrollment Act. Cornish's The Sable Army remains the single best volume on the subject. Benjamin's Quarle's, The Negro in the Civil War (New York: Da Capo, 1953), is still highly informative. A few works - the bulk of which are post-war memoirs, described the experiences at a regimental level.

Associations between legislation and black recruitment have been developed in more recent studies on recruitment and social control during wartime. These works demonstrated that integration, democratization and bureaucratization did not necessarily reinforce one another in American military organization, emphasizing that access was extended to blacks just when the army reduced the degree of democratic participation by ordinary soldiers.[12]

There is much to be learned about the impact of black recruiting on the processes of centralization and nationalization of the Union army. This chapter focuses attention on the contrast between black recruitment and the decentralized strategies prevalent at the beginning of the conflict, and explores the ways in which partial military desegregation connected with the failure of volunteerism in the American military tradition. In sharp contrast with the Brazilian situation, African American recruitment advanced the destruction of southern slavery during the final years of the Civil War.

African Americans and the American Military Tradition

White Americans had always been ambivalent about recruiting blacks. It is generally assumed that the use of black soldiers was rare before the Civil War and that this situation differs from Brazil's, where the use of blacks in the army was

[12] This perspective was established by Robert Sterling, "Civil War Resistance in the Middle West," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1974), James W. Geary, We Need Men. The Union Draft in the Civil War (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1991), and James Osher, "Soldiers Citizens for a Disciplined Nation: Union Conscription and the Construction of the Modern American Army," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1992).

supposedly more normal and more widespread during the same period.[13] However, as Carl Degler pointed out some years ago, this difference between the two countries cannot be explained by fundamentally different racial attitudes. Rather, the difference arose from the particular strategic and political circumstances that responsible authorities confronted in each context.[14]

During the colonial period, demographic and cultural factors restrained the recruitment of blacks in British America.[15] In the thirteen colonies, a predominant white population from which to draw soldiers, a small military establishment, and the close connection between military service and citizenship, all operated against the use of black soldiers.[16] Consequently, the right to use arms or to be temporarily enlisted in the militia did not officially exist for blacks, either free or enslaved, in colonial America, while in Brazil both law and custom tolerated it. In America service was a privilege of race, while in Brazil it was, rather, a punishment for social undesirables.[17]

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[13] "In every instance [in Brazil] the [free] Negro participated with the whites in their wars on equal terms, and some of them achieved the prestige of a national hero...[while in the United States] [t]hey could not hold office in the black militia." Frank Tannenbaun, Slave and Citizen (1946, reprint, Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), pp. 90-1; 94-5.

[14] See Carl N. Degler, Neither Black nor White. Slave and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States (New York: Macmillam Company, 1971). In this sense Degler denies the Tannenbaum-Elkins model concerning a more benevolent attitude from Brazilians in what concerned Afro-descendants. The path opened by Degler led the way for inquiries concerning the role of political and institutional processes.

[15] Ibid. pp. 80-1. For an appreciation concerning the participation of blacks in previous conflicts, see Wilson, The Black Phalanx.

[16] According to Robert A. Gross, in the town of Concord in colonial Massachusetts only two groups were exempt from service in the militia: Harvard graduates and a dozen black slaves. See The Minutemen and Their World (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976), p. 70. On the limited size of the American army see chapter V.

[17] As shown in chapter IV, Brazilian recruitment during the 19th century also operated as a mechanism of social control, singling out socially dangerous individuals. Peter M. Beattie,

An armed militia provided one of the civic bases for the American nation, but this asset was open only to those considered to be citizens, that is, white free males. Nevertheless, the fact that blacks were not officially permitted to fight did not mean that they were not enrolled on special occasions. Necessity often led to the recruitment of racially segregated minorities in most colonial societies and British North America was no exception. Men of African descent were always present during times of trouble, filling the ranks in order to fight the enemies of white colonists.[18] Although demographic conditions reinforced racial segregation in the militias, military exclusion could be temporarily suspended when some emergency demanded it. As recent scholarship has shown, such emergencies were more common than the traditional view would allow, with blacks being called to fight during colonial revolts such as Bacon's Rebellion (Virginia, 1676) and in the campaigns against the Indians, such as the Yamasee War (South Carolina, 1715). According to Peter Voelz, the foremost analyst of the military impact of blacks in the colonial Americas:

> Desperation was thus a mark of raising and arming slaves and free blacks on a colony wide basis. It took an emergency to overcome the habitual fear the planters and masters, fears not only that the slaves

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"Conscription Versus Penal Servitude: Army Reform's Influence on the Brazilian State's Management of Social Control, 1870-1930," in Journal of Social History, Vol. 32, No. 4, summer 1999, pp. 847-73; Fernando Doers Costa, "Os Problems do Recrutamento Militar no Final do Século XVIII e as Questões da Construção do Estado e da Nação," in Análise Social, Vol. 20 No. 130, 1995, pp. 121-55.

[18]Winthrop Jordan in White Over Black. American Attitudes Toward Negro, 1550-1812 (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969) develops this thesis. The discussion about white fears of a black revolt is on page 562n. About the different images attributed to Blacks in literature and society see, Friedrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind.

might turn their weapons against their masters but also that they might join an enemy to destroy the colony.[19]

Americans officially discussed the enlistment of blacks in the Army on a national basis as early as the struggle for independence.[20] Unlike the Brazilian experience, Revolutionary leaders in the U.S. faced a long struggle to defeat the British and their local allies.[21] As in other colonial revolts, the Patriots faced a chronic shortage of troops, a permanent nightmare for military leaders on long campaigns. Of the 300,000 American troops that took part in the Revolutionary war, an estimated 5,000 (1.6%) were blacks.[22] The great majority of them were recruited from the 50,000 African Americans living in the northern colonies. Basically blacks substituted for affluent whites in non-segregated battalions, serving in most theaters and campaigns. Some of these individuals were free men of color who voluntarily enlisted to fight for freedom from Britain.[23] Others were slaves, who found in the Revolution a good opportunity to gain their freedom on

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[19] Peter M. Voelz, Slave and Soldier. The Military Impact of Blacks in the Colonial Americas (New York: Garland Publishing, 1993), p. 29. Complete lists concerning examples of military use of blacks during emergencies can be found on Chart 1, pp. 24-8. Chart 2, pp. 34-5, Chart 3, pp. 46-7 and Chart 4, pp. 66-7.

[20] Ira Berlin, Slaves Without Masters. The Free Negro in the Antebellum South (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), pp.15-24. Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961).

[21] In Brazil only three provinces reacted against independence: Bahia, Maranão, and Grão-Pará. The Brazilian Imperial government did not need more than a small number of loyal regular troops, supported by foreign mercenaries, to subordinate these provinces to the new order.

[22] Peter Maslowski, "National Policy Toward the Use of Black Troops in the Revolution," South Carolina Historical Magazine 73, 1972. J. MacLeod Duncan, Slavery, Race and the American Revolution (London: 1974). Charles Neimeyer, America Goes to War: A Social History of the Continental Army (New York: New York University Press, 1996) incorporates an excellent discussion of African American participation in the Continental Army. See especially chapter 4, "Changing One Master for Another: Black Soldiers in the Continental Army," pp. 65-88.

[23] David Biron Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), pp. 73-83. Davis defined the American Revolution as a movement of "conservative criollos."

the battlefields.[24] Southern blacks, for obvious reasons, did not significantly participate, although many enlisted on the British side.[25] The southern colonies' insecure position was well voiced some years later in a letter sent from the planter-dominated "Louisiana Committee of Defense" to General Andrew Jackson, describing their country as "strong by Nature, but extremely weak from the nature of its population."[26]

In 1792, in the midst of the conservative reaction to the revolutionary era, Congress passed the Federal Militia Act. This legislation defined the national militia as "free able-bodied white male citizen[s] of the respective states."[27] The Federal Militia Act maintained the control of states over the militias, incorporating racial restrictions and excluding blacks and Indians from military service. These restrictions also affected the regular army, excepting the occasional black and Indian scouts who were not considered as regular soldiers.[28]

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[24] For a good case study see David O. White, Connecticut's Black Soldiers, 1775-1783 (Chester: Connecticut Historical Commission, 1973).

[25] Sylvia Frey, Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) discusses how the Revolution enabled southern blacks to challenge the colonial social order in the name of egalitarian principles, seeking liberty by fighting for the British. From the same author see also "The British and the Blacks: A New Perspective," The Historian 38 (1976), which surveys the mixture of principle and pragmatism that shaped British treatment of blacks, particularly in the southern colonies.

[26] John Spencer Basset (ed.), Correspondence of Andrew Jackson (Washington: DC, Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1926), Vol. II, pp. 51-4.

[27] Appendix to the Annals of Congress, 1st Congress, 1st Sessions, p. 1392.

[28] On the lost opportunity for African Americans at the end of the revolutionary period two interesting studies case are Gary B. Nash, Freedom by Degrees: Emancipation in Philadelphia and its Aftermath (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and Shane White, Somewhat More Independent: The End of Slavery in New York City (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991). Both authors blame pervasive racism in the North for the lack of a vigorous abolitionist policy in the period following independence.

Blacks continued to be called up when an emergency demanded a shift away from dominant racial patterns. During the War of 1812, free blacks were accepted into the Louisiana troops organized under the leadership of General Andrew Jackson. Two battalions of blacks composed of 180 soldiers each faced British forces that included between 1,000 and 1,500 black soldiers, mostly coming from the British West Indies. For their efforts in the War of 1812, particularly during the fighting at New Orleans in 1814 and 1815, African Americans earned the praise of General Jackson, although they were soon stripped of their arms.[29]

During most of the antebellum period the recruitment of African Americans was very limited. Participation in state militias meant access to citizenship and implied equality. Thus, military discrimination formed an important barrier against the extension of citizenship to the racially segregated. Typical of this color bar was the attitude of General Nathaniel P. Banks. In 1859, in his capacity as governor of Massachusetts, he vetoed legislation that would have admitted blacks to the state militia on the grounds that it violated the whites-only provision of the 1792 Federal Militia Act.[30] During the late 1850s the U.S. Supreme Court

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[29] David C. Rankin, "The Impact of the Civil War on the Free Colored Community of New Orleans," in Perspectives in American History, 11, 1977-1978, pp. 379-416. The state of Louisiana paid free colored soldiers pensions and the federal government granted them bounties. On the black presence in the West India Regiments see David Patrick Geggus, "Slavery, War and Revolution in the Greater Caribbean, 1789-1815," in David Barry Gaspar and David Patric Geggus (eds.), A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the Greater Caribbean (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 1-50. See also Adam Rothman, "The West India Regiments at the Battle of New Orleans and Beyond," (paper presented for the meeting of the American Historical Association), January 1999.

[30] Quoted in Manoj K. Joshi and Joseph P. Reidy, "To Come Foreward and Aid in Putting Down This Unholy Rebellion: The Officers of Louisiana's Free Black Native Guard During the Civil War Era," in Southern Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1983, p. 330. Ira Berlin et all., "The Black Military Experience, " in Slaves no More. Three Essays on Emancipation and the Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 195.

made another symbolic declaration of black inferiority. When issuing the Dred Scott Decision, Chief of Justice Roger B. Taney reaffirmed the importance of racial exclusion in the army in terms that sounded familiar to many white northerners:

> Nothing could more strongly mark the entire repudiation of the African race...[than] not being permitted to share in one of the highest duties of the citizens...He forms no part of the sovereignty of the State, and is not therefore called on to uphold and defend it...[31]

The Sectional Crisis and Racial Issues

The question of black recruitment was again posed to the Federal government when the Civil War began. Pressures from black communities in the North and their allies in the abolitionist movement demanded the inclusion of African-descendants in northern military efforts. Black leadership understood the opportunity in the crisis and engaged in a campaign to recruit freed African-Americans. They expected that black support would be rewarded, helping African Americans achieve both emancipation and citizenship as a result of the war. Fighting for the Union, blacks could at the same time strike a blow against slavery and demonstrate their worth as citizens.[32] The "colored citizens of Cleveland" who declared in October 1861 that "We will pray for the Union, will give our money for the Union, and will fight for the Union" publicly expressed the civic virtue

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[31] Benjamin C. Howard, compiler, Report of the Decision of the Supreme Court of the Unites States, and the opinions of the Judges thereon in the case of Dred Scot versus John F. A. Sandford., (Washington: 1857). Quoted in Osher, Soldier Citizens for a Disciplined Nation..., p. 371.

[32] From 1861 black men and women served as military laborers in a variety of jobs. Some worked as personal servants, teamsters, laundresses, hospital attendants and cooks while others helped as

demanded of citizens. But most white northerners agreed with the decision of the Lincoln administration to enlist only whites. Prejudice in the northern states was powerful, and few whites outside of abolitionist circles believed that blacks had the character to endure combat. Frederick Douglass lamented such arguments in an editorial published in May, 1861: "We are ready and would go, counting ourselves happy in being permitted to serve and suffer for the cause of freedom and free institutions. But you won't let us go."[33]

Many Republican leaders supported racial military restrictions as long as these aided their primary objective of bringing back the seceding states. A restrictive policy satisfied both federal and state legislation and fit with the racist traditions of military service in America. It was also consistent with Lincoln's devotion to the Constitution. One of Lincoln's favorite themes was the uniqueness of the American experience. During the first months of the war the president struggled to preserve the Constitution as a living proof of American uniqueness.[34] Non-interference with slavery was one of the pillars of his administration's official politics, as outlined in Lincoln's Annual Message to Congress in December 1861:

> In considering the policy to be adopted for suppressing the insurrection, I have been anxious and careful that the inevitable conflict for this purpose shall not degenerate into a violent and

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guides, scouts and builders of fortifications. Occasionally some of these workers had to take arms for personal defense when facing situations of extreme danger.

[33] Douglass' Monthly, III, May, 1861, p. 451.

[34] On the constitutional impasses involving emancipation, see Donald G. Nieman, Promises to Keep. African-Americans and the Constitutional Order, 1776 to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 50-7.

> remorseless revolutionary struggle. I have, therefore, in every case, thought it proper to keep the integrity of the Union prominent as the primary object of the contest on our part, leaving all questions, which are not of vital military importance to the more deliberate action of the legislature.[35]

No large organized slave uprising capable of bringing the South to its knees developed before or after Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, much to the disappointment of some abolitionists. This can be explained by the fact that slaves lived in a militarized society, with whites constantly on the lookout for slave rebellion. Thomas Wentworth Higginson questioned his soldiers about this issue when taking charge of his "colored regiment" during the spring of 1863. The former slaves invariably answered they never openly revolted because "they had neither the knowledge, nor the weapons, nor the mutual confidence to make any such attempt successful."[36] However, white southerners could not prevent small, local revolts, involving individuals or handfuls of slaves rather than hundreds of them. Neither could the Confederate army prevent slaves from running to the Union lines, a fact of vital importance for the evolution of the war. Clearly, slaves in the South were not passive observers.[37]

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[35] Abraham Lincoln, "Annual Message to Congress, December 3, 1861." Quoted in Don E. Fehrenbacher (ed.), Abraham Lincoln, p. 176.

[36] Thomas Wentworth Higginson, "The First Black Regiment, The Outlook, July 1898, pp. 521-531, as quoted in Noah Andre Trudeau, Like Men of War. Black Troops in the Civil War, 1862-1865 (Boston: Little Brown, 1998), p. 66.

[37] For a good account of black mobilization at the beginning of the war see James M. McPherson, The Negro's Civil War. How American Blacks Felt and Acted During the War for the Union (1965, reprint, New York: Ballantine Books, 1991), especially chapter II, "The Negro's Response to the War, 1861," pp. 19-36.

Blacks in the Confederate War Effort

While northerners denied blacks the right to serve, southerners tried to optimize the military use of slaves and free blacks. In the Confederacy, the large black population was viewed by many as an important military resource in the rearguard. At the beginning of the war, freed blacks around the Confederacy offered their military services to the cause of secession. Southern leaders immediately rejected these proposals, invoking moral and ideological principles that black mobilization would have contradicted. As prominent Georgian slaveholder and Confederate General, Howell Cobb stated at the end of the war, reliance on black military power would be equal to the destruction of the movement because:

> The day you make soldiers of them [blacks] is the beginning of the end of the revolution. If slaves make good soldiers our whole theory of slavery is wrong.[38]

Confederate racial fears did not prevent their leaders from using blacks (free or slave) in the rearguard, supporting their fighting armies with heavy labor. From the beginning of the war, slaves built much of the infrastructure of the southern war effort. Hundreds of thousands worked on fortifications, breastworks, trenches, forts, and other defensive works that were built in nearly every city and

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[38]Quoted in Degler, Neither Black Nor White, p. 78. A similar point of view about black soldiers was also formulated by some officers who told Union Brigadier General Daniel Ulman that: "we must not discipline them (blacks), for if we do, we will have to fight them some day ourselves." Quoted in Joseph T. Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, p. 168. On the southern debate over the enlistment of slaves in the last months of war, see Robert Durden, The Gray and the Black (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), Richard Rollins (ed.) Black Southerners in Gray. Essays on Afro-Americans in Confederate Armies. (Murfreesboro: Southern Heritage Press, 1994), and Thomas E. Preisser, "The Virginia Decision to Use Negro Soldiers in the Civil War, 1864-1865," in Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 82, No. 1, 1975, pp. 98-113.

town in the South. Indeed, one of the persistent themes in Confederate politics was the labor question. How should black labor be used? What compensation should be given owners of slaves used on national projects? [39]

Blacks staffed southern hospitals and worked in weapons manufacturing plants in Virginia and Georgia. They also followed their masters, working as cooks or assistants and, eventually, taking up arms. If southerners for ideological and political reasons clearly rejected the draft of slaves, they could not dispense with their work on the home front. A Virginian slaveholder summarized the sacrifices planters made to support their army with black laborers:

> In this section of the country a heavy draught has been made upon the farmers (half of the available working force) to work on the fortifications. I, for one, rendered this tribute cheerfully to a cause which is dear to my heart, though that, together with the excessive rains will materially shorten my crop.[40]

While portions of the slave population worked on the Confederate defenses, some of them began to run for Union lines. With the advance of Union troops, the picture begun to change, and so did the position of slaves in the Confederacy.

Runaways and the Union Army

When Union troops moved deep into the South, commanders had to choose how to deal with the runaways that began to cross their lines. Early in the

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[39] For a description of the varieties of jobs performed by black in the Army of Virginia see Ervin L. Jordan Jr. Black Confederates and Afro-Yankees in Civil War Virginia (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995), especially chapter 8, "Grand and Awful Time. Body Servants at War," pp. 185-200. See also McPherson, The Negro's Civil War, pp. 245-48.

[40] L. H. Minor to the Confederate Secretary of War, Hanover, Virginia, May 2, 1862 in Ira Berlin et al, "The Destruction of Slavery," in Freedom. A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), Document 264, p. 698 (henceforth quoted as "Destruction of Slavery."

war, troop units constituted microcosms of communities, reflecting the customs and prejudices existing in different parts of the North. For many soldiers, seeing the South for the first time convinced them that it was indeed a backward society in need of fundamental changes. As one soldier observed, "They [southerners] are certainly the most primitive ignorant people I ever came across".[41]

The behavior of northern soldiers and their attitudes about the slaves have been subjected to extensive historiographical debate. Most analyses agree that northern condemnation of slavery did not necessarily reinforce ideas of racial justice, nor did it lead to the acceptance of blacks as equal citizens.[42] Many soldiers condemned slavery while holding reservations about the slaves themselves. With the exception of some abolitionists and of northern blacks, neither northern society as a whole nor the newly formed Republican Party supported full citizenship for blacks. This can easily be seen in the "Black Codes"

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[41] James S. Slight to his wife, Jan. 17, 1862, quoted in Randall Jimmerson, The Private Civil War: Popular Thought during the Sectional Conflict (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), p. 133.

[42]Bell Irvin Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank, pp. 40-44; James McPherson, For Cause and Comrades, pp. 117-30; Nina Silber and Mary Beth Sievens (eds.) Yankee Correspondence: Civil War Letters Between New England Soldiers and the Homefront (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996); Randall C. Jimerson, The Private Civil War: Popular Though During the Sectional Conflict (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), especially chapter 4; Reid Mitchell, Civil War Soldiers: Their Expectations and Their Experiences (New York: Touchstone, 1988), pp. 117-26. David A. Cecere, "Carrying the Home Front to War: Race and New England Culture During the Civil War," in Paul A. Cimbala (ed.), Look Homeward: Union Soldiers and the North Home Front Before and After the Civil War (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000); Earl J. Hess, Liberty, Virtue and Progress: Northerners and Their War for the Union (New York: New York University Press, 1988). The extreme case seems to be Michael Barton's Goodmen. The Character of Civil War Soldiers. (London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1981), in which Barton argues that southerners and northerners shared the same core value system.

existing in most of the northern states, with the exception of New England.[43] Many officers reflected this pattern of behavior, including the provost marshal of Norfolk, Virginia, who told president Lincoln that "the decided majority of our officers of all grades have no sympathy with your policy...They hate the Negro, more than they love the Union."[44] Such attitudes, as George Fredrickson has pointed out, "suggest the tragic limitation of the white racial imagination of the nineteenth century, namely its characteristic inability to visualize an egalitarian biracial society."[45]

There was no uniform response to runaways. Because immediate communication with Washington DC was difficult, many commanders exercised considerable discretion in their treatment of runaways. Neither the military nor the Lincoln administration had a comprehensive plan to deal with the torrent of African-Americans who approached the Union lines. Responses depended on the commander's moral beliefs as well as on the relations among Union troops,

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[43] According to Leon F. Litwack, the extent of antislavery and anti-southern sentiment in 1860 cannot be taken as an index of the success of abolitionism since many Republicans, probably a large majority, were explicitly opposed to the doctrine of immediate abolition. Blacks did not share in the expansion of political democracy during the first half of the nineteenth century. North of Slavery. The Negro in the Free States, 1790-1860 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961). Many years and hundreds of thousand of victims would be necessary for the Radical wing of the Republican party achieve the necessary strength in order to organize their demands on a consistent political project. Only at the war's end would such a project be able to claim a deep transformation in the country's racial structures. On the Republican Party's free labor ideology before the Civil War see: Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men. The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), and Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). especially pp. 23-4 and 261-62. As limited as the Republican attitude could be, Foner claims it was qualitatively more progressive than the average northern position.

[44] Major E. Boney to Mr. Lincoln, 18 Feb. 1861, Ira Berlin et al. Black Military Experience, Doc. 162, p. 411.

[45] Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind., pp. xii-xiii.

slaveholders, and slaves in each area. In this environment, individual Union commanders established their own policies regarding runaways. While some immediately understood the importance of the slaves to the Confederate war effort, others preferred to return fugitives, expecting some cooperation from loyal slaveholders. During the peninsular campaign (Spring 1862), Major General John A. Dix worked to exclude blacks from his lines, assuring local slaveholders that "special directions have been given not to interfere with the condition of any person held to domestic service."[46] This position was criticized by radical Republicans such as representative Owen Lovejoy from Illinois, who declared that, "it is no part of the duty of the soldiers of the United States to capture and return fugitive slaves."[47]

The situation of each group of runaways varied according to circumstances. In some cases, slaves had fled their masters; in others, masters had evacuated, leaving their slaves behind; in still others, masters stayed and declared their loyalty to the Union cause. The first situation involved personal or collective decisions on the part of the slaves. From the outset of the war, many slaves sensed that the conflict would ultimately destroy slavery and that, if they could escape behind Union lines, they would find freedom. Susie King Taylor, a young slave girl from South Carolina, described the excitement at the time of her family's escape: "I wanted to see these wonderful Yankees so much, as I heard

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[46] Dix to Colonel August Morse, 14 Oct 1861, OR, Vol. II, pp. 773-74. Dix also proposed to send "contrabands" north to alleviate the demographic pressure in the military camps. See Jordan, Black Confederates and Afro-Yankees, p. 265.

my parents say the Yankee was going to set all the slaves free"[48] Another fugitive, informed by a Union general that he could not enlist into the army because "it wasn't a black man's war," answered that "it would be a black man's war before they got through."[49]

During the first months of the war, the Virginia tidewater was the Confederate theater where Union troops most often met with runaway slaves. General Benjamin Butler, then in command of the Union forces at Fort Monroe, refused to return runaways on the grounds that they should be considered "contrabands of war." From that moment the runaways were known as "contrabands." Butler's justification was useful because it associated emancipation with the needs of the war.[50]

The situation of those who looked for help under northern protection was difficult. Runaways who came into contact with Federal forces needed to be fed, clothed, and provided with shelter. They also had to be put to work as soon as possible, or else they would soon become an obstacle to the army by consuming

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[47] Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 1st session, p. 32. Owen Lovejoy was a brother of martyred abolitionist Elijah Lovejoy.

[48] Patricia W. Romero and Willie Lee Rose (eds.) Reminiscences of My Life. A Black Woman's Civil War Memoirs. Susie King Taylor (New York: Markus Wiener Publishing, 1988), p. 32.

[49] Testimony given by former Virginia slave Harry Jarvis in John W. Blassingame (ed.), Slave Testimony: Two Centuries of Letters, Speeches, Interviews, and Autobiographies (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), p. 608.

[50] This incident took place in May 22, 1861. See Louis Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedmen. Federal Policy Toward Southern Blacks, 1861-1865 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 11-13. According to Louis S. Gerteis the population of blacks under federal control in Virginia rose from approximately 1,500 early in 1862 to nearly 5,000 by the end of the year. p. 23. See also McPherson, The Negro's Civil War, p. 28. For the official correspondence of the whole affair, see O.R., Series I, Vol. II, pp. 52-4, 648-51; Series I, Vol. VIII, p. 370; Series III, Vol. I, p. 243.

supplies and by slowing down the movements of the Union forces.[51] In part to alleviate the problem, Congress passed the Second Confiscation Act on August 6, 1862. This enactment allowed Union commanders to confiscate and employ those slaves who had been used as laborers by the Confederate military or who worked for disloyal masters. The act basically confirmed Butler's policy at Fortress Monroe. The slaveholder who permitted his slaves to be used against the government "forfeit[ed] his claim" to his slaves' labor. The act did nothing, however, for those slaves who had not been in Confederate service.[52] An editorial from Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper portrayed the derogatory way in which runaways were viewed in the northern press during these first months. Under the title "Morning Mustering of the Contrabands" the magazine emphasized that, "Doubtless the nigger band have never had so pleasant an existence as under their new state of contraband existence."[53]

The relations between soldiers and runaways turned more complex as Union forces advanced over the Confederate heartland, assuming command of

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[51] Women and children significantly surpassed the male population in many camps. In December 12, 1863, a report from a refugee camp in Natchez, Mississippi, recorded 495 men, 1,612 women, and 875 children for a total of 2,982 refugees. Liberator, 15 January 1864. Quoted in Dan R. Frost, "Blacks and Emancipation: The Decisive Factors that Resulted in Union Victory in the Civil War," (M.A. Thesis, Fullerton State University, 1987), pp. 103-4.

[52] George P. Sanger (comp.), The Statutes at Large, treaties, and Proclamations, of the United States of America (Boston, Little Brown Company, 1863), Vol. 12, p. 319.

[53] Frank Leslie Illustrate Newspaper, 2 Nov.1861. Open prejudices were part of what Michael Barton defined as the "Victorian Panorama." According to Barton "Victorians believed that the economy was a test of morals, and that the poor could not control their impulses. Rescuing the poor, therefore, meant teaching them willpower and new morals. Many of the poor believed this too." Barton, Goodmen, p. 50.

plantations and dealing with black populations whose labor was potentially useful.

Figure 4

The Popular Idea of the Freedmen's Bureau - "Plenty to Eat and Nothing to Do."
The derogatory image of blacks surviving the end of the war.

Source: Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, October, 1866.

At first, the problem of caring for and governing large slave populations was quite without precedent for the Union army. When South Carolina's Sea Islands were occupied in November, 1861, masters and their families fled the region, leaving a significant black population of 10,000 persons behind. The former slaves as well as the plantations were subjected to the supervision of the Department of Treasury. The Port Royal Experiment, as it became known, united a particular set of northern expectations to an experiment in "free labor" applied directly to the Confederate landscape. While the flower of New England Abolitionism came to the Sea Islands as teachers, some military and civilian administrators, including businessman less interested in the well being of the

freed slaves than in profiting from the wartime circumstances, also came. Conflicts involving northern officers, former slaves, commercial agents, and religious missionaries soon emerged, showing the limits of reform ideals. In retrospect, the Port Royal experience was atypical when compared to the Northern management of slave labor elsewhere in the conquered South.[54]

In the central and the Gulf departments of the army, the experience was quite different. The Union invasion of heavily populated areas in Louisiana and the Mississippi Valley did not assure complete control of the territory or its people. Taking advantage of this precarious distribution of power, many masters declared loyalty to the Union and pressured the army to enforce labor discipline. The initial labor program of the Union Army on the Mississippi River reflected the fragile military situation and maintained the hegemony of the planter class. As work conditions deteriorated, many slaves ran away from the plantations. The army's main concern then was control of the labor force, especially the runaways whom they classified as "vagrant blacks."[55] General Nathaniel P. Banks assured Louisiana's white population that "the well being of this people [blacks] requires

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[54] On Port Royal conflicts, see Willie Lee Rose, Rehearsal for Reconstruction. The Port Royal Experiment (1964, reprint, New York, Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 199-216; Ira Berlin et al. The Destruction of Slavery, pp. 101-114; Eric Foner, Reconstruction. America's Unfinished Revolution (1984, reprint, New York: Harper and Row, 1989) pp. 51-5.

[55] Thomas May, "Continuity and Change in the Labor Program of the Union Army and the Freedman's Bureau," in Civil War History, Vol. XVII, number 3, 1971, pp. 245-54.

that they should labor, and be preserved from vagrancy and idle, vicious habits."[56]

Former slaveholders in these areas kept a high degree of control over the African American work force and had the cooperation of the Union's main representatives until late in the war. They were supported by an interpretation of free-labor ideology that blamed the slaves' own lack of initiative for their economic plight. Late in the war, an editorial expressed the concerns of many in the northern white community about the rupture of the South's social hierarchy: "The slaves with the idea of freedom had not imbibed the idea of labor, and were in a state of perfect bewilderment. Many wandered around the streets, so many in fact to become a growing evil."[57]

The difficult problem of defining the status of black refugees continued even after the war. The Second Confiscation Act solved part of the problem by giving commanders full power to employ them, pay them for their work and, eventually, demand their cooperation for military purposes. However, it did not give commanders a clear blueprint of how to deal with recently emancipated slaves. Still, the ambiguous policies of federal authorities could not block the deterioration of slavery, a process flowing inevitably from the logic of the war. Dislocation, migration, and the introduction of wage labor impelled the

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[56] Louis S. Gerteis argued that the experience of blacks in Civil War Louisiana, where General Nathaniel P. Banks established a labor system that critics charged resembled slavery, shaped Reconstruction far more than events on the Sea Islands.

[57] Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, 21 May 1864.

destruction of slavery, but military recruitment was the decisive factor in preventing a return to the antebellum status quo.[58]

Early Experiences with Black Soldiers

As Union troops occupied plantation states, unauthorized recruitment of black soldiers began to take place. Initially, local Union officers, largely on their own initiative and without official sanction, recruited blacks. The federal government tolerated some of this but several officers were subject to strong censure. During the spring of 1862 David Hunter in South Carolina, Benjamin Butler in Louisiana and James Lane in Kansas, seized the chance to arm former slaves against their masters, before the Lincoln administration had taken definite steps to authorize it. Although these unauthorized actions met with rebuke from the Lincoln administration, they paved the way for a shift in Federal military policy once manpower demands became pressing and white induction declined. In each case, the local initiative answered a perceived emergency in a region considered vulnerable to Confederate guerrillas. While the president remained "averse to arming negroes" he agreed to allow local commanders "to arm, for purely defensive purposes, slaves coming within their lines."[59]

In occupied Louisiana, General Butler, facing a military shortage and Confederate threat, recruited the 1,400-man Louisiana State Guard, a force of free

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[58] According to Joe H. Mays, from a pre-war population of 4,000,000, approximately 520,000 African Americans in the Confederacy entered the Union lines during the war. "Black Americans and their Contribution Toward Union Victory in the American Civil War, 1861-1865, (Ph.D. Dissertation, Middle Tennessee State University, 1983), p. 53.

[59] David Donald (ed.), Inside Lincoln's Cabinet - The Civil War Diaries of Salomon P. Chase (New York, Longamas, Green, 1954), pp. 96, 99-100.

blacks who had served as an auxiliary militia with the Confederates.[60] Butler thus became the first Union general to successfully organize a black regiment, although his regiment, the Louisiana Native Guards, would not see combat until the spring of the next year.[61] The ranks of the Native Guards were filled by free blacks, most light-skinned mulattos, who had been previously enrolled under the Confederacy (although their service was refused in 1861). Their enrollment helped to coopt this expressive minority, who possessed some property and influence in New Orleans.[62] "The Darkest of them" said General Butler "were about the complexion of the late Mr. Webster."[63]

Louisiana's non-white community was heavily stratified and differences between free people of color and slaves were stronger there than in any other part of the South. Consequently, in its early phase, recruitment of Louisiana's black soldiers did not lead to an Emancipation policy. This made Buttler's regiments more palatable for white public opinion in the North and for loyal slaveholders in

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[60] Late in the summer of 1862 Confederates reversed the initial progress of Union troops and re-captured Baton Rouge, the state capital. Complete control of the state was only achieved after the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson in July 1863.

[61] In 1860 18,647 free blacks lived in Louisiana, 10,689 of them in New Orleans. In 1830 some 750 free men of color owned 2,351 slaves. Rural Louisiana developed a significant class of slaveholding free blacks. See, Ted Tunnel, "Free Negroes and the Freedmen: Black Politics in New Orleans During the Civil War," in Southern Studies, Volume 19, number 1, 1980, pp. 5-28.

[62] For Congressional debates concerning Butler's recruitment efforts in Louisiana, see Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd session, pp. 2620-1.

[63] Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Army Life in a Black Regiment, (1869, reprint, Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 1. According to Manoj K. Joshi and Joseph P. Reidy, on the eve of the Civil War, New Orleans freemen owned two million dollar's worth of property, and fully 85 percent worked as artisans, professionals, and proprietors. The most prosperous owned large plantations and dozens of slaves. See, " 'To Come Forward and Aid in Putting Down this Unholy Rebellion': The Officers of Louisiana's Free Black Native Guard During the Civil War Era," in Southern Studies, Vol. 21, Issue 2, 1983, p. 326.

the state. Even so, Butler's successor, Nathaniel P. Banks, did what he could to dismiss black officers.[64]

In May, 1862, while Butler's efforts in Louisiana were proceeding, General David Hunter, military commander of South Carolina, ordered the enlistment of all able-bodied African Americans.[65] Recruitment in the Port Royal area was complicated because it threatened economic gains made by the recently liberated slaves. Many were employed as wage laborers, earning an income on the cotton plantations for the first time in their lives and improving their standard of living. They felt no willingness to become soldiers and risk their precarious status on an uncertain enterprise.

Hunter's decision instituted the first African American draft of the Civil War, a practice that spread later to other parts of South. The implementation of the draft spread panic on the plantations, with men fleeing to the woods and being hunted down by the soldiers. Those who were caught were marched off under guard, as if they were still slaves. Almost six hundred men were dispatched to Hunter's headquarters to be drilled.[66]

The regiment did not last long. President Lincoln refused to sanction the recruitment of black troops and never authorized Hunter to pay or to equip them properly. By August, Hunter's regiment was disbanded, to the joy of its "would-be

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[64] Ira Berlin et al., Black Military Experience, pp. 41-44.

[65] In sequence, Hunter proclaimed the emancipation of all slaves in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, whether or not within Union Lines.

[66] The violence of the draft system was symbolically connected with masters' previous insinuations that the Yankees would sell the former slaves to the Caribbean plantations.

soldiers," and General Rufus Saxton replaced Hunter as the military commander of the Sea Islands. Probably the worst effect of Hunter's attempted conscription was the bad impression left on the black population around Port Royal. As a result of Hunter's draconian impressment, many former slaves remained deeply distrustful of the Union army. Colonel Thomas Wentworth Higginson, commanding officer of the First South Carolina Volunteers, later complained that Hunter's actions were detrimental to his own recruiting efforts:[67]

> The trouble is in the legacy of bitter distrust bequeathed by the abortive regiment of General Hunter - into which they were driven like cattle, kept for several months in camp and then turned off without a shilling, by order of the War Department. The formation of the regiment, was on the whole, a great injury to this one...those who now refuse to enlist have great influence in deterring others.[68]

In Kansas, Senator James Lane, a veteran of the border wars, undertook a different strategy for black enlistment. In July 1862, Lane introduced a recruiting system under which black agents were authorized to enroll former slaves under the promise they might become officers. The system worked very well, although gaps in the ranks were filled by impressment. By October 1862, the 1st Kansas Colored Volunteers was formed, with many volunteers responding to the promises of equal pay and equal promotion with white soldiers. However,

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[67] Hunter's experiments with black regiments also alarmed Border State politicians. In Washington D.C., Kentucky representatives introduced resolutions before the House denouncing recruitment in South Carolina. See, Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, Part 3, June 9, 1862, pp. 2620-2621, Part 4, July 3, 5, 1862, pp. 3102, 3109, 3125. See also, Bell I. Wiley, Southern Negroes, 1861-1865 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), pp. 297-98.

[68] Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Army Life in a Black Regiment, (1869, reprint, Boston: Beacon Press, 1970) pp. 15-16.

because Lane acted without Federal authority, his regiments were not paid, nor did his black officers receive commissions, until 1864.[69]

The Emancipation Proclamation

An important difference between the Brazilian and American processes lies in the direct consequences the Civil War had for emancipation in the South, in contrast with Brazil, where emancipation did not immediately follow the Paraguayan War. By 1863 northern Republicans thought of themselves as attacking the enemy by emancipating slaves as well as by putting them into the army, while in Brazil, emancipation would have inflicted damage on the regime's own supporters. While Brazilian leaders compromised with slaveholders, Republicans formulated a policy of emancipation. During the spring and summer of 1862, opinion in the North began to shift in favor of stronger measures to deal with slaves and abandoned property in the rebel areas. Another important difference between military emancipation in Brazil and the U.S. was the role of public debate. In America, debates were not restricted to the presidential cabinet. While Lincoln's decision for emancipation was essential, there were also intense discussions in the Congress and the press. Senators and representatives were tuned in to public opinion, which reflected changes in behavior and attitudes taking place in the North. It is possible to follow in these debates the gradual steps taken towards abolition during the 37th Congress.[70] On

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[69] On James [Big] Lane recruitment's procedures, see Cornish, The Sable Arm, pp. 69-76.

[70] The thirty-seventh Congress was one of the most influential in American legislative history with fundamental contributions in land-grants, colleges, confiscation, banks, and expropriation of property. See Leonard P. Curry, Blueprint for Modern America: Non-Military Legislation of the First

April 16, 1862, President Lincoln signed a bill abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia. By July 1862, the Republican leadership clearly favored emancipation as a war aim. The continuing drop in the enlistment of white volunteers and the lack of success on the battlefield convinced Lincoln that emancipation was a needed weapon to defeat the Confederacy. In March 1863, Henry H. Halleck, General-in Chief of the army, summarized for Ulysses S. Grant, Military Commander of the Department of Tennessee, the new understanding of the administration:

> The character of the war has very much changed within the last year. There is now no possible hope of a reconciliation with the rebels. The union party in the South is virtually destroyed. There can be no peace but that which is enforced by the sword. We must conquer the rebels or be conquered by them. The north must either destroy the slave oligarchy or become slaves themselves;[71]

The preliminary Emancipation Proclamation was issued on September, 1862. It asserted that unless the rebels relinquished their arms by January 1st, 1863, their slaves would be considered free. The border states and other areas with a population of "loyal masters" were excluded from the proclamation. The New York Times of November 21, 1862, expressed this new pragmatic spirit in support of the presidential decision:

Civil War Congress (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968). For the Republican behavior in the Congress see Herman Belz, Emancipation and Equal Rights: Politics and Constitutionalism in the Civil War Era. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978).

[71] Henry W. Halleck to Ulysses S. Grant, 31 Mar., 1863. Quoted in Berlin et. al., Black Military Experience, Doc. 50, p. 144.

> Slavery is a prodigious element of the strength of the rebellion. It multiplies its military power, - for it releases every white man from labor and sends him to the field. It is a tremendous weapon in the hands of the rebels...Why have not our military authorities precisely the same to deprive the rebellion of that weapon which they have to deprive of any other?[72]

Prior to the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, there existed a very real possibility that the South would indeed achieve independence. Confederate victories on the battlefield and the unexpected length of the war had taken their toll on northern morale and enlistment into the army had greatly declined. There were indications that the Confederacy might be recognized by France and England, turning the war into a still more difficult enterprise. Lincoln's stated purpose in issuing the proclamation as a war measure was no subterfuge. The North was desperate for manpower to conduct its offensive war against the Confederacy. In addition to defeating Confederate armies, the Union army had to occupy and administer large areas of southern territory. The army had to protect long supply and communication lines from Confederate cavalry and guerrillas. Union forces often had to attack entrenched Confederate positions, and this proved costly in lives. Mounting casualty lists caused many citizens and the government to look favorably upon black enlistment. Many northern and southern blacks were willing to join the war because of the promise of emancipation. Emancipation encouraged slaves to flee the South, thereby depriving the Confederacy of its labor. In turn, blacks serving as laborers strengthened Union armies, liberating white troops from fatigue duties. The final

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[72] The New York Times, November 21, 1862.

Emancipation Proclamation on New Year's Day authorized the freed slaves to "be received into the armed services of the United States" for garrison duty. Within days President Lincoln took further action allowing black men, whether freed slaves or free born, to become full scale Union soldiers.[73]

While the federal administration acted cautiously in the border states, it still faced strong resistance in some northern areas where the political controversy over the recruitment and organization of black soldiers was stronger, confronting what Eric Foner called "the inner civil War."[74] Northern Democrats had great influence until very late in the conflict. Peace Democrats opposed emancipation and black enlistment, positions still very popular among immigrants and Middle Westerners.[75] Many of these sectors feared that freedom would bring a flood of black immigrants to the North, competing for the most menial jobs in the cities.[76]

The Democratic press, politicians and soldiers complained bitterly against what they perceived as a subversion of the war's objectives. Upon receiving the nomination for governor at the New York Democratic state convention on September 10, 1862, Horatio Seymour expressed common northern reservations about the Emancipation Proclamation: "The scheme for an immediate emancipation and general arming of the slaves throughout the South is a proposal

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[73] Emancipation Proclamation in Fehrenbacher ed., Lincoln, p. 212. See also Franklin, The Emancipation Proclamation.

[74] Eric Foner, Reconstruction America's Unfinished Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), pp. 11-18

[75] Although Democrats could not avoid the victory of Emancipation they could filibuster to retard approbation of emancipation legislation, see Leonard P. Curry, "Congressional Democrats, 1861-1863," in Civil War History, Vol. 12, 1966, pp. 213-19.

for the butchery of women and children for scenes of lust and rapine, of arson and murder unparalleled in the history of the world." In November, he swept to victory in the polls, one of many electoral defeats for the Republicans. [77]

From Contraband to Soldiers

When the Congress began to discuss the possibility of recruiting black soldiers, it was moved by a public opinion willing to sacrifice some of its most cherished values in exchange for a more effective strategy of mobilization. It was also moved by a relentless shortage of troops only partially relieved by a conscription policy that was partial and difficult to implement.[78] Senator John Sherman, a conservative Republican, captured this reversal in a letter to his brother, General William T. Sherman:

> You can form no conception at the change of opinion here on the negro question. Men of all parties who now appreciate the magnitude of the contest and who are determined to preserve the unity of the government at all hazards, agree that we must seek and make it the interests of the Negroes to help us.[79]

By the spring of 1863 the perception of the war had changed substantially in the North. Many soldiers had died, others were disabled or out of combat, and

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[76] Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War, pp. 166-7.

[77] Thomas Cook and Thomas Knox, Public Record: Including Speeches, Messages, Proclamations, Official Correspondence and Other Public Utterances of Horatio Seymour (New York, 1868), p. 54. Quoted in William Seraile, "The Struggle to Raise Black Regiments in New York States, 1861-1864," in The New-York Historical Society Quarterly, Vol. LVIII, No. 3, 1974, p.224. New York was the only state in the North where the state government did not help the federal administration to raise a black regiment. Recruitment in New York was directly promoted by the Federal authorities in connection with a group of affluent citizens organized around the Union Club.

[78] On the problems presented by conscription in America refer to chapter V.

[79] Senator John Sherman to General William Tecumseh Sherman, August 24, 1862. Quoted in Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War , p. 158.

the number of desertions was growing.[80] After the approval of the Enrollment Act (March, 1863), pressure on the free male population increased substantially, and soon there were clear signals of increasing resistance to the conscription lottery. Not unlike the experience in Brazil, three years later, Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, remarked in January of 1863 that "partyism" seemed stronger than "patriotism" in most northern states.[81] However, in Brazil, the Emperor held a great deal of discretionary power, while President Lincoln had to deal with an extremely competitive political system. Federal law enforcement could adopt extreme measures to cope with public emergencies, as in the temporary suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, but elections were not suspended, and all politicians had to respect the attitudes of the common man.[82]

Resistance assumed unexpected dimensions during the New York draft riots of July 1863. For many people the draft transformed the republic into "one great military dictatorship." The mob's attacks included not only racial targets, but also symbols of Republican power such as the residences of politicians and

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[80] According to James W. Geary 116,125 soldiers deserted during the last two years of the war. We Need Men, p. 14.

[81] Howard K. Beale (ed.), Diary of Gideon Welles: Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, 3 vols. (New York, 1960), Vol. I, p. 324.

[82] In addition to the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary powers the Emperor counted on a fourth power called the Moderator which weakened congressional independence. Through the Moderator Power the Emperor could call new elections and forge a majority when he needed it. Joaquim Nabuco, Um Estadista do Império. Nabuco de Araújo. Sua Vida, Suas Opiniões, Sua Época (São Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1936). For a liberal critique against the opeation of this power see Zacarias de Góes e Vasconcellos, Da Natureza e Limites do Poder Moderador (Rio de Janeiro: Laemmert, 1862). During the war, provincial elections were suspended in the Province of Rio Grande do Sul.

industrialists.[83] A group of Boston businessmen expressed a common sense of the connections between the recruitment crisis in the North and the recruitment of black soldiers in the South:

> In the free States the great numbers already drawn from the workshops and fields have seriously embarrassed many branches of the industry upon which the production of the country depends, and it is desirable to reduce the call upon such resources to the lowest point which is consistent with the vigorous prosecution of the War...For these and other reasons we earnestly recommend that permission should be immediately given to the loyal states to recruit soldiers (against their Quotas) in those parts of the Rebel States within our control, both to fill up the white regiments now there and to create such black regiments as you may deem it expedient to authorize.[84]

Official recruiting of black troops in the wake of the Emancipation Proclamation effectively began in the winter and the spring of 1863, when the effects of the Enrollment Act were most deeply felt. This process involved several steps in early 1863 in which the federal government extended permission for the recruitment of slaves in the northern states. The Enrollment Act of March 1863, by subjecting the mass of white northerners to the draft, encouraged the

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[83] Through violence portions of the poor produced a symbolic theater for a white laboring audience who participated in the process of dehumanizing its victims by committing the most horrendous atrocities on the bodies of black man they murdered. James McPherson, The Negro's Civil War, pp. 71-77. Ernest McKay, The Civil War and New York City (Syracuse,: Syracuse University Press, 1990). See especially chapter 11, "Riot pp. 195-215. Alessandra Lorini, "Class, Race, Gender, and Public Rituals: the New York African-American Community in the Civil War Era," in Storia Nordamericana (Italy), Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990, pp. 117-137. From the same author see also Rituals of Race: American Public Culture and the Search for Racial Democracy (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1999), especially chapter 1, "Parades in New York City: Rituals of Loyalty and Freedom," pp. 1-32. On this subject the classic reference is Natalie Davis, "The Rites of Violence," in Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), pp. 152-187.

[84] Amos A. Lawrence et al. To Honorable E. M. Stanton, 10 Dec. 1863, enclosed in S. Hooper to Honble. E. M. Stanton, 19 Dec. 1863, H-1807 1863m Letters Received, RG 107 {L-159}. Quoted in Ira Berlin et al, The Black Military Experience, Doc. 39A, pp. 108-9.

use of black soldiers -- that blacks could "stop a bullet as well as any white man" became a common attitude in the North as the war in Virginia and in Tennessee became ever more costly. Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson, a Republican and a leading proponent of using black troops, noted with enthusiasm the impact of the draft a white attitudes around the North:

> When the [Enrollment] act was passed, you had a wild, unreasoning prejudice against using a black man to fight the battles of our country. But when people who were filled with these prejudices saw that they must go themselves, and bare their bosoms to the shot and shell of the enemy, they learned that the black man's blood was no more sacred than their own, and that they would as soon have a black man stand up and fight the battles of the country as to do it themselves.[85]

By May, the Bureau of Colored Troops had been created to take care of the organization of black troops and to standardize procedures. The Bureau also completed the process of centralization, as most regiments would be directly linked to the Federal government, not to the states.[86] By the middle of 1863, Secretary Stanton permitted all of the northern states to recruit freed slaves in the South. The Union government had reached the end of the long process through which it became committed to the recruitment of black troops in both the North and the southern and border states.[87]

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[85] Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, 1st Session, p. 80.

[86] A famous case was the 1st South Carolina Volunteers subsequently renamed the 33rd U.S. Colored Infantry. See Willie Lee Rose, Rehearsal for Reconstruction, p.193,

[87] Dudley Taylor Cornish, The Sable Arm.

The Parameters of Change

By the fall of 1863 war weariness in the North made whites increasingly more willing to accept the revolutionary impact of emancipation and black enlistment. At the same time, many conservatives in both parties understood that the African-American population offered a possible solution to the troop crisis.

Table XII
Black Population and White Population
Southern and Border States, 1860[88]

States	Slave Population	White Population
Border	432,585	2,650,243
Upper South	1,097,643	2,503,963
Deep South	2,240,901	2,943,257
Total	3,771,129	8,097,463

Source: Ira Berlin, Slaves Without Masters, Tables A and B, pp. 396-399.
OBS: Border (Washington DC, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri); Upper South (North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia); Lower South (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas).

With the threat of a draft quite near, many white northerners began to see the enrollment of black volunteers as preferable to the draft of relatives and friends. An Illinois soldier expressed this opinion clearly in early 1863: "For my part I would like to see all the negroes we could raise armed and put under military discipline...I think if a negro could save their lives [the lives of whites] by sacrificing theirs, they [the whites] would be willing."[89] For this soldier, against a background of mounting casualties, desertion, and growing sacrifices, the recruitment of African Americans came to seem as a "lesser evil." A letter from

[88] Black free population not included.

[89] David Givler to a friend, 14 Feb., 1863, in "Intimate Glimpses of Army Life During the Civil War; Autobiography, Diaries, Letters, of David B. Givler, Company C, 7th Illinois Infantry..." typewritten MS, Illinois State Historical Library), p. 101. Quoted in Victor Hicken, "The Record of Illinois' Negro Soldiers in the Civil War," in Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, Vol. LVI, Np. 3, Autumn 1963, pp. 538-9.

the Governor of Iowa to the General in Chief of the Army illustrates the same attitude, even more crudely. "When this war is over, "he wrote," and we have summed up the entire loss of life it has imposed on this country I shall not have any regrets if it is found that a part of the dead are niggers and that all are not white men."[90]

Mobilizing Black Regiments in the North

The final Emancipation Proclamation called for the enrollment of blacks in the Union Army and Navy. During the winter of 1863, few black units were recruited. General Rufus Saxton nominated Thomas Wentworth Higginson, an abolitionist minister from Massachusetts, to reorganize the unit disbanded by General David Hunter, now renamed the 1st South Carolina Volunteers.[91] The regiment was composed mainly of men of the South Carolina Sea Islands, together with refugees coming from the coastal areas of Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina. In spite of the importance normally associated with this initiative, the regiment saw little action during its first year, except for occasional raids on the gulf coastal areas.[92]

Initial steps toward recruitment in the North followed the traditional American pattern, where the governors of states undertook the organization and designated officers. In Massachusetts and Rhode Island, governors John

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[90] Samuel J. Kirkwood to General Henry W. Halleck, 5 Aug. 1862. Quoted in Berlin et al., The Black Military Experience, Doc. 25, pp. 87-8.

[91] James W. Geary estimates that between two and three thousand slaves enlisted in these experimental regiments. We Need Men, p. 30.

[92] Higginson's diary, Army Life in a Black Regiment, is one the best sources for the story of this regiment. See also Luis Emilio, A Brave Black Regiment.

Andrew and William Sprague received authorization to raise the first black regiments in New England. Abolitionist governor Andrew of Massachusetts immediately nominated prominent black leaders such as Frederick Douglass, Martin Delany, John M. Langston, and several clergymen to recruit in diverse parts of the North. From February to May, 1863, two regiments were raised and trained, the 54th and 55th Massachusetts Colored Infantry.[93] Soon, following the examples of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, most northern states requested authorization to raise their own black regiments.[94] The 54th soon achieved fame through its heroic attack against Fort Wagner in South Carolina. Although they were repelled, the high number of casualties helped the regiment to acquire a reputation of courage that encouraged black recruitment in other Northern states.[95]

The federal administration soon realized that the relatively small number of free blacks of military age in the North would not supply the manpower needs

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[93] Prevalent racist attitudes in certain parts of the North drove many free blacks to the Massachusetts regiments. See, William Seraile, "The Struggle to Raise Black Regiments in New York State, 1861-1864," in The New-York Historical Society Quarterly, Vol. LVIII, Number 3, July 1974, pp. 215-233, and Michael O. Smith, "Raising a Black Regiment in Michigan: Adversity and Triumph," in Michigan Historical Society Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1990, pp. 22-41. In the 55th Massachusetts Regiment, 106 troops (11%) of its 961 soldiers were from Virginia. Ervin L. Jordan, Black Confederates and Afro Yankees in Civil War Virginia, p. 268.

[94] Five regiments were initially raised in the North: the 54th and 55th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, the 5th Massachusetts Colored Cavalry, the 29th Connecticut Volunteer Infantry and 14th Rhode Island Heavy Artillery. Ira Berlin et al, The Black Military Experience, p. 407.

[95] On the action and the role of the regiment's first commander see Russel Duncan (ed.), Blue-Eyed Child of Fortune. The Civil War Letters of Colonel Robert Gould Shaw (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1992); Luis F. Emilio, History of the Fifty-four Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, 1863-1865 (Boston, Boston Book Company, 1894); "The Union Army's Fighting 54th. Black Men Banded Together in a Civil War Regiment to Provide Their Might and Passion for Justice," in American Visions, Vol. 4, No. 6, 1989, pp. 20-6.

of the Union army.[96] The number of free black males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five in the North, excluding the border states, totaled approximately 46,150. An impressive 32,671, or seventy-one percent, of these black men did serve in Union armies. Because the proportion of African Americans in any one locality was very small, these regiments were filled with people coming from many areas.

However, the Union's greatest manpower reserve was southern blacks, who were finding their way to Union lines. They were the "yet unavailed" resource that Lincoln desperately wanted to tap. Frank Leslie's Illustrated editorials, again, showed how much white attitudes could change when confronted by the draft. After months of fighting, with thousand of casualties and enlistment down to a trickle, the newspaper reconsidered its conservative position on black troops and in Christmas editorial in December, 1862, surrendered to the war needs: "Whatever may be the abstract opinion of the community as to the policy of forming contraband regiments, there can be no doubt as to the great interest with which the public must regard the first hostile collision between the slaves and their former masters."[97]

Recruitment, Emancipation, and the States

The experience of black soldiers illustrates the importance of state power in the shaping of African-American citizenship. During the American Civil War, the

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[96] According to Benjamin Quarles, from a total of 980 recruits enlisted in the Massachusetts 54th, 287 or (29.2%) had been slaves. See The Negro in the Civil War, p. 187.

[97] Frank Leslie Illustrated Newspaper, 20 Dec. 1862.

army emerged as the most important sector of the federal bureaucracy, its functions going far beyond the straightforward military sphere in which it was constitutionally enabled to perform.[98] Unlike the system of parties or the courts, the post-1863 army had a centralized command and a nationalized bureaucracy. As a force of occupation, the army became the organizing branch of the federal government in the South, implementing policies that disrupted traditional labor relations, confronting the interests of southern oligarchs when the necessities of the war demanded. In its quest to enhance national authority, the army interfered in local affairs in ways not previously admitted in America by any other branch of the federal government. This movement altered the fundamental relationship between citizens and the federal government, because black rights were basically federalized. Many commanders assumed positions as military governors of Confederate territory held by the Union troops, turning into arbiters of the social conflict that followed conquest and emancipation. In the border states, their authority sometimes surpassed that exercised by loyal governors, especially where it affected the structure of the labor market. After the Emancipation Proclamation, military successes magnified the immediate power of generals and their local allies among non-slaveholding whites. [99] William H. Johnson, a free black soldier from Connecticut, passionately described the connections between the army's success and emancipation: "The abolition of slavery is rapidly progressing South

[98] Allan Nevins, The War for the Union: The Organized War to Victory, 1864-1865 (New York,: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), provides a good account of the transformations in the Union Army's organization.

- it is the natural course of events, and must be; for wherever the Federal Army goes, the so-called master dies, and the slaves, once chattels, are transformed into men!"[100]

In the recruitment of black soldiers, the national government confronted southern sensibilities more intensely than in any other area. This interference precipitated a series of crises between federal and state authorities. Loyal slaveholders in the border states were gradually forced to recognize that the real breakthrough in recruiting black regiments occurred in the occupied South and border region. Some fought these changes. From Kentucky, Congressman William H. Wadsworth protested administration policy, arguing, correctly, that: "If they...arm the negro they are logically bound to recognize his freedom and equality."[101] Kentucky provided the most extreme case of slaveholder resistance, but the situation was far from exceptional.[102] Some Tennessee slaveholders submitted more easily, recognizing their powerlessness "It matters not what may have been our opinions upon this subject, "one wrote; "or whether we prefer a

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[99] Nearly sixty percent of eligible Kentucky blacks served in the army forces. Eric Foner, Reconstruction. America's Unfinished Revolution, p. 8.

[100] William H. Johnson, 8th Connecticut Infantry, Roanoke Island, North Carolina, 10 Feb. 1862; Pine and Palm, 27 Feb., 1862. Quoted in Edwin S. Redkey, A Grand Army of Black Men, Letters from African American Soldiers in the Union Army, 1861-1865 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991), Letter 7, p. 18.

[101] Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, 1st Session, Part 1, February 10, 11, 16, 26, 1863, pp. 598-602. For a detailed account of the conflicts in Kentucky see John David Smith, "The Recruitment of Negro Soldiers in Kentucky, 1863-1865," in Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, Vol. 72, No. 4, 1974, pp. 364-90.

[102] Kentucky local opposition delayed the enrollment of all blacks until March 1st, 1864. See John Blassingame, "The Recruitment of Colored Troops in Kentucky, Maryland and Missouri," The Historian, 29, 1967; Victor Howard, "The Civil War in Kentucky: The Slave Claims His Freedom," Journal of Negro History 67, 1982.

different state of things, the destruction of negro slavery in this country, is an accomplished and immutable fact, and we are willing to accept it as such."[103]

Figure 5
"A Queer Recontre"

A QUEER RENCONTRE.

SLAVE CATCHER (who has strayed into a Federal camp)—"*You arn't seen a boy o' mine named Cæsar, have you?* (Aside.) *Darn'd if it arn't the black nigger himself.*"
COLORED SENTRY—"*Who goes dare—advance and gib de countersign.* (Aside.) *Golly if dat arn't my old massa.*" (Sensation.)

A QUEER RENCONTRE.

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COLORED SENTRY—"*Who goes dare—advance and gib de countersign.* (Aside.) *Golly if dat arn't my old massa.*" (Sensation.)

Source: Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper

Unlike in Brazil, most blacks recruited for the Union army came from areas that stood on the periphery of the Northern industrial economy. Thus, the reaction faced by the federal officers who confiscated agricultural slave labor was qualitatively different from that faced by the Imperial agents in Brazil. Brazilian Imperial policy was deeply constrained by the interests of powerful slaveholders, especially the coffee producers, who constituted the pillars of Brazil's agrarian economy. Black recruitment in Brazil was limited by the willingness of planters to cooperate and by the need to defend the stability of the

[103] John W. Bowen et al. To Hon. Secretary of War, 26 Sept., 1863. Quoted in Ira Berlin et al., Black Military Experience, Doc. 65, p. 174.

Imperial state. In the American South, the conflict took place in a very different political environment: it mainly affected the center of the slave labor region, not the commercial and industrial markets in the North. Recruiting from the Confederacy meant depriving the enemy of valuable resources. Disruptions in the plantation economy did not directly affect the operation of the northern economy. Only in the border states, and in pockets such as southern Louisiana and the Mississippi Valley, did conflicts similar to those in Brazil arise. There, some loyal masters were able to keep part of their pre-war power and press the government for concessions. Nonetheless, as soon as these areas lost their strategic importance for the Union war effort, guarantees of exemption previously given to slaveholders vanished.[104] In early 1864 the Adjutant General of the Army informed the Secretary of the War of the disruption of slavery in Kentucky: "Being informed at this place that the slaves of Kentucky on the borders of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Tennessee, were constantly crossing the lines and quite a number of them enlisting in organizations were for the distant states of Massachusetts and Michigan, I...suggest [to the governor] the organization of regiments within its limits, and thus obtain a credit for the Negroes in the States quota."[105]

Throughout the South black recruitment was inseparable from the politics of emancipation. Although President Lincoln proclaimed respect for loyal property-owners, there was no strategy of social control capable of containing the disruption

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[104] After Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg the power of loyal slaveholders steadily decreased. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, pp. 689-716.

[105] Adjutant General {Lorenzo Thomas} to Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, 1 Feb. 1864. Ira Berlin, Black Military Experience, Doc. 98, pp. 253-54.

brought by emancipation, recruitment, and the social forces they unleashed. Recruitment made emancipation inevitable even in those regions originally exempt from it, overcoming the limits originally established the Lincoln's proclamation. Union officers and agents increasingly interfered with plantation work throughout the South and border states. By the spring of 1864, the enrollment of African Americans was conducted on a large scale in most southern and border regions. The right of emancipation granted to any conscript slave (and his family), authorized through the act of Congress of March 3, 1865, became the one of the last measures taken against slaveowners' rights in these states.[106]

Chart V



Source: O.R., Volume 3, No. 4, pp. 1260-1270.

[106] Official Records, Series III, Volume IV, April 18,1864, pp. 233-4. For a good account concerning the destruction of slavery in the Border States see Suzanne Leslie Rowland, "Emancipation and the Black Military Experience During the American Civil War: A Documentary History," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of History, University of Rochester, 1991). Of course, the last blow against slaveowner's rights was the 13th Amendment in January, 1865.

Although the federal government played a crucial role in the disintegration of slavery, the slaves themselves took the most important part. Slaves sensed the opportunities and moved quickly to take advantage of them. During 1863 and 1864 a vast number of slaves left plantations and headed for army camps, dissolving the bonds of servitude. The process was spurred by the credits given for black soldiers against state draft quotas.[107] Consequently, in 1863 and 1864 the nation watched the practical destruction of slavery and the development of freedom on a scale unknown to any other slave society in the Americas. Agustin L. Taveau, a southern master from Charleston, commented on the realities of post-emancipation South and the lack of attachment of former slaves to the old social order "I believed that these people [slaves] were content happy, and attached to their masters...If they were content, happy and attached to their masters, why did they desert him in the moment of his need and flock to an enemy whom they did not know, and thus left their, perhaps really good masters whom they did know from infancy?"[108]

Blacks and the Nationalization of the Army

By April 1865, around 10 percent of the Union Army (or 178,000 men) was composed of black troops, many of them former slaves.[109] During the last

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[107] The first African American to receive the Congressional Medal Of Honor, Sergeant William H. Carney of the 54th Massachusetts furnishes a good example of migration for enlistment. Born in Norfolk, Virginia, Carney fled to Massachusetts and enlisted at New Bedford. Elvin Jordan Jr, Black Confederates and Afro-Yankees in Civil War Virginia, p. 272. Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War, pp. 183-202.

[108] New York Tribune. 10 June, 1865. Quoted in Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll. The World the Slaves Made (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 112

[109] Some authors disagree with these numbers. Susan Cooper estimates at 185,000 the total number of African Americans who served in the USTC's. See "Records of Civil War African American Troops Inspire Major Archival Project" in The Record, Vol. 3, No. 2, November 1996, pp.

two years of the campaign, blacks comprised 13.1% of the 1,261,571 estimated soldiers recruited after the passage of the Enrollment Act.[110] Approximately 144,000 (78.5%) of the African American troops who entered the Union ranks came from the slave states. These southern-born freedmen comprised the large majority of those recruited. They were overwhelmingly illiterate, suspicious of white motives but drawn by the guarantee of freedom offered by enlistment. Many of their families were still enslaved or living in refugee camps, and they faced an uncertain fate if captured. Confederate behavior towards captured black soldiers was ambiguous. As the well-known episodes at Port Hudson, Fort Pillow, and Poison Springs showed, the fate of those captured could be worse than re-enslavement.[111]

It should be noted that, at the time of their enlistment, these men were not considered to be citizens and could be more easily subjected to severe treatment than white soldiers, even post-1863 white draftees. Disparate treatment was evidenced in less pay, worse living conditions, harsher discipline, and other

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9-11. Jacob Metzer estimates the number in 186,017 or 17.7 percent of the colored men ages 15-49. "The Records of the U.S. Colored Troops as a Historical Source: An Exploratory Examination," in Historical Methods, Vol. 14, No. 3, Summer 1981, pp. 123-132. For methodological convenience I am working from data coming from O.R., the same source used by Ira Berlin, Joseph Glatthaar and most authors on the subject.

[110] James W. Geary, We Need Men, p. 31.

[111] Howard C. Westwood, "Captive Black Union Soldiers in Charleston - What to do?" in Civil War History, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1982, pp. 29-44; John Cimprich and Robert C. Mainfort Jr., "The Fort Pillow Massacre: A Statistical Note," The Journal of American History, Vol. 76, No. 3, December 1989, pp. 830-839; Ronald K. Huch, "Fort Pillow Massacre: The Aftermath of Paducah," in Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, Vol. 66, No.1, 1973, pp. 62-70; Ronald K. Huch, "We Cannot treat Negroes...as Prisoners of War: Racial atrocities and Reprisals in Civil War Arkansas," in Civil War History, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1996, pp.193-210.

forms of discrimination.[112] Harsh military discipline broke with the established patterns of voluntarism because it was more compatible with the needs of a modern army in campaign than the democratic relations between officers and soldiers that were sanctioned by American military tradition.[113] It suited the modern strategy of "friction," in which northern demographic superiority was used to degrade southern manpower in a sequence of bloody battles that forced Confederates to spend their reserves while defending their heartland.[114] As the Secretary of the Navy confided to his diary "all of our increased military strength now comes from Negroes."[115]

African American soldiers were approximately one fifth of the country's eligible black population (17%). They fought in 449 battles, leaving thirty-seven thousand dead on the service of the Union (or ten percent of northern casualties – two thousand at the battle-fields).[116] When we add the 200,000 blacks, men and women, whose labor supported the soldiers on the field, their work can be seen as absolutely essential to the northern war effort. Black soldiers fought

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[112] Black soldiers comprised 21 percent of all executed federal soldiers. See Joseph Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, p. 118.

[113] In March 9, 1863, the War Department issued a manual titled United States Tactics for the Use of Colored Troops.

[114] For the changing nature of the Civil War see Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991).

[115] Quoted in Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War, p. xiv.

[116] Andrew K. Black gives different numbers. According to Black's numbers 33,294 black soldiers died during the Civil War. From these, 3,331 died in combat, while 29, 963 were victims of diseases. Andrew K. Black, "In the Service of the United States: Comparative Mortality Among African-American and White Troops in the Union Army," in The Journal of Negro History, Volume LXXIX, N.4, Fall of 1994, pp. 317-333.

bravely and with honor in spite of the enormous discrimination suffered while in the ranks.[117]

Centralization

In clear contrast to the local character of white recruitment before 1863, the Department of War and the Bureau of Colored Troops directly recruited most African Americans for service in the Union Army.[118] Only a few of the 144 regiments of United States Colored Troops carried a state designation.[119] After May 1863 these regiments were mustered directly into federal service, organized and led by officers acting under the authority of the United States. The War Department decreed that henceforth all new black regiments, even though they might be recruited and sponsored by northern states, would be administered together and labeled "United States Colored Troops" (USCT). One-third of the regiments it administered were organized from units mustered early by state and regional military administrations. Eventually, all black regiments, with the exception of those from Massachusetts and Connecticut, were designated "USCT." Most were infantry regiments (USCI), some were in the

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[117] Although blacks only participated effectively during the last three years of the war, seventeen black soldiers and four black sailors won Congressional medals of honor, see Joe H. Mays, Black Americans and their Contributions Toward Union Victory in the Civil War (Lanhan: University Press of America, 1982), pp. 125-7. For descriptions of the acts of bravery performed by these soldiers see William C. Stark, "Forgotten Heroes: Black Recipients of the United States Congressional Medal of Honor in the American Civil War, 1863-1865," in The Lincoln Herald, Vol. 88, no. 1, 1986, pp. 70-80.

[118] An order from Assistant General's Office dated March 11, 1864, stated that "thenceforth all black regiments should be designated by numbers and include the word 'colored.'" See, Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War, p. 200.

[119] The 54th Massachusetts Infantry is perhaps the most famous of these state-organized regiments. They were kept under state jurisdiction throughout their service. OR, series 3, Vol. 5, p. 661.

cavalry (USCCO), and a few were in the heavy artillery (USCHA). No regiments composed of black troops elected their officers, and very few of them had black officers.[120]

The recruitment of African Americans continued the gradual subversion of local-volunteer practices that prevailed when the war began, denominated by Ira Berlin a "minor revolution." The old system was based on the traditional primacy of states rights and on the assumption that the primary allegiance of the body of citizens was to state and local sources of power. Under volunteerism, military service was viewed as a privilege of race, as it was identified with access to citizenship, a monopoly of white men.[121]

Conscription

While black enlistment in the army advanced the African American struggle for citizenship, it is not necessarily the case that the military experience was good for the soldiers who served in the USCT's. One problem facing Union recruiters in enlisting emancipated slaves was the freedmen's reluctance to leave their families without support. Jane Walls of York County, Virginia, complained that her husband was kidnapped and forced to join the Union army in 1863, leaving her and their three children without means of support.[122]

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[120] From the 7,000 men who officered USTC troops fewer than one hundred were blacks and those were heavily concentrated in the Louisiana Native Guards, an auxiliary institution whose existence preceded the formation of the USCT's. The regimental division by branch was: 145 of Infantry, 7 Cavalry, 13 artillery and 1 of engineers. Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War, p. 199.

[121] Jacob Metzer, "The Records of the U.S. Colored Troops as a Historical Source: An exploratory examination," in Historical Methods, Vol. 14, No. 3, Summer 1981, pp. 123-32.

[122] Quoted in Laura Virginia Hale, Four Valiant Years in the Lower Shenandoah Valley, 1861-1865 (Strasburg, Virginia: 1975), pp. 336-7.

Thousands were enlisted against their will by ambitious agents or army patrols. John Banks of Virginia, testified in January 1864 that, while cutting wood, he was seized by about ten black soldiers and threatened with death if he did not enlist.[123] The precise number of black men drafted or impressed against their will and sent to distant camps will never be known. A revised estimate by David Osher suggests a total of 50,000, or twenty eight percent of the total.[124] Blacks in the South could be more easily targeted because there was no public opinion to defend them against these attacks. The southern African American population was also forbidden to own guns, consequently, their capacity for self-defense was much more limited than that of their white counterparts, who could also count on Democratic Party support.[125]

Opinion about conscription of blacks was divided. Some, such as Senator Andrew Johnson, from Tennessee, and Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas, strongly supported it, while governors John Andrew, John Murray Forbes, and George Stearns opposed such practices, preferring volunteer solutions and a transformation of the South's racial relations, reshaping them on a northern free-labor model. Resistance to impressment also came from some military commanders more interested in using blacks as laborers than as soldiers.

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[123] Statement of John Banks, 2 Jan. 1864, in Ira Berlin et al, The Black Military Experience, Document 47C, pp. 139-40.

[124] If Osher's data were correct, the number of African American drafted would be larger than the number of whites enrolled in all the three drafts of the Civil War. See "Soldier Citizens for a Disciplined Nation," p. 420.

[125] The threat of a draft against blacks was not restricted to the South. Eugene Murdock, pointed that in some cities police officers intimidated black men, accusing them of invented crimes in case they

General William Tecumseh Sherman protested against the depletion of his work force. Benjamin Butler, commander of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina in 1864, also banned recruiting agents, reporting to the Secretary of War that African Americans were sold at 50 to 100 dollars to become substitutes to white draftees.[126]

The fact that southern blacks were more easily subjected to the draft than whites expanded the reach of conscription but also brought problems to recruiters. Some African Americans protested against being treated as able-bodied citizens for purposes of a draft, even while state laws denied their rights of citizenship. As Robert Sterling noted, the thesis that blacks should be exempted from the draft on the grounds that they had being never granted citizenship became the basis of several petitions to the War Department. A black draftee from Wisconsin, who previously had been rejected as a volunteer, underlined the contradictions presented by the draft of African Americans:

> Now will you permit a poor fugitive from Bondage to ask you Some questions, Am I by the Laws of Wis. A citizen of the State [?] And if not and am not allowed to inlist in the Army to fight for our Country which you know was my wish to do when I saw you. Am I by the Laws of the United States Subject to be Drafted – the same as the white Man who has rights under the Constitution [?]....[127]

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did not enlist. Through this expedient they aimed to sell them as substitutes for whites. One Million Men., p. 289.

[126] Jordan Jr., Black Confederates and Afro-Yankees, p. 270.

[127] Andrew Pratt to Salomon, November 22, 1863, Salomon Papers. Quoted in Sterling, Civil War Draft Resistance in the Middle West, p. 605.

Substituting for Whites

In spite of the progressive nationalization of black recruitment, states continued to receive credits for their quotas on the basis of the regiments raised. Republican governors in the North faced the dilemma of being loyal both to the federal administration, in its efforts to reunite the country through a military victory, and to their constituencies, who increasingly reacted against military service. With local resistance increasing, the recruitment of black substitutes became an important element in reducing local tensions, enhancing its appeal to the white community. On July 4, 1864, an amendment to the Enrollment Act extended black recruitment to all the rebellious states except Arkansas, Tennessee, and Louisiana. Although no more than 5,050 substitutes were enlisted in the southern states, a growing number of Confederate-born African Americans went North and enlisted as substitutes for whites. Section 13 of the Enrollment Act, which provided for substitution and commutation, represented the most controversial provision of the draft. Under this section, draftees could pay other men to serve in their places, or escape military service completely by paying the federal government a $300 commutation fee. Substitution was legal throughout the four federal drafts, while commutation was in effect for just the first two. In theory, substitution would enable only draftees with a civilian station or occupation that was crucial to the war effort to remain at work, but in practice

it allowed any citizen with sufficient financial resources to avoid military service.[128]

By mid-1864, black soldiers had become eligible for federal bounties, and state competition for their services grew relentlessly during the final months of the war.[129] There were increasing opportunities for substitution after the commutation clause was eliminated in the summer of 1864, and substitutes became a significant portion of the enlistment in the North.[130] According to Taylor Cornish, so widely accepted was the practice of substitution that even Lincoln's secretary, John G. Nicolay, furnished a replacement when he was drafted in New York, in 1864.[131]

Many communities in the North contributed toward the purchase of a substitute for each of their draft-eligible men, eliminating white men from the state's draft quota. According to James D. Geary, the highest proportion of substitutes was provided by the state of New Hampshire, with 75 of substitutes for each 100 drafted men.[132] But the average was high in the entire North.[133] Data

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[128] Eugene C. Murdock, One Million Men: The Civil War Draft in the North (Madison, The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1971), pp. 178-80. On the debates concerning commutation see Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 64-5, 80, 142, 143. Commutation issues generated an enormous debate inside the Republican Party. While Senator Jim Lane attacked it, many other Republicans, led by Senator Henry Wilson, defended its maintenance under the argument the it would furnish a positive benefit for the poor. For more information see Chapter V.

[129] It should be noted that, previously, various states cities, towns, and even individuals were offering enlistment inducements (formally and informally) to blacks.

[130] O.R., series 3, vol. 4, p. 473. See also Berlin et al, The Black Military Experience, p. 77.

[131] Cornish, The Sable Arm, p. 235. Nicolay's substitute was an African American from North Carolina, Hiram Child, who later died in battle.

[132] Geary, We Need Men, p. 113. On January 8, 1864, Senator Daniel Clark referred to the permissiveness of this practice in his state. See Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, 1st Session, p.

from the New Hampshire Colored Troops confirms the significance of substitutes. Out of a total of 393 black soldiers recruited from 1862 to 1865, 75 percent (295) came from out of the state.[134] Confederates and foreign soldiers provided around 58 percent of the total, the border states about 4 percent, and other northern states, about 12 percent. The high percentage of southern-born people illustrates the correlation between draft policies and the acceptance of black enlistment, because most of these troops were black substitutes for whites. Following the national pattern, most New Hampshire colored soldiers were recruited in the last two years of the war, 1864 (45%) and 1865 (23%), when substitutions were authorized on a federal basis. If the Granite State provides an example of the importance of black substitutes in northern war efforts, it nonetheless typifies a regional situation: by the end of 1863, the recruitment of southern blacks had become functional, and therefore acceptable, to northern states, and resistance to recruitment had been contained to the border states.[135]

To recognize the growing importance of bounty money for black enlistment does not mean that blacks volunteered only for the prospect of a

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140. William Marvel, "New Hampshire and the Draft, 1863," in Historical New Hampshire, Vol. 36, 1981, pp. 58-72.

[133] In Michigan Michael O. Smith found black substitutions accounting for 50.7 percent during the last two drafts of the war. See Raising a Black Regiment in Michigan... p. 38.

[134] This figure is impressive when we compared with the percent of blacks in New England's population before the war. According to the U.S. Census of 1860, 0.8% of New England's population was black. The proportion by state was: Maine 0.2%, New Hampshire 0.2%, Massachusetts 0.8%, Vermont 0.2%, Connecticut 1.9%, and Rhode Island 2.3%. See William Loren Katz (ed.), U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Negro Population in the United States, 1790-1915 (1918, reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1968), p. 51.

financial reward. Choosing the most advantageous terms for enlistment was one of the few options available for men who could not even choose their units and who suffered inferior treatment while in the ranks. Furthermore, the absence of federal enlistment bounties until late in the war and the differential payments, enhanced the role of local bounties in the minds of prospective recruits. Many of these black soldiers also had families to support and were reluctant to accept less than the best offer for their services.

Fighting for Union and Freedom

The recruitment of African-American soldiers illustrates some of the complex ramifications of racial issues during the Civil War. In 1861 ethnicity, class, status, and place of birth fragmented black people in America. Obvious contrasts distinguished southern and northern recruits from one another as well as the free blacks and slaves within the Confederacy. In the North, blacks came from the native free population and from southern and foreign migrants. Some of these volunteers were educated and active members of the abolitionist movement, accustomed to working in a biracial organization.

While some of them had known slavery by experience, others had never before seen a slave. While many blacks volunteered to fight for freedom, others who served under northern quotas were forced to fight by draft officers and

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[135] Data collected and processed from Ira C. Evans, Revised Register of the Soldiers and Sailors of New Hampshire in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1866 (Concord, NH: Ira C. Evans [printer], 1895). The information about the United States Colored Troops (USTC) is in pages 1016 to 1026.

northern agents.[136] In the South, many recruits were ex-slaves, suddenly freed to enlist. Others were runways who were compelled to enlist by northern agents operating in the "contraband camps." There were also free black communities who fought in order to maintain their relatively higher status after the war.

The motivations of the free black volunteer for service, his conduct during the war, and the associations that he formed with the white officers who led him into battle were different from those of the freedman enlistee. For many freedmen, the army was an escape from slavery, a ready source of employment, and a chance to take up arms against their former masters. The free black soldiers did not share these motivations. They viewed the army as an opportunity to prove their worth as men and as an argument for gaining equal rights under the law as well as a means to destroy slavery. In spite of their differences, both groups had both much to win and much to lose by enlisting.[137] Samuel Cobble, a southern runaway who enlisted in the 55th Massachusetts Infantry as a private, exemplifies some of these feelings. In a letter to his wife, still a slave in South Carolina, Cobble stated some of the reasons why he enlisted:

> I would like to [k]no[w] if you are still in slavery if you are it will not be long before we shall have crushed the system that now

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[136] Some regiments reflected the preponderance of specific groups. The 36th United States Colored Infantry was organized among former slaves seeking refuge within Union lines in eastern North Carolina and southeastern Virginia. The Fifth Regiment of Infantry USCT was raised among the free black community of Ohio. Recent regimental studies have explored such differences. See James Kenneth Bryant II, "A Model Regiment: The 36th United States Colored Infantry in the Civil War." (MA Thesis, The University of Vermont and State Agricultural College, 1996); Michael James Paradis, "Strike the Blow: A Study of the Sixth Regiment of United States Colored Infantry, (Ph.D. Dissertation, Temple University, 1995).

[137] It should also be underlined that a minority came from other countries, especially Canada and the Caribbean.

> oppresses you for in the course of three months you shall have your liberty. Great is the outpouring of the colored people that is now rallying with the hearts of lions against that very curse that has separate you and me. Yet we shall meet again and oh what happy time it will be when this ingodly rebellion shall be put down and the curses of our land is trampled under out feet. I am a soldier now and I shall use my utmost endeavor to strike at the rebellion and the heart of this system that so long has kept us in chains...[138]

For many black people, North and South, the decision to enlist was not an easy one. Enlistment meant, in practice, the surrender of their freedom to white authority and military discipline. It also meant a split from family and friends as well as a disruption work and income. For some in the South, there was the additional risk of meeting slave-pickets who patrolled the Confederate borders. A northern commander observed that courage was an attribute of every southern volunteer because: "There were more than a hundred men in the ranks who had voluntarily met more dangers in their escape from slavery than any of my young captains had incurred in all their lives."[139] This insecurity was especially painful for those with relatives who stayed behind in the hands of the former masters and who might suffer some form of revenge. Testimony from a black soldier's widow gives an idea of the perils to which the soldiers' families were exposed:

> My husband ...had only been about a month in service when he was killed. From that time [my master] treated me more cruelly than ever whipping me frequently without any cause and insulting me on every occasion...When my husband was Killed my master whipped me severely saying my husband had gone into the army to fight against white folks and he my master would let me know that I was foolish to let my husband go he would 'take it out of my back,' he

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[138] Samuel Cabble to his wife, 1863, National Archives, Record Group 94, Records of the Adjudant General's Office. Quoted in Susan Coper, "Records of Civil War African American Troops"

[139] Higginson, Army Life in a Black Regiment, p. 248.

would 'Kill me by piecemeal" and he hoped 'that the last one of the nigger soldiers would be Killed'.[140]

Unlike the situation of the majority of white troops, there were few ways open for advancement for blacks inside the military organization. The color bar was much stronger in the American army than in the Brazilian. Blacks could not become officers, nor could they elect their commanders. Non-commissioned officers did not receive higher salaries. Many of them could not even choose their regiments, as most whites had previously done. With the exception of some chaplains and doctors, few blacks became officers, and even officers were subjected to extreme discrimination in their camps. African Americans had to serve in segregated regiments commanded by white officers, facing all kinds of prejudice. Their inferior camp conditions were evidenced in the greater rate of death by disease as well as the larger number of punishments inflicted and capital sentences recorded.[141]

African-Americans who served in the Union Army did so under more difficult conditions than those of their white compatriots. They were assigned more onerous duties which exposed them to a greater risk of disease. When they became ill they received substandard care. They became more likely as the war continued to be assigned to combat. For blacks this was healthier duty. A

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[140] Berlin et al, Black Military Experience, Doc. 106, pp. 268-9. This woman ran away with her baby, leaving five of her children behind.

[141] Even black non-commissioned officers received the same salaries of private soldiers. For African American rates of mortality in the military service, see Andrew K. Black, "In the Service of the United States: Comparative Mortality Among African-American and White Troops in the Union Army," in The Journal of Negro History, Vol. LXXIX, No. 4, 1994, pp. 317-33. According to Black, white troops were twice as likely to die from disease as in battle, while black troops were almost ten times likely to do so.

black Sergeant described the health of the troops in his regiment at Fort Redoubt, Florida: "At one time nearly all of our men were sick. My company could not muster but seventeen men fit for duty, and some of the other companies could not muster as many."[142]

Hierarchical Relations

The relations between black soldiers and white officers were complex. Joseph Glatthaar emphasized the positive aspects of the relationship, referring to it as "an alliance," between black soldiers and their officers, a term he borrowed from diplomacy.[143] Ideological allies in their common cause for Union and freedom in general united soldiers and officers. According to Glatthaar, it was during Reconstruction, not the Civil War, that the ideological alliance was broken.[144] Glatthaar's perspective, however, has faced scholarly challenges during the last decade.[145]

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[142] Sergeant Milton Harris, Co. F., 25th USCI, Christian Recorded, December 17, 1864. Quoted in Redkey (ed.), A Grand Army of Black Men, p.151.

[143] On a huge work of comparative biography, British historian Allan Bullock made an ironic remark concerning the failure of alliances through history. While discussing the Russian-American agreements during the Second World War, Bullock commented that the history of alliances in not an encouraging one, "few have accomplished more, most nothing like so much." Hitler and Stalin. Parallel Lives (New York: Random House, 1993), p. 889.

[144] Joseph Glatthaar, Forged in Battle. The Civil War Alliance Between Black Soldiers and White Officers (New York: Harper and Row, 1990). Glatthaar presents the war as an event capable of forging a new relationship between black soldiers and their 7,000 white officers. Although Glatthaar discusses the situation of opportunistic officers (those who enlisted in Colored troops to receive promotions), what he most emphasizes is the presence of many members of traditional abolitionist families in the officer ranks. From this perspective, the opportunistic group appears to be the exception not the rule. The "Alliance Thesis" is best explained in chapters III "Recruiting the Officers" and V "Coping with Racism."

[145] Gary Kynoch, "Terrible Dilemmas: Black Enlistment in the Union Army During the American Civil War," in Frank Cass Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2, August 1997, pp. 104-27; James W. Geary, "Blacks in the American Military: A Review Essay," in Ethnic Forum, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1991, pp. 59-68, William

There was much diversity among the white officers of black units, who were drawn largely from two groups. Many were selected because they were educated, Christian, anti-slavery activists well known in abolitionist circles. The narratives of officers and soldiers alike show that underlying the alleged alliance was strong paternalism on the part of the philanthropic officers. Others, most of whom were accepted later, were experienced non-commissioned officers in white volunteer regiments who, for a variety of personal reasons, sought commands unattainable in their original units. Many showed strong prejudice when dealing with soldiers and their families. A private at the 43rd USCI warned the readers of the Christian Recorder, a black newspaper, about the consequences of prejudice for military discipline: "Our officers must stop beating their men across the head and back with their swords, or I fear there will be trouble with some of us."[146]

The exact nature of the relationship between black soldiers and their white officers remains elusive. There were some, like Colonel Isaac F. Shepard, who defended his black soldiers when they were molested to the point of whipping a white soldier.[147] But there were others, such as the infamous Lieutenant

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Cheek and Aimee Lee Cheeck, "White Over Black in Union Blue," in Reviews in American History, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1990, pp. 104-27.

[146] "Private," 43rd USCI, Bermuda Hundred, Virginia. Quoted in the Christian Recorder, January 26, 1864.

[147] Berlin et al, Black Military Experience, Doc. 164, pp. 414-15.

Augustus Benedict, whose behavior toward his soldiers was so discriminatory that it produced a mutiny among his troops. [148]

The relationship between officers and men, including the importance of drill and ritual, can be more carefully considered through a comparative approach. In the story of military organizations one can identify many examples of sympathy and care across ethnic boundaries or between officers and their men, especially at times of crisis. This does not mean that ethnic differences disappeared in the course of the struggle. During the Paraguayan War, Alfredo D'Escragnole Taunay produced one of the best reports on battle solidarity in his 1867 A Retirada da Laguna (Lagunas' Retreat). In his marvelous description of the Mato Grosso 1867 campaign, Taunay describes how the Brazilian Imperial officers could show the tenderest solicitude for their soldiers without bridging the social chasm that separated the classes and the races in the army. Indeed, officers are supposed to take care of their men, and it is not clear how these from the USCT were different. Taunay himself showed great compassion for his soldiers although he never admitted their capacity for personal initiative or intellectual command.[149]

In the regiments initially raised in the North, there was a clear preponderance of abolitionist Christians among the officers, carefully chosen by committed abolitionists such as Governor John Andrew. As the recruitment of

[148] On Benedicts' episode see Phillip Rutherford, "Revolt In The Corps D'Afrique," in Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. 24, No.2, 1985, pp. 20-3.

blacks spread through the South, the philanthropic idealists were replaced by a more generic group. Concerned that this heterogeneity would endanger discipline, the federal government created a board of examination, aiming to standardize the recruitment of white officers.[150] Those intended to lead black regiments had to undertake a series of exams and special training.[151] The Board effectively broke with the patronage system in the designation of the officers' corps, but merit alone was not a warranty against racial prejudice. This new channel of promotion created new avenues for ambitious non-commissioned white officers originally assigned to white regiments.[152] Some of them espoused strong racist beliefs and resorted to harsh punishment. Fourteen of the nineteen Union soldiers executed for mutiny were blacks.[153]

Another sensitive area involved soldiers' pay, of fundamental importance in military life and essential to the process of standardization. While some governors had initially promised equal pay, federal legislation sanctioned

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[149] Alfredo D'Escragnole Taunay, A Retirada da Laguna (1867, reprint, São Paulo: Editorial Tecnoprint, 1946). See also his, Cartas da Campanha de Mato Grosso (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Militar, 1944), and Memórias (São Paulo: Instituto Pregresso Editorial, 1948).

[150] Those intended to be examined could attend the Free Military School for Applicants for Command of Colored Troops, which was established in December 1863.

[151] The army produced special manuals such as U.S. Infantry Tactics, for the Instruction, Exercise, and Manoeuvers of the Soldier, a Company, Line of Skirmishes, and Battalion, for the Use of Colored Troops of the United States Infantry, Prepared under the Direction of the War Department (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1863). See Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, pp. 103-4.

[152] Even among those deeply committed to abolition, promotion could be quick. Robert Gould Shaw, the famous 54th commander, was promoted from Captain (in the Second Massachusetts Infantry) to Major and finally to Lieutenant Colonel in less than two months. Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War, p. 9.

[153] Howard C. Westwood, "The Cause and Consequence of a Union Black Soldier's Mutiny and Execution." In Civil War History, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1985, p. 222; Berlin et al. The Black Military Experience, pp. 365-66 and 388-95.

economic discrimination. The clauses of the Militia Act stated that blacks were entitled to $ 10 a month, less $ 3.50 for clothing expenses.[154] By contrast, whites received $ 13 plus $ 3.50 for clothing. Officers and politicians justified the difference in terms of differential military risks: initially blacks were supposed to perform fatigue duties, not to fight. As the war progressed, these excuses became more and more untenable. Black troops were used as combatants in Virginia and other theaters, suffering a great number of casualties. James Henry Gooding, a corporal in the Massachusetts 54th, put the situation in a simple way in a letter addressed to the president: "Now if the United States exacts uniformity of treatment of her Soldiers, from the Insurgents, would it not be well, and consistent, to set the example herself, by paying all her Soldiers alike?"[155]

Early recruits felt betrayed by the abrogated promises of equal pay made by governors and agents. They complained bitterly in northern newspapers about camp conditions: "Do we not fill the same ranks? Do we not cover the same space of ground? Do we not take up the same length of ground in a grave-yard that other do?" wrote a soldier in the Massachusetts 54th.[156] Protests led to repeated cases of insubordination, a famous example of which was Sergeant William Walker from Company A of the Third South Carolina Colored Infantry.

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[154] U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. XII, p. 599.

[155] Corporal James Henry Gooding to Abraham Lincoln, 28 Sept. 1863. Quoted in Ira Berlin et al, Black Military Experience, Document. 157A, p. 386. Only those who were free as of 19 April 1861 received equal and back pay and they had to swear an oath to provide testimony from another source before receiving back pay retroactive from 19 April 1861 to 31 January 1864. Not until March 1865 were all black soldiers assured of the same pay as white soldiers.

[156] Private E. D. W. Christian Recorder, April 2, 1864. Quoted in Edwin S. Redkey, A Grand Army of Black Men, p. 48.

Walker was charged with leading his company in a strike to protest the lower rate of pay for black troops. Although some officers sympathized with Walker's conduct, Walker was court-martialed on January 9, 1864 and shot on March 1st of the same year without having been given time to appeal.[157]

Many at home refused to enlist until the problem was settled.[158] Yet the struggle for equal pay furnished an opportunity to enlarge the debate concerning equal rights. Although prejudice was strong, the army worked as an arena where many blacks, for the first time in their lives, could testify against whites and complain publicly against racial discrimination. By March 1864, the War Department agreed that those already free at the time of their enlistment were entitled to equal payments as well as to reimbursements dating from the period of their service. Prejudice was temporarily subordinated to administrative uniformity.[159]

Immediate Consequences

By the end of the conflict, many African Americans recognized the essential opportunities the war offered their race. The war provided a valuable platform for combating decades of racial prejudice, raising new expectations, opportunities, and awareness among blacks. In contrast with the conditions in

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[157] For a summary of the events involving Walker's protest and execution, see Howard C. Westwood, "The Cause and Consequence of a Union Black Soldier's Mutiny and Execution," in Civil War History, Vol. 1, No. 3, September 1995, pp. 222-35.

[158] Some 14,870 black soldiers deserted the Union army, approximately 8.2 percent of all black soldiers enlisted. See Roberto Sterling, Civil War Resistance in the Middle West, p. 605.

[159] Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Army Life in a Black Regiment, Appendix D, "The Struggle for Pay," pp. 280-85; Herman Belz, "Law, Politics, and Race in the Struggle for Equal Pay During the

the Paraguayan war, black enlistment in the Union army encouraged social reform in the defeated South. It politicized thousands of black soldiers and created a proud and determined black political leadership, thus accelerating the quest for equality both during and after the war.[160]

Another essential difference was the importance of black public opinion for black recruitment in America. Although many black man were drafted, voluntary recruitment also derived from public pressures coming from black communities in the North. African Americans were active participants in the political debate over recruitment. They kept pressure on the President and Congress to abolish slavery, enlist blacks, and provide for racial equality. They had their own black churches, secular leaders, and newspapers that kept many informed about the situation in the front. They formed freedmen's aid associations, which helped recruiting in certain parts of the North. This kind of pressure was completely absent in Brazil.

Federal recruitment of African Americans during the Civil War was an important part of the process that destroyed slavery and initiated the reordering of American race relations. Enlistment, especially for those who fled slavery, provided opportunities to help defeat the pro-slavery Confederacy and to

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Civil War," in Civil War History, 22, 1976; Otto Friedrich, "We Will Not Do Duty Any Longer for Seven Dollars per Month," in American Heritage, Vol. 39, No. 1, February 1988, pp. 64-73.

[160] The African American community in the North was informed of many aspects of black military life through the letters published in some newspapers that appealed directly to the black population: the Christian Recorder, of Philadelphia, the Weekly Anglo-African, and the Frederick Douglass's Monthly were published by black editors. Other newspapers such as The Liberator occasionally published letters from black soldiers. On blacks and the war press see the "Preface" in A Grand Army of Black Men. pp. ix-xv.

promote changes for blacks, the most important of which was the approval by Congress of the 13th Amendment in January 1865, granting freedom to all slaves.

The burdens of race, nonetheless, haunted black soldiers virtually every step of the way. Segregated within camps, assigned the most degrading and menial duties, and often scorned by white fellows, African Americans were distinctively second-class citizens in an army whose fortunes they had so brightened. In spite of these problems, blacks' presence in the USCT helped to transform the action of the Union forces in the South into a real army of liberation. The vision of black regiments marching through southern cities and the epic behavior of some of those same armies in battles such as Forth Wagner and the Crater helped to speed the achievement of citizenship for both northern and southern black Americans. In countless settings, black troops communicated with freedmen and freed women the meaning of the war, the role black people played in defeating the Confederacy and destroying slavery, the new rights liberty allowed, and the new responsibilities it demanded. Many individuals who filled the ranks understood that they were fighting for a just cause and helping to build a new political situation in post-Civil War American.

Unfortunately, the army's degree of true integration was at most relative. It presented a genuine step in the democratization of American society, but it was limited by the cultural stereotypes still prevalent in the American North. If the structure of society had been changed, racial attitudes and stereotypes survived and, in the long run, recovered part of their pre-war strength. Still, the war

equipped black people with elements to continue the struggle for social equality. This process was unparalleled in any other multiracial society and was perpetuated in the nation's memory by the occupation of the defeated southern states and later by Civil War veterans' dependence upon military pensions during the decades following Appomattox.[161]

In contrast to the American experience, the way freedmen were integrated into the Brazilian army did not allow black participation during the war to be used as the basis for the construction of a movement aiming black social improvement in the post-war landscape. Black interests were diluted as the freedmen were integrated into a military organization in which the roles of the soldier and the citizen were not connected. At the end of the Paraguayan War, quick demobilization of troops prevented army veterans from supporting the formulation of new social demands under the shelter of the army. Those who served returned to civilian life as dispossessed individuals living in poverty in a country of abundance, as acknowledged by an Imperial representative.[162] The debate about African American soldiers and their motivations in the U.S. reveals the distinct new options offered by the war to blacks. It helps us to understand that historical progress does not rise in a steady line, but many times is the unexpected and unintended result of events.

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[161] On the importance of veteran's pension in the post-war see Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers. The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).

[162] Atas do Parlamento Brasileiro, Câmara dos Deputados, p. 390.

Conclusion

> I claim not to have controlled events but confess plainly that events have controlled me. Now, at the end of three years [of] struggle the nation's condition is not what either party, or any man devised or expected. God alone can claim it."
>
> Abraham Lincoln[1]

> It is lamentable that partisan politics ...led to the understanding that National revenge is a monopoly of some political faction.
>
> Marquis of Caxias[2]

> In order to have historical comparison, two conditions must be fulfilled: a certain similarity or analogy between observed phenomena - that is obvious - and a certain dissimilarity between the environments in which they occur.
>
> Marc Bloch[3]

The comparative analysis of military enlistment undertaken throughout this dissertation has emphasized similarities and dissimilarities in the trajectories undertaken by the Brazilian Empire and the American Union during the 1860s. It demonstrated that, in spite of diverging patterns of historical evolution, Brazil and the United States each faced similar logistical problems during their major 19th century wars. These problems were linked to the lack of bureaucratic expertise

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[1] Norman A. Graebner (ed.), The Enduring Lincoln (Urbana: Illinois University Press, 1959), p. 105.

[2] Marquis of Caxias to Viscount of Muritiba, 14 Aug. 1868. AN, Códice 934, Confidenciais, Reservados e Cartas, p. 137.

[3] Marc Bloch, "Toward a Comparative History of European Societies," quoted in Shearer Davis Bowman, "Antebellum Planters and Vormaz Junkers in Comparative Perspective," in American Historical Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, 1980, p. 780.

and to the incomplete development of national armies in each country. Despite differences in political cultures, these two societies made similar efforts toward centralization, extraction, and recruitment during their wars.

War efforts created new necessities, forcing each government to search for adequate means to reach its needs. Recruitment became a crucial issue, when traditionally established militias failed to maintain troop strength in the field. The question was less a fundamental struggle over the future of national organization than a temporary emergency, necessitating unprecedented recruitment to face the enemy's relentless resistance. The people most affected by these changes, however, thought their world had been turned upside down by powerful external forces. Their reaction was proportional to the intensity of these perceptions.

If the concept of "political culture" does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the dilemmas created by these wars, it accounts much better for differences in the degree of post-war social transformation in each society. Political culture made the difference in the impact black recruitment had on each society, and this difference was especially evident in the American struggles of the Reconstruction period. The Civil War consolidated a new moral consciousness about the country's social and ethnic diversity. No group was more permanently affected by this change than African-Americans. Conflicts over a new concept of citizenship were a mark of post-bellum America. These conflicts involved the emergence of African-Americans as central actors in

national politics, as blacks took advantage of growing federal power to obtain civil and political rights.

During the war, an expanded national state emerged in the U.S. Unlike its antebellum predecessor, this new polity showed a strong commitment to creating national citizenship based on equal rights. Although it reflected the contradictions of the coalition of interests that supported the Union, it compensated for this deficiency through the exercise of a victorious authority, a bloody mandate to enforce social and racial transformations in the defeated Confederacy. Nothing comparable occurred in Brazil after its victory. Consequently, it is during the post-war periods that we can find the strongest correlation between political culture and divergent national outcomes. The long-term results for slavery - immediate emancipation and citizenship in the U.S., delayed emancipation with few political rights in Brazil - can be better explained by the "idealist" differences in political cultural than by the "materialist" needs of each state.

In this conclusion, the comparison will focus on the main issues related to wartime problems and war's immediate aftermath.

Similarities and Dissimilarities

The Civil and the Paraguayan wars erupted out of very different long term conditions. The American Civil War was the culmination of decades of political and regional tension, involving different visions of social organization, political power, and racial hierarchy. It was the logical outgrowth of the revolutionary process initiated in 1776. The Civil War resolved many of the problems which

caused its outbreak. A wartime Congress imposed tariffs and created the National Bank System, and the Homestead Act expanded access to the western lands, an agenda favored by the North since the 1820s.

The Paraguayan War resulted much more from external factors, mainly the process of state formation on the River Plate region. It was an international conflict, involving a diplomatic alliance of the two most powerful countries in the region, the Brazilian Empire and the Argentine Confederation. Most of the action took place outside of Brazilian territory, far from centers of plantation agriculture. The war had no direct influence on the process of agricultural transformation that had been taking place in Brazil since the 1850's. Agriculture was affected only indirectly, through the temporary demands made by the war on the landowner's human and financial resources.

For both Republican and Imperial leadership, the question of territorial integrity was paramount. For Brazilians, protecting territorial integrity meant an articulation with the colonial past as well as preservation of its chief imperial achievement: Brazil was the only Latin American country to keep intact its colonial territorial configuration. Despite all its internal divisions, few issues so united the Brazilian population.

For the Union, territorial integrity signified the survival of principles viewed as essential to the American polity. In his annual message to the Congress, in December of 1862, President Lincoln emphasized the symbolic and practical meanings of territorial preservation in terms that would have sounded familiar to

a Brazilian Imperial bureaucrat: "The territory is the only part [of a nation] which is of certain durability...It is of the first importance to duly consider, and estimate, this ever-enduring part."[4]

Both conflicts showed strategic and material similarities in the administration of the war effort. The wars produced internal conflict, opening a window to alternative visions of national organization and social reform. They showed the limits of the central states' capacity to extract additional resources from their societies, especially the problematic action of recruitment agents in the far interior. Subsequent war efforts exacerbated problems of social cohesion and national stability to an extent never before reached in the historical evolution of either nation.[5]

A common issue in both countries was centralization, that is, national political consolidation, which interfered with perceptions of regional rights. During the Paraguayan war, the Emperor's excessive intervention undermined the strength of the political system. Increasingly, political and personal differences

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[4] Abraham Lincoln, "Annual Message to Congress," 1st Dec., 1862. Quoted in Don E. Fehrenbacher, Abraham Lincoln. A Documentary Portrait Through His Speeches and Writings, pp. 202-3.

[5] I am defining national unity as the maintenance of territorial integrity, that is, the achievement and the maintenance of administrative control of larger portions of an extensive territory by a political center. It comprehends the creation of a differentiated and autonomous set of institutions that claim sovereignty and a monopoly over the tasks of coercion and extraction. This control was historically achieved through the diffusion and acceptance of the central authority by the whole set of inhabitants of specific regions. It involved enhanced national symbols, rituals, and costumes, forging a large conception of nationality, based on territorial integration concurrently with the feeling of being part of a larger structure. Two good accounts on this subject are Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and Eric Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

interfered with the performance of the army in the field. Victory elevated the army to the role of national savior, providing the officers with a platform for the nation that transcended the influence of the monarchical state. This situation led to the fall of the monarchy within two decades.[6]

Compared to Brazil, American political organization was stronger and much more consistent. The virtue of the northern party system lay in the strong links between local and national organizations and in the vitality of the Republican Party as a fundamental instrument to maximize the war effort. In Brazil, military initiative was an apparatus of the central state, with no ideological agenda. Those in power would recruit their opponents and vice-versa, but there was no essential moral or political rationale uniting state and national efforts. Also, no political authority was capable of taking up the burden of unpopular war measures. Political and social contention was directed toward the Emperor and the monarchy, as was the case during the attacks on the enlistment of slaves.[7]

While it can be said that, during the Civil War, the American government went beyond its formal constitutional powers, it is also certain that the evolution remained consistent with the liberal traditions of the country, because the costs of the war could be more evenly divided between the government and the party. The party acted as a strong motivational force at the local level, maintaining the

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[6] Dudley, "Reform and Radicalism in the Brazilian Army, 1879-1889," pp.126-224, John Schulz, O Exército na Política. Origens da Intervenção Militar, 1850-1894 (São Paulo: Edusp, 1994), pp.75-121, Ricardo Salles, Nostalgia Imperial, pp. 158-92.

[7] Richard Graham, Patronage and Politics in Brazil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 195-238.

allegiance of a substantial part of the population in the states and towns. This role was exercised during the debates over commutation and substitution. With commutation viewed as a triumph of the idea of "a rich men's war but a poor men's fight," other sources of troops had to be identified. The recruitment of blacks worked as an escape valve, to keep local Republican support alive while alleviating the burden on poor white males.

Transferring Troops to the Front

No central interference was more unpopular in Brazil than the transfer of the National Guard corps to the front. The National Guard had been an essential institution for the repression of slave revolts and the maintenance of internal peace in Brazil. After 1850, the local political bosses commanded the Guard's militias and armed their clients. These bosses possessed the arms and the authority to use them. Such rights were seen as a civic privilege. The transfer of National Guards to the Paraguayan front temporarily undermined the efficiency of the system of social control, generating a problem that was potentially more serious than was the arming of slaves.

The Imperial government assumed control over the private militias, subordinating them to the centralized control of the national army. The presence of the state in an area so fully connected to local private interests was seen as a threat to the moral economy of recruitment. It touched off many conflicts over the command of the Guard and the employment of its troops. By 1866, many slaveholders still saw the Empire as a society haunted by the menace of slave

rebellion, and saw the National Guard as essential for the maintenance of internal peace. These fears were exaggerated, but the perception was what counted.

Imperial patriotic appeals, therefore conflicted with the more utilitarian needs of the slaveholders and other powerful local groups. The Barons' lack of cooperation and the government's timid retaliation upset the professional military officers. Some of these officers complained bitterly about the lack of support for the army and the corruption of higher Imperial echelons. They were also very critical of the ways in which political partisanship influenced the operations of the army.

Immediate Political Repercussions of Recruitment

In Brazil, emancipation and recruitment of freed slaves came to be seen as an attack on the regime's main supporters. In America, by 1863, northern Republicans thought of themselves as attacking the enemy by emancipating slaves and putting them into the Army. As the war progressed, many Republicans were convinced that the South could not return to the pre-war situation and sought to use military victory as a way to revolutionize conquered states. For the next ten years, the American national government was the strongest defender of civil rights, in a clear inversion of the Jeffersonian republican doctrines that had prevailed in antebellum America. Government initiative for change was extended by the operation of two main institutions: the Army and the Freedmen's Bureau.

The fundamental geographic differentiation between North and South is a key to explaining differences between the US and Brazil. The simple existence of a free North gave American Emancipation an opportunity to break down racial hierarchies in the South. No other society in the hemisphere shared this contrast between a free and a slave region. Frederick Douglass' description of his first impressions of northern labor activity gives a glimpse on the impact of a free society of an individual who had recently left slavery:

> I saw no whipping of men; but all seemed to be smoothly on. Every man appeared to understand his work, and went at it with a sober, yet cheerful earnestness, which betokened the deep interest which he felt in which he was doing, as a sense of his own dignity as a man. To me it looked exceedingly strange.[8]

Although recent literature has shown the extent of northern racism, and the extend of black inequality in the industrial cities, only through comparison with other slave societies can this contrast be adequately balanced and the role of the North reevaluated.

The free institutions of the North changed the meaning of freedom in the South. They reinforced the roles of the occupation forces, bringing the values of northern society to the forefront of Southern political debate. They spread liberal values that became much stronger among African Americans than among Brazil's blacks. They provided blacks with elements of a liberal culture, defiant of despotic authority; a tradition blacks could adapt for their own needs. This process was happening among blacks well before the Civil War but was

accelerated with the occupation of Confederate territory and the vision of black troops as liberators.

The effects of sectional difference were clearer for the former slaves than for the free African American population. Blacks in the South achieved some gains that could not be taken back even with the failure of Reconstruction. Prominent among them were the reorganization of black families, the establishment of black churches, and freedom of movement. African Americans were able to some extent to disconnect American civic values from the racist assumptions of American civic culture that had informed them.[9]

The values of northern society affected the function of the army. During the Civil War, those who escaped slavery to enlist ran away not only in the geographic sense, but also in the cultural sense; they escaped in the direction of an institution regulated by values different from those of the plantation. Although blacks were segregated in camps, many of them were able to use the opportunities created by the war to advance their struggle for citizenship, such as during the conflict over equal pay and promotion. The values of freedom that informed liberal society in the North informed the action of black soldiers. The army provided them with a valuable opportunity to contest decades of racial prejudice. The political system magnified their chances to conquer social and political rights and to envision a social transformation.

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[8] Frederick Douglass, "Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglas," in Henry Louis Gates, Jr. The Classic Slave Narratives (New York: Mentor Books, 1987), p. 323.

[9] These elements were described in chapter I.

Nothing similar happened in Brazil. There was no nation to be reconstructed, no political alliance with dispossessed groups, and no assimilation of alternative political leaders to the mainstream of national debates.[10] The Imperial political system ended the war severely damaged by factional and personal conflicts. In this context, initiatives for reforms were restricted to the Imperial inner circle, and debates took place in the same closed coteries where they had been held during the war. The Council of State and the Parliament were the arenas where representative political forces responded to state-centered initiatives. No expansion of the electoral franchise took place, nor did reform result in increased popular participation. As traditionally had been the case, the initiative toward reforms came from the government, not from public opinion. This distance between governors and governed widened through the electoral reform of 1881, which diminished the range of public participation to less than one percent of the adult male population. Consequently, while in American Reconstruction there was an enlargement, even if temporary, of the electoral franchise, post-war politics in Brazil led to a decrease of participation, connected to a slow erosion of the regime's legitimacy.[11]

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[10] Of course, there was Paraguay. The reconstruction of Paraguay was analyzed in Harrys Gaylord Warren, Paraguay and the Triple Alliance. The Postwar Decade, 1869-1878 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978). Unfortunately it is not possible to follow the developments in Paraguayan Reconstruction in this work.

[11] Seymour Drescher, "Brazilian Abolition in Comparative Perspective" in Rebecca J. Scott (ed.), The Abolition of Slavery and the Aftermath of Emancipation in Brazil (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), pp. 23-54.

Social Conflict and State Action

Emerging social conflicts in each case help us to understand the limits of state action in these periods of national emergency, especially when the state, with its centripetal nationalistic demands, confronted the local interests of individuals and groups. Most of these conflicts centered on the extension of recruitment and its consequences for social stability. They led to great debates involving the war efforts and its consequences for the victorious societies.

Conscription and emancipation were central issues in the debates about mobilization. Armed mobs in the far interior of Brazil, as well as anti-draft riots in America, were perceived as a dangerous menace to progress and social stability. The threats posed by these movements of local resistance were more symbolic than real, reflecting attitudes of desperation in the face of changing conditions of livelihood, without ever becoming a real risk to the maintenance of the social order. In spite of that, protests contributed to changes in the formulation of public policies during the decades following the end of each war. In Brazil they led to the formulation of new proposals on the organization of the army, the introduction of universal recruitment, and the abolition of the National Guard. In America, they enabled expanded intervention of federal power in the South as well as the birth of a national citizenship.[12]

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[12] In Brazil a new recruitment law was created in 1874 by minister Oliveira Junqueira. Through this law corporal punishments abolished and military service was made compulsory. A lottery would select those who would serve, thus minimizing the problems of conscription. The law had no practical effect and Brazilian recruitment was modified in practice only in 1916, during the First World War. John Schulz, O Exército na Política (São Paulo: Edusp, 1994), pp. 76-93, William S. Dudley, "Reform and Radicalism in the Brazilian Army, 1870-1889," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia

The years 1863 (in the US) and 1867 (in Brazil) show similarities that justify a more careful comparison. During those years, the dominant and hegemonic groups of each society confronted unexpected challenges, as in each nation, a crisis emerged in response to the expansion of state action. There was a clear choice in both countries to pursue a complete military victory in spite of all obstacles and human costs. This determination, common to both the Republican and the Imperial bureaucrats, set the path for further compromises. The rhetoric of elite members in both societies expressed their main concerns about recruitment, and revealed the limits to their current definitions of citizenship.

In Brazil, government rhetoric emphasized the dangerous insecurity brought by the exacerbation of partisan factionalism. Elite opinion demanded a massive intervention of state power to suppress local opposition and keep peace locally while maintaining the war effort. In America, repression was also used, and the government interfered with the lives of its citizens in many ways, but no suspension of the electoral calendar took place. The government could influence the party system, but did not try to replace it.[13]

The Army and Reform

It has been argued by some authors that the army can be an avenue of social mobility for disadvantaged people. The fact that the army was one of the

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University, 1972), pp.126-80. For the law of 1916, see Frank D. McCann, "The Nation in Arms: Obligatory Military Service During the Old Republic," in Dauril Alden and Warren Dean (eds.), Essays Concerning the Socioeconomic History of Brazil and Portuguese India (Gainesville, The University Presses of Florida, 1977), pp. 211-43.

few bureaucracies open to members of socially subordinate groups suggests it was a channel for uplift. The evidence presented in this dissertation shows, however, that it basically depends on the state of a political system: if disadvantaged individuals can find some support from other groups, expanding their roles and pressuring for reforms, army experiences provide good opportunities for social mobility. If that outside support does not exist, the army will not play such a positive role, and the chances for social and racial mobility can be correspondingly remote.

The evidence presented here lends some support to the hypothesis that black participation in the Paraguayan War was a key element in the Brazilian abolitionist struggle. Post-war goals depended on compromises between the state and the landowners. There was popular mobilization to some extent, but it was much less significant than in the United States. The Brazilian army was impregnated by the values and practices of slavery. It could accept former slaves and occasionally protect runaways, but the slave who escaped to the army did not find a totally new racial environment. The army was deeply marked by the same social hierarchies existing in the rest of society, and its discipline many times reproduced the harsh treatment received by field workers in the farms. If the slave disappeared into the shelter of the army, the hierarchical and authoritarian character of the society was continued in the barracks.

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[13] I am not considering resources connected to the use of patronage or Congressional adjournment as detrimental to a democratic order.

In America, there was a civic culture from which the blacks could draw to demand rights and fight for a better position even when subject to discrimination. The Republican Party became a force that combined various elements to achieve black empowerment after the war. This party mobilization was anchored in the participation of a public opinion and in a long democratic tradition, suddenly opened to blacks. Consequently, in the United States the army turned into a platform for African Americans to demand equality and racial justice.

There was no similar public opinion behind black enlistment in Brazil, where society as a whole did not participate actively in the debate about the war. The Imperial army's composition reflected the predominance of a forced draft, targeting basically the poor, black or white. An important distinction between the Brazilian and the American political systems was that, in Brazil, poor whites were also outsiders. Thus, the disciplinarian rules were directed not just against blacks, but against social undesirables of all races. Consequently, blacks were immersed in the same mass of social undesirables whose demands were ignored by the Imperial Military authorities. Recent empirical research has shown that the links of sympathy between the officers and their men were far from generating a corporate response in opposition to the prevalent social hierarchies that structured Brazilian society. This reduced the possibilities for social mobilization. During the Paraguayan War some officers did complain bitterly about the presence of freed slaves in the ranks, but this was mainly because that presence was harmful to their own social position. Criticism from within the

officer corps envisioned an order where the military had a higher status and elevated social role. It did not break with the social and the racial hierarchies that typified racial relations in Brazil.

During the Paraguayan War, the military hierarchy worked hard to maintain the rigid social patterns that excluded a good deal of the population from political life. Segregation affected even the rewards of soldiers, who received different medals depending on rank. After the war, officers struggled against the political civilian elite, fighting to be recognized as important actors in the national politics. Thus the struggle over the nature of political-military citizenship in Brazil was far from being a popular revolution. The officers who opposed the Monarchy aimed at a more influential role in the country, but their ideas concerning the role of the poor and the black were usually very much contradictory. In the long run, the army proved unable to fulfill any expectations that it might create a more democratic and egalitarian nation, tending rather to perpetuate social exclusion and political authoritarianism.

The military in Brazil, as well as in other Latin American countries, were not the redeemers they hoped they could be. Military intervention after the proclamation of the Brazilian Republic, in 1889, has demonstrated that a bureaucratic branch of the state, alone, lacks the legitimacy necessary to create a better order.[14] Those expectations, then as today, rest on the creation of a

[14] On the corruption of Brazilian military, see Shawn C. Smalmman, "Shady Business: Corruption in the Brazilian Army Before 1954," Latin American Research Review, Volume 32, Number 3, 1997, pp. 39-62.

strong democratic political system, where all representative political forces play a role in the social and political reforms needed to combat the hierarchies responsible for social and political exclusion. Slavery disappeared, but some of its social legacies resist in Brazil, as well as in the United States. Indeed, the battle against social exclusion is also a battle against the heritage of slavery. We live in hope.

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Arquivo Histórico do Museu Imperial	AHMI
Arquivo Histórico do Rio Grande do Sul	AHRS
Arquivo Nacional	ANRJ
Arquivo Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro	APRJ
Arquivo Público do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul	APRS
Congressional Globe	C.G.
Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro	IHGB
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